user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v4.19.32

libceph: wait for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add()

2019-03-27T05:14:39Z

commit bb229bbb3bf63d23128e851a1f3b85c083178fa1 upstream. Because map updates are distributed lazily, an OSD may not know about the new blacklist for quite some time after "osd blacklist add" command is completed. This makes it possible for a blacklisted but still alive client to overwrite a post-blacklist update, resulting in data corruption. Waiting for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add() and thus using the post-blacklist epoch for all post-blacklist requests ensures that all such requests "wait" for the blacklist to come into force on their respective OSDs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6305a3b41515 ("libceph: support for blacklisting clients") Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KVM: Call kvm_arch_memslots_updated() before updating memslots

2019-03-23T19:10:13Z

commit 152482580a1b0accb60676063a1ac57b2d12daf6 upstream. kvm_arch_memslots_updated() is at this point in time an x86-specific hook for handling MMIO generation wraparound. x86 stashes 19 bits of the memslots generation number in its MMIO sptes in order to avoid full page fault walks for repeat faults on emulated MMIO addresses. Because only 19 bits are used, wrapping the MMIO generation number is possible, if unlikely. kvm_arch_memslots_updated() alerts x86 that the generation has changed so that it can invalidate all MMIO sptes in case the effective MMIO generation has wrapped so as to avoid using a stale spte, e.g. a (very) old spte that was created with generation==0. Given that the purpose of kvm_arch_memslots_updated() is to prevent consuming stale entries, it needs to be called before the new generation is propagated to memslots. Invalidating the MMIO sptes after updating memslots means that there is a window where a vCPU could dereference the new memslots generation, e.g. 0, and incorrectly reuse an old MMIO spte that was created with (pre-wrap) generation==0. Fixes: e59dbe09f8e6 ("KVM: Introduce kvm_arch_memslots_updated()") Cc: Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/unwind/orc: Fix ORC unwind table alignment

2019-03-23T19:10:10Z

commit f76a16adc485699f95bb71fce114f97c832fe664 upstream. The .orc_unwind section is a packed array of 6-byte structs. It's currently aligned to 6 bytes, which is causing warnings in the LLD linker. Six isn't a power of two, so it's not a valid alignment value. The actual alignment doesn't matter much because it's an array of packed structs. An alignment of two is sufficient. In reality it always gets aligned to four bytes because it comes immediately after the 4-byte-aligned .orc_unwind_ip section. Fixes: ee9f8fce9964 ("x86/unwind: Add the ORC unwinder") Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers Reported-by: Dmitry Golovin Reported-by: Sedat Dilek Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Sedat Dilek Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/218 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d55027ee95fe73e952dcd8be90aebd31b0095c45.1551892041.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dm: fix to_sector() for 32bit

2019-03-23T19:10:09Z

commit 0bdb50c531f7377a9da80d3ce2d61f389c84cb30 upstream. A dm-raid array with devices larger than 4GB won't assemble on a 32 bit host since _check_data_dev_sectors() was added in 4.16. This is because to_sector() treats its argument as an "unsigned long" which is 32bits (4GB) on a 32bit host. Using "unsigned long long" is more correct. Kernels as early as 4.2 can have other problems due to to_sector() being used on the size of a device. Fixes: 0cf4503174c1 ("dm raid: add support for the MD RAID0 personality") cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v4.2+) Reported-and-tested-by: Guillaume Perréal Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

arm64: Fix HCR.TGE status for NMI contexts

2019-03-23T19:10:08Z

commit 5870970b9a828d8693aa6d15742573289d7dbcd0 upstream. When using VHE, the host needs to clear HCR_EL2.TGE bit in order to interact with guest TLBs, switching from EL2&0 translation regime to EL1&0. However, some non-maskable asynchronous event could happen while TGE is cleared like SDEI. Because of this address translation operations relying on EL2&0 translation regime could fail (tlb invalidation, userspace access, ...). Fix this by properly setting HCR_EL2.TGE when entering NMI context and clear it if necessary when returning to the interrupted context. Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier Reviewed-by: James Morse Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Marc Zyngier Cc: James Morse Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: only test gso type on gso packets

2019-03-23T19:10:06Z

[ Upstream commit 4c3024debf62de4c6ac6d3cb4c0063be21d4f652 ] BPF can adjust gso only for tcp bytestreams. Fail on other gso types. But only on gso packets. It does not touch this field if !gso_size. Fixes: b90efd225874 ("bpf: only adjust gso_size on bytestream protocols") Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Acked-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

device property: Fix the length used in PROPERTY_ENTRY_STRING()

2019-03-23T19:10:04Z

commit 2b6e492467c78183bb629bb0a100ea3509b615a5 upstream. With string type property entries we need to use sizeof(const char *) instead of the number of characters as the length of the entry. If the string was shorter then sizeof(const char *), attempts to read it would have failed with -EOVERFLOW. The problem has been hidden because all build-in string properties have had a string longer then 8 characters until now. Fixes: a85f42047533 ("device property: helper macros for property entry creation") Cc: 4.5+ # 4.5+ Signed-off-by: Heikki Krogerus Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

splice: don't merge into linked buffers

2019-03-23T19:09:59Z

commit a0ce2f0aa6ad97c3d4927bf2ca54bcebdf062d55 upstream. Before this patch, it was possible for two pipes to affect each other after data had been transferred between them with tee(): ============ $ cat tee_test.c int main(void) { int pipe_a[2]; if (pipe(pipe_a)) err(1, "pipe"); int pipe_b[2]; if (pipe(pipe_b)) err(1, "pipe"); if (write(pipe_a[1], "abcd", 4) != 4) err(1, "write"); if (tee(pipe_a[0], pipe_b[1], 2, 0) != 2) err(1, "tee"); if (write(pipe_b[1], "xx", 2) != 2) err(1, "write"); char buf[5]; if (read(pipe_a[0], buf, 4) != 4) err(1, "read"); buf[4] = 0; printf("got back: '%s'\n", buf); } $ gcc -o tee_test tee_test.c $ ./tee_test got back: 'abxx' $ ============ As suggested by Al Viro, fix it by creating a separate type for non-mergeable pipe buffers, then changing the types of buffers in splice_pipe_to_pipe() and link_pipe(). Cc: Fixes: 7c77f0b3f920 ("splice: implement pipe to pipe splicing") Fixes: 70524490ee2e ("[PATCH] splice: add support for sys_tee()") Suggested-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

phonet: fix building with clang

2019-03-23T19:09:51Z

[ Upstream commit 6321aa197547da397753757bd84c6ce64b3e3d89 ] clang warns about overflowing the data[] member in the struct pnpipehdr: net/phonet/pep.c:295:8: warning: array index 4 is past the end of the array (which contains 1 element) [-Warray-bounds] if (hdr->data[4] == PEP_IND_READY) ^ ~ include/net/phonet/pep.h:66:3: note: array 'data' declared here u8 data[1]; Using a flexible array member at the end of the struct avoids the warning, but since we cannot have a flexible array member inside of the union, each index now has to be moved back by one, which makes it a little uglier. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key

2019-03-23T19:09:48Z

[ Upstream commit 822ad64d7e46a8e2c8b8a796738d7b657cbb146d ] In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned. Fix this by the following changes: (1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead. (2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the payload available outside of security/keys/. (3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons record and operation name. Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked. Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key") Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin