<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/include, branch v5.15.3</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.15.3</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.15.3'/>
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<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:21Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>arch/cc: Introduce a function to check for confidential computing features</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T22:58:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d1568346180023918716cc23cc58ba0ab7ca80cf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d1568346180023918716cc23cc58ba0ab7ca80cf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 46b49b12f3fc5e1347dba37d4639e2165f447871 upstream.

In preparation for other confidential computing technologies, introduce
a generic helper function, cc_platform_has(), that can be used to
check for specific active confidential computing attributes, like
memory encryption. This is intended to eliminate having to add multiple
technology-specific checks to the code (e.g. if (sev_active() ||
tdx_active() || ... ).

 [ bp: s/_CC_PLATFORM_H/_LINUX_CC_PLATFORM_H/g ]

Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-3-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: Add PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PAYLOAD_* macros</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pali Rohár</name>
<email>pali@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-05T18:09:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0b86872ba468e6ddfe001abe70ff88000262451f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0b86872ba468e6ddfe001abe70ff88000262451f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 460275f124fb072dca218a6b43b6370eebbab20d upstream.

Define a macro PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PAYLOAD_* for every possible Max Payload
Size in linux/pci_regs.h, in the same style as PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ_*.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211005180952.6812-2-kabel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár &lt;pali@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún &lt;kabel@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi &lt;lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marek Behún &lt;kabel@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net, neigh: Enable state migration between NUD_PERMANENT and NTF_USE</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-11T12:12:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1f03911876ab9c0bc6f149d4b4d6ea2ac43bc194'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1f03911876ab9c0bc6f149d4b4d6ea2ac43bc194</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3dc20f4762c62d3b3f0940644881ed818aa7b2f5 ]

Currently, it is not possible to migrate a neighbor entry between NUD_PERMANENT
state and NTF_USE flag with a dynamic NUD state from a user space control plane.
Similarly, it is not possible to add/remove NTF_EXT_LEARNED flag from an existing
neighbor entry in combination with NTF_USE flag.

This is due to the latter directly calling into neigh_event_send() without any
meta data updates as happening in __neigh_update(). Thus, to enable this use
case, extend the latter with a NEIGH_UPDATE_F_USE flag where we break the
NUD_PERMANENT state in particular so that a latter neigh_event_send() is able
to re-resolve a neighbor entry.

Before fix, NUD_PERMANENT -&gt; NUD_* &amp; NTF_USE:

  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT
  [...]
  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT
  [...]

As can be seen, despite the admin-triggered replace, the entry remains in the
NUD_PERMANENT state.

After fix, NUD_PERMANENT -&gt; NUD_* &amp; NTF_USE:

  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT
  [...]
  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn REACHABLE
  [...]
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn STALE
  [...]
  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT
  [...]

After the fix, the admin-triggered replace switches to a dynamic state from
the NTF_USE flag which triggered a new neighbor resolution. Likewise, we can
transition back from there, if needed, into NUD_PERMANENT.

Similar before/after behavior can be observed for below transitions:

Before fix, NTF_USE -&gt; NTF_USE | NTF_EXT_LEARNED -&gt; NTF_USE:

  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE
  [...]
  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE
  [...]

After fix, NTF_USE -&gt; NTF_USE | NTF_EXT_LEARNED -&gt; NTF_USE:

  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE
  [...]
  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn REACHABLE
  [...]
  # ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use
  # ./ip/ip n
  192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE
  [..]

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu &lt;roopa@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>posix-cpu-timers: Clear task::posix_cputimers_work in copy_process()</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Pratt</name>
<email>mpratt@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-01T21:06:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d5d21724af2304361cdc7d3f4c8bb917a1d3334e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d5d21724af2304361cdc7d3f4c8bb917a1d3334e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ca7752caeaa70bd31d1714af566c9809688544af upstream.

copy_process currently copies task_struct.posix_cputimers_work as-is. If a
timer interrupt arrives while handling clone and before dup_task_struct
completes then the child task will have:

1. posix_cputimers_work.scheduled = true
2. posix_cputimers_work.work queued.

copy_process clears task_struct.task_works, so (2) will have no effect and
posix_cpu_timers_work will never run (not to mention it doesn't make sense
for two tasks to share a common linked list).

Since posix_cpu_timers_work never runs, posix_cputimers_work.scheduled is
never cleared. Since scheduled is set, future timer interrupts will skip
scheduling work, with the ultimate result that the task will never receive
timer expirations.

Together, the complete flow is:

1. Task 1 calls clone(), enters kernel.
2. Timer interrupt fires, schedules task work on Task 1.
   2a. task_struct.posix_cputimers_work.scheduled = true
   2b. task_struct.posix_cputimers_work.work added to
       task_struct.task_works.
3. dup_task_struct() copies Task 1 to Task 2.
4. copy_process() clears task_struct.task_works for Task 2.
5. Future timer interrupts on Task 2 see
   task_struct.posix_cputimers_work.scheduled = true and skip scheduling
   work.

Fix this by explicitly clearing contents of task_struct.posix_cputimers_work
in copy_process(). This was never meant to be shared or inherited across
tasks in the first place.

Fixes: 1fb497dd0030 ("posix-cpu-timers: Provide mechanisms to defer timer handling to task_work")
Reported-by: Rhys Hiltner &lt;rhys@justin.tv&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Pratt &lt;mpratt@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211101210615.716522-1-mpratt@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI/MSI: Move non-mask check back into low level accessors</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-03T23:27:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ab40a2e5e29e684794ffba0609b0c378500f02e0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab40a2e5e29e684794ffba0609b0c378500f02e0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9c8e9c9681a0f3f1ae90a90230d059c7a1dece5a upstream.

The recent rework of PCI/MSI[X] masking moved the non-mask checks from the
low level accessors into the higher level mask/unmask functions.

This missed the fact that these accessors can be invoked from other places
as well. The missing checks break XEN-PV which sets pci_msi_ignore_mask and
also violates the virtual MSIX and the msi_attrib.maskbit protections.

Instead of sprinkling checks all over the place, lift them back into the
low level accessor functions. To avoid checking three different conditions
combine them into one property of msi_desc::msi_attrib.

[ josef: Fixed the missed conversion in the core code ]

Fixes: fcacdfbef5a1 ("PCI/MSI: Provide a new set of mask and unmask functions")
Reported-by: Josef Johansson &lt;josef@oderland.se&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Josef Johansson &lt;josef@oderland.se&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;helgaas@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seq_file: fix passing wrong private data</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Muchun Song</name>
<email>songmuchun@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-09T02:35:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f00e054b299cbd44a266bbe32f42ffe9aff8a684'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f00e054b299cbd44a266bbe32f42ffe9aff8a684</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 10a6de19cad6efb9b49883513afb810dc265fca2 ]

DEFINE_PROC_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE() is supposed to be used to define a series
of functions and variables to register proc file easily. And the users
can use proc_create_data() to pass their own private data and get it
via seq-&gt;private in the callback. Unfortunately, the proc file system
use PDE_DATA() to get private data instead of inode-&gt;i_private. So fix
it. Fortunately, there only one user of it which does not pass any
private data, so this bug does not break any in-tree codes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211029032638.84884-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: 97a32539b956 ("proc: convert everything to "struct proc_ops"")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song &lt;songmuchun@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Florent Revest &lt;revest@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, sockmap: sk_skb data_end access incorrect when src_reg = dst_reg</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jussi Maki</name>
<email>joamaki@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-03T20:47:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0bff34d6712a6cedee6a4360268768836a1e4738'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0bff34d6712a6cedee6a4360268768836a1e4738</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b2c4618162ec615a15883a804cce7e27afecfa58 ]

The current conversion of skb-&gt;data_end reads like this:

  ; data_end = (void*)(long)skb-&gt;data_end;
   559: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r2 +200)   ; r1  = skb-&gt;data
   560: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r2 +112)  ; r11 = skb-&gt;len
   561: (0f) r1 += r11
   562: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r2 +116)
   563: (1f) r1 -= r11

But similar to the case in 84f44df664e9 ("bpf: sock_ops sk access may stomp
registers when dst_reg = src_reg"), the code will read an incorrect skb-&gt;len
when src == dst. In this case we end up generating this xlated code:

  ; data_end = (void*)(long)skb-&gt;data_end;
   559: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +200)   ; r1  = skb-&gt;data
   560: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r1 +112)  ; r11 = (skb-&gt;data)-&gt;len
   561: (0f) r1 += r11
   562: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r1 +116)
   563: (1f) r1 -= r11

... where line 560 is the reading 4B of (skb-&gt;data + 112) instead of the
intended skb-&gt;len Here the skb pointer in r1 gets set to skb-&gt;data and the
later deref for skb-&gt;len ends up following skb-&gt;data instead of skb.

This fixes the issue similarly to the patch mentioned above by creating an
additional temporary variable and using to store the register when dst_reg =
src_reg. We name the variable bpf_temp_reg and place it in the cb context for
sk_skb. Then we restore from the temp to ensure nothing is lost.

Fixes: 16137b09a66f2 ("bpf: Compute data_end dynamically with JIT code")
Signed-off-by: Jussi Maki &lt;joamaki@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211103204736.248403-6-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: sockmap, strparser, and tls are reusing qdisc_skb_cb and colliding</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Fastabend</name>
<email>john.fastabend@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-03T20:47:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1a8dba02a8883b65944949a865d9040cbe3eed8e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a8dba02a8883b65944949a865d9040cbe3eed8e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e0dc3b93bd7bcff8c3813d1df43e0908499c7cf0 ]

Strparser is reusing the qdisc_skb_cb struct to stash the skb message handling
progress, e.g. offset and length of the skb. First this is poorly named and
inherits a struct from qdisc that doesn't reflect the actual usage of cb[] at
this layer.

But, more importantly strparser is using the following to access its metadata.

  (struct _strp_msg *)((void *)skb-&gt;cb + offsetof(struct qdisc_skb_cb, data))

Where _strp_msg is defined as:

  struct _strp_msg {
        struct strp_msg            strp;                 /*     0     8 */
        int                        accum_len;            /*     8     4 */

        /* size: 12, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */
        /* last cacheline: 12 bytes */
  };

So we use 12 bytes of -&gt;data[] in struct. However in BPF code running parser
and verdict the user has read capabilities into the data[] array as well. Its
not too problematic, but we should not be exposing internal state to BPF
program. If its really needed then we can use the probe_read() APIs which allow
reading kernel memory. And I don't believe cb[] layer poses any API breakage by
moving this around because programs can't depend on cb[] across layers.

In order to fix another issue with a ctx rewrite we need to stash a temp
variable somewhere. To make this work cleanly this patch builds a cb struct
for sk_skb types called sk_skb_cb struct. Then we can use this consistently
in the strparser, sockmap space. Additionally we can start allowing -&gt;cb[]
write access after this.

Fixes: 604326b41a6fb ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: Jussi Maki &lt;joamaki@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211103204736.248403-5-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>llc: fix out-of-bound array index in llc_sk_dev_hash()</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-05T21:42:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=72fb40d87c59229e465fdf0c3d63481e1f6189d8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:72fb40d87c59229e465fdf0c3d63481e1f6189d8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8ac9dfd58b138f7e82098a4e0a0d46858b12215b ]

Both ifindex and LLC_SK_DEV_HASH_ENTRIES are signed.

This means that (ifindex % LLC_SK_DEV_HASH_ENTRIES) is negative
if @ifindex is negative.

We could simply make LLC_SK_DEV_HASH_ENTRIES unsigned.

In this patch I chose to use hash_32() to get more entropy
from @ifindex, like llc_sk_laddr_hashfn().

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ./include/net/llc.h:75:26
index -43 is out of range for type 'hlist_head [64]'
CPU: 1 PID: 20999 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.15.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:151
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x62/0x6c lib/ubsan.c:291
 llc_sk_dev_hash include/net/llc.h:75 [inline]
 llc_sap_add_socket+0x49c/0x520 net/llc/llc_conn.c:697
 llc_ui_bind+0x680/0xd70 net/llc/af_llc.c:404
 __sys_bind+0x1e9/0x250 net/socket.c:1693
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1704 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1702 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1702
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fa503407ae9

Fixes: 6d2e3ea28446 ("llc: use a device based hash table to speed up multicast delivery")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drm/ttm: remove ttm_bo_vm_insert_huge()</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T18:17:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgg@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-19T23:27:31Z</published>
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[ Upstream commit 0d979509539ed1df883a30d442177ca7be609565 ]

The huge page functionality in TTM does not work safely because PUD and
PMD entries do not have a special bit.

get_user_pages_fast() considers any page that passed pmd_huge() as
usable:

	if (unlikely(pmd_trans_huge(pmd) || pmd_huge(pmd) ||
		     pmd_devmap(pmd))) {

And vmf_insert_pfn_pmd_prot() unconditionally sets

	entry = pmd_mkhuge(pfn_t_pmd(pfn, prot));

eg on x86 the page will be _PAGE_PRESENT | PAGE_PSE.

As such gup_huge_pmd() will try to deref a struct page:

	head = try_grab_compound_head(pmd_page(orig), refs, flags);

and thus crash.

Thomas further notices that the drivers are not expecting the struct page
to be used by anything - in particular the refcount incr above will cause
them to malfunction.

Thus everything about this is not able to fully work correctly considering
GUP_fast. Delete it entirely. It can return someday along with a proper
PMD/PUD_SPECIAL bit in the page table itself to gate GUP_fast.

Fixes: 314b6580adc5 ("drm/ttm, drm/vmwgfx: Support huge TTM pagefaults")
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström &lt;thomas.helllstrom@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian König &lt;christian.koenig@amd.com&gt;
[danvet: Update subject per Thomas' &amp;Christian's review]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/0-v2-a44694790652+4ac-ttm_pmd_jgg@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
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