<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/init, branch v5.10.152</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.152</id>
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<updated>2022-06-09T08:21:25Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Kconfig: Add option for asm goto w/ tied outputs to workaround clang-13 bug</title>
<updated>2022-06-09T08:21:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-02T00:49:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=09408080adb1c704c66685f3ec4391a4b9490c41'/>
<id>urn:sha1:09408080adb1c704c66685f3ec4391a4b9490c41</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1aa0e8b144b6474c4914439d232d15bfe883636b upstream.

Add a config option to guard (future) usage of asm_volatile_goto() that
includes "tied outputs", i.e. "+" constraints that specify both an input
and output parameter.  clang-13 has a bug[1] that causes compilation of
such inline asm to fail, and KVM wants to use a "+m" constraint to
implement a uaccess form of CMPXCHG[2].  E.g. the test code fails with

  &lt;stdin&gt;:1:29: error: invalid operand in inline asm: '.long (${1:l}) - .'
  int foo(int *x) { asm goto (".long (%l[bar]) - .\n": "+m"(*x) ::: bar); return *x; bar: return 0; }
                            ^
  &lt;stdin&gt;:1:29: error: unknown token in expression
  &lt;inline asm&gt;:1:9: note: instantiated into assembly here
          .long () - .
                 ^
  2 errors generated.

on clang-13, but passes on gcc (with appropriate asm goto support).  The
bug is fixed in clang-14, but won't be backported to clang-13 as the
changes are too invasive/risky.

gcc also had a similar bug[3], fixed in gcc-11, where gcc failed to
account for its behavior of assigning two numbers to tied outputs (one
for input, one for output) when evaluating symbolic references.

[1] https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1512
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/YfMruK8%2F1izZ2VHS@google.com
[3] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=98096

Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20220202004945.2540433-2-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init()</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:33:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-05T00:20:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5123cc61e27d6aaddf564fe9068e3bbdd193abff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5123cc61e27d6aaddf564fe9068e3bbdd193abff</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2f14062bb14b0fcfcc21e6dc7d5b5c0d25966164 upstream.

Currently, start_kernel() adds latent entropy and the command line to
the entropy bool *after* the RNG has been initialized, deferring when
it's actually used by things like stack canaries until the next time
the pool is seeded. This surely is not intended.

Rather than splitting up which entropy gets added where and when between
start_kernel() and random_init(), just do everything in random_init(),
which should eliminate these kinds of bugs in the future.

While we're at it, rename the awkwardly titled "rand_initialize()" to
the more standard "random_init()" nomenclature.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>init: call time_init() before rand_initialize()</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:33:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-05T00:20:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7d9eab78bed97625619c30b4dbc27a4702c589ad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7d9eab78bed97625619c30b4dbc27a4702c589ad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fe222a6ca2d53c38433cba5d3be62a39099e708e upstream.

Currently time_init() is called after rand_initialize(), but
rand_initialize() makes use of the timer on various platforms, and
sometimes this timer needs to be initialized by time_init() first. In
order for random_get_entropy() to not return zero during early boot when
it's potentially used as an entropy source, reverse the order of these
two calls. The block doing random initialization was right before
time_init() before, so changing the order shouldn't have any complicated
effects.

Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>init/main.c: return 1 from handled __setup() functions</title>
<updated>2022-04-13T19:01:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-23T23:06:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8d9efd4434e3479ea624b8e65e57e39a3ea91126</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f9a40b0890658330c83c95511f9d6b396610defc ]

initcall_blacklist() should return 1 to indicate that it handled its
cmdline arguments.

set_debug_rodata() should return 1 to indicate that it handled its
cmdline arguments.  Print a warning if the option string is invalid.

This prevents these strings from being added to the 'init' program's
environment as they are not init arguments/parameters.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220221050901.23985-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov &lt;i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Add kconfig knob for disabling unpriv bpf by default</title>
<updated>2022-01-05T11:40:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-11T20:35:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8c15bfb36a442d63aec74a3379cb7a197f3e5f99'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8c15bfb36a442d63aec74a3379cb7a197f3e5f99</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 08389d888287c3823f80b0216766b71e17f0aba5 upstream.

Add a kconfig knob which allows for unprivileged bpf to be disabled by default.
If set, the knob sets /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled to value of 2.

This still allows a transition of 2 -&gt; {0,1} through an admin. Similarly,
this also still keeps 1 -&gt; {1} behavior intact, so that once set to permanently
disabled, it cannot be undone aside from a reboot.

We've also added extra2 with max of 2 for the procfs handler, so that an admin
still has a chance to toggle between 0 &lt;-&gt; 2.

Either way, as an additional alternative, applications can make use of CAP_BPF
that we added a while ago.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/74ec548079189e4e4dffaeb42b8987bb3c852eee.1620765074.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Cc: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bootconfig: init: Fix memblock leak in xbc_make_cmdline()</title>
<updated>2021-11-21T12:46:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-16T06:23:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f27060e28efcbd939e4ae6cd2ecc2ba7d2f5d93d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f27060e28efcbd939e4ae6cd2ecc2ba7d2f5d93d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ae43851b18afe861120ebd7c426dc44f06bb2bd upstream.

Free unused memblock in a error case to fix memblock leak
in xbc_make_cmdline().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163177339181.682366.8713781325929549256.stgit@devnote2

Fixes: 51887d03aca1 ("bootconfig: init: Allow admin to use bootconfig for kernel command line")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:55:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Valentin Schneider</name>
<email>valentin.schneider@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-12T09:46:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3c51d82d0b7862d7d246016c74b4390fb1fa1f11'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3c51d82d0b7862d7d246016c74b4390fb1fa1f11</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f1a0a376ca0c4ef1fc3d24e3e502acbb5b795674 ]

As pointed out by commit

  de9b8f5dcbd9 ("sched: Fix crash trying to dequeue/enqueue the idle thread")

init_idle() can and will be invoked more than once on the same idle
task. At boot time, it is invoked for the boot CPU thread by
sched_init(). Then smp_init() creates the threads for all the secondary
CPUs and invokes init_idle() on them.

As the hotplug machinery brings the secondaries to life, it will issue
calls to idle_thread_get(), which itself invokes init_idle() yet again.
In this case it's invoked twice more per secondary: at _cpu_up(), and at
bringup_cpu().

Given smp_init() already initializes the idle tasks for all *possible*
CPUs, no further initialization should be required. Now, removing
init_idle() from idle_thread_get() exposes some interesting expectations
with regards to the idle task's preempt_count: the secondary startup always
issues a preempt_disable(), requiring some reset of the preempt count to 0
between hot-unplug and hotplug, which is currently served by
idle_thread_get() -&gt; idle_init().

Given the idle task is supposed to have preemption disabled once and never
see it re-enabled, it seems that what we actually want is to initialize its
preempt_count to PREEMPT_DISABLED and leave it there. Do that, and remove
init_idle() from idle_thread_get().

Secondary startups were patched via coccinelle:

  @begone@
  @@

  -preempt_disable();
  ...
  cpu_startup_entry(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE);

Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider &lt;valentin.schneider@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512094636.2958515-1-valentin.schneider@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid`</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T11:39:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-05T03:01:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7178be006d495ffb741c329012da289b62dddfe6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7178be006d495ffb741c329012da289b62dddfe6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0711f0d7050b9e07c44bc159bbc64ac0a1022c7f upstream.

During boot, kernel_init_freeable() initializes `cad_pid` to the init
task's struct pid.  Later on, we may change `cad_pid` via a sysctl, and
when this happens proc_do_cad_pid() will increment the refcount on the
new pid via get_pid(), and will decrement the refcount on the old pid
via put_pid().  As we never called get_pid() when we initialized
`cad_pid`, we decrement a reference we never incremented, can therefore
free the init task's struct pid early.  As there can be dangling
references to the struct pid, we can later encounter a use-after-free
(e.g.  when delivering signals).

This was spotted when fuzzing v5.13-rc3 with Syzkaller, but seems to
have been around since the conversion of `cad_pid` to struct pid in
commit 9ec52099e4b8 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid") from the
pre-KASAN stone age of v2.6.19.

Fix this by getting a reference to the init task's struct pid when we
assign it to `cad_pid`.

Full KASAN splat below.

   ==================================================================
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
   BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
   Read of size 4 at addr ffff23794dda0004 by task syz-executor.0/273

   CPU: 1 PID: 273 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.12.0-00001-g9aef892b2d15 #1
   Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
   Call trace:
    ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
    task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
    do_notify_parent+0x308/0xe60 kernel/signal.c:1950
    exit_notify kernel/exit.c:682 [inline]
    do_exit+0x2334/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:845
    do_group_exit+0x108/0x2c8 kernel/exit.c:922
    get_signal+0x4e4/0x2a88 kernel/signal.c:2781
    do_signal arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:882 [inline]
    do_notify_resume+0x300/0x970 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:936
    work_pending+0xc/0x2dc

   Allocated by task 0:
    slab_post_alloc_hook+0x50/0x5c0 mm/slab.h:516
    slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2907 [inline]
    slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2915 [inline]
    kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f4/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:2920
    alloc_pid+0xdc/0xc00 kernel/pid.c:180
    copy_process+0x2794/0x5e18 kernel/fork.c:2129
    kernel_clone+0x194/0x13c8 kernel/fork.c:2500
    kernel_thread+0xd4/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2552
    rest_init+0x44/0x4a0 init/main.c:687
    arch_call_rest_init+0x1c/0x28
    start_kernel+0x520/0x554 init/main.c:1064
    0x0

   Freed by task 270:
    slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1562 [inline]
    slab_free_freelist_hook+0x98/0x260 mm/slub.c:1600
    slab_free mm/slub.c:3161 [inline]
    kmem_cache_free+0x224/0x8e0 mm/slub.c:3177
    put_pid.part.4+0xe0/0x1a8 kernel/pid.c:114
    put_pid+0x30/0x48 kernel/pid.c:109
    proc_do_cad_pid+0x190/0x1b0 kernel/sysctl.c:1401
    proc_sys_call_handler+0x338/0x4b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:591
    proc_sys_write+0x34/0x48 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:617
    call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1977 [inline]
    new_sync_write+0x3ac/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518
    vfs_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline]
    vfs_write+0x9c4/0x1018 fs/read_write.c:585
    ksys_write+0x124/0x240 fs/read_write.c:658
    __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:670 [inline]
    __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:667 [inline]
    __arm64_sys_write+0x78/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:667
    __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
    invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 [inline]
    el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x16c/0x388 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
    do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:168
    el0_svc+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:416
    el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:432
    el0_sync+0x154/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:701

   The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff23794dda0000
    which belongs to the cache pid of size 224
   The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
    224-byte region [ffff23794dda0000, ffff23794dda00e0)
   The buggy address belongs to the page:
   page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x4dda0
   head:(____ptrval____) order:1 compound_mapcount:0
   flags: 0x3fffc0000010200(slab|head)
   raw: 03fffc0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff23794d40d080
   raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
   page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

   Memory state around the buggy address:
    ffff23794dd9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dd9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   &gt;ffff23794dda0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                      ^
    ffff23794dda0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
    ffff23794dda0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ==================================================================

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210524172230.38715-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Fixes: 9ec52099e4b8678a ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Cedric Le Goater &lt;clg@fr.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian@brauner.io&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: Fix CONFIG tests for Seccomp_filters</title>
<updated>2021-05-14T07:50:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kenta.Tada@sony.com</name>
<email>Kenta.Tada@sony.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-21T15:52:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7456cc7c9fd5e551f462287b0d105e8cd1ffc9ec'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7456cc7c9fd5e551f462287b0d105e8cd1ffc9ec</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 64bdc0244054f7d4bb621c8b4455e292f4e421bc ]

Strictly speaking, seccomp filters are only used
when CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER.
This patch fixes the condition to enable "Seccomp_filters"
in /proc/$pid/status.

Signed-off-by: Kenta Tada &lt;Kenta.Tada@sony.com&gt;
Fixes: c818c03b661c ("seccomp: Report number of loaded filters in /proc/$pid/status")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/OSBPR01MB26772D245E2CF4F26B76A989F5669@OSBPR01MB2677.jpnprd01.prod.outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>init/Kconfig: make COMPILE_TEST depend on HAS_IOMEM</title>
<updated>2021-04-10T11:36:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-13T05:07:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=cef13a04376b44b71196f74b29941678c18bc7ec'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cef13a04376b44b71196f74b29941678c18bc7ec</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ea29b20a828511de3348334e529a3d046a180416 upstream.

I read the commit log of the following two:

- bc083a64b6c0 ("init/Kconfig: make COMPILE_TEST depend on !UML")
- 334ef6ed06fa ("init/Kconfig: make COMPILE_TEST depend on !S390")

Both are talking about HAS_IOMEM dependency missing in many drivers.

So, 'depends on HAS_IOMEM' seems the direct, sensible solution to me.

This does not change the behavior of UML. UML still cannot enable
COMPILE_TEST because it does not provide HAS_IOMEM.

The current dependency for S390 is too strong. Under the condition of
CONFIG_PCI=y, S390 provides HAS_IOMEM, hence can enable COMPILE_TEST.

I also removed the meaningless 'default n'.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210224140809.1067582-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nick Terrell &lt;terrelln@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Quentin Perret &lt;qperret@google.com&gt;
Cc: Valentin Schneider &lt;valentin.schneider@arm.com&gt;
Cc: "Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult" &lt;lkml@metux.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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