<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/ipc, branch v4.4.203</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.203</id>
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<updated>2019-08-06T16:28:28Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ipc/mqueue.c: only perform resource calculation if user valid</title>
<updated>2019-08-06T16:28:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-16T23:30:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=793cbeb94830a660c9f7e29855b24d13d2122368'/>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a318f12ed8843cfac53198390c74a565c632f417 ]

Andreas Christoforou reported:

  UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ipc/mqueue.c:414:49 signed integer overflow:
  9 * 2305843009213693951 cannot be represented in type 'long int'
  ...
  Call Trace:
    mqueue_evict_inode+0x8e7/0xa10 ipc/mqueue.c:414
    evict+0x472/0x8c0 fs/inode.c:558
    iput_final fs/inode.c:1547 [inline]
    iput+0x51d/0x8c0 fs/inode.c:1573
    mqueue_get_inode+0x8eb/0x1070 ipc/mqueue.c:320
    mqueue_create_attr+0x198/0x440 ipc/mqueue.c:459
    vfs_mkobj+0x39e/0x580 fs/namei.c:2892
    prepare_open ipc/mqueue.c:731 [inline]
    do_mq_open+0x6da/0x8e0 ipc/mqueue.c:771

Which could be triggered by:

        struct mq_attr attr = {
                .mq_flags = 0,
                .mq_maxmsg = 9,
                .mq_msgsize = 0x1fffffffffffffff,
                .mq_curmsgs = 0,
        };

        if (mq_open("/testing", 0x40, 3, &amp;attr) == (mqd_t) -1)
                perror("mq_open");

mqueue_get_inode() was correctly rejecting the giant mq_msgsize, and
preparing to return -EINVAL.  During the cleanup, it calls
mqueue_evict_inode() which performed resource usage tracking math for
updating "user", before checking if there was a valid "user" at all
(which would indicate that the calculations would be sane).  Instead,
delay this check to after seeing a valid "user".

The overflow was real, but the results went unused, so while the flaw is
harmless, it's noisy for kernel fuzzers, so just fix it by moving the
calculation under the non-NULL "user" where it actually gets used.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201906072207.ECB65450@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reported-by: Andreas Christoforou &lt;andreaschristofo@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: prevent lockup on alloc_msg and free_msg</title>
<updated>2019-06-22T06:18:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Rongqing</name>
<email>lirongqing@baidu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T22:46:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d8129a5d7a9dc8c2e41a7b385feb8b43731b8cba'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d8129a5d7a9dc8c2e41a7b385feb8b43731b8cba</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d6a2946a88f524a47cc9b79279667137899db807 ]

msgctl10 of ltp triggers the following lockup When CONFIG_KASAN is
enabled on large memory SMP systems, the pages initialization can take a
long time, if msgctl10 requests a huge block memory, and it will block
rcu scheduler, so release cpu actively.

After adding schedule() in free_msg, free_msg can not be called when
holding spinlock, so adding msg to a tmp list, and free it out of
spinlock

  rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu:     Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 16-31): P32505
  rcu:     Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 48-63): P34978
  rcu:     (detected by 11, t=35024 jiffies, g=44237529, q=16542267)
  msgctl10        R  running task    21608 32505   2794 0x00000082
  Call Trace:
   preempt_schedule_irq+0x4c/0xb0
   retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d
  RIP: 0010:__is_insn_slot_addr+0xfb/0x250
  Code: 82 1d 00 48 8b 9b 90 00 00 00 4c 89 f7 49 c1 ee 03 e8 59 83 1d 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 39 eb 48 89 9d 58 ff ff ff &lt;41&gt; c6 04 06 f8 74 66 4c 8d 75 98 4c 89 f1 48 c1 e9 03 48 01 c8 48
  RSP: 0018:ffff88bce041f758 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff8471bc50 RCX: ffffffff828a2a57
  RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88bce041f780
  RBP: ffff88bce041f828 R08: ffffed15f3f4c5b3 R09: ffffed15f3f4c5b3
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15f3f4c5b2 R12: 000000318aee9b73
  R13: ffffffff8471bc50 R14: 1ffff1179c083ef0 R15: 1ffff1179c083eec
   kernel_text_address+0xc1/0x100
   __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
   unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50
   __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
   create_object+0x380/0x650
   __kmalloc+0x14c/0x2b0
   load_msg+0x38/0x1a0
   do_msgsnd+0x19e/0xcf0
   do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

  rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu:     Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 0-15): P32170
  rcu:     (detected by 14, t=35016 jiffies, g=44237525, q=12423063)
  msgctl10        R  running task    21608 32170  32155 0x00000082
  Call Trace:
   preempt_schedule_irq+0x4c/0xb0
   retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d
  RIP: 0010:lock_acquire+0x4d/0x340
  Code: 48 81 ec c0 00 00 00 45 89 c6 4d 89 cf 48 8d 6c 24 20 48 89 3c 24 48 8d bb e4 0c 00 00 89 74 24 0c 48 c7 44 24 20 b3 8a b5 41 &lt;48&gt; c1 ed 03 48 c7 44 24 28 b4 25 18 84 48 c7 44 24 30 d0 54 7a 82
  RSP: 0018:ffff88af83417738 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88bd335f3080 RCX: 0000000000000002
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88bd335f3d64
  RBP: ffff88af83417758 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed13f3f745b2 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
   is_bpf_text_address+0x32/0xe0
   kernel_text_address+0xec/0x100
   __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
   unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50
   __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
   save_stack+0x32/0xb0
   __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180
   kfree+0xfa/0x2d0
   free_msg+0x24/0x50
   do_msgrcv+0x508/0xe60
   do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Davidlohr said:
 "So after releasing the lock, the msg rbtree/list is empty and new
  calls will not see those in the newly populated tmp_msg list, and
  therefore they cannot access the delayed msg freeing pointers, which
  is good. Also the fact that the node_cache is now freed before the
  actual messages seems to be harmless as this is wanted for
  msg_insert() avoiding GFP_ATOMIC allocations, and after releasing the
  info-&gt;lock the thing is freed anyway so it should not change things"

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1552029161-4957-1-git-send-email-lirongqing@baidu.com
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing &lt;lirongqing@baidu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yu &lt;zhangyu31@baidu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc/shm: fix shmat() nil address after round-down when remapping</title>
<updated>2018-05-30T05:48:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Davidlohr Bueso</name>
<email>dave@stgolabs.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-25T21:47:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a4e37ca958f179c24e814f3febfadcc2b3be105d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4e37ca958f179c24e814f3febfadcc2b3be105d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8f89c007b6dec16a1793cb88de88fcc02117bbbc upstream.

shmat()'s SHM_REMAP option forbids passing a nil address for; this is in
fact the very first thing we check for.  Andrea reported that for
SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP cases we can end up bypassing the initial addr check,
but we need to check again if the address was rounded down to nil.  As
of this patch, such cases will return -EINVAL.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503204934.kk63josdu6u53fbd@linux-n805
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection"</title>
<updated>2018-05-30T05:48:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Davidlohr Bueso</name>
<email>dave@stgolabs.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-25T21:47:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bd4792b31a8ebdfbb3a5af03a903ee8da1e78656'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd4792b31a8ebdfbb3a5af03a903ee8da1e78656</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a73ab244f0dad8fffb3291b905f73e2d3eaa7c00 upstream.

Patch series "ipc/shm: shmat() fixes around nil-page".

These patches fix two issues reported[1] a while back by Joe and Andrea
around how shmat(2) behaves with nil-page.

The first reverts a commit that it was incorrectly thought that mapping
nil-page (address=0) was a no no with MAP_FIXED.  This is not the case,
with the exception of SHM_REMAP; which is address in the second patch.

I chose two patches because it is easier to backport and it explicitly
reverts bogus behaviour.  Both patches ought to be in -stable and ltp
testcases need updated (the added testcase around the cve can be
modified to just test for SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP).

[1] lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430172152.nfa564pvgpk3ut7p@linux-n805

This patch (of 2):

Commit 95e91b831f87 ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection")
worked on the idea that we should not be mapping as root addr=0 and
MAP_FIXED.  However, it was reported that this scenario is in fact
valid, thus making the patch both bogus and breaks userspace as well.

For example X11's libint10.so relies on shmat(1, SHM_RND) for lowmem
initialization[1].

[1] https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/tree/hw/xfree86/os-support/linux/int10/linux.c#n347
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503203243.15045-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Fixes: 95e91b831f87 ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection")
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc/shm: fix use-after-free of shm file via remap_file_pages()</title>
<updated>2018-04-24T07:32:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-13T22:35:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b7e06a79c2e3a7e16ad1ed4887cad9a103ca355d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b7e06a79c2e3a7e16ad1ed4887cad9a103ca355d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3f05317d9889ab75c7190dcd39491d2a97921984 upstream.

syzbot reported a use-after-free of shm_file_data(file)-&gt;file-&gt;f_op in
shm_get_unmapped_area(), called via sys_remap_file_pages().

Unfortunately it couldn't generate a reproducer, but I found a bug which
I think caused it.  When remap_file_pages() is passed a full System V
shared memory segment, the memory is first unmapped, then a new map is
created using the -&gt;vm_file.  Between these steps, the shm ID can be
removed and reused for a new shm segment.  But, shm_mmap() only checks
whether the ID is currently valid before calling the underlying file's
-&gt;mmap(); it doesn't check whether it was reused.  Thus it can use the
wrong underlying file, one that was already freed.

Fix this by making the "outer" shm file (the one that gets put in
-&gt;vm_file) hold a reference to the real shm file, and by making
__shm_open() require that the file associated with the shm ID matches
the one associated with the "outer" file.

Taking the reference to the real shm file is needed to fully solve the
problem, since otherwise sfd-&gt;file could point to a freed file, which
then could be reallocated for the reused shm ID, causing the wrong shm
segment to be mapped (and without the required permission checks).

Commit 1ac0b6dec656 ("ipc/shm: handle removed segments gracefully in
shm_mmap()") almost fixed this bug, but it didn't go far enough because
it didn't consider the case where the shm ID is reused.

The following program usually reproduces this bug:

	#include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/shm.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/syscall.h&gt;
	#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		int is_parent = (fork() != 0);
		srand(getpid());
		for (;;) {
			int id = shmget(0xF00F, 4096, IPC_CREAT|0700);
			if (is_parent) {
				void *addr = shmat(id, NULL, 0);
				usleep(rand() % 50);
				while (!syscall(__NR_remap_file_pages, addr, 4096, 0, 0, 0));
			} else {
				usleep(rand() % 50);
				shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL);
			}
		}
	}

It causes the following NULL pointer dereference due to a 'struct file'
being used while it's being freed.  (I couldn't actually get a KASAN
use-after-free splat like in the syzbot report.  But I think it's
possible with this bug; it would just take a more extraordinary race...)

	BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058
	PGD 0 P4D 0
	Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
	CPU: 9 PID: 258 Comm: syz_ipc Not tainted 4.16.0-05140-gf8cf2f16a7c95 #189
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
	RIP: 0010:d_inode include/linux/dcache.h:519 [inline]
	RIP: 0010:touch_atime+0x25/0xd0 fs/inode.c:1724
	[...]
	Call Trace:
	 file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2063 [inline]
	 shmem_mmap+0x25/0x40 mm/shmem.c:2149
	 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
	 shm_mmap+0x34/0x80 ipc/shm.c:465
	 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
	 mmap_region+0x309/0x5b0 mm/mmap.c:1712
	 do_mmap+0x294/0x4a0 mm/mmap.c:1483
	 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2235 [inline]
	 SYSC_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:2853 [inline]
	 SyS_remap_file_pages+0x232/0x310 mm/mmap.c:2769
	 do_syscall_64+0x64/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

[ebiggers@google.com: add comment]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180410192850.235835-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180409043039.28915-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d11f321e7f1923157eac80aa990b446596f46439@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c8d78c1823f4 ("mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: msg, make msgrcv work with LONG_MIN</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T11:06:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-14T23:06:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bab93a6196224c862c679a1b1e97be8ceef926a5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bab93a6196224c862c679a1b1e97be8ceef926a5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 999898355e08ae3b92dfd0a08db706e0c6703d30 upstream.

When LONG_MIN is passed to msgrcv, one would expect to recieve any
message.  But convert_mode does *msgtyp = -*msgtyp and -LONG_MIN is
undefined.  In particular, with my gcc -LONG_MIN produces -LONG_MIN
again.

So handle this case properly by assigning LONG_MAX to *msgtyp if
LONG_MIN was specified as msgtyp to msgrcv.

This code:
  long msg[] = { 100, 200 };
  int m = msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT | 0644);
  msgsnd(m, &amp;msg, sizeof(msg), 0);
  msgrcv(m, &amp;msg, sizeof(msg), LONG_MIN, 0);

produces currently nothing:

  msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT|0644)     = 65538
  msgsnd(65538, {100, "\310\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 16, 0) = 0
  msgrcv(65538, ...

Except a UBSAN warning:

  UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ipc/msg.c:745:13
  negation of -9223372036854775808 cannot be represented in type 'long int':

With the patch, I see what I expect:

  msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT|0644)     = 0
  msgsnd(0, {100, "\310\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 16, 0) = 0
  msgrcv(0, {100, "\310\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 16, -9223372036854775808, 0) = 16

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161024082633.10148-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()</title>
<updated>2017-07-15T09:57:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-09T20:19:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=034e10b4f8348c2c267e491d1e2872023c35f310'/>
<id>urn:sha1:034e10b4f8348c2c267e491d1e2872023c35f310</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f991af3daabaecff34684fd51fac80319d1baad1 upstream.

The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:

1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
   release the file refcnt

so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.

Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.

Reported-by: GeneBlue &lt;geneblue.mail@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection</title>
<updated>2017-03-12T05:37:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Davidlohr Bueso</name>
<email>dave@stgolabs.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-27T22:28:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f0ae01568e0cf4b00071d1dfd27c90022c2b6d7e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f0ae01568e0cf4b00071d1dfd27c90022c2b6d7e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 95e91b831f87ac8e1f8ed50c14d709089b4e01b8 upstream.

The issue is described here, with a nice testcase:

    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192931

The problem is that shmat() calls do_mmap_pgoff() with MAP_FIXED, and
the address rounded down to 0.  For the regular mmap case, the
protection mentioned above is that the kernel gets to generate the
address -- arch_get_unmapped_area() will always check for MAP_FIXED and
return that address.  So by the time we do security_mmap_addr(0) things
get funky for shmat().

The testcase itself shows that while a regular user crashes, root will
not have a problem attaching a nil-page.  There are two possible fixes
to this.  The first, and which this patch does, is to simply allow root
to crash as well -- this is also regular mmap behavior, ie when hacking
up the testcase and adding mmap(...  |MAP_FIXED).  While this approach
is the safer option, the second alternative is to ignore SHM_RND if the
rounded address is 0, thus only having MAP_SHARED flags.  This makes the
behavior of shmat() identical to the mmap() case.  The downside of this
is obviously user visible, but does make sense in that it maintains
semantics after the round-down wrt 0 address and mmap.

Passes shm related ltp tests.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486050195-18629-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Gareth Evans &lt;gareth.evans@contextis.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc/sem.c: fix complex_count vs. simple op race</title>
<updated>2016-10-28T07:01:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Manfred Spraul</name>
<email>manfred@colorfullife.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-11T20:54:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f6031d95320dc2930f1b813e98533a01c92f3dc0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f6031d95320dc2930f1b813e98533a01c92f3dc0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5864a2fd3088db73d47942370d0f7210a807b9bc upstream.

Commit 6d07b68ce16a ("ipc/sem.c: optimize sem_lock()") introduced a
race:

sem_lock has a fast path that allows parallel simple operations.
There are two reasons why a simple operation cannot run in parallel:
 - a non-simple operations is ongoing (sma-&gt;sem_perm.lock held)
 - a complex operation is sleeping (sma-&gt;complex_count != 0)

As both facts are stored independently, a thread can bypass the current
checks by sleeping in the right positions.  See below for more details
(or kernel bugzilla 105651).

The patch fixes that by creating one variable (complex_mode)
that tracks both reasons why parallel operations are not possible.

The patch also updates stale documentation regarding the locking.

With regards to stable kernels:
The patch is required for all kernels that include the
commit 6d07b68ce16a ("ipc/sem.c: optimize sem_lock()") (3.10?)

The alternative is to revert the patch that introduced the race.

The patch is safe for backporting, i.e. it makes no assumptions
about memory barriers in spin_unlock_wait().

Background:
Here is the race of the current implementation:

Thread A: (simple op)
- does the first "sma-&gt;complex_count == 0" test

Thread B: (complex op)
- does sem_lock(): This includes an array scan. But the scan can't
  find Thread A, because Thread A does not own sem-&gt;lock yet.
- the thread does the operation, increases complex_count,
  drops sem_lock, sleeps

Thread A:
- spin_lock(&amp;sem-&gt;lock), spin_is_locked(sma-&gt;sem_perm.lock)
- sleeps before the complex_count test

Thread C: (complex op)
- does sem_lock (no array scan, complex_count==1)
- wakes up Thread B.
- decrements complex_count

Thread A:
- does the complex_count test

Bug:
Now both thread A and thread C operate on the same array, without
any synchronization.

Fixes: 6d07b68ce16a ("ipc/sem.c: optimize sem_lock()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1469123695-5661-1-git-send-email-manfred@colorfullife.com
Reported-by: &lt;felixh@informatik.uni-bremen.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: &lt;1vier1@web.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysv, ipc: fix security-layer leaking</title>
<updated>2016-08-16T07:30:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Fabian Frederick</name>
<email>fabf@skynet.be</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-02T21:03:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=62659f0b9ed71ffb8a1e66a42eb52ab8ddadb77a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:62659f0b9ed71ffb8a1e66a42eb52ab8ddadb77a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9b24fef9f0410fb5364245d6cc2bd044cc064007 upstream.

Commit 53dad6d3a8e5 ("ipc: fix race with LSMs") updated ipc_rcu_putref()
to receive rcu freeing function but used generic ipc_rcu_free() instead
of msg_rcu_free() which does security cleaning.

Running LTP msgsnd06 with kmemleak gives the following:

  cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak

  unreferenced object 0xffff88003c0a11f8 (size 8):
    comm "msgsnd06", pid 1645, jiffies 4294672526 (age 6.549s)
    hex dump (first 8 bytes):
      1b 00 00 00 01 00 00 00                          ........
    backtrace:
      kmemleak_alloc+0x23/0x40
      kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe1/0x180
      selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security+0x3f/0xd0
      security_msg_queue_alloc+0x2e/0x40
      newque+0x4e/0x150
      ipcget+0x159/0x1b0
      SyS_msgget+0x39/0x40
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f

Manfred Spraul suggested to fix sem.c as well and Davidlohr Bueso to
only use ipc_rcu_free in case of security allocation failure in newary()

Fixes: 53dad6d3a8e ("ipc: fix race with LSMs")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470083552-22966-1-git-send-email-fabf@skynet.be
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick &lt;fabf@skynet.be&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
