user/sven/linux.git/kernel/bpf/syscall.c, branch v6.9.2

bpf: support deferring bpf_link dealloc to after RCU grace period

2024-03-29T01:47:45Z

BPF link for some program types is passed as a "context" which can be used by those BPF programs to look up additional information. E.g., for multi-kprobes and multi-uprobes, link is used to fetch BPF cookie values. Because of this runtime dependency, when bpf_link refcnt drops to zero there could still be active BPF programs running accessing link data. This patch adds generic support to defer bpf_link dealloc callback to after RCU GP, if requested. This is done by exposing two different deallocation callbacks, one synchronous and one deferred. If deferred one is provided, bpf_link_free() will schedule dealloc_deferred() callback to happen after RCU GP. BPF is using two flavors of RCU: "classic" non-sleepable one and RCU tasks trace one. The latter is used when sleepable BPF programs are used. bpf_link_free() accommodates that by checking underlying BPF program's sleepable flag, and goes either through normal RCU GP only for non-sleepable, or through RCU tasks trace GP *and* then normal RCU GP (taking into account rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp() optimization), if BPF program is sleepable. We use this for multi-kprobe and multi-uprobe links, which dereference link during program run. We also preventively switch raw_tp link to use deferred dealloc callback, as upcoming changes in bpf-next tree expose raw_tp link data (specifically, cookie value) to BPF program at runtime as well. Fixes: 0dcac2725406 ("bpf: Add multi kprobe link") Fixes: 89ae89f53d20 ("bpf: Add multi uprobe link") Reported-by: syzbot+981935d9485a560bfbcb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+2cb5a6c573e98db598cc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+62d8b26793e8a2bd0516@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko Acked-by: Jiri Olsa Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328052426.3042617-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: move sleepable flag from bpf_prog_aux to bpf_prog

2024-03-11T23:41:25Z

prog->aux->sleepable is checked very frequently as part of (some) BPF program run hot paths. So this extra aux indirection seems wasteful and on busy systems might cause unnecessary memory cache misses. Let's move sleepable flag into prog itself to eliminate unnecessary pointer dereference. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko Acked-by: Jiri Olsa Message-ID: <20240309004739.2961431-1-andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: Recognize addr_space_cast instruction in the verifier.

2024-03-11T22:37:24Z

rY = addr_space_cast(rX, 0, 1) tells the verifier that rY->type = PTR_TO_ARENA. Any further operations on PTR_TO_ARENA register have to be in 32-bit domain. The verifier will mark load/store through PTR_TO_ARENA with PROBE_MEM32. JIT will generate them as kern_vm_start + 32bit_addr memory accesses. rY = addr_space_cast(rX, 1, 0) tells the verifier that rY->type = unknown scalar. If arena->map_flags has BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV set then convert cast_user to mov32 as well. Otherwise JIT will convert it to: rY = (u32)rX; if (rY) rY |= arena->user_vm_start & ~(u64)~0U; Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240308010812.89848-6-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com

bpf: Introduce bpf_arena.

2024-03-11T22:37:23Z

Introduce bpf_arena, which is a sparse shared memory region between the bpf program and user space. Use cases: 1. User space mmap-s bpf_arena and uses it as a traditional mmap-ed anonymous region, like memcached or any key/value storage. The bpf program implements an in-kernel accelerator. XDP prog can search for a key in bpf_arena and return a value without going to user space. 2. The bpf program builds arbitrary data structures in bpf_arena (hash tables, rb-trees, sparse arrays), while user space consumes it. 3. bpf_arena is a "heap" of memory from the bpf program's point of view. The user space may mmap it, but bpf program will not convert pointers to user base at run-time to improve bpf program speed. Initially, the kernel vm_area and user vma are not populated. User space can fault in pages within the range. While servicing a page fault, bpf_arena logic will insert a new page into the kernel and user vmas. The bpf program can allocate pages from that region via bpf_arena_alloc_pages(). This kernel function will insert pages into the kernel vm_area. The subsequent fault-in from user space will populate that page into the user vma. The BPF_F_SEGV_ON_FAULT flag at arena creation time can be used to prevent fault-in from user space. In such a case, if a page is not allocated by the bpf program and not present in the kernel vm_area, the user process will segfault. This is useful for use cases 2 and 3 above. bpf_arena_alloc_pages() is similar to user space mmap(). It allocates pages either at a specific address within the arena or allocates a range with the maple tree. bpf_arena_free_pages() is analogous to munmap(), which frees pages and removes the range from the kernel vm_area and from user process vmas. bpf_arena can be used as a bpf program "heap" of up to 4GB. The speed of bpf program is more important than ease of sharing with user space. This is use case 3. In such a case, the BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV flag is recommended. It will tell the verifier to treat the rX = bpf_arena_cast_user(rY) instruction as a 32-bit move wX = wY, which will improve bpf prog performance. Otherwise, bpf_arena_cast_user is translated by JIT to conditionally add the upper 32 bits of user vm_start (if the pointer is not NULL) to arena pointers before they are stored into memory. This way, user space sees them as valid 64-bit pointers. Diff https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/84410 enables LLVM BPF backend generate the bpf_addr_space_cast() instruction to cast pointers between address_space(1) which is reserved for bpf_arena pointers and default address space zero. All arena pointers in a bpf program written in C language are tagged as __attribute__((address_space(1))). Hence, clang provides helpful diagnostics when pointers cross address space. Libbpf and the kernel support only address_space == 1. All other address space identifiers are reserved. rX = bpf_addr_space_cast(rY, /* dst_as */ 1, /* src_as */ 0) tells the verifier that rX->type = PTR_TO_ARENA. Any further operations on PTR_TO_ARENA register have to be in the 32-bit domain. The verifier will mark load/store through PTR_TO_ARENA with PROBE_MEM32. JIT will generate them as kern_vm_start + 32bit_addr memory accesses. The behavior is similar to copy_from_kernel_nofault() except that no address checks are necessary. The address is guaranteed to be in the 4GB range. If the page is not present, the destination register is zeroed on read, and the operation is ignored on write. rX = bpf_addr_space_cast(rY, 0, 1) tells the verifier that rX->type = unknown scalar. If arena->map_flags has BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV set, then the verifier converts such cast instructions to mov32. Otherwise, JIT will emit native code equivalent to: rX = (u32)rY; if (rY) rX |= clear_lo32_bits(arena->user_vm_start); /* replace hi32 bits in rX */ After such conversion, the pointer becomes a valid user pointer within bpf_arena range. The user process can access data structures created in bpf_arena without any additional computations. For example, a linked list built by a bpf program can be walked natively by user space. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko Reviewed-by: Barret Rhoden Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240308010812.89848-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com

bpf: Plumb get_unmapped_area() callback into bpf_map_ops

2024-03-07T22:58:48Z

Subsequent patches introduce bpf_arena that imposes special alignment requirements on address selection. Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307031228.42896-4-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau

bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free LSM hooks

2024-01-25T00:21:01Z

Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs. Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which seems to be a sweet spot. But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the outcome. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Paul Moore Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org

bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks

2024-01-25T00:21:01Z

Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much information as we can basically provide. The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF verification step. bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and signatures. Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one *even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their relative ordering. Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it should not be an issue anymore. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Paul Moore Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org

bpf: Take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos

2024-01-25T00:21:01Z

Instead of performing unconditional system-wide bpf_capable() and perfmon_capable() calls inside bpf_base_func_proto() function (and other similar ones) to determine eligibility of a given BPF helper for a given program, use previously recorded BPF token during BPF_PROG_LOAD command handling to inform the decision. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-8-andrii@kernel.org

bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command

2024-01-25T00:21:01Z

Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd. Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types, derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-7-andrii@kernel.org

bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command

2024-01-25T00:21:01Z

Accept BPF token FD in BPF_BTF_LOAD command to allow BTF data loading through delegated BPF token. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag has to be specified when passing BPF token FD. Given BPF_BTF_LOAD command didn't have flags field before, we also add btf_flags field. BTF loading is a pretty straightforward operation, so as long as BPF token is created with allow_cmds granting BPF_BTF_LOAD command, kernel proceeds to parsing BTF data and creating BTF object. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-6-andrii@kernel.org