<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel/bpf, branch v4.14.200</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.200</id>
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<updated>2020-10-01T11:12:35Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Remove recursion prevention from rcu free callback</title>
<updated>2020-10-01T11:12:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-24T14:01:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:25b3f09cef1e03c5257945280f0edf6a61d41296</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8a37963c7ac9ecb7f86f8ebda020e3f8d6d7b8a0 ]

If an element is freed via RCU then recursion into BPF instrumentation
functions is not a concern. The element is already detached from the map
and the RCU callback does not hold any locks on which a kprobe, perf event
or tracepoint attached BPF program could deadlock.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200224145643.259118710@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix map leak in HASH_OF_MAPS map</title>
<updated>2020-08-05T08:06:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Nakryiko</name>
<email>andriin@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-29T04:09:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e1aa01195b82a5a8354c9b87746097866f3693de</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1d4e1eab456e1ee92a94987499b211db05f900ea ]

Fix HASH_OF_MAPS bug of not putting inner map pointer on bpf_map_elem_update()
operation. This is due to per-cpu extra_elems optimization, which bypassed
free_htab_elem() logic doing proper clean ups. Make sure that inner map is put
properly in optimized case as well.

Fixes: 8c290e60fa2a ("bpf: fix hashmap extra_elems logic")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200729040913.2815687-1-andriin@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Explicitly memset some bpf info structures declared on the stack</title>
<updated>2020-04-02T14:34:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-20T16:22:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7855a721d9db4a2c0a64758ac08e73aa627fcecd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5c6f25887963f15492b604dd25cb149c501bbabf upstream.

Trying to initialize a structure with "= {};" will not always clean out
all padding locations in a structure. So be explicit and call memset to
initialize everything for a number of bpf information structures that
are then copied from userspace, sometimes from smaller memory locations
than the size of the structure.

Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200320162258.GA794295@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Explicitly memset the bpf_attr structure</title>
<updated>2020-04-02T14:34:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-20T09:48:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ba1ebf3aef04922bfbe549bb5254765379d62f77</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8096f229421f7b22433775e928d506f0342e5907 upstream.

For the bpf syscall, we are relying on the compiler to properly zero out
the bpf_attr union that we copy userspace data into. Unfortunately that
doesn't always work properly, padding and other oddities might not be
correctly zeroed, and in some tests odd things have been found when the
stack is pre-initialized to other values.

Fix this by explicitly memsetting the structure to 0 before using it.

Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Alistair Delva &lt;adelva@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/common/+/1235490
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200320094813.GA421650@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix passing modified ctx to ld/abs/ind instruction</title>
<updated>2020-01-12T11:12:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-06T21:51:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b454ac1b22af130c6fb8d34c344a98339f1cea9a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6d4f151acf9a4f6fab09b615f246c717ddedcf0c upstream.

Anatoly has been fuzzing with kBdysch harness and reported a KASAN
slab oob in one of the outcomes:

  [...]
  [   77.359642] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130
  [   77.360463] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880679bac68 by task bpf/406
  [   77.361119]
  [   77.361289] CPU: 2 PID: 406 Comm: bpf Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2-xfstests-00157-g2187f215eba #1
  [   77.362134] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
  [   77.362984] Call Trace:
  [   77.363249]  dump_stack+0x97/0xe0
  [   77.363603]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x220
  [   77.364251]  ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130
  [   77.365030]  ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130
  [   77.365860]  __kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7b
  [   77.366365]  ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130
  [   77.366940]  kasan_report+0xe/0x20
  [   77.367295]  bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130
  [   77.367821]  ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8+0xf0/0xf0
  [   77.368278]  ? mark_lock+0xa3/0x9b0
  [   77.368641]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30
  [   77.369096]  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  [   77.369460]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x110
  [   77.369876]  ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8+0xf0/0xf0
  [   77.370330]  ___bpf_prog_run+0x16c0/0x28f0
  [   77.370755]  __bpf_prog_run32+0x83/0xc0
  [   77.371153]  ? __bpf_prog_run64+0xc0/0xc0
  [   77.371568]  ? match_held_lock+0x1b/0x230
  [   77.371984]  ? rcu_read_lock_held+0xa1/0xb0
  [   77.372416]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x50
  [   77.372826]  sk_filter_trim_cap+0x17c/0x4d0
  [   77.373259]  ? sock_kzfree_s+0x40/0x40
  [   77.373648]  ? __get_filter+0x150/0x150
  [   77.374059]  ? skb_copy_datagram_from_iter+0x80/0x280
  [   77.374581]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa5/0x140
  [   77.375025]  unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x33a/0xa70
  [   77.375459]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1d0/0x1d0
  [   77.375893]  ? unix_peer_get+0xa0/0xa0
  [   77.376287]  ? __fget_light+0xa4/0xf0
  [   77.376670]  __sys_sendto+0x265/0x280
  [   77.377056]  ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0x50/0x50
  [   77.377523]  ? lock_downgrade+0x350/0x350
  [   77.377940]  ? __sys_setsockopt+0x2a6/0x2c0
  [   77.378374]  ? sock_read_iter+0x240/0x240
  [   77.378789]  ? __sys_socketpair+0x22a/0x300
  [   77.379221]  ? __ia32_sys_socket+0x50/0x50
  [   77.379649]  ? mark_held_locks+0x1d/0x90
  [   77.380059]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
  [   77.380536]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90
  [   77.380938]  do_syscall_64+0x68/0x2a0
  [   77.381324]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  [   77.381878] RIP: 0033:0x44c070
  [...]

After further debugging, turns out while in case of other helper functions
we disallow passing modified ctx, the special case of ld/abs/ind instruction
which has similar semantics (except r6 being the ctx argument) is missing
such check. Modified ctx is impossible here as bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache()
and others are expecting skb fields in original position, hence, add
check_ctx_reg() to reject any modified ctx. Issue was first introduced back
in f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking").

Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko &lt;anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200106215157.3553-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: reject passing modified ctx to helper functions</title>
<updated>2020-01-12T11:12:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-07T15:40:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7fed98f4a1e6eb77a5d66ecfdf9345e21df6ac82</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 58990d1ff3f7896ee341030e9a7c2e4002570683 upstream.

As commit 28e33f9d78ee ("bpf: disallow arithmetic operations on
context pointer") already describes, f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier:
rework value tracking") removed the specific white-listed cases
we had previously where we would allow for pointer arithmetic in
order to further generalize it, and allow e.g. context access via
modified registers. While the dereferencing of modified context
pointers had been forbidden through 28e33f9d78ee, syzkaller did
recently manage to trigger several KASAN splats for slab out of
bounds access and use after frees by simply passing a modified
context pointer to a helper function which would then do the bad
access since verifier allowed it in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().

Rejecting arithmetic on ctx pointer in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals()
generally could break existing programs as there's a valid use
case in tracing in combination with passing the ctx to helpers as
bpf_probe_read(), where the register then becomes unknown at
verification time due to adding a non-constant offset to it. An
access sequence may look like the following:

  offset = args-&gt;filename;  /* field __data_loc filename */
  bpf_probe_read(&amp;dst, len, (char *)args + offset); // args is ctx

There are two options: i) we could special case the ctx and as
soon as we add a constant or bounded offset to it (hence ctx type
wouldn't change) we could turn the ctx into an unknown scalar, or
ii) we generalize the sanity test for ctx member access into a
small helper and assert it on the ctx register that was passed
as a function argument. Fwiw, latter is more obvious and less
complex at the same time, and one case that may potentially be
legitimate in future for ctx member access at least would be for
ctx to carry a const offset. Therefore, fix follows approach
from ii) and adds test cases to BPF kselftests.

Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: syzbot+3d0b2441dbb71751615e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c8504affd4fdd0c1b626@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+e5190cb881d8660fb1a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+efae31b384d5badbd620@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Edward Cree &lt;ecree@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: drop refcount if bpf_map_new_fd() fails in map_create()</title>
<updated>2019-12-05T14:38:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peng Sun</name>
<email>sironhide0null@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-27T14:36:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ebf233fd40bfc70e53ac9ba6b46ec7b3439c3da1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 352d20d611414715353ee65fc206ee57ab1a6984 ]

In bpf/syscall.c, map_create() first set map-&gt;usercnt to 1, a file
descriptor is supposed to return to userspace. When bpf_map_new_fd()
fails, drop the refcount.

Fixes: bd5f5f4ecb78 ("bpf: Add BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID")
Signed-off-by: Peng Sun &lt;sironhide0null@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: decrease usercnt if bpf_map_new_fd() fails in bpf_map_get_fd_by_id()</title>
<updated>2019-12-05T14:37:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peng Sun</name>
<email>sironhide0null@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-26T14:15:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7e50f6c7dc3006d3f92d668b61b2e75bec793ccf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7e50f6c7dc3006d3f92d668b61b2e75bec793ccf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 781e62823cb81b972dc8652c1827205cda2ac9ac ]

In bpf/syscall.c, bpf_map_get_fd_by_id() use bpf_map_inc_not_zero()
to increase the refcount, both map-&gt;refcnt and map-&gt;usercnt. Then, if
bpf_map_new_fd() fails, should handle map-&gt;usercnt too.

Fixes: bd5f5f4ecb78 ("bpf: Add BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID")
Signed-off-by: Peng Sun &lt;sironhide0null@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: devmap: fix wrong interface selection in notifier_call</title>
<updated>2019-12-01T08:13:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Taehee Yoo</name>
<email>ap420073@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-24T11:15:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8ba716e81648b2a0ffe016d2cad74d795ba399cd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f592f804831f1cf9d1f9966f58c80f150e6829b5 ]

The dev_map_notification() removes interface in devmap if
unregistering interface's ifindex is same.
But only checking ifindex is not enough because other netns can have
same ifindex. so that wrong interface selection could occurred.
Hence netdev pointer comparison code is added.

v2: compare netdev pointer instead of using net_eq() (Daniel Borkmann)
v1: Initial patch

Fixes: 2ddf71e23cc2 ("net: add notifier hooks for devmap bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo &lt;ap420073@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix use after free in prog symbol exposure</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:55:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-04T17:41:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=47569360be87709e690e9261df738080a2f740d2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:47569360be87709e690e9261df738080a2f740d2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c751798aa224fadc5124b49eeb38fb468c0fa039 upstream.

syzkaller managed to trigger the warning in bpf_jit_free() which checks via
bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off() for potentially unlinked JITed BPF progs
in kallsyms, and subsequently trips over GPF when walking kallsyms entries:

  [...]
  8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
  8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9869 at kernel/bpf/core.c:810 bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0
  Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
  CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #1
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
  Call Trace:
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
   dump_stack+0x113/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:113
   panic+0x212/0x40b kernel/panic.c:214
   __warn.cold.8+0x1b/0x38 kernel/panic.c:571
   report_bug+0x1a4/0x200 lib/bug.c:186
   fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline]
   do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271
   do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290
   invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973
  RIP: 0010:bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0
  Code: 02 4c 89 e2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 86 00 00 00 48 ba 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de 0f b6 43 02 49 39 d6 0f 84 5f fe ff ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 58 fe ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1
  RSP: 0018:ffff888092f67cd8 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffffc90001947000 RCX: ffffffff816e9d88
  RDX: dead000000000200 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88808769f7f0
  RBP: ffff888092f67d00 R08: fffffbfff1394059 R09: fffffbfff1394058
  R10: fffffbfff1394058 R11: ffffffff89ca02c7 R12: ffffc90001947002
  R13: ffffc90001947020 R14: ffffffff881eca80 R15: ffff88808769f7e8
  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbfff400d000
  #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
  PGD 21ffee067 P4D 21ffee067 PUD 21ffed067 PMD 9f942067 PTE 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
  CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #1
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
  RIP: 0010:bpf_get_prog_addr_region kernel/bpf/core.c:495 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:bpf_tree_comp kernel/bpf/core.c:558 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:__lt_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:115 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:latch_tree_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:208 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_kallsyms_find+0x107/0x2e0 kernel/bpf/core.c:632
  Code: 00 f0 ff ff 44 38 c8 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 fa 00 00 00 41 f6 45 02 01 75 02 0f 0b 48 39 da 0f 82 92 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 &lt;42&gt; 0f b6 04 30 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 45 01 00 00 8b 03 48 c1 e0
  [...]

Upon further debugging, it turns out that whenever we trigger this
issue, the kallsyms removal in bpf_prog_ksym_node_del() was /skipped/
but yet bpf_jit_free() reported that the entry is /in use/.

Problem is that symbol exposure via bpf_prog_kallsyms_add() but also
perf_event_bpf_event() were done /after/ bpf_prog_new_fd(). Once the
fd is exposed to the public, a parallel close request came in right
before we attempted to do the bpf_prog_kallsyms_add().

Given at this time the prog reference count is one, we start to rip
everything underneath us via bpf_prog_release() -&gt; bpf_prog_put().
The memory is eventually released via deferred free, so we're seeing
that bpf_jit_free() has a kallsym entry because we added it from
bpf_prog_load() but /after/ bpf_prog_put() from the remote CPU.

Therefore, move both notifications /before/ we install the fd. The
issue was never seen between bpf_prog_alloc_id() and bpf_prog_new_fd()
because upon bpf_prog_get_fd_by_id() we'll take another reference to
the BPF prog, so we're still holding the original reference from the
bpf_prog_load().

Fixes: 6ee52e2a3fe4 ("perf, bpf: Introduce PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT")
Fixes: 74451e66d516 ("bpf: make jited programs visible in traces")
Reported-by: syzbot+bd3bba6ff3fcea7a6ec6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra &lt;zsm@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
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