<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel/bpf, branch v6.16.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.16.2</id>
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<updated>2025-08-20T16:41:20Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Make reg_not_null() true for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP</title>
<updated>2025-08-20T16:41:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ihor Solodrai</name>
<email>isolodrai@meta.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-09T18:30:22Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d05a7bf334549f3fede211b3e6a46484d06470c2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5534e58f2e9bd72b253d033ee0af6e68eb8ac96b ]

When reg-&gt;type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, it can not be null. However the
verifier explores the branches under rX == 0 in check_cond_jmp_op()
even if reg-&gt;type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, because it was not checked for
in reg_not_null().

Fix this by adding CONST_PTR_TO_MAP to the set of types that are
considered non nullable in reg_not_null().

An old "unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero" selftest fails with this
change, because now early out correctly triggers in
check_cond_jmp_op(), making the verification to pass.

In practice verifier may allow pointer to null comparison in unpriv,
since in many cases the relevant branch and comparison op are removed
as dead code. So change the expected test result to __success_unpriv.

Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai &lt;isolodrai@meta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609183024.359974-2-isolodrai@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET</title>
<updated>2025-08-20T16:41:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Chaignon</name>
<email>paul.chaignon@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-10T18:20:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:80a6b11862a7cfdf691e8f9faee89cfea219f098</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6279846b9b2532e1b04559ef8bd0dec049f29383 ]

Syzbot reported a kernel warning due to a range invariant violation on
the following BPF program.

  0: call bpf_get_netns_cookie
  1: if r0 == 0 goto &lt;exit&gt;
  2: if r0 &amp; Oxffffffff goto &lt;exit&gt;

The issue is on the path where we fall through both jumps.

That path is unreachable at runtime: after insn 1, we know r0 != 0, but
with the sign extension on the jset, we would only fallthrough insn 2
if r0 == 0. Unfortunately, is_branch_taken() isn't currently able to
figure this out, so the verifier walks all branches. The verifier then
refines the register bounds using the second condition and we end
up with inconsistent bounds on this unreachable path:

  1: if r0 == 0 goto &lt;exit&gt;
    r0: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0xffffffffffffffff)
  2: if r0 &amp; 0xffffffff goto &lt;exit&gt;
    r0 before reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0)
    r0 after reg_bounds_sync:  u64=[0x1, 0] var_off=(0, 0)

Improving the range refinement for JSET to cover all cases is tricky. We
also don't expect many users to rely on JSET given LLVM doesn't generate
those instructions. So instead of improving the range refinement for
JSETs, Eduard suggested we forget the ranges whenever we're narrowing
tnums after a JSET. This patch implements that approach.

Reported-by: syzbot+c711ce17dd78e5d4fdcf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9d4fd6432a095d281f815770608fdcd16028ce0b.1752171365.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T14:39:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-30T23:47:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:19341d5c59e8c7e8528e40f8663e99d67810473c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit abad3d0bad72a52137e0c350c59542d75ae4f513 ]

Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage
can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a
cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program
doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of
the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context
the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the
BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program
uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the
runtime context:

  ctx = container_of(current-&gt;bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx);
  storage = ctx-&gt;prog_item-&gt;cgroup_storage[stype];

  if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED)
    ptr = &amp;READ_ONCE(storage-&gt;buf)-&gt;data[0];
  else
    ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage-&gt;percpu_buf);

For the second program which was called from the originally attached
one, this means bpf_get_local_storage() will pick up the former
program's map, not its own. With mismatching sizes, this can result
in an unintended out-of-bounds access.

To fix this issue, we need to extend bpf_map_owner with an array of
storage_cookie[] to match on i) the exact maps from the original
program if the second program was using bpf_get_local_storage(), or
ii) allow the tail call combination if the second program was not
using any of the cgroup local storage maps.

Fixes: 7d9c3427894f ("bpf: Make cgroup storages shared between programs on the same cgroup")
Reported-by: Lonial Con &lt;kongln9170@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Move bpf map owner out of common struct</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T14:39:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-30T23:47:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:960c947610a5ad4873882d5c75cf05b7f6ab0ad8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fd1c98f0ef5cbcec842209776505d9e70d8fcd53 ]

Given this is only relevant for BPF tail call maps, it is adding up space
and penalizing other map types. We also need to extend this with further
objects to track / compare to. Therefore, lets move this out into a separate
structure and dynamically allocate it only for BPF tail call maps.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Add cookie object to bpf maps</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T14:39:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-30T23:47:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e5f141ed16f7818fc63c8275176bf86494a1d38a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 12df58ad294253ac1d8df0c9bb9cf726397a671d ]

Add a cookie to BPF maps to uniquely identify BPF maps for the timespan
when the node is up. This is different to comparing a pointer or BPF map
id which could get rolled over and reused.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf/preload: Don't select USERMODE_DRIVER</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T14:38:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Weißschuh</name>
<email>thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-21T09:04:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=edb6e99dac1d9eb2e7ad66b2151b331d42f3f2fc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:edb6e99dac1d9eb2e7ad66b2151b331d42f3f2fc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2b03164eee20eac7ce0fe3aa4fbda7efc1e5427a ]

The usermode driver framework is not used anymore by the BPF
preload code.

Fixes: cb80ddc67152 ("bpf: Convert bpf_preload.ko to use light skeleton.")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh &lt;thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250721-remove-usermode-driver-v1-1-0d0083334382@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Reject narrower access to pointer ctx fields</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T14:38:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Chaignon</name>
<email>paul.chaignon@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-22T14:32:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=202900ceeef67458c964c2af6e1427c8e533ea7c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:202900ceeef67458c964c2af6e1427c8e533ea7c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e09299225d5ba3916c91ef70565f7d2187e4cca0 ]

The following BPF program, simplified from a syzkaller repro, causes a
kernel warning:

    r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 169);
    exit;

With pointer field sk being at offset 168 in __sk_buff. This access is
detected as a narrower read in bpf_skb_is_valid_access because it
doesn't match offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk). It is therefore allowed
and later proceeds to bpf_convert_ctx_access. Note that for the
"is_narrower_load" case in the convert_ctx_accesses(), the insn-&gt;off
is aligned, so the cnt may not be 0 because it matches the
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk) in the bpf_convert_ctx_access. However,
the target_size stays 0 and the verifier errors with a kernel warning:

    verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion(1)

This patch fixes that to return a proper "invalid bpf_context access
off=X size=Y" error on the load instruction.

The same issue affects multiple other fields in context structures that
allow narrow access. Some other non-affected fields (for sk_msg,
sk_lookup, and sockopt) were also changed to use bpf_ctx_range_ptr for
consistency.

Note this syzkaller crash was reported in the "Closes" link below, which
used to be about a different bug, fixed in
commit fce7bd8e385a ("bpf/verifier: Handle BPF_LOAD_ACQ instructions
in insn_def_regno()"). Because syzbot somehow confused the two bugs,
the new crash and repro didn't get reported to the mailing list.

Fixes: f96da09473b52 ("bpf: simplify narrower ctx access")
Fixes: 0df1a55afa832 ("bpf: Warn on internal verifier errors")
Reported-by: syzbot+0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3b8dcee67ff4296903351a974ddd9c4dca768b64.1753194596.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Ensure RCU lock is held around bpf_prog_ksym_find</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T14:38:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi</name>
<email>memxor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-03T20:48:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8f6dda962a05ad7150441c6c9b58656d2147494f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8f6dda962a05ad7150441c6c9b58656d2147494f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d090326860096df9dac6f27cff76d3f8df44d4f1 ]

Add a warning to ensure RCU lock is held around tree lookup, and then
fix one of the invocations in bpf_stack_walker. The program has an
active stack frame and won't disappear. Use the opportunity to remove
unneeded invocation of is_bpf_text_address.

Fixes: f18b03fabaa9 ("bpf: Implement BPF exceptions")
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: handle jset (if a &amp; b ...) as a jump in CFG computation</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T14:38:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eduard Zingerman</name>
<email>eddyz87@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-13T17:53:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:261b30ad1516f4b9edd500aa6e8d6315c8fc109a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3157f7e2999616ac91f4d559a8566214f74000a5 ]

BPF_JSET is a conditional jump and currently verifier.c:can_jump()
does not know about that. This can lead to incorrect live registers
and SCC computation.

E.g. in the following example:

   1: r0 = 1;
   2: r2 = 2;
   3: if r1 &amp; 0x7 goto +1;
   4: exit;
   5: r0 = r2;
   6: exit;

W/o this fix insn_successors(3) will return only (4), a jump to (5)
would be missed and r2 won't be marked as alive at (3).

Fixes: 14c8552db644 ("bpf: simple DFA-based live registers analysis")
Reported-by: syzbot+a36aac327960ff474804@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250613175331.3238739-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btf: Fix virt_to_phys() on arm64 when mmapping BTF</title>
<updated>2025-07-17T18:33:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenz Bauer</name>
<email>lmb@isovalent.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-17T16:49:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2e2713ae1a05eea7dda2f3b6988827196e33b25a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2e2713ae1a05eea7dda2f3b6988827196e33b25a</id>
<content type='text'>
Breno Leitao reports that arm64 emits the following warning
with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL:

    [   58.896157] virt_to_phys used for non-linear address: 000000009fea9737
      (__start_BTF+0x0/0x685530)
    [   23.988669] WARNING: CPU: 25 PID: 1442 at arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:15
      __virt_to_phys (arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:?)

        ...

    [   24.075371] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE, [N]=TEST
    [   24.080276] Hardware name: Quanta S7GM 20S7GCU0010/S7G MB (CG1), BIOS 3D22
      07/03/2024
    [   24.088295] pstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
    [   24.098440] pc : __virt_to_phys (arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:?)
    [   24.105398] lr : __virt_to_phys (arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:?)

	...

    [   24.197257] Call trace:
    [   24.199761] __virt_to_phys (arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:?) (P)
    [   24.206883] btf_sysfs_vmlinux_mmap (kernel/bpf/sysfs_btf.c:27)
    [   24.214264] sysfs_kf_bin_mmap (fs/sysfs/file.c:179)
    [   24.218536] kernfs_fop_mmap (fs/kernfs/file.c:462)
    [   24.222461] mmap_region (./include/linux/fs.h:? mm/internal.h:167
       mm/vma.c:2405 mm/vma.c:2467 mm/vma.c:2622 mm/vma.c:2692)

It seems that the memory layout on arm64 maps the kernel image in vmalloc space
which is different than x86. This makes virt_to_phys emit the warning.

Fix this by translating the address using __pa_symbol as suggested by
Breno instead.

Reported-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/g2gqhkunbu43awrofzqb4cs4sxkxg2i4eud6p4qziwrdh67q4g@mtw3d3aqfgmb/
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer &lt;lmb@isovalent.com&gt;
Tested-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian&gt;
Fixes: a539e2a6d51d ("btf: Allow mmap of vmlinux btf")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717-vmlinux-mmap-pa-symbol-v1-1-970be6681158@isovalent.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
