<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel/bpf, branch v6.9.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v6.9.2</id>
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<updated>2024-04-26T16:45:18Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access</title>
<updated>2024-04-26T16:45:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Puranjay Mohan</name>
<email>puranjay12@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-24T10:02:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=66e13b615a0ce76b785d780ecc9776ba71983629'/>
<id>urn:sha1:66e13b615a0ce76b785d780ecc9776ba71983629</id>
<content type='text'>
With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry
for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace
address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has
mapped it.

Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and
skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region.

The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken
as default.

The implementation is as follows:

REG_AX =  SRC_REG
if(offset)
	REG_AX += offset;
REG_AX &gt;&gt;= 32;
if (REG_AX &lt;= (uaddress_limit &gt;&gt; 32))
	DST_REG = 0;
else
	DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);

Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper
32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down
to a 4GB boundary before comparison.

The above means that all loads with address &lt;= uaddress_limit + 4GB are
skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger
than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a
correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory
above the userspace.

Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program
dereferencing an untrusted pointer:

  SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
  int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
  {
                *(volatile long *)sk;
                return 0;
  }

    BPF Program before              |           BPF Program after
    ------------------              |           -----------------

  0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)          0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\      1: (bf) r11 = r1
  ----------------------------\   \     2: (77) r11 &gt;&gt;= 32
  2: (b7) r0 = 0               \   \    3: (b5) if r11 &lt;= 0x8000 goto pc+2
  3: (95) exit                  \   \-&gt; 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
                                 \      5: (05) goto pc+1
                                  \     6: (b7) r1 = 0
                                   \--------------------------------------
                                        7: (b7) r0 = 0
                                        8: (95) exit

As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions
are emitted.

Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of
ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction
that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been
added around it.

                                x86-64 JIT
                                ==========
     JIT's Instrumentation
          (upstream)
     ---------------------

   0:   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
   5:   xchg   %ax,%ax
   7:   push   %rbp
   8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp
   b:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
  ---------------------------------
   f:   movabs $0x800000000000,%r11
  19:   cmp    %r11,%rdi
  1c:   jb     0x000000000000002a
  1e:   mov    %rdi,%r11
  21:   add    $0x0,%r11
  28:   jae    0x000000000000002e
  2a:   xor    %edi,%edi
  2c:   jmp    0x0000000000000032
  2e:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
  ---------------------------------
  32:   xor    %eax,%eax
  34:   leave
  35:   ret

The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user
memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT.

                                  ARM64 JIT
                                  =========

        No Intrumentation                       Verifier's Instrumentation
           (upstream)                                  (This patch)
        -----------------                       --------------------------

   0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0                0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0
   4:   nop                                  4:   nop
   8:   paciasp                              8:   paciasp
   c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!        c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
  10:   mov     x29, sp                     10:   mov     x29, sp
  14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!       14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
  18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!       18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
  1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!       1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
  20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!       20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
  24:   mov     x25, sp                     24:   mov     x25, sp
  28:   mov     x26, #0x0                   28:   mov     x26, #0x0
  2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0              2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0
  30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0                30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0
  34:   ldr     x0, [x0]                    34:   ldr     x0, [x0]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  38:   ldr     x0, [x0] ----------\        38:   add     x9, x0, #0x0
-----------------------------------\\       3c:   lsr     x9, x9, #32
  3c:   mov     x7, #0x0            \\      40:   cmp     x9, #0x10, lsl #12
  40:   mov     sp, sp               \\     44:   b.ls    0x0000000000000050
  44:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16   \\--&gt; 48:   ldr     x0, [x0]
  48:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16    \    4c:   b       0x0000000000000054
  4c:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16     \   50:   mov     x0, #0x0
  50:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16      \---------------------------------------
  54:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16         54:   mov     x7, #0x0
  58:   add     x0, x7, #0x0                58:   mov     sp, sp
  5c:   autiasp                             5c:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16
  60:   ret                                 60:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16
  64:   nop                                 64:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16
  68:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000070     68:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16
  6c:   br      x10                         6c:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16
                                            70:   add     x0, x7, #0x0
                                            74:   autiasp
                                            78:   ret
                                            7c:   nop
                                            80:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000088
                                            84:   br      x10

There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will
become 7 in the worst case (off != 0).

                           RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled)
                           ==========

        No Intrumentation           Verifier's Instrumentation
           (upstream)                      (This patch)
        -----------------           --------------------------

   0:   nop                            0:   nop
   4:   nop                            4:   nop
   8:   li      a6, 33                 8:   li      a6, 33
   c:   addi    sp, sp, -16            c:   addi    sp, sp, -16
  10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)             10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)
  14:   addi    s0, sp, 16            14:   addi    s0, sp, 16
  18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)             18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
---------------------------------------------------------------
  1c:   ld      a0, 0(a0) --\         1c:   mv      t0, a0
--------------------------\  \        20:   srli    t0, t0, 32
  20:   li      a5, 0      \  \       24:   lui     t1, 4096
  24:   ld      s0, 8(sp)   \  \      28:   sext.w  t1, t1
  28:   addi    sp, sp, 16   \  \     2c:   bgeu    t1, t0, 12
  2c:   sext.w  a0, a5        \  \--&gt; 30:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
  30:   ret                    \      34:   j       8
                                \     38:   li      a0, 0
                                 \------------------------------
                                      3c:   li      a5, 0
                                      40:   ld      s0, 8(sp)
                                      44:   addi    sp, sp, 16
                                      48:   sext.w  a0, a5
                                      4c:   ret

There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V.

Fixes: 800834285361 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables")
Reported-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay12@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix a verifier verbose message</title>
<updated>2024-04-12T16:37:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Anton Protopopov</name>
<email>aspsk@isovalent.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-12T14:11:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=37eacb9f6e89fb399a79e952bc9c78eb3e16290e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:37eacb9f6e89fb399a79e952bc9c78eb3e16290e</id>
<content type='text'>
Long ago a map file descriptor in a pseudo ldimm64 instruction could
only be present as an immediate value insn[0].imm, and thus this value
was used in a verbose verifier message printed when the file descriptor
wasn't valid. Since addition of BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE/BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX
the insn[0].imm field can also contain an index pointing to the file
descriptor in the attr.fd_array array. However, if the file descriptor
is invalid, the verifier still prints the verbose message containing
value of insn[0].imm. Patch the verifier message to always print the
actual file descriptor value.

Fixes: 387544bfa291 ("bpf: Introduce fd_idx")
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov &lt;aspsk@isovalent.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240412141100.3562942-1-aspsk@isovalent.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'net-6.9-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net</title>
<updated>2024-04-04T21:49:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-04T21:49:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c88b9b4cde17aec34fb9bfaf69f9f72a1c44f511'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c88b9b4cde17aec34fb9bfaf69f9f72a1c44f511</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
 "Including fixes from netfilter, bluetooth and bpf.

  Fairly usual collection of driver and core fixes. The large selftest
  accompanying one of the fixes is also becoming a common occurrence.

  Current release - regressions:

   - ipv6: fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done()

   - net/rds: fix possible null-deref in newly added error path

  Current release - new code bugs:

   - net: do not consume a full cacheline for system_page_pool

   - bpf: fix bpf_arena-related file descriptor leaks in the verifier

   - drv: ice: fix freeing uninitialized pointers, fixing misuse of the
     newfangled __free() auto-cleanup

  Previous releases - regressions:

   - x86/bpf: fixes the BPF JIT with retbleed=stuff

   - xen-netfront: add missing skb_mark_for_recycle, fix page pool
     accounting leaks, revealed by recently added explicit warning

   - tcp: fix bind() regression for v6-only wildcard and v4-mapped-v6
     non-wildcard addresses

   - Bluetooth:
      - replace "hci_qca: Set BDA quirk bit if fwnode exists in DT" with
        better workarounds to un-break some buggy Qualcomm devices
      - set conn encrypted before conn establishes, fix re-connecting to
        some headsets which use slightly unusual sequence of msgs

   - mptcp:
      - prevent BPF accessing lowat from a subflow socket
      - don't account accept() of non-MPC client as fallback to TCP

   - drv: mana: fix Rx DMA datasize and skb_over_panic

   - drv: i40e: fix VF MAC filter removal

  Previous releases - always broken:

   - gro: various fixes related to UDP tunnels - netns crossing
     problems, incorrect checksum conversions, and incorrect packet
     transformations which may lead to panics

   - bpf: support deferring bpf_link dealloc to after RCU grace period

   - nf_tables:
      - release batch on table validation from abort path
      - release mutex after nft_gc_seq_end from abort path
      - flush pending destroy work before exit_net release

   - drv: r8169: skip DASH fw status checks when DASH is disabled"

* tag 'net-6.9-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (81 commits)
  netfilter: validate user input for expected length
  net/sched: act_skbmod: prevent kernel-infoleak
  net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid the interface always configured as random address
  net: dsa: sja1105: Fix parameters order in sja1110_pcs_mdio_write_c45()
  net: ravb: Always update error counters
  net: ravb: Always process TX descriptor ring
  netfilter: nf_tables: discard table flag update with pending basechain deletion
  netfilter: nf_tables: Fix potential data-race in __nft_flowtable_type_get()
  netfilter: nf_tables: reject new basechain after table flag update
  netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before exit_net release
  netfilter: nf_tables: release mutex after nft_gc_seq_end from abort path
  netfilter: nf_tables: release batch on table validation from abort path
  Revert "tg3: Remove residual error handling in tg3_suspend"
  tg3: Remove residual error handling in tg3_suspend
  net: mana: Fix Rx DMA datasize and skb_over_panic
  net/sched: fix lockdep splat in qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
  net: phy: micrel: lan8814: Fix when enabling/disabling 1-step timestamping
  net: stmmac: fix rx queue priority assignment
  net: txgbe: fix i2c dev name cannot match clkdev
  net: fec: Set mac_managed_pm during probe
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'kbuild-fixes-v6.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild</title>
<updated>2024-03-31T18:23:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-31T18:23:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7e40c2100c87e8f11c270b4ddbe0bf8534dcab21'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7e40c2100c87e8f11c270b4ddbe0bf8534dcab21</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull Kbuild fixes from Masahiro Yamada:

 - Deduplicate Kconfig entries for CONFIG_CXL_PMU

 - Fix unselectable choice entry in MIPS Kconfig, and forbid this
   structure

 - Remove unused include/asm-generic/export.h

 - Fix a NULL pointer dereference bug in modpost

 - Enable -Woverride-init warning consistently with W=1

 - Drop KCSAN flags from *.mod.c files

* tag 'kbuild-fixes-v6.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild:
  kconfig: Fix typo HEIGTH to HEIGHT
  Documentation/llvm: Note s390 LLVM=1 support with LLVM 18.1.0 and newer
  kbuild: Disable KCSAN for autogenerated *.mod.c intermediaries
  kbuild: make -Woverride-init warnings more consistent
  modpost: do not make find_tosym() return NULL
  export.h: remove include/asm-generic/export.h
  kconfig: do not reparent the menu inside a choice block
  MIPS: move unselectable FIT_IMAGE_FDT_EPM5 out of the "System type" choice
  cxl: remove CONFIG_CXL_PMU entry in drivers/cxl/Kconfig
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kbuild: make -Woverride-init warnings more consistent</title>
<updated>2024-03-31T02:32:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-26T14:47:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c40845e3195d074b34f8f8e400e28c9403a06588'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c40845e3195d074b34f8f8e400e28c9403a06588</id>
<content type='text'>
The -Woverride-init warn about code that may be intentional or not,
but the inintentional ones tend to be real bugs, so there is a bit of
disagreement on whether this warning option should be enabled by default
and we have multiple settings in scripts/Makefile.extrawarn as well as
individual subsystems.

Older versions of clang only supported -Wno-initializer-overrides with
the same meaning as gcc's -Woverride-init, though all supported versions
now work with both. Because of this difference, an earlier cleanup of
mine accidentally turned the clang warning off for W=1 builds and only
left it on for W=2, while it's still enabled for gcc with W=1.

There is also one driver that only turns the warning off for newer
versions of gcc but not other compilers, and some but not all the
Makefiles still use a cc-disable-warning conditional that is no
longer needed with supported compilers here.

Address all of the above by removing the special cases for clang
and always turning the warning off unconditionally where it got
in the way, using the syntax that is supported by both compilers.

Fixes: 2cd3271b7a31 ("kbuild: avoid duplicate warning options")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Hamza Mahfooz &lt;hamza.mahfooz@amd.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jani Nikula &lt;jani.nikula@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew Jeffery &lt;andrew@codeconstruct.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula &lt;jani.nikula@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix possible file descriptor leaks in verifier</title>
<updated>2024-03-29T16:19:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Anton Protopopov</name>
<email>aspsk@isovalent.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-29T07:11:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6dae957c8eef6eae5b386462767de97303235d5c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6dae957c8eef6eae5b386462767de97303235d5c</id>
<content type='text'>
The resolve_pseudo_ldimm64() function might have leaked file
descriptors when BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA was used in a program (some
error paths missed a corresponding fdput). Add missing fdputs.

v2:
  remove unrelated changes from the fix

Fixes: 6082b6c328b5 ("bpf: Recognize addr_space_cast instruction in the verifier.")
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov &lt;aspsk@isovalent.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329071106.67968-1-aspsk@isovalent.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: support deferring bpf_link dealloc to after RCU grace period</title>
<updated>2024-03-29T01:47:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Nakryiko</name>
<email>andrii@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-28T05:24:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1a80dbcb2dbaf6e4c216e62e30fa7d3daa8001ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a80dbcb2dbaf6e4c216e62e30fa7d3daa8001ce</id>
<content type='text'>
BPF link for some program types is passed as a "context" which can be
used by those BPF programs to look up additional information. E.g., for
multi-kprobes and multi-uprobes, link is used to fetch BPF cookie values.

Because of this runtime dependency, when bpf_link refcnt drops to zero
there could still be active BPF programs running accessing link data.

This patch adds generic support to defer bpf_link dealloc callback to
after RCU GP, if requested. This is done by exposing two different
deallocation callbacks, one synchronous and one deferred. If deferred
one is provided, bpf_link_free() will schedule dealloc_deferred()
callback to happen after RCU GP.

BPF is using two flavors of RCU: "classic" non-sleepable one and RCU
tasks trace one. The latter is used when sleepable BPF programs are
used. bpf_link_free() accommodates that by checking underlying BPF
program's sleepable flag, and goes either through normal RCU GP only for
non-sleepable, or through RCU tasks trace GP *and* then normal RCU GP
(taking into account rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp() optimization), if BPF
program is sleepable.

We use this for multi-kprobe and multi-uprobe links, which dereference
link during program run. We also preventively switch raw_tp link to use
deferred dealloc callback, as upcoming changes in bpf-next tree expose
raw_tp link data (specifically, cookie value) to BPF program at runtime
as well.

Fixes: 0dcac2725406 ("bpf: Add multi kprobe link")
Fixes: 89ae89f53d20 ("bpf: Add multi uprobe link")
Reported-by: syzbot+981935d9485a560bfbcb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2cb5a6c573e98db598cc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+62d8b26793e8a2bd0516@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328052426.3042617-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size</title>
<updated>2024-03-27T16:56:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrei Matei</name>
<email>andreimatei1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-27T02:42:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ecc6a2101840177e57c925c102d2d29f260d37c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ecc6a2101840177e57c925c102d2d29f260d37c8</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch re-introduces protection against the size of access to stack
memory being negative; the access size can appear negative as a result
of overflowing its signed int representation. This should not actually
happen, as there are other protections along the way, but we should
protect against it anyway. One code path was missing such protections
(fixed in the previous patch in the series), causing out-of-bounds array
accesses in check_stack_range_initialized(). This patch causes the
verification of a program with such a non-sensical access size to fail.

This check used to exist in a more indirect way, but was inadvertendly
removed in a833a17aeac7.

Fixes: a833a17aeac7 ("bpf: Fix verification of indirect var-off stack access")
Reported-by: syzbot+33f4297b5f927648741a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+aafd0513053a1cbf52ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQLORV5PT0iTAhRER+iLBTkByCYNBYyvBSgjN1T31K+gOw@mail.gmail.com/
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei &lt;andreimatei1@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327024245.318299-3-andreimatei1@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Check bloom filter map value size</title>
<updated>2024-03-27T16:56:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrei Matei</name>
<email>andreimatei1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-27T02:42:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a8d89feba7e54e691ca7c4efc2a6264fa83f3687'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a8d89feba7e54e691ca7c4efc2a6264fa83f3687</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds a missing check to bloom filter creating, rejecting
values above KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. This brings the bloom map in line with
many other map types.

The lack of this protection can cause kernel crashes for value sizes
that overflow int's. Such a crash was caught by syzkaller. The next
patch adds more guard-rails at a lower level.

Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei &lt;andreimatei1@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327024245.318299-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix warning for crash_kexec</title>
<updated>2024-03-27T15:52:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hari Bathini</name>
<email>hbathini@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-19T08:01:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=96b98a6552a90690d7bc18dd71b66312c9ded1fb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:96b98a6552a90690d7bc18dd71b66312c9ded1fb</id>
<content type='text'>
With [1], crash dump specific code is moved out of CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
and placed under CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP, where it is more appropriate.
And since CONFIG_KEXEC &amp; !CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP build option is supported
with that, it led to the below warning:

  "WARN: resolve_btfids: unresolved symbol crash_kexec"

Fix it by using the appropriate #ifdef.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240124051254.67105-1-bhe@redhat.com/

Acked-by: Baoquan He &lt;bhe@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 02aff8480533 ("crash: split crash dumping code out from kexec_core.c")
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini &lt;hbathini@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240319080152.36987-1-hbathini@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
