user/sven/linux.git/kernel/capability.c, branch v3.2.65

kernel: Map most files to use export.h instead of module.h

2011-10-31T13:20:12Z

The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them onto the isolated export header for faster compile times. Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of: -#include +#include This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker

Merge branch 'master' into next

2011-05-19T08:51:57Z

Conflicts: include/linux/capability.h Manually resolve merge conflict w/ thanks to Stephen Rothwell. Signed-off-by: James Morris

Cache user_ns in struct cred

2011-05-13T18:45:33Z

If !CONFIG_USERNS, have current_user_ns() defined to (&init_user_ns). Get rid of _current_user_ns. This requires nsown_capable() to be defined in capability.c rather than as static inline in capability.h, so do that. Request_key needs init_user_ns defined at current_user_ns if !CONFIG_USERNS, so forward-declare that in cred.h if !CONFIG_USERNS at current_user_ns() define. Compile-tested with and without CONFIG_USERNS. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn [ This makes a huge performance difference for acl_permission_check(), up to 30%. And that is one of the hottest kernel functions for loads that are pathname-lookup heavy. ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

capabilities: delete unused cap_set_full

2011-04-04T00:31:12Z

unused code. Clean it up. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: David Howells Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan Signed-off-by: James Morris

capabilities: do not drop CAP_SETPCAP from the initial task

2011-04-04T00:31:09Z

In olden' days of yore CAP_SETPCAP had special meaning for the init task. We actually have code to make sure that CAP_SETPCAP wasn't in pE of things using the init_cred. But CAP_SETPCAP isn't so special any more and we don't have a reason to special case dropping it for init or kthreads.... Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan Signed-off-by: James Morris

userns: make has_capability* into real functions

2011-03-24T02:47:06Z

So we can let type safety keep things sane, and as a bonus we can remove the declaration of init_user_ns in capability.h. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Daniel Lezcano Cc: David Howells Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace

2011-03-24T02:47:02Z

- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano Acked-by: David Howells Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

security: add cred argument to security_capable()

2011-02-11T06:41:58Z

Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a wider range of call sites. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris

sched: Remove remaining USER_SCHED code

2010-04-02T18:12:00Z

This is left over from commit 7c9414385e ("sched: Remove USER_SCHED"") Signed-off-by: Li Zefan Acked-by: Dhaval Giani Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: David Howells LKML-Reference: <4BA9A05F.7010407@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

capabilities: Use RCU to protect task lookup in sys_capget

2009-12-09T22:42:48Z

cap_get_target_pid() protects the task lookup with tasklist_lock. security_capget() is called under tasklist_lock as well but tasklist_lock does not protect anything there. The capabilities are protected by RCU already. So tasklist_lock only protects the lookup and prevents the task going away, which can be done with rcu_read_lock() as well. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: James Morris