<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel/cred.c, branch v5.1.19</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.1.19</id>
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<updated>2019-06-19T06:00:03Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access()</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T06:00:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-29T11:31:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:58fd0749b44328ce5c1ac69358cfe9afda50f0d3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f6581f5b55141a95657ef5742cf6a6bfa20a109f upstream.

Restore the read memory barrier in __ptrace_may_access() that was deleted
a couple years ago. Also add comments on this barrier and the one it pairs
with to explain why they're there (as far as I understand).

Fixes: bfedb589252c ("mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoning</title>
<updated>2019-01-08T21:18:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-22T00:17:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:98c88651365767c72ec6dc672072423bc19a39aa</id>
<content type='text'>
The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense
if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this
patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules
and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has
to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure
at some later date.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: export get_task_cred().</title>
<updated>2018-12-19T18:52:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-03T00:30:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a6d8e7637faac93f362b694311bff64d5a8c701e</id>
<content type='text'>
There is no reason that modules should not be able
to use this, and NFS will need it when converted to
use 'struct cred'.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: add get_cred_rcu()</title>
<updated>2018-12-19T18:52:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-03T00:30:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:97d0fb239c041f5f99655af74812c3ab75cc4346</id>
<content type='text'>
Sometimes we want to opportunistically get a
ref to a cred in an rcu_read_lock protected section.
get_task_cred() does this, and NFS does as similar thing
with its own credential structures.
To prepare for NFS converting to use 'struct cred' more
uniformly, define get_cred_rcu(), and use it in
get_task_cred().

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: add cred_fscmp() for comparing creds.</title>
<updated>2018-12-19T18:52:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-03T00:30:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d89b22d46a40da3a1630ecea111beaf3ef10bc21</id>
<content type='text'>
NFS needs to compare to credentials, to see if they can
be treated the same w.r.t. filesystem access.  Sometimes
an ordering is needed when credentials are used as a key
to an rbtree.
NFS currently has its own private credential management from
before 'struct cred' existed.  To move it over to more consistent
use of 'struct cred' we need a comparison function.
This patch adds that function.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>doc: ReSTify credentials.txt</title>
<updated>2017-05-18T16:30:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-13T11:51:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:af777cd1b83e95138e7285fde87c795ef0ae7c4d</id>
<content type='text'>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to &lt;linux/sched/coredump.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-08T17:51:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f7ccbae45c5e2c1077654b0e857e7efb1aa31c92</id>
<content type='text'>
We are going to split &lt;linux/sched/coredump.h&gt; out of &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder &lt;linux/sched/coredump.h&gt; file that just
maps to &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()</title>
<updated>2016-06-30T23:05:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Seth Forshee</name>
<email>seth.forshee@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-26T19:36:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5f65e5ca286126a60f62c8421b77c2018a482b8a</id>
<content type='text'>
Using INVALID_[UG]ID for the LSM file creation context doesn't
make sense, so return an error if the inode passed to
set_create_file_as() has an invalid id.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcg</title>
<updated>2016-01-15T00:00:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladimir Davydov</name>
<email>vdavydov@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-14T23:18:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5d097056c9a017a3b720849efb5432f37acabbac</id>
<content type='text'>
Mark those kmem allocations that are known to be easily triggered from
userspace as __GFP_ACCOUNT/SLAB_ACCOUNT, which makes them accounted to
memcg.  For the list, see below:

 - threadinfo
 - task_struct
 - task_delay_info
 - pid
 - cred
 - mm_struct
 - vm_area_struct and vm_region (nommu)
 - anon_vma and anon_vma_chain
 - signal_struct
 - sighand_struct
 - fs_struct
 - files_struct
 - fdtable and fdtable-&gt;full_fds_bits
 - dentry and external_name
 - inode for all filesystems. This is the most tedious part, because
   most filesystems overwrite the alloc_inode method.

The list is far from complete, so feel free to add more objects.
Nevertheless, it should be close to "account everything" approach and
keep most workloads within bounds.  Malevolent users will be able to
breach the limit, but this was possible even with the former "account
everything" approach (simply because it did not account everything in
fact).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/cred.c: remove unnecessary kdebug atomic reads</title>
<updated>2015-09-10T20:29:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-09T22:36:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:52aa8536f8f41367d5f2938ad67aa87957e70010</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit e0e817392b9a ("CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]")
added the kdebug mechanism to this file back in 2009.

The kdebug macro calls no_printk which always evaluates arguments.

Most of the kdebug uses have an unnecessary call of
	atomic_read(&amp;cred-&gt;usage)

Make the kdebug macro do nothing by defining it with
	do { if (0) no_printk(...); } while (0)
when not enabled.

$ size kernel/cred.o* (defconfig x86-64)
   text	   data	    bss	    dec	    hex	filename
   2748	    336	      8	   3092	    c14	kernel/cred.o.new
   2788	    336	      8	   3132	    c3c	kernel/cred.o.old

Miscellanea:
o Neaten the #define kdebug macros while there

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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