user/sven/linux.git/kernel/events, branch v3.18.84

perf/core: Fix group {cpu,task} validation

2017-08-30T08:16:56Z

commit 64aee2a965cf2954a038b5522f11d2cd2f0f8f3e upstream. Regardless of which events form a group, it does not make sense for the events to target different tasks and/or CPUs, as this leaves the group inconsistent and impossible to schedule. The core perf code assumes that these are consistent across (successfully intialised) groups. Core perf code only verifies this when moving SW events into a HW context. Thus, we can violate this requirement for pure SW groups and pure HW groups, unless the relevant PMU driver happens to perform this verification itself. These mismatched groups subsequently wreak havoc elsewhere. For example, we handle watchpoints as SW events, and reserve watchpoint HW on a per-CPU basis at pmu::event_init() time to ensure that any event that is initialised is guaranteed to have a slot at pmu::add() time. However, the core code only checks the group leader's cpu filter (via event_filter_match()), and can thus install follower events onto CPUs violating thier (mismatched) CPU filters, potentially installing them into a CPU without sufficient reserved slots. This can be triggered with the below test case, resulting in warnings from arch backends. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static int perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, pid_t pid, int cpu, int group_fd, unsigned long flags) { return syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, attr, pid, cpu, group_fd, flags); } char watched_char; struct perf_event_attr wp_attr = { .type = PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT, .bp_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_RW, .bp_addr = (unsigned long)&watched_char, .bp_len = 1, .size = sizeof(wp_attr), }; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int leader, ret; cpu_set_t cpus; /* * Force use of CPU0 to ensure our CPU0-bound events get scheduled. */ CPU_ZERO(&cpus); CPU_SET(0, &cpus); ret = sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpus), &cpus); if (ret) { printf("Unable to set cpu affinity\n"); return 1; } /* open leader event, bound to this task, CPU0 only */ leader = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0); if (leader < 0) { printf("Couldn't open leader: %d\n", leader); return 1; } /* * Open a follower event that is bound to the same task, but a * different CPU. This means that the group should never be possible to * schedule. */ ret = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 1, leader, 0); if (ret < 0) { printf("Couldn't open mismatched follower: %d\n", ret); return 1; } else { printf("Opened leader/follower with mismastched CPUs\n"); } /* * Open as many independent events as we can, all bound to the same * task, CPU0 only. */ do { ret = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0); } while (ret >= 0); /* * Force enable/disble all events to trigger the erronoeous * installation of the follower event. */ printf("Opened all events. Toggling..\n"); for (;;) { prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0); prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0); } return 0; } Fix this by validating this requirement regardless of whether we're moving events. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Zhou Chengming Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498142498-15758-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "perf/core: Drop kernel samples even though :u is specified"

2017-07-27T22:03:28Z

commit 6a8a75f3235724c5941a33e287b2f98966ad14c5 upstream. This reverts commit cc1582c231ea041fbc68861dfaf957eaf902b829. This commit introduced a regression that broke rr-project, which uses sampling events to receive a signal on overflow (but does not care about the contents of the sample). These signals are critical to the correct operation of rr. There's been some back and forth about how to fix it - but to not keep applications in limbo queue up a revert. Reported-by: Kyle Huey Acked-by: Kyle Huey Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Jin Yao Cc: Vince Weaver Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Jiri Olsa Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170628105600.GC5981@leverpostej Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf/core: Drop kernel samples even though :u is specified

2017-06-14T10:54:19Z

commit cc1582c231ea041fbc68861dfaf957eaf902b829 upstream. When doing sampling, for example: perf record -e cycles:u ... On workloads that do a lot of kernel entry/exits we see kernel samples, even though :u is specified. This is due to skid existing. This might be a security issue because it can leak kernel addresses even though kernel sampling support is disabled. The patch drops the kernel samples if exclude_kernel is specified. For example, test on Haswell desktop: perf record -e cycles:u perf report --stdio Before patch applied: 99.77% mgen mgen [.] buf_read 0.20% mgen mgen [.] rand_buf_init 0.01% mgen [kernel.vmlinux] [k] apic_timer_interrupt 0.00% mgen mgen [.] last_free_elem 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] __random_r 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] _int_malloc 0.00% mgen mgen [.] rand_array_init 0.00% mgen [kernel.vmlinux] [k] page_fault 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] __random 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] __strcasestr 0.00% mgen ld-2.23.so [.] strcmp 0.00% mgen ld-2.23.so [.] _dl_start 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] sched_setaffinity@@GLIBC_2.3.4 0.00% mgen ld-2.23.so [.] _start We can see kernel symbols apic_timer_interrupt and page_fault. After patch applied: 99.79% mgen mgen [.] buf_read 0.19% mgen mgen [.] rand_buf_init 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] __random_r 0.00% mgen mgen [.] rand_array_init 0.00% mgen mgen [.] last_free_elem 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] vfprintf 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] rand 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] __random 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] _int_malloc 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] _IO_doallocbuf 0.00% mgen ld-2.23.so [.] do_lookup_x 0.00% mgen ld-2.23.so [.] open_verify.constprop.7 0.00% mgen ld-2.23.so [.] _dl_important_hwcaps 0.00% mgen libc-2.23.so [.] sched_setaffinity@@GLIBC_2.3.4 0.00% mgen ld-2.23.so [.] _start There are only userspace symbols. Signed-off-by: Jin Yao Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: jolsa@kernel.org Cc: kan.liang@intel.com Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: yao.jin@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495706947-3744-1-git-send-email-yao.jin@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Fix race in swevent hash

2017-05-20T12:18:43Z

commit 12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373 upstream. There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array while it can still have events on. This will result in a use-after-free which is BAD. Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing around and no use-after-free takes place. When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage will occur. Reported-by: Sasha Levin Tested-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Fix event->ctx locking

2017-05-20T12:18:43Z

commit f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b upstream. There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those. It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please give it some thought in review. What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Paul E. McKenney Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Tighten (and fix) the grouping condition

2017-05-08T05:44:10Z

commit c3c87e770458aa004bd7ed3f29945ff436fd6511 upstream. The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled. Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice as well by me via the perf fuzzer. Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context. This means for the same task and/or the same cpu. Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.090683288@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Avoid horrible stack usage

2017-04-30T03:49:15Z

commit 86038c5ea81b519a8a1fcfcd5e4599aab0cdd119 upstream. Both Linus (most recent) and Steve (a while ago) reported that perf related callbacks have massive stack bloat. The problem is that software events need a pt_regs in order to properly report the event location and unwind stack. And because we could not assume one was present we allocated one on stack and filled it with minimal bits required for operation. Now, pt_regs is quite large, so this is undesirable. Furthermore it turns out that most sites actually have a pt_regs pointer available, making this even more onerous, as the stack space is pointless waste. This patch addresses the problem by observing that software events have well defined nesting semantics, therefore we can use static per-cpu storage instead of on-stack. Linus made the further observation that all but the scheduler callers of perf_sw_event() have a pt_regs available, so we change the regular perf_sw_event() to require a valid pt_regs (where it used to be optional) and add perf_sw_event_sched() for the scheduler. We have a scheduler specific call instead of a more generic _noregs() like construct because we can assume non-recursion from the scheduler and thereby simplify the code further (_noregs would have to put the recursion context call inline in order to assertain which __perf_regs element to use). One last note on the implementation of perf_trace_buf_prepare(); we allow .regs = NULL for those cases where we already have a pt_regs pointer available and do not need another. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds Reported-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Javi Merino Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Petr Mladek Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Tom Zanussi Cc: Vaibhav Nagarnaik Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141216115041.GW3337@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf/core: Fix event inheritance on fork()

2017-04-22T05:15:03Z

commit e7cc4865f0f31698ef2f7aac01a50e78968985b7 upstream. While hunting for clues to a use-after-free, Oleg spotted that perf_event_init_context() can loose an error value with the result that fork() can succeed even though we did not fully inherit the perf event context. Spotted-by: Oleg Nesterov Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Cc: oleg@redhat.com Fixes: 889ff0150661 ("perf/core: Split context's event group list into pinned and non-pinned lists") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170316125823.190342547@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

uprobes: Fix the memcg accounting

2016-09-01T02:05:44Z

[ Upstream commit 6c4687cc17a788a6dd8de3e27dbeabb7cbd3e066 ] __replace_page() wronlgy calls mem_cgroup_cancel_charge() in "success" path, it should only do this if page_check_address() fails. This means that every enable/disable leads to unbalanced mem_cgroup_uncharge() from put_page(old_page), it is trivial to underflow the page_counter->count and trigger OOM. Reported-and-tested-by: Brenden Blanco Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Reviewed-by: Johannes Weiner Acked-by: Michal Hocko Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vladimir Davydov Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+ Fixes: 00501b531c47 ("mm: memcontrol: rewrite charge API") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817153629.GB29724@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-04-12T21:06:22Z

[ Upstream commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 ] By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Al Viro Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin