user/sven/linux.git/kernel/futex.c, branch v4.9.235

futex: Unbreak futex hashing

2020-04-02T15:20:28Z

commit 8d67743653dce5a0e7aa500fcccb237cde7ad88e upstream. The recent futex inode life time fix changed the ordering of the futex key union struct members, but forgot to adjust the hash function accordingly, As a result the hashing omits the leading 64bit and even hashes beyond the futex key causing a bad hash distribution which led to a ~100% performance regression. Hand in the futex key pointer instead of a random struct member and make the size calculation based of the struct offset. Fixes: 8019ad13ef7f ("futex: Fix inode life-time issue") Reported-by: Rong Chen Decoded-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Rong Chen Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87h7yy90ve.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Fix inode life-time issue

2020-04-02T15:20:27Z

commit 8019ad13ef7f64be44d4f892af9c840179009254 upstream. As reported by Jann, ihold() does not in fact guarantee inode persistence. And instead of making it so, replace the usage of inode pointers with a per boot, machine wide, unique inode identifier. This sequence number is global, but shared (file backed) futexes are rare enough that this should not become a performance issue. Reported-by: Jann Horn Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Ensure that futex address is aligned in handle_futex_death()

2019-03-27T05:13:03Z

commit 5a07168d8d89b00fe1760120714378175b3ef992 upstream. The futex code requires that the user space addresses of futexes are 32bit aligned. sys_futex() checks this in futex_get_keys() but the robust list code has no alignment check in place. As a consequence the kernel crashes on architectures with strict alignment requirements in handle_futex_death() when trying to cmpxchg() on an unaligned futex address which was retrieved from the robust list. [ tglx: Rewrote changelog, proper sizeof() based alignement check and add comment ] Fixes: 0771dfefc9e5 ("[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: core") Signed-off-by: Chen Jie Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Cc: Cc: Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1552621478-119787-1-git-send-email-chenjie6@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex,rt_mutex: Restructure rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock()

2019-03-13T21:05:01Z

commit 38d589f2fd08f1296aea3ce62bebd185125c6d81 upstream. With the ultimate goal of keeping rt_mutex wait_list and futex_q waiters consistent it's necessary to split 'rt_mutex_futex_lock()' into finer parts, such that only the actual blocking can be done without hb->lock held. Split split_mutex_finish_proxy_lock() into two parts, one that does the blocking and one that does remove_waiter() when the lock acquire failed. When the rtmutex was acquired successfully the waiter can be removed in the acquisiton path safely, since there is no concurrency on the lock owner. This means that, except for futex_lock_pi(), all wait_list modifications are done with both hb->lock and wait_lock held. [bigeasy@linutronix.de: fix for futex_requeue_pi_signal_restart] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: xlpang@redhat.com Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com Cc: dvhart@infradead.org Cc: bristot@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170322104152.001659630@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: futex_wake_op, do not fail on invalid op

2018-11-10T15:42:54Z

[ Upstream commit e78c38f6bdd900b2ad9ac9df8eff58b745dc5b3c ] In commit 30d6e0a4190d ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour"), I let FUTEX_WAKE_OP to fail on invalid op. Namely when op should be considered as shift and the shift is out of range (< 0 or > 31). But strace's test suite does this madness: futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xa0caffee); futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xbadfaced); futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xffffffff); When I pick the first 0xa0caffee, it decodes as: 0x80000000 & 0xa0caffee: oparg is shift 0x70000000 & 0xa0caffee: op is FUTEX_OP_OR 0x0f000000 & 0xa0caffee: cmp is FUTEX_OP_CMP_EQ 0x00fff000 & 0xa0caffee: oparg is sign-extended 0xcaf = -849 0x00000fff & 0xa0caffee: cmparg is sign-extended 0xfee = -18 That means the op tries to do this: (futex |= (1 << (-849))) == -18 which is completely bogus. The new check of op in the code is: if (encoded_op & (FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT << 28)) { if (oparg < 0 || oparg > 31) return -EINVAL; oparg = 1 << oparg; } which results obviously in the "Invalid argument" errno: FAIL: futex =========== futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xa0caffee) = -1: Invalid argument futex.test: failed test: ../futex failed with code 1 So let us soften the failure to print only a (ratelimited) message, crop the value and continue as if it were right. When userspace keeps up, we can switch this to return -EINVAL again. [v2] Do not return 0 immediatelly, proceed with the cropped value. Fixes: 30d6e0a4190d ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour") Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Darren Hart Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

futex: futex_wake_op, fix sign_extend32 sign bits

2018-05-19T08:27:00Z

commit d70ef22892ed6c066e51e118b225923c9b74af34 upstream. sign_extend32 counts the sign bit parameter from 0, not from 1. So we have to use "11" for 12th bit, not "12". This mistake means we have not allowed negative op and cmp args since commit 30d6e0a4190d ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour") till now. Fixes: 30d6e0a4190d ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour") Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Darren Hart Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour

2018-05-19T08:27:00Z

commit 30d6e0a4190d37740e9447e4e4815f06992dd8c3 upstream. There is code duplicated over all architecture's headers for futex_atomic_op_inuser. Namely op decoding, access_ok check for uaddr, and comparison of the result. Remove this duplication and leave up to the arches only the needed assembly which is now in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser. This effectively distributes the Will Deacon's arm64 fix for undefined behaviour reported by UBSAN to all architectures. The fix was done in commit 5f16a046f8e1 (arm64: futex: Fix undefined behaviour with FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT usage). Look there for an example dump. And as suggested by Thomas, check for negative oparg too, because it was also reported to cause undefined behaviour report. Note that s390 removed access_ok check in d12a29703 ("s390/uaccess: remove pointless access_ok() checks") as access_ok there returns true. We introduce it back to the helper for the sake of simplicity (it gets optimized away anyway). Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Russell King Acked-by: Michael Ellerman (powerpc) Acked-by: Heiko Carstens [s390] Acked-by: Chris Metcalf [for tile] Reviewed-by: Darren Hart (VMware) Reviewed-by: Will Deacon [core/arm64] Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Rich Felker Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Max Filippov Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonas Bonn Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yoshinori Sato Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: Helge Deller Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Matt Turner Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: Fenghua Yu Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org Cc: Stefan Kristiansson Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky Cc: Stafford Horne Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Richard Henderson Cc: Chris Zankel Cc: Michal Simek Cc: Tony Luck Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vineet Gupta Cc: Ralf Baechle Cc: Richard Kuo Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: "David S. Miller" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073105.3901-1-jslaby@suse.cz Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation

2018-01-23T18:57:04Z

commit fbe0e839d1e22d88810f3ee3e2f1479be4c0aa4a upstream. UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18 signed integer overflow: 0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int' Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue. Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: dvhart@infradead.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Remove unnecessary warning from get_futex_key

2017-08-16T20:43:15Z

commit 48fb6f4db940e92cfb16cd878cddd59ea6120d06 upstream. Commit 65d8fc777f6d ("futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()") removed an unnecessary lock_page() with the side-effect that page->mapping needed to be treated very carefully. Two defensive warnings were added in case any assumption was missed and the first warning assumed a correct application would not alter a mapping backing a futex key. Since merging, it has not triggered for any unexpected case but Mark Rutland reported the following bug triggering due to the first warning. kernel BUG at kernel/futex.c:679! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 3695 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc3-00020-g307fec773ba3 #3 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff80001e271780 task.stack: ffff000010908000 PC is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679 LR is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679 pc : [] lr : [] pstate: 80000145 The fact that it's a bug instead of a warning was due to an unrelated arm64 problem, but the warning itself triggered because the underlying mapping changed. This is an application issue but from a kernel perspective it's a recoverable situation and the warning is unnecessary so this patch removes the warning. The warning may potentially be triggered with the following test program from Mark although it may be necessary to adjust NR_FUTEX_THREADS to be a value smaller than the number of CPUs in the system. #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define NR_FUTEX_THREADS 16 pthread_t threads[NR_FUTEX_THREADS]; void *mem; #define MEM_PROT (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE) #define MEM_SIZE 65536 static int futex_wrapper(int *uaddr, int op, int val, const struct timespec *timeout, int *uaddr2, int val3) { syscall(SYS_futex, uaddr, op, val, timeout, uaddr2, val3); } void *poll_futex(void *unused) { for (;;) { futex_wrapper(mem, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI, 1, NULL, mem + 4, 1); } } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i; mem = mmap(NULL, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT, MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); printf("Mapping @ %p\n", mem); printf("Creating futex threads...\n"); for (i = 0; i < NR_FUTEX_THREADS; i++) pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, poll_futex, NULL); printf("Flipping mapping...\n"); for (;;) { mmap(mem, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); } return 0; } Reported-and-tested-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Add missing error handling to FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI

2017-03-22T11:43:40Z

commit 9bbb25afeb182502ca4f2c4f3f88af0681b34cae upstream. Thomas spotted that fixup_pi_state_owner() can return errors and we fail to unlock the rt_mutex in that case. Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Darren Hart Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: xlpang@redhat.com Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com Cc: dvhart@infradead.org Cc: bristot@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170304093558.867401760@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman