<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel/module.c, branch v5.2.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.2.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.2.2'/>
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<updated>2019-05-30T18:26:35Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 156</title>
<updated>2019-05-30T18:26:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-27T06:55:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1a59d1b8e05ea6ab45f7e18897de1ef0e6bc3da6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a59d1b8e05ea6ab45f7e18897de1ef0e6bc3da6</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version this program is distributed in the
  hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
  the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
  purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
  should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
  with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
  59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana &lt;rfontana@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'modules-for-v5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux</title>
<updated>2019-05-14T17:55:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T17:55:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:280664f558c9d973315d48f125eb664cc607d089</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull modules updates from Jessica Yu:

 - Use a separate table to store symbol types instead of hijacking
   fields in struct Elf_Sym

 - Trivial code cleanups

* tag 'modules-for-v5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux:
  module: add stubs for within_module functions
  kallsyms: store type information in its own array
  vmlinux.lds.h: drop unused __vermagic
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2019-05-09T19:54:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-09T19:54:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7664cd6e3a0b2709f04c07435e96c7c85e7d7324</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull intgrity updates from James Morris:
 "This contains just three patches, the remainder were either included
  in other pull requests (eg. audit, lockdown) or will be upstreamed via
  other subsystems (eg. kselftests, Power).

  Included here is one bug fix, one documentation update, and extending
  the x86 IMA arch policy rules to coordinate the different kernel
  module signature verification methods"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  doc/kernel-parameters.txt: Deprecate ima_appraise_tcb
  x86/ima: add missing include
  x86/ima: require signed kernel modules
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>modules: Use vmalloc special flag</title>
<updated>2019-04-30T10:37:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rick Edgecombe</name>
<email>rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-26T00:11:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1a7b7d9220819afe79d1ec5d759fe4349bd2453e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1a7b7d9220819afe79d1ec5d759fe4349bd2453e</id>
<content type='text'>
Use new flag for handling freeing of special permissioned memory in vmalloc
and remove places where memory was set RW before freeing which is no longer
needed.

Since freeing of VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS memory is not supported in an
interrupt by vmalloc, the freeing of init sections is moved to a work
queue. Instead of call_rcu it now uses synchronize_rcu() in the work
queue.

Lastly, there is now a WARN_ON in module_memfree since it should not be
called in an interrupt with special memory as is required for
VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;deneen.t.dock@intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kristen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux_dti@icloud.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Nadav Amit &lt;nadav.amit@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@surriel.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-18-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/modules: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules</title>
<updated>2019-04-30T10:37:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nadav Amit</name>
<email>namit@vmware.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-26T00:11:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f2c65fb3221adc6b73b0549fc7ba892022db9797</id>
<content type='text'>
When modules and BPF filters are loaded, there is a time window in
which some memory is both writable and executable. An attacker that has
already found another vulnerability (e.g., a dangling pointer) might be
able to exploit this behavior to overwrite kernel code. Prevent having
writable executable PTEs in this stage.

In addition, avoiding having W+X mappings can also slightly simplify the
patching of modules code on initialization (e.g., by alternatives and
static-key), as would be done in the next patch. This was actually the
main motivation for this patch.

To avoid having W+X mappings, set them initially as RW (NX) and after
they are set as RO set them as X as well. Setting them as executable is
done as a separate step to avoid one core in which the old PTE is cached
(hence writable), and another which sees the updated PTE (executable),
which would break the W^X protection.

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@vmware.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;deneen.t.dock@intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kristen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux_dti@icloud.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@surriel.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-12-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kallsyms: store type information in its own array</title>
<updated>2019-03-28T14:00:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eugene Loh</name>
<email>eugene.loh@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-25T19:59:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1c7651f43777cdd59c1aaa82c87324d3e7438c7b</id>
<content type='text'>
When a module is loaded, its symbols' Elf_Sym information is stored
in a symtab.  Further, type information is also captured.  Since
Elf_Sym has no type field, historically the st_info field has been
hijacked for storing type:  st_info was overwritten.

commit 5439c985c5a83a8419f762115afdf560ab72a452 ("module: Overwrite
st_size instead of st_info") changes that practice, as its one-liner
indicates.  Unfortunately, this change overwrites symbol size,
information that a tool like DTrace expects to find.

Allocate a typetab array to store type information so that no Elf_Sym
field needs to be overwritten.

Fixes: 5439c985c5a8 ("module: Overwrite st_size instead of st_info")
Signed-off-by: Eugene Loh &lt;eugene.loh@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Alcock &lt;nick.alcock@oracle.com&gt;
[jeyu: renamed typeoff -&gt; typeoffs ]
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ima: require signed kernel modules</title>
<updated>2019-03-27T14:36:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-28T00:03:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8db5da0b8618df79eceea99672e205d4a2a6309e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8db5da0b8618df79eceea99672e205d4a2a6309e</id>
<content type='text'>
Have the IMA architecture specific policy require signed kernel modules
on systems with secure boot mode enabled; and coordinate the different
signature verification methods, so only one signature is required.

Requiring appended kernel module signatures may be configured, enabled
on the boot command line, or with this patch enabled in secure boot
mode.  This patch defines set_module_sig_enforced().

To coordinate between appended kernel module signatures and IMA
signatures, only define an IMA MODULE_CHECK policy rule if
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is not enabled.  A custom IMA policy may still define
and require an IMA signature.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dynamic_debug: add static inline stub for ddebug_add_module</title>
<updated>2019-03-08T02:32:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rasmus Villemoes</name>
<email>linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-08T00:27:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a4507fedcd2580d510d8d91ac6b99537f869f62a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4507fedcd2580d510d8d91ac6b99537f869f62a</id>
<content type='text'>
For symmetry with ddebug_remove_module, and to avoid a bit of ifdeffery
in module.c, move the declaration of ddebug_add_module inside #if
defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) and add a corresponding no-op stub in the
#else branch.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190212214150.4807-10-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Cc: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dynamic_debug: move pr_err from module.c to ddebug_add_module</title>
<updated>2019-03-08T02:32:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rasmus Villemoes</name>
<email>linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-08T00:27:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=513770f54edba8b19c2175a151e02f1dfc911d87'/>
<id>urn:sha1:513770f54edba8b19c2175a151e02f1dfc911d87</id>
<content type='text'>
This serves two purposes: First, we get a diagnostic if (though
extremely unlikely), any of the calls of ddebug_add_module for built-in
code fails, effectively disabling dynamic_debug.  Second, I want to make
struct _ddebug opaque, and avoid accessing any of its members outside
dynamic_debug.[ch].

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190212214150.4807-9-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Cc: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jump_label: move 'asm goto' support test to Kconfig</title>
<updated>2019-01-06T00:46:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>yamada.masahiro@socionext.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-30T15:14:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e9666d10a5677a494260d60d1fa0b73cc7646eb3</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL just means "I _want_ to use jump label".

The jump label is controlled by HAVE_JUMP_LABEL, which is defined
like this:

  #if defined(CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO) &amp;&amp; defined(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL)
  # define HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
  #endif

We can improve this by testing 'asm goto' support in Kconfig, then
make JUMP_LABEL depend on CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO.

Ugly #ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL will go away, and CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL will
match to the real kernel capability.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek &lt;sedat.dilek@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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