user/sven/linux.git/kernel/sched/core.c, branch v5.15.16

sched/uclamp: Fix rq->uclamp_max not set on first enqueue

2021-12-08T08:04:54Z

[ Upstream commit 315c4f884800c45cb6bd8c90422fad554a8b9588 ] Commit d81ae8aac85c ("sched/uclamp: Fix initialization of struct uclamp_rq") introduced a bug where uclamp_max of the rq is not reset to match the woken up task's uclamp_max when the rq is idle. The code was relying on rq->uclamp_max initialized to zero, so on first enqueue static inline void uclamp_rq_inc_id(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, enum uclamp_id clamp_id) { ... if (uc_se->value > READ_ONCE(uc_rq->value)) WRITE_ONCE(uc_rq->value, uc_se->value); } was actually resetting it. But since commit d81ae8aac85c changed the default to 1024, this no longer works. And since rq->uclamp_flags is also initialized to 0, neither above code path nor uclamp_idle_reset() update the rq->uclamp_max on first wake up from idle. This is only visible from first wake up(s) until the first dequeue to idle after enabling the static key. And it only matters if the uclamp_max of this task is < 1024 since only then its uclamp_max will be effectively ignored. Fix it by properly initializing rq->uclamp_flags = UCLAMP_FLAG_IDLE to ensure uclamp_idle_reset() is called which then will update the rq uclamp_max value as expected. Fixes: d81ae8aac85c ("sched/uclamp: Fix initialization of struct uclamp_rq") Signed-off-by: Qais Yousef Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider Tested-by: Dietmar Eggemann Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202112033.1705279-1-qais.yousef@arm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

preempt/dynamic: Fix setup_preempt_mode() return value

2021-12-08T08:04:54Z

[ Upstream commit 9ed20bafc85806ca6c97c9128cec46c3ef80ae86 ] __setup() callbacks expect 1 for success and 0 for failure. Correct the usage here to reflect that. Fixes: 826bfeb37bb4 ("preempt/dynamic: Support dynamic preempt with preempt= boot option") Reported-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Andrew Halaney Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211203233203.133581-1-ahalaney@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sched/scs: Reset task stack state in bringup_cpu()

2021-12-01T08:04:54Z

[ Upstream commit dce1ca0525bfdc8a69a9343bc714fbc19a2f04b3 ] To hot unplug a CPU, the idle task on that CPU calls a few layers of C code before finally leaving the kernel. When KASAN is in use, poisoned shadow is left around for each of the active stack frames, and when shadow call stacks are in use. When shadow call stacks (SCS) are in use the task's saved SCS SP is left pointing at an arbitrary point within the task's shadow call stack. When a CPU is offlined than onlined back into the kernel, this stale state can adversely affect execution. Stale KASAN shadow can alias new stackframes and result in bogus KASAN warnings. A stale SCS SP is effectively a memory leak, and prevents a portion of the shadow call stack being used. Across a number of hotplug cycles the idle task's entire shadow call stack can become unusable. We previously fixed the KASAN issue in commit: e1b77c92981a5222 ("sched/kasan: remove stale KASAN poison after hotplug") ... by removing any stale KASAN stack poison immediately prior to onlining a CPU. Subsequently in commit: f1a0a376ca0c4ef1 ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled") ... the refactoring left the KASAN and SCS cleanup in one-time idle thread initialization code rather than something invoked prior to each CPU being onlined, breaking both as above. We fixed SCS (but not KASAN) in commit: 63acd42c0d4942f7 ("sched/scs: Reset the shadow stack when idle_task_exit") ... but as this runs in the context of the idle task being offlined it's potentially fragile. To fix these consistently and more robustly, reset the SCS SP and KASAN shadow of a CPU's idle task immediately before we online that CPU in bringup_cpu(). This ensures the idle task always has a consistent state when it is running, and removes the need to so so when exiting an idle task. Whenever any thread is created, dup_task_struct() will give the task a stack which is free of KASAN shadow, and initialize the task's SCS SP, so there's no need to specially initialize either for idle thread within init_idle(), as this was only necessary to handle hotplug cycles. I've tested this on arm64 with: * gcc 11.1.0, defconfig +KASAN_INLINE, KASAN_STACK * clang 12.0.0, defconfig +KASAN_INLINE, KASAN_STACK, SHADOW_CALL_STACK ... offlining and onlining CPUS with: | while true; do | for C in /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/online; do | echo 0 > $C; | echo 1 > $C; | done | done Fixes: f1a0a376ca0c4ef1 ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled") Reported-by: Qian Cai Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider Tested-by: Qian Cai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211115113310.35693-1-mark.rutland@arm.com/ Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sched/fair: Prevent dead task groups from regaining cfs_rq's

2021-11-25T08:48:32Z

[ Upstream commit b027789e5e50494c2325cc70c8642e7fd6059479 ] Kevin is reporting crashes which point to a use-after-free of a cfs_rq in update_blocked_averages(). Initial debugging revealed that we've live cfs_rq's (on_list=1) in an about to be kfree()'d task group in free_fair_sched_group(). However, it was unclear how that can happen. His kernel config happened to lead to a layout of struct sched_entity that put the 'my_q' member directly into the middle of the object which makes it incidentally overlap with SLUB's freelist pointer. That, in combination with SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED's freelist pointer mangling, leads to a reliable access violation in form of a #GP which made the UAF fail fast. Michal seems to have run into the same issue[1]. He already correctly diagnosed that commit a7b359fc6a37 ("sched/fair: Correctly insert cfs_rq's to list on unthrottle") is causing the preconditions for the UAF to happen by re-adding cfs_rq's also to task groups that have no more running tasks, i.e. also to dead ones. His analysis, however, misses the real root cause and it cannot be seen from the crash backtrace only, as the real offender is tg_unthrottle_up() getting called via sched_cfs_period_timer() via the timer interrupt at an inconvenient time. When unregister_fair_sched_group() unlinks all cfs_rq's from the dying task group, it doesn't protect itself from getting interrupted. If the timer interrupt triggers while we iterate over all CPUs or after unregister_fair_sched_group() has finished but prior to unlinking the task group, sched_cfs_period_timer() will execute and walk the list of task groups, trying to unthrottle cfs_rq's, i.e. re-add them to the dying task group. These will later -- in free_fair_sched_group() -- be kfree()'ed while still being linked, leading to the fireworks Kevin and Michal are seeing. To fix this race, ensure the dying task group gets unlinked first. However, simply switching the order of unregistering and unlinking the task group isn't sufficient, as concurrent RCU walkers might still see it, as can be seen below: CPU1: CPU2: : timer IRQ: : do_sched_cfs_period_timer(): : : : distribute_cfs_runtime(): : rcu_read_lock(); : : : unthrottle_cfs_rq(): sched_offline_group(): : : walk_tg_tree_from(…,tg_unthrottle_up,…): list_del_rcu(&tg->list); : (1) : list_for_each_entry_rcu(child, &parent->children, siblings) : : (2) list_del_rcu(&tg->siblings); : : tg_unthrottle_up(): unregister_fair_sched_group(): struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = tg->cfs_rq[cpu_of(rq)]; : : list_del_leaf_cfs_rq(tg->cfs_rq[cpu]); : : : : if (!cfs_rq_is_decayed(cfs_rq) || cfs_rq->nr_running) (3) : list_add_leaf_cfs_rq(cfs_rq); : : : : : : : : : : (4) : rcu_read_unlock(); CPU 2 walks the task group list in parallel to sched_offline_group(), specifically, it'll read the soon to be unlinked task group entry at (1). Unlinking it on CPU 1 at (2) therefore won't prevent CPU 2 from still passing it on to tg_unthrottle_up(). CPU 1 now tries to unlink all cfs_rq's via list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() in unregister_fair_sched_group(). Meanwhile CPU 2 will re-add some of these at (3), which is the cause of the UAF later on. To prevent this additional race from happening, we need to wait until walk_tg_tree_from() has finished traversing the task groups, i.e. after the RCU read critical section ends in (4). Afterwards we're safe to call unregister_fair_sched_group(), as each new walk won't see the dying task group any more. On top of that, we need to wait yet another RCU grace period after unregister_fair_sched_group() to ensure print_cfs_stats(), which might run concurrently, always sees valid objects, i.e. not already free'd ones. This patch survives Michal's reproducer[2] for 8h+ now, which used to trigger within minutes before. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211011172236.11223-1-mkoutny@suse.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211102160228.GA57072@blackbody.suse.cz/ Fixes: a7b359fc6a37 ("sched/fair: Correctly insert cfs_rq's to list on unthrottle") [peterz: shuffle code around a bit] Reported-by: Kevin Tanguy Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sched/core: Mitigate race cpus_share_cache()/update_top_cache_domain()

2021-11-25T08:48:32Z

[ Upstream commit 42dc938a590c96eeb429e1830123fef2366d9c80 ] Nothing protects the access to the per_cpu variable sd_llc_id. When testing the same CPU (i.e. this_cpu == that_cpu), a race condition exists with update_top_cache_domain(). One scenario being: CPU1 CPU2 ================================================================== per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) => 0 partition_sched_domains_locked() detach_destroy_domains() cpus_share_cache(CPUX, CPUX) update_top_cache_domain(CPUX) per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) => 0 per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) = CPUX per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) => CPUX return false ttwu_queue_cond() wouldn't catch smp_processor_id() == cpu and the result is a warning triggered from ttwu_queue_wakelist(). Avoid a such race in cpus_share_cache() by always returning true when this_cpu == that_cpu. Fixes: 518cd6234178 ("sched: Only queue remote wakeups when crossing cache boundaries") Reported-by: Jing-Ting Wu Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211104175120.857087-1-vincent.donnefort@arm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kernel/sched: Fix sched_fork() access an invalid sched_task_group

2021-11-18T18:16:32Z

[ Upstream commit 4ef0c5c6b5ba1f38f0ea1cedad0cad722f00c14a ] There is a small race between copy_process() and sched_fork() where child->sched_task_group point to an already freed pointer. parent doing fork() | someone moving the parent | to another cgroup -------------------------------+------------------------------- copy_process() + dup_task_struct()<1> parent move to another cgroup, and free the old cgroup. <2> + sched_fork() + __set_task_cpu()<3> + task_fork_fair() + sched_slice()<4> In the worst case, this bug can lead to "use-after-free" and cause panic as shown above: (1) parent copy its sched_task_group to child at <1>; (2) someone move the parent to another cgroup and free the old cgroup at <2>; (3) the sched_task_group and cfs_rq that belong to the old cgroup will be accessed at <3> and <4>, which cause a panic: [] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 [] PGD 8000001fa0a86067 P4D 8000001fa0a86067 PUD 2029955067 PMD 0 [] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [] CPU: 7 PID: 648398 Comm: ebizzy Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE --------- - - 4.18.0.x86_64+ #1 [] RIP: 0010:sched_slice+0x84/0xc0 [] Call Trace: [] task_fork_fair+0x81/0x120 [] sched_fork+0x132/0x240 [] copy_process.part.5+0x675/0x20e0 [] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x63f/0x690 [] _do_fork+0xcd/0x3b0 [] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca [] RIP: 0033:0x7f04418cd7e1 Between cgroup_can_fork() and cgroup_post_fork(), the cgroup membership and thus sched_task_group can't change. So update child's sched_task_group at sched_post_fork() and move task_fork() and __set_task_cpu() (where accees the sched_task_group) from sched_fork() to sched_post_fork(). Fixes: 8323f26ce342 ("sched: Fix race in task_group") Signed-off-by: Zhang Qiao Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Tejun Heo Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210915064030.2231-1-zhangqiao22@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sched/scs: Reset the shadow stack when idle_task_exit

2021-10-19T15:46:11Z

Commit f1a0a376ca0c ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled") removed the init_idle() call from idle_thread_get(). This was the sole call-path on hotplug that resets the Shadow Call Stack (scs) Stack Pointer (sp). Not resetting the scs-sp leads to scs overflow after enough hotplug cycles. Therefore add an explicit scs_task_reset() to the hotplug code to make sure the scs-sp does get reset on hotplug. Fixes: f1a0a376ca0c ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled") Signed-off-by: Woody Lin [peterz: Changelog] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211012083521.973587-1-woodylin@google.com

Merge tag 'sched_urgent_for_v5.15_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2021-09-12T18:37:41Z

Pull scheduler fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Make sure the idle timer expires in hardirq context, on PREEMPT_RT - Make sure the run-queue balance callback is invoked only on the outgoing CPU * tag 'sched_urgent_for_v5.15_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: sched: Prevent balance_push() on remote runqueues sched/idle: Make the idle timer expire in hard interrupt context

sched: Prevent balance_push() on remote runqueues

2021-09-09T09:27:23Z

sched_setscheduler() and rt_mutex_setprio() invoke the run-queue balance callback after changing priorities or the scheduling class of a task. The run-queue for which the callback is invoked can be local or remote. That's not a problem for the regular rq::push_work which is serialized with a busy flag in the run-queue struct, but for the balance_push() work which is only valid to be invoked on the outgoing CPU that's wrong. It not only triggers the debug warning, but also leaves the per CPU variable push_work unprotected, which can result in double enqueues on the stop machine list. Remove the warning and validate that the function is invoked on the outgoing CPU. Fixes: ae7927023243 ("sched: Optimize finish_lock_switch()") Reported-by: Sebastian Siewior Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87zgt1hdw7.ffs@tglx

Merge tag 'locking-core-2021-08-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2021-08-30T21:26:36Z

Pull locking and atomics updates from Thomas Gleixner: "The regular pile: - A few improvements to the mutex code - Documentation updates for atomics to clarify the difference between cmpxchg() and try_cmpxchg() and to explain the forward progress expectations. - Simplification of the atomics fallback generator - The addition of arch_atomic_long*() variants and generic arch_*() bitops based on them. - Add the missing might_sleep() invocations to the down*() operations of semaphores. The PREEMPT_RT locking core: - Scheduler updates to support the state preserving mechanism for 'sleeping' spin- and rwlocks on RT. This mechanism is carefully preserving the state of the task when blocking on a 'sleeping' spin- or rwlock and takes regular wake-ups targeted at the same task into account. The preserved or updated (via a regular wakeup) state is restored when the lock has been acquired. - Restructuring of the rtmutex code so it can be utilized and extended for the RT specific lock variants. - Restructuring of the ww_mutex code to allow sharing of the ww_mutex specific functionality for rtmutex based ww_mutexes. - Header file disentangling to allow substitution of the regular lock implementations with the PREEMPT_RT variants without creating an unmaintainable #ifdef mess. - Shared base code for the PREEMPT_RT specific rw_semaphore and rwlock implementations. Contrary to the regular rw_semaphores and rwlocks the PREEMPT_RT implementation is writer unfair because it is infeasible to do priority inheritance on multiple readers. Experience over the years has shown that real-time workloads are not the typical workloads which are sensitive to writer starvation. The alternative solution would be to allow only a single reader which has been tried and discarded as it is a major bottleneck especially for mmap_sem. Aside of that many of the writer starvation critical usage sites have been converted to a writer side mutex/spinlock and RCU read side protections in the past decade so that the issue is less prominent than it used to be. - The actual rtmutex based lock substitutions for PREEMPT_RT enabled kernels which affect mutex, ww_mutex, rw_semaphore, spinlock_t and rwlock_t. The spin/rw_lock*() functions disable migration across the critical section to preserve the existing semantics vs per-CPU variables. - Rework of the futex REQUEUE_PI mechanism to handle the case of early wake-ups which interleave with a re-queue operation to prevent the situation that a task would be blocked on both the rtmutex associated to the outer futex and the rtmutex based hash bucket spinlock. While this situation cannot happen on !RT enabled kernels the changes make the underlying concurrency problems easier to understand in general. As a result the difference between !RT and RT kernels is reduced to the handling of waiting for the critical section. !RT kernels simply spin-wait as before and RT kernels utilize rcu_wait(). - The substitution of local_lock for PREEMPT_RT with a spinlock which protects the critical section while staying preemptible. The CPU locality is established by disabling migration. The underlying concepts of this code have been in use in PREEMPT_RT for way more than a decade. The code has been refactored several times over the years and this final incarnation has been optimized once again to be as non-intrusive as possible, i.e. the RT specific parts are mostly isolated. It has been extensively tested in the 5.14-rt patch series and it has been verified that !RT kernels are not affected by these changes" * tag 'locking-core-2021-08-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (92 commits) locking/rtmutex: Return success on deadlock for ww_mutex waiters locking/rtmutex: Prevent spurious EDEADLK return caused by ww_mutexes locking/rtmutex: Dequeue waiter on ww_mutex deadlock locking/rtmutex: Dont dereference waiter lockless locking/semaphore: Add might_sleep() to down_*() family locking/ww_mutex: Initialize waiter.ww_ctx properly static_call: Update API documentation locking/local_lock: Add PREEMPT_RT support locking/spinlock/rt: Prepare for RT local_lock locking/rtmutex: Add adaptive spinwait mechanism locking/rtmutex: Implement equal priority lock stealing preempt: Adjust PREEMPT_LOCK_OFFSET for RT locking/rtmutex: Prevent lockdep false positive with PI futexes futex: Prevent requeue_pi() lock nesting issue on RT futex: Simplify handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup() futex: Reorder sanity checks in futex_requeue() futex: Clarify comment in futex_requeue() futex: Restructure futex_requeue() futex: Correct the number of requeued waiters for PI futex: Remove bogus condition for requeue PI ...