user/sven/linux.git/kernel/seccomp.c, branch v4.4.235

seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code

2018-07-25T08:18:27Z

commit 8bf37d8c067bb7eb8e7c381bdadf9bd89182b6bc upstream The migitation control is simpler to implement in architecture code as it avoids the extra function call to check the mode. Aside of that having an explicit seccomp enabled mode in the architecture mitigations would require even more workarounds. Move it into architecture code and provide a weak function in the seccomp code. Remove the 'which' argument as this allows the architecture to decide which mitigations are relevant for seccomp. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov Reviewed-by: Bo Gan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation

2018-07-25T08:18:27Z

commit 00a02d0c502a06d15e07b857f8ff921e3e402675 upstream If a seccomp user is not interested in Speculative Store Bypass mitigation by default, it can set the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW flag when adding filters. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov Reviewed-by: Bo Gan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE

2018-07-25T08:18:27Z

commit b849a812f7eb92e96d1c8239b06581b2cfd8b275 upstream Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE in seccomp() because seccomp does not allow to widen restrictions. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov Reviewed-by: Bo Gan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations

2018-07-25T08:18:27Z

commit 5c3070890d06ff82eecb808d02d2ca39169533ef upstream When speculation flaw mitigations are opt-in (via prctl), using seccomp will automatically opt-in to these protections, since using seccomp indicates at least some level of sandboxing is desired. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov Reviewed-by: Bo Gan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

seccomp: fix the usage of get/put_seccomp_filter() in seccomp_get_filter()

2017-10-05T07:41:46Z

commit 66a733ea6b611aecf0119514d2dddab5f9d6c01e upstream. As Chris explains, get_seccomp_filter() and put_seccomp_filter() can end up using different filters. Once we drop ->siglock it is possible for task->seccomp.filter to have been replaced by SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC. Fixes: f8e529ed941b ("seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters") Reported-by: Chris Salls Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov [tycho: add __get_seccomp_filter vs. open coding refcount_inc()] Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen [kees: tweak commit log] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

seccomp: always propagate NO_NEW_PRIVS on tsync

2016-03-03T23:07:25Z

commit 103502a35cfce0710909da874f092cb44823ca03 upstream. Before this patch, a process with some permissive seccomp filter that was applied by root without NO_NEW_PRIVS was able to add more filters to itself without setting NO_NEW_PRIVS by setting the new filter from a throwaway thread with NO_NEW_PRIVS. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters

2015-10-28T02:55:13Z

This patch adds support for dumping a process' (classic BPF) seccomp filters via ptrace. PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER allows the tracer to dump the user's classic BPF seccomp filters. addr should be an integer which represents the ith seccomp filter (0 is the most recently installed filter). data should be a struct sock_filter * with enough room for the ith filter, or NULL, in which case the filter is not saved. The return value for this command is the number of BPF instructions the program represents, or negative in the case of errors. Command specific errors are ENOENT: which indicates that there is no ith filter in this seccomp tree, and EMEDIUMTYPE, which indicates that the ith filter was not installed as a classic BPF filter. A caveat with this approach is that there is no way to get explicitly at the heirarchy of seccomp filters, and users need to memcmp() filters to decide which are inherited. This means that a task which installs two of the same filter can potentially confuse users of this interface. v2: * make save_orig const * check that the orig_prog exists (not necessary right now, but when grows eBPF support it will be) * s/n/filter_off and make it an unsigned long to match ptrace * count "down" the tree instead of "up" when passing a filter offset v3: * don't take the current task's lock for inspecting its seccomp mode * use a 0x42** constant for the ptrace command value v4: * don't copy to userspace while holding spinlocks v5: * add another condition to WARN_ON v6: * rebase on net-next Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen Acked-by: Kees Cook CC: Will Drewry Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov CC: Andy Lutomirski CC: Pavel Emelyanov CC: Serge E. Hallyn CC: Alexei Starovoitov CC: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

bpf, seccomp: prepare for upcoming criu support

2015-10-05T13:47:05Z

The current ongoing effort to dump existing cBPF seccomp filters back to user space requires to hold the pre-transformed instructions like we do in case of socket filters from sk_attach_filter() side, so they can be reloaded in original form at a later point in time by utilities such as criu. To prepare for this, simply extend the bpf_prog_create_from_user() API to hold a flag that tells whether we should store the original or not. Also, fanout filters could make use of that in future for things like diag. While fanout filters already use bpf_prog_destroy(), move seccomp over to them as well to handle original programs when present. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Cc: Tycho Andersen Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Tested-by: Tycho Andersen Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

Merge tag 'seccomp-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux into next

2015-07-20T07:19:19Z

seccomp: swap hard-coded zeros to defined name

2015-07-15T18:52:54Z

For clarity, if CONFIG_SECCOMP isn't defined, seccomp_mode() is returning "disabled". This makes that more clear, along with another 0-use, and results in no operational change. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook