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<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel/sys.c, branch v6.2.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2023-01-21T15:14:17Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>prlimit: do_prlimit needs to have a speculation check</title>
<updated>2023-01-21T15:14:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-20T10:03:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:739790605705ddcf18f21782b9c99ad7d53a8c11</id>
<content type='text'>
do_prlimit() adds the user-controlled resource value to a pointer that
will subsequently be dereferenced.  In order to help prevent this
codepath from being used as a spectre "gadget" a barrier needs to be
added after checking the range.

Reported-by: Jordy Zomer &lt;jordyzomer@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jordy Zomer &lt;jordyzomer@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random</title>
<updated>2022-10-10T17:41:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-10T17:41:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8adc0486f3c85e3c1e40c1ce6884317a17c380d3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:

 - Huawei reported that when they updated their kernel from 4.4 to
   something much newer, some userspace code they had broke, the culprit
   being the accidental removal of O_NONBLOCK from /dev/random way back
   in 5.6. It's been gone for over 2 years now and this is the first
   we've heard of it, but userspace breakage is userspace breakage, so
   O_NONBLOCK is now back.

 - Use randomness from hardware RNGs much more often during early boot,
   at the same interval that crng reseeds are done, from Dominik.

 - A semantic change in hardware RNG throttling, so that the hwrng
   framework can properly feed random.c with randomness from hardware
   RNGs that aren't specifically marked as creditable.

   A related patch coming to you via Herbert's hwrng tree depends on
   this one, not to compile, but just to function properly, so you may
   want to merge this PULL before that one.

 - A fix to clamp credited bits from the interrupts pool to the size of
   the pool sample. This is mainly just a theoretical fix, as it'd be
   pretty hard to exceed it in practice.

 - Oracle reported that InfiniBand TCP latency regressed by around
   10-15% after a change a few cycles ago made at the request of the RT
   folks, in which we hoisted a somewhat rare operation (1 in 1024
   times) out of the hard IRQ handler and into a workqueue, a pretty
   common and boring pattern.

   It turns out, though, that scheduling a worker from there has
   overhead of its own, whereas scheduling a timer on that same CPU for
   the next jiffy amortizes better and doesn't incur the same overhead.

   I also eliminated a cache miss by moving the work_struct (and
   subsequently, the timer_list) to below a critical cache line, so that
   the more critical members that are accessed on every hard IRQ aren't
   split between two cache lines.

 - The boot-time initialization of the RNG has been split into two
   approximate phases: what we can accomplish before timekeeping is
   possible and what we can accomplish after.

   This winds up being useful so that we can use RDRAND to seed the RNG
   before CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y systems initialize slabs, in
   addition to other early uses of randomness. The effect is that
   systems with RDRAND (or a bootloader seed) will never see any
   warnings at all when setting CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM=y. And
   kfence benefits from getting a better seed of its own.

 - Small systems without much entropy sometimes wind up putting some
   truncated serial number read from flash into hostname, so contribute
   utsname changes to the RNG, without crediting.

 - Add smaller batches to serve requests for smaller integers, and make
   use of them when people ask for random numbers bounded by a given
   compile-time constant. This has positive effects all over the tree,
   most notably in networking and kfence.

 - The original jitter algorithm intended (I believe) to schedule the
   timer for the next jiffy, not the next-next jiffy, yet it used
   mod_timer(jiffies + 1), which will fire on the next-next jiffy,
   instead of what I believe was intended, mod_timer(jiffies), which
   will fire on the next jiffy. So fix that.

 - Fix a comment typo, from William.

* tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
  random: clear new batches when bringing new CPUs online
  random: fix typos in get_random_bytes() comment
  random: schedule jitter credit for next jiffy, not in two jiffies
  prandom: make use of smaller types in prandom_u32_max
  random: add 8-bit and 16-bit batches
  utsname: contribute changes to RNG
  random: use init_utsname() instead of utsname()
  kfence: use better stack hash seed
  random: split initialization into early step and later step
  random: use expired timer rather than wq for mixing fast pool
  random: avoid reading two cache lines on irq randomness
  random: clamp credited irq bits to maximum mixed
  random: throttle hwrng writes if no entropy is credited
  random: use hwgenerator randomness more frequently at early boot
  random: restore O_NONBLOCK support
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'ucount-rlimits-cleanups-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2022-10-09T23:24:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-09T23:24:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:493ffd6605b2d3d4dc7008ab927dba319f36671f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull ucounts update from Eric Biederman:
 "Split rlimit and ucount values and max values

  After the ucount rlimit code was merged a bunch of small but
  siginificant bugs were found and fixed. At the time it was realized
  that part of the problem was that while the ucount rlimits were very
  similar to the oridinary ucounts (in being nested counts with limits)
  the semantics were slightly different and the code would be less error
  prone if there was less sharing.

  This is the long awaited cleanup that should hopefully keep things
  more comprehensible and less error prone for whoever needs to touch
  that code next"

* tag 'ucount-rlimits-cleanups-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>utsname: contribute changes to RNG</title>
<updated>2022-09-29T19:37:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-27T09:35:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:37608ba315a2b1b548aa5b1064e5559e029cb016</id>
<content type='text'>
On some small machines with little entropy, a quasi-unique hostname is
sometimes a relevant factor. I've seen, for example, 8 character
alpha-numeric serial numbers. In addition, the time at which the hostname
is set is usually a decent measurement of how long early boot took. So,
call add_device_randomness() on new hostnames, which feeds its arguments
to the RNG in addition to a fresh cycle counter.

Low cost hooks like this never hurt and can only ever help, and since
this costs basically nothing for an operation that is never a fast path,
this is an overall easy win.

Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values</title>
<updated>2022-05-18T23:24:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Gladkov</name>
<email>legion@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T17:17:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:de399236e240743ad2dd10d719c37b97ddf31996</id>
<content type='text'>
Since the semantics of maximum rlimit values are different, it would be
better not to mix ucount and rlimit values. This will prevent the error
of using inc_count/dec_ucount for rlimit parameters.

This patch also renames the functions to emphasize the lack of
connection between rlimit and ucount.

v3:
- Fix BUG:KASAN:use-after-free_in_dec_ucount.

v2:
- Fix the array-index-out-of-bounds that was found by the lkp project.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;oliver.sang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov &lt;legion@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220518171730.l65lmnnjtnxnftpq@example.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64/sme: Implement vector length configuration prctl()s</title>
<updated>2022-04-22T17:50:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Brown</name>
<email>broonie@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-19T11:22:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9e4ab6c89109472082616f8d2f6ada7deaffe161</id>
<content type='text'>
As for SVE provide a prctl() interface which allows processes to
configure their SME vector length.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419112247.711548-12-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>prlimit: do not grab the tasklist_lock</title>
<updated>2022-03-08T20:33:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Barret Rhoden</name>
<email>brho@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-06T17:20:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:18c91bb2d87268d23868bf13508f5bc9cf04e89a</id>
<content type='text'>
Unnecessarily grabbing the tasklist_lock can be a scalability bottleneck
for workloads that also must grab the tasklist_lock for waiting,
killing, and cloning.

The tasklist_lock was grabbed to protect tsk-&gt;sighand from disappearing
(becoming NULL).  tsk-&gt;signal was already protected by holding a
reference to tsk.

update_rlimit_cpu() assumed tsk-&gt;sighand != NULL.  With this commit, it
attempts to lock_task_sighand().  However, this means that
update_rlimit_cpu() can fail.  This only happens when a task is exiting.
Note that during exec, sighand may *change*, but it will not be NULL.

Prior to this commit, the do_prlimit() ensured that update_rlimit_cpu()
would not fail by read locking the tasklist_lock and checking tsk-&gt;sighand
!= NULL.

If update_rlimit_cpu() fails, there may be other tasks that are not
exiting that share tsk-&gt;signal.  However, the group_leader is the last
task to be released, so if we cannot update_rlimit_cpu(group_leader),
then the entire process is exiting.

The only other caller of update_rlimit_cpu() is
selinux_bprm_committing_creds().  It has tsk == current, so
update_rlimit_cpu() cannot fail (current-&gt;sighand cannot disappear
until current exits).

This change resulted in a 14% speedup on a microbenchmark where parents
kill and wait on their children, and children getpriority, setpriority,
and getrlimit.

Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden &lt;brho@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220106172041.522167-4-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>prlimit: make do_prlimit() static</title>
<updated>2022-03-08T20:33:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Barret Rhoden</name>
<email>brho@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-06T17:20:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c57bef0287dd5deeabaea5727950559fb9037cd9</id>
<content type='text'>
There are no other callers in the kernel.

Fixed up a comment format and whitespace issue when moving do_prlimit()
higher in sys.c.

Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden &lt;brho@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220106172041.522167-3-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: refactor vm_area_struct::anon_vma_name usage code</title>
<updated>2022-03-05T19:08:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Suren Baghdasaryan</name>
<email>surenb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-05T04:28:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5c26f6ac9416b63d093e29c30e79b3297e425472</id>
<content type='text'>
Avoid mixing strings and their anon_vma_name referenced pointers by
using struct anon_vma_name whenever possible.  This simplifies the code
and allows easier sharing of anon_vma_name structures when they
represent the same name.

[surenb@google.com: fix comment]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220223153613.835563-1-surenb@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220224231834.1481408-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Colin Cross &lt;ccross@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Gladkov &lt;legion@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Hyser &lt;chris.hyser@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Peter Collingbourne &lt;pcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Xiaofeng Cao &lt;caoxiaofeng@yulong.com&gt;
Cc: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ucounts: Move RLIMIT_NPROC handling after set_user</title>
<updated>2022-02-17T15:11:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-14T15:40:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c923a8e7edb010da67424077cbf1a6f1396ebd2e</id>
<content type='text'>
During set*id() which cred-&gt;ucounts to charge the the current process
to is not known until after set_cred_ucounts.  So move the
RLIMIT_NPROC checking into a new helper flag_nproc_exceeded and call
flag_nproc_exceeded after set_cred_ucounts.

This is very much an arbitrary subset of the places where we currently
change the RLIMIT_NPROC accounting, designed to preserve the existing
logic.

Fixing the existing logic will be the subject of another series of
changes.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-4-ebiederm@xmission.com
Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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