user/sven/linux.git/kernel/sysctl.c, branch v3.7

Kconfig: clean up the "#if defined(arch)" list for exception-trace sysctl entry

2012-10-09T07:22:14Z

Introduce SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE config option and selec it in the architectures requiring support for the "exception-trace" debug_table entry in kernel/sysctl.c. Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

coredump: make core dump functionality optional

2012-10-05T18:05:15Z

Adds an expert Kconfig option, CONFIG_COREDUMP, which allows disabling of core dump. This saves approximately 2.6k in the compiled kernel, and complements CONFIG_ELF_CORE, which now depends on it. CONFIG_COREDUMP also disables coredump-related sysctls, except for suid_dumpable and related functions, which are necessary for ptrace. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix binfmt_aout.c build] Signed-off-by: Alex Kelly Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 'arm64-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cmarinas/linux-aarch64

2012-10-01T18:51:57Z

Pull arm64 support from Catalin Marinas: "Linux support for the 64-bit ARM architecture (AArch64) Features currently supported: - 39-bit address space for user and kernel (each) - 4KB and 64KB page configurations - Compat (32-bit) user applications (ARMv7, EABI only) - Flattened Device Tree (mandated for all AArch64 platforms) - ARM generic timers" * tag 'arm64-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cmarinas/linux-aarch64: (35 commits) arm64: ptrace: remove obsolete ptrace request numbers from user headers arm64: Do not set the SMP/nAMP processor bit arm64: MAINTAINERS update arm64: Build infrastructure arm64: Miscellaneous header files arm64: Generic timers support arm64: Loadable modules arm64: Miscellaneous library functions arm64: Performance counters support arm64: Add support for /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace arm64: Debugging support arm64: Floating point and SIMD arm64: 32-bit (compat) applications support arm64: User access library functions arm64: Signal handling support arm64: VDSO support arm64: System calls handling arm64: ELF definitions arm64: SMP support arm64: DMA mapping API ...

arm64: Add support for /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace

2012-09-17T12:42:16Z

This patch allows setting of the show_unhandled_signals variable via /proc/sys/debug/exception-trace. The default value is currently 1 showing unhandled user faults (undefined instructions, data aborts) and invalid signal stack frames. Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Acked-by: Tony Lindgren Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre Acked-by: Olof Johansson Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar

sched: Add time unit suffix to sched sysctl knobs

2012-09-04T12:31:34Z

Unlike others, sched_migration_cost, sched_time_avg and sched_shares_window doesn't have time unit as suffix. Add them. Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1345083330-19486-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2012-08-01T17:26:23Z

Pull second vfs pile from Al Viro: "The stuff in there: fsfreeze deadlock fixes by Jan (essentially, the deadlock reproduced by xfstests 068), symlink and hardlink restriction patches, plus assorted cleanups and fixes. Note that another fsfreeze deadlock (emergency thaw one) is *not* dealt with - the series by Fernando conflicts a lot with Jan's, breaks userland ABI (FIFREEZE semantics gets changed) and trades the deadlock for massive vfsmount leak; this is going to be handled next cycle. There probably will be another pull request, but that stuff won't be in it." Fix up trivial conflicts due to unrelated changes next to each other in drivers/{staging/gdm72xx/usb_boot.c, usb/gadget/storage_common.c} * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (54 commits) delousing target_core_file a bit Documentation: Correct s_umount state for freeze_fs/unfreeze_fs fs: Remove old freezing mechanism ext2: Implement freezing btrfs: Convert to new freezing mechanism nilfs2: Convert to new freezing mechanism ntfs: Convert to new freezing mechanism fuse: Convert to new freezing mechanism gfs2: Convert to new freezing mechanism ocfs2: Convert to new freezing mechanism xfs: Convert to new freezing code ext4: Convert to new freezing mechanism fs: Protect write paths by sb_start_write - sb_end_write fs: Skip atime update on frozen filesystem fs: Add freezing handling to mnt_want_write() / mnt_drop_write() fs: Improve filesystem freezing handling switch the protection of percpu_counter list to spinlock nfsd: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutex btrfs: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutex fat: Push mnt_want_write() outside of i_mutex ...

mm: prepare for removal of obsolete /proc/sys/vm/nr_pdflush_threads

2012-08-01T01:42:40Z

Since per-BDI flusher threads were introduced in 2.6, the pdflush mechanism is not used any more. But the old interface exported through /proc/sys/vm/nr_pdflush_threads still exists and is obviously useless. For back-compatibility, printk warning information and return 2 to notify the users that the interface is removed. Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li Cc: Wu Fengguang Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

sysctl: suppress kmemleak messages

2012-07-31T00:25:21Z

register_sysctl_table() is a strange function, as it makes internal allocations (a header) to register a sysctl_table. This header is a handle to the table that is created, and can be used to unregister the table. But if the table is permanent and never unregistered, the header acts the same as a static variable. Unfortunately, this allocation of memory that is never expected to be freed fools kmemleak in thinking that we have leaked memory. For those sysctl tables that are never unregistered, and have no pointer referencing them, kmemleak will think that these are memory leaks: unreferenced object 0xffff880079fb9d40 (size 192): comm "swapper/0", pid 0, jiffies 4294667316 (age 12614.152s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmemleak_alloc+0x73/0x98 [] kmemleak_alloc_recursive.constprop.42+0x16/0x18 [] __kmalloc+0x107/0x153 [] kzalloc.constprop.8+0xe/0x10 [] __register_sysctl_paths+0xe1/0x160 [] register_sysctl_paths+0x1b/0x1d [] register_sysctl_table+0x18/0x1a [] sysctl_init+0x10/0x14 [] proc_sys_init+0x2f/0x31 [] proc_root_init+0xa5/0xa7 [] start_kernel+0x3d0/0x40a [] x86_64_start_reservations+0xae/0xb2 [] x86_64_start_kernel+0x102/0x111 [] 0xffffffffffffffff The sysctl_base_table used by sysctl itself is one such instance that registers the table to never be unregistered. Use kmemleak_not_leak() to suppress the kmemleak false positive. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt Acked-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

coredump: warn about unsafe suid_dumpable / core_pattern combo

2012-07-31T00:25:11Z

When suid_dumpable=2, detect unsafe core_pattern settings and warn when they are seen. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Suggested-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Alan Cox Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Doug Ledford Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fs: add link restrictions

2012-07-29T17:37:58Z

This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS. Symlinks: A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp The solution is to permit symlinks to only be followed when outside a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. Some pointers to the history of earlier discussion that I could find: 1996 Aug, Zygo Blaxell http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=87602167419830&w=2 1996 Oct, Andrew Tridgell http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9610.2/0086.html 1997 Dec, Albert D Cahalan http://lkml.org/lkml/1997/12/16/4 2005 Feb, Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0502.0/1896.html 2010 May, Kees Cook https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/30/144 Past objections and rebuttals could be summarized as: - Violates POSIX. - POSIX didn't consider this situation and it's not useful to follow a broken specification at the cost of security. - Might break unknown applications that use this feature. - Applications that break because of the change are easy to spot and fix. Applications that are vulnerable to symlink ToCToU by not having the change aren't. Additionally, no applications have yet been found that rely on this behavior. - Applications should just use mkstemp() or O_CREATE|O_EXCL. - True, but applications are not perfect, and new software is written all the time that makes these mistakes; blocking this flaw at the kernel is a single solution to the entire class of vulnerability. - This should live in the core VFS. - This should live in an LSM. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/31/135) - This should live in an LSM. - This should live in the core VFS. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/2/188) Hardlinks: On systems that have user-writable directories on the same partition as system files, a long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally, an issue exists where users can "pin" a potentially vulnerable setuid/setgid file so that an administrator will not actually upgrade a system fully. The solution is to permit hardlinks to only be created when the user is already the existing file's owner, or if they already have read/write access to the existing file. Many Linux users are surprised when they learn they can link to files they have no access to, so this change appears to follow the doctrine of "least surprise". Additionally, this change does not violate POSIX, which states "the implementation may require that the calling process has permission to access the existing file"[1]. This change is known to break some implementations of the "at" daemon, though the version used by Fedora and Ubuntu has been fixed[2] for a while. Otherwise, the change has been undisruptive while in use in Ubuntu for the last 1.5 years. [1] http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/linkat.html [2] http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=collab-maint/at.git;a=commitdiff;h=f4114656c3a6c6f6070e315ffdf940a49eda3279 This patch is based on the patches in Openwall and grsecurity, along with suggestions from Al Viro. I have added a sysctl to enable the protected behavior, and documentation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Al Viro