<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v3.4.97</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.4.97</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.4.97'/>
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<updated>2014-07-07T01:49:20Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix syscall_*regfunc() vs copy_process() race</title>
<updated>2014-07-07T01:49:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-13T18:58:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0c3351a0a4815ea566d3febf82033b6c55ed4a2d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c3351a0a4815ea566d3febf82033b6c55ed4a2d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4af4206be2bd1933cae20c2b6fb2058dbc887f7c upstream.

syscall_regfunc() and syscall_unregfunc() should set/clear
TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT system-wide, but do_each_thread() can race
with copy_process() and miss the new child which was not added to
the process/thread lists yet.

Change copy_process() to update the child's TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT
under tasklist.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/20140413185854.GB20668@redhat.com

Fixes: a871bd33a6c0 "tracing: Add syscall tracepoints"
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>genirq: Sanitize spurious interrupt detection of threaded irqs</title>
<updated>2014-07-01T03:01:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-07T13:53:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a97df3f22b83742deb9191d53928641ec3befb6e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a97df3f22b83742deb9191d53928641ec3befb6e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1e77d0a1ed7417d2a5a52a7b8d32aea1833faa6c upstream.

Till reported that the spurious interrupt detection of threaded
interrupts is broken in two ways:

- note_interrupt() is called for each action thread of a shared
  interrupt line. That's wrong as we are only interested whether none
  of the device drivers felt responsible for the interrupt, but by
  calling multiple times for a single interrupt line we account
  IRQ_NONE even if one of the drivers felt responsible.

- note_interrupt() when called from the thread handler is not
  serialized. That leaves the members of irq_desc which are used for
  the spurious detection unprotected.

To solve this we need to defer the spurious detection of a threaded
interrupt to the next hardware interrupt context where we have
implicit serialization.

If note_interrupt is called with action_ret == IRQ_WAKE_THREAD, we
check whether the previous interrupt requested a deferred check. If
not, we request a deferred check for the next hardware interrupt and
return.

If set, we check whether one of the interrupt threads signaled
success. Depending on this information we feed the result into the
spurious detector.

If one primary handler of a shared interrupt returns IRQ_HANDLED we
disable the deferred check of irq threads on the same line, as we have
found at least one device driver who cared.

Reported-by: Till Straumann &lt;strauman@slac.stanford.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Austin Schuh &lt;austin@peloton-tech.com&gt;
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger &lt;wg@grandegger.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Pisa &lt;pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz&gt;
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1303071450130.22263@ionos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nohz: Fix another inconsistency between CONFIG_NO_HZ=n and nohz=off</title>
<updated>2014-06-26T19:10:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-29T11:18:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3f8f4ae48f4023e1c53722b1dc1a7ab897cbca14'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f8f4ae48f4023e1c53722b1dc1a7ab897cbca14</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0e576acbc1d9600cf2d9b4a141a2554639959d50 upstream.

If CONFIG_NO_HZ=n tick_nohz_get_sleep_length() returns NSEC_PER_SEC/HZ.

If CONFIG_NO_HZ=y and the nohz functionality is disabled via the
command line option "nohz=off" or not enabled due to missing hardware
support, then tick_nohz_get_sleep_length() returns 0. That happens
because ts-&gt;sleep_length is never set in that case.

Set it to NSEC_PER_SEC/HZ when the NOHZ mode is inactive.

Reported-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Rui Xiang &lt;rui.xiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking</title>
<updated>2014-06-16T20:45:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-29T03:09:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:39da9a416814e556060bab8569293b8f3d889765</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream.

Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.

This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.

eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Fix hotplug vs. set_cpus_allowed_ptr()</title>
<updated>2014-06-11T19:04:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lai Jiangshan</name>
<email>laijs@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-16T03:50:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d6e81d4f7b4e8cea2817c7568e3756798cd29aae'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d6e81d4f7b4e8cea2817c7568e3756798cd29aae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6acbfb96976fc3350e30d964acb1dbbdf876d55e upstream.

Lai found that:

  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 13 at arch/x86/kernel/smp.c:124 native_smp_send_reschedule+0x2d/0x4b()
  ...
  migration_cpu_stop+0x1d/0x22

was caused by set_cpus_allowed_ptr() assuming that cpu_active_mask is
always a sub-set of cpu_online_mask.

This isn't true since 5fbd036b552f ("sched: Cleanup cpu_active madness").

So set active and online at the same time to avoid this particular
problem.

Fixes: 5fbd036b552f ("sched: Cleanup cpu_active madness")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Gautham R. Shenoy &lt;ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michael wang &lt;wangyun@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Toshi Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hp.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/53758B12.8060609@cn.fujitsu.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix race in removing an event</title>
<updated>2014-06-11T19:04:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-02T14:56:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4b2cfc9508d9e509708f85748548e03db696dbcd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4b2cfc9508d9e509708f85748548e03db696dbcd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 46ce0fe97a6be7532ce6126bb26ce89fed81528c upstream.

When removing a (sibling) event we do:

	raw_spin_lock_irq(&amp;ctx-&gt;lock);
	perf_group_detach(event);
	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&amp;ctx-&gt;lock);

	&lt;hole&gt;

	perf_remove_from_context(event);
		raw_spin_lock_irq(&amp;ctx-&gt;lock);
		...
		raw_spin_unlock_irq(&amp;ctx-&gt;lock);

Now, assuming the event is a sibling, it will be 'unreachable' for
things like ctx_sched_out() because that iterates the
groups-&gt;siblings, and we just unhooked the sibling.

So, if during &lt;hole&gt; we get ctx_sched_out(), it will miss the event
and not call event_sched_out() on it, leaving it programmed on the
PMU.

The subsequent perf_remove_from_context() call will find the ctx is
inactive and only call list_del_event() to remove the event from all
other lists.

Hereafter we can proceed to free the event; while still programmed!

Close this hole by moving perf_group_detach() inside the same
ctx-&gt;lock region(s) perf_remove_from_context() has.

The condition on inherited events only in __perf_event_exit_task() is
likely complete crap because non-inherited events are part of groups
too and we're tearing down just the same. But leave that for another
patch.

Most-likely-Fixes: e03a9a55b4e ("perf: Change close() semantics for group events")
Reported-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Much-staring-at-traces-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Much-staring-at-traces-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140505093124.GN17778@laptop.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Limit perf_event_attr::sample_period to 63 bits</title>
<updated>2014-06-11T19:04:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-15T18:23:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=183f99ecb6a484c142ae2fc99df3ef5cdadc3985'/>
<id>urn:sha1:183f99ecb6a484c142ae2fc99df3ef5cdadc3985</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0819b2e30ccb93edf04876237b6205eef84ec8d2 upstream.

Vince reported that using a large sample_period (one with bit 63 set)
results in wreckage since while the sample_period is fundamentally
unsigned (negative periods don't make sense) the way we implement
things very much rely on signed logic.

So limit sample_period to 63 bits to avoid tripping over this.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-p25fhunibl4y3qi0zuqmyf4b@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Prevent false warning in perf_swevent_add</title>
<updated>2014-06-11T19:04:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Olsa</name>
<email>jolsa@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-07T09:04:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0d41f6026aa0c15d60e75f8f71f1408c32fe1ba4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0d41f6026aa0c15d60e75f8f71f1408c32fe1ba4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 39af6b1678afa5880dda7e375cf3f9d395087f6d upstream.

The perf cpu offline callback takes down all cpu context
events and releases swhash-&gt;swevent_hlist.

This could race with task context software event being just
scheduled on this cpu via perf_swevent_add while cpu hotplug
code already cleaned up event's data.

The race happens in the gap between the cpu notifier code
and the cpu being actually taken down. Note that only cpu
ctx events are terminated in the perf cpu hotplug code.

It's easily reproduced with:
  $ perf record -e faults perf bench sched pipe

while putting one of the cpus offline:
  # echo 0 &gt; /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online

Console emits following warning:
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2845 at kernel/events/core.c:5672 perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0()
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 2845 Comm: sched-pipe Tainted: G        W    3.14.0+ #256
  Hardware name: Intel Corporation Montevina platform/To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS AMVACRB1.86C.0066.B00.0805070703 05/07/2008
   0000000000000009 ffff880077233ab8 ffffffff81665a23 0000000000200005
   0000000000000000 ffff880077233af8 ffffffff8104732c 0000000000000046
   ffff88007467c800 0000000000000002 ffff88007a9cf2a0 0000000000000001
  Call Trace:
   [&lt;ffffffff81665a23&gt;] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7c
   [&lt;ffffffff8104732c&gt;] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0
   [&lt;ffffffff8104737a&gt;] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
   [&lt;ffffffff8110fb3d&gt;] perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0
   [&lt;ffffffff811162ae&gt;] event_sched_in.isra.75+0x9e/0x1f0
   [&lt;ffffffff8111646a&gt;] group_sched_in+0x6a/0x1f0
   [&lt;ffffffff81083dd5&gt;] ? sched_clock_local+0x25/0xa0
   [&lt;ffffffff811167e6&gt;] ctx_sched_in+0x1f6/0x450
   [&lt;ffffffff8111757b&gt;] perf_event_sched_in+0x6b/0xa0
   [&lt;ffffffff81117a4b&gt;] perf_event_context_sched_in+0x7b/0xc0
   [&lt;ffffffff81117ece&gt;] __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x43e/0x460
   [&lt;ffffffff81096f1e&gt;] ? put_lock_stats.isra.18+0xe/0x30
   [&lt;ffffffff8107b3c8&gt;] finish_task_switch+0xb8/0x100
   [&lt;ffffffff8166a7de&gt;] __schedule+0x30e/0xad0
   [&lt;ffffffff81172dd2&gt;] ? pipe_read+0x3e2/0x560
   [&lt;ffffffff8166b45e&gt;] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70
   [&lt;ffffffff8166b45e&gt;] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70
   [&lt;ffffffff8166b464&gt;] preempt_schedule_irq+0x44/0x70
   [&lt;ffffffff816707f0&gt;] retint_kernel+0x20/0x30
   [&lt;ffffffff8109e60a&gt;] ? lockdep_sys_exit+0x1a/0x90
   [&lt;ffffffff812a4234&gt;] lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x35/0x67
   [&lt;ffffffff81679321&gt;] ? sysret_check+0x5/0x56

Fixing this by tracking the cpu hotplug state and displaying
the WARN only if current cpu is initialized properly.

Cc: Corey Ashford &lt;cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1396861448-10097-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Use CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES instead of MAX_RT_PRIO in cpupri check</title>
<updated>2014-06-11T19:04:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-13T13:34:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4e0d105c09b8bec501ff5455b774bf3a845d017c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4e0d105c09b8bec501ff5455b774bf3a845d017c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6227cb00cc120f9a43ce8313bb0475ddabcb7d01 upstream.

The check at the beginning of cpupri_find() makes sure that the task_pri
variable does not exceed the cp-&gt;pri_to_cpu array length. But that length
is CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES not MAX_RT_PRIO, where it will miss the last two
priorities in that array.

As task_pri is computed from convert_prio() which should never be bigger
than CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES, if the check should cause a panic if it is
hit.

Reported-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1397015410.5212.13.camel@marge.simpson.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T23:02:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-03T12:27:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=11b9a7a786232e811cbe988543cb83b5ff1a829c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:11b9a7a786232e811cbe988543cb83b5ff1a829c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 54a217887a7b658e2650c3feff22756ab80c7339 upstream.

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex.  We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address.  This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

       Waiter | pi_state | pi-&gt;owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

  [1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
  [2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | &gt;0        | 0/1    | Valid

  [3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

  [4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
  [5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | &gt;0        | 1      | Invalid

  [6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

  [7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

  [8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
  [9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
  [10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

 [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

 [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

 [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

 [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

 [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

 [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

 [7] pi_state-&gt;owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

 [8] Owner and user space value match

 [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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