user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v4.14.162

ptp: fix the race between the release of ptp_clock and cdev

2020-01-04T13:00:12Z

[ Upstream commit a33121e5487b424339636b25c35d3a180eaa5f5e ] In a case when a ptp chardev (like /dev/ptp0) is open but an underlying device is removed, closing this file leads to a race. This reproduces easily in a kvm virtual machine: ts# cat openptp0.c int main() { ... fp = fopen("/dev/ptp0", "r"); ... sleep(10); } ts# uname -r 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e ts# cat /proc/cmdline ... slub_debug=FZP ts# modprobe ptp_kvm ts# ./openptp0 & [1] 670 opened /dev/ptp0, sleeping 10s... ts# rmmod ptp_kvm ts# ls /dev/ptp* ls: cannot access '/dev/ptp*': No such file or directory ts# ...woken up [ 48.010809] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 48.012502] CPU: 6 PID: 658 Comm: openptp0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e #25 [ 48.014624] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ... [ 48.016270] RIP: 0010:module_put.part.0+0x7/0x80 [ 48.017939] RSP: 0018:ffffb3850073be00 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 48.018339] RAX: 000000006b6b6b6b RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RCX: ffff89a476c00ad0 [ 48.018936] RDX: fffff65a08d3ea08 RSI: 0000000000000247 RDI: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b [ 48.019470] ... ^^^ a slub poison [ 48.023854] Call Trace: [ 48.024050] __fput+0x21f/0x240 [ 48.024288] task_work_run+0x79/0x90 [ 48.024555] do_exit+0x2af/0xab0 [ 48.024799] ? vfs_write+0x16a/0x190 [ 48.025082] do_group_exit+0x35/0x90 [ 48.025387] __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0x10 [ 48.025737] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x130 [ 48.026056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 48.026479] RIP: 0033:0x7f53b12082f6 [ 48.026792] ... [ 48.030945] Modules linked in: ptp i6300esb watchdog [last unloaded: ptp_kvm] [ 48.045001] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed! This happens in: static void __fput(struct file *file) { ... if (file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release(inode, file); <<< cdev is kfree'd here if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL && !(mode & FMODE_PATH))) { cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); <<< cdev fields are accessed here Namely: __fput() posix_clock_release() kref_put(&clk->kref, delete_clock) <<< the last reference delete_clock() delete_ptp_clock() kfree(ptp) <<< cdev is embedded in ptp cdev_put module_put(p->owner) <<< *p is kfree'd, bang! Here cdev is embedded in posix_clock which is embedded in ptp_clock. The race happens because ptp_clock's lifetime is controlled by two refcounts: kref and cdev.kobj in posix_clock. This is wrong. Make ptp_clock's sysfs device a parent of cdev with cdev_device_add() created especially for such cases. This way the parent device with its ptp_clock is not released until all references to the cdev are released. This adds a requirement that an initialized but not exposed struct device should be provided to posix_clock_register() by a caller instead of a simple dev_t. This approach was adopted from the commit 72139dfa2464 ("watchdog: Fix the race between the release of watchdog_core_data and cdev"). See details of the implementation in the commit 233ed09d7fda ("chardev: add helper function to register char devs with a struct device"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20191125125342.6189-1-vdronov@redhat.com/T/#u Analyzed-by: Stephen Johnston Analyzed-by: Vern Lovejoy Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov Acked-by: Richard Cochran Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

hrtimer: Annotate lockless access to timer->state

2020-01-04T13:00:08Z

commit 56144737e67329c9aaed15f942d46a6302e2e3d8 upstream. syzbot reported various data-race caused by hrtimer_is_queued() reading timer->state. A READ_ONCE() is required there to silence the warning. Also add the corresponding WRITE_ONCE() when timer->state is set. In remove_hrtimer() the hrtimer_is_queued() helper is open coded to avoid loading timer->state twice. KCSAN reported these cases: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __remove_hrtimer / tcp_pacing_check write to 0xffff8880b2a7d388 of 1 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: __remove_hrtimer+0x52/0x130 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:991 __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1496 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x250/0x600 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1576 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x10e/0x150 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1593 __do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292 run_ksoftirqd+0x46/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:603 smpboot_thread_fn+0x37d/0x4a0 kernel/smpboot.c:165 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 read to 0xffff8880b2a7d388 of 1 bytes by task 24652 on cpu 1: tcp_pacing_check net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2235 [inline] tcp_pacing_check+0xba/0x130 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2225 tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue+0x32c/0x5a0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3044 tcp_xmit_recovery+0x7c/0x120 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3558 tcp_ack+0x17b6/0x3170 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3717 tcp_rcv_established+0x37e/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5696 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x381/0x4e0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1561 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:945 [inline] __release_sock+0x135/0x1e0 net/core/sock.c:2435 release_sock+0x61/0x160 net/core/sock.c:2951 sk_stream_wait_memory+0x3d7/0x7c0 net/core/stream.c:145 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xb47/0x1f30 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1393 tcp_sendmsg+0x39/0x60 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1434 inet_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __remove_hrtimer / __tcp_ack_snd_check write to 0xffff8880a3a65588 of 1 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: __remove_hrtimer+0x52/0x130 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:991 __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1496 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x250/0x600 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1576 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x10e/0x150 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1593 __do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline] irq_exit+0xbb/0xe0 kernel/softirq.c:413 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xe6/0x280 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:830 read to 0xffff8880a3a65588 of 1 bytes by task 22891 on cpu 1: __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x415/0x4f0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5265 tcp_ack_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5287 [inline] tcp_rcv_established+0x750/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5708 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x381/0x4e0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1561 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:945 [inline] __release_sock+0x135/0x1e0 net/core/sock.c:2435 release_sock+0x61/0x160 net/core/sock.c:2951 sk_stream_wait_memory+0x3d7/0x7c0 net/core/stream.c:145 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xb47/0x1f30 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1393 tcp_sendmsg+0x39/0x60 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1434 inet_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657 __sys_sendto+0x21f/0x320 net/socket.c:1952 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1964 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1960 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x89/0xb0 net/socket.c:1960 do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 24652 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 [ tglx: Added comments ] Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106174804.74723-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernel: sysctl: make drop_caches write-only

2020-01-04T12:59:57Z

[ Upstream commit 204cb79ad42f015312a5bbd7012d09c93d9b46fb ] Currently, the drop_caches proc file and sysctl read back the last value written, suggesting this is somehow a stateful setting instead of a one-time command. Make it write-only, like e.g. compact_memory. While mitigating a VM problem at scale in our fleet, there was confusion about whether writing to this file will permanently switch the kernel into a non-caching mode. This influences the decision making in a tense situation, where tens of people are trying to fix tens of thousands of affected machines: Do we need a rollback strategy? What are the performance implications of operating in a non-caching state for several days? It also caused confusion when the kernel team said we may need to write the file several times to make sure it's effective ("But it already reads back 3?"). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031221602.9375-1-hannes@cmpxchg.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner Acked-by: Chris Down Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka Acked-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: Michal Hocko Acked-by: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kernel/module.c: wakeup processes in module_wq on module unload

2019-12-17T19:40:02Z

[ Upstream commit 5d603311615f612320bb77bd2a82553ef1ced5b7 ] Fix the race between load and unload a kernel module. sys_delete_module() try_stop_module() mod->state = _GOING add_unformed_module() old = find_module_all() (old->state == _GOING => wait_event_interruptible()) During pre-condition finished_loading() rets 0 schedule() (never gets waken up later) free_module() mod->state = _UNFORMED list_del_rcu(&mod->list) (dels mod from "modules" list) return The race above leads to modprobe hanging forever on loading a module. Error paths on loading module call wake_up_all(&module_wq) after freeing module, so let's do the same on straight module unload. Fixes: 6e6de3dee51a ("kernel/module.c: Only return -EEXIST for modules that have finished loading") Reviewed-by: Prarit Bhargava Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khorenko Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

workqueue: Fix missing kfree(rescuer) in destroy_workqueue()

2019-12-17T19:39:59Z

commit 8efe1223d73c218ce7e8b2e0e9aadb974b582d7f upstream. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Reported-by: Qian Cai Fixes: def98c84b6cd ("workqueue: Fix spurious sanity check failures in destroy_workqueue()") Cc: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cgroup: pids: use atomic64_t for pids->limit

2019-12-17T19:39:29Z

commit a713af394cf382a30dd28a1015cbe572f1b9ca75 upstream. Because pids->limit can be changed concurrently (but we don't want to take a lock because it would be needlessly expensive), use atomic64_ts instead. Fixes: commit 49b786ea146f ("cgroup: implement the PIDs subsystem") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.3+ Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

workqueue: Fix pwq ref leak in rescuer_thread()

2019-12-17T19:39:26Z

commit e66b39af00f426b3356b96433d620cb3367ba1ff upstream. 008847f66c3 ("workqueue: allow rescuer thread to do more work.") made the rescuer worker requeue the pwq immediately if there may be more work items which need rescuing instead of waiting for the next mayday timer expiration. Unfortunately, it doesn't check whether the pwq is already on the mayday list and unconditionally gets the ref and moves it onto the list. This doesn't corrupt the list but creates an additional reference to the pwq. It got queued twice but will only be removed once. This leak later can trigger pwq refcnt warning on workqueue destruction and prevent freeing of the workqueue. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Cc: "Williams, Gerald S" Cc: NeilBrown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

workqueue: Fix spurious sanity check failures in destroy_workqueue()

2019-12-17T19:39:25Z

commit def98c84b6cdf2eeea19ec5736e90e316df5206b upstream. Before actually destrying a workqueue, destroy_workqueue() checks whether it's actually idle. If it isn't, it prints out a bunch of warning messages and leaves the workqueue dangling. It unfortunately has a couple issues. * Mayday list queueing increments pwq's refcnts which gets detected as busy and fails the sanity checks. However, because mayday list queueing is asynchronous, this condition can happen without any actual work items left in the workqueue. * Sanity check failure leaves the sysfs interface behind too which can lead to init failure of newer instances of the workqueue. This patch fixes the above two by * If a workqueue has a rescuer, disable and kill the rescuer before sanity checks. Disabling and killing is guaranteed to flush the existing mayday list. * Remove sysfs interface before sanity checks. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Reported-by: Marcin Pawlowski Reported-by: "Williams, Gerald S" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched/fair: Scale bandwidth quota and period without losing quota/period ratio precision

2019-12-17T19:38:43Z

commit 4929a4e6faa0f13289a67cae98139e727f0d4a97 upstream. The quota/period ratio is used to ensure a child task group won't get more bandwidth than the parent task group, and is calculated as: normalized_cfs_quota() = [(quota_us << 20) / period_us] If the quota/period ratio was changed during this scaling due to precision loss, it will cause inconsistency between parent and child task groups. See below example: A userspace container manager (kubelet) does three operations: 1) Create a parent cgroup, set quota to 1,000us and period to 10,000us. 2) Create a few children cgroups. 3) Set quota to 1,000us and period to 10,000us on a child cgroup. These operations are expected to succeed. However, if the scaling of 147/128 happens before step 3, quota and period of the parent cgroup will be changed: new_quota: 1148437ns, 1148us new_period: 11484375ns, 11484us And when step 3 comes in, the ratio of the child cgroup will be 104857, which will be larger than the parent cgroup ratio (104821), and will fail. Scaling them by a factor of 2 will fix the problem. Tested-by: Phil Auld Signed-off-by: Xuewei Zhang Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Phil Auld Cc: Anton Blanchard Cc: Ben Segall Cc: Dietmar Eggemann Cc: Juri Lelli Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vincent Guittot Fixes: 2e8e19226398 ("sched/fair: Limit sched_cfs_period_timer() loop to avoid hard lockup") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191004001243.140897-1-xueweiz@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched/core: Avoid spurious lock dependencies

2019-12-17T19:37:29Z

[ Upstream commit ff51ff84d82aea5a889b85f2b9fb3aa2b8691668 ] While seemingly harmless, __sched_fork() does hrtimer_init(), which, when DEBUG_OBJETS, can end up doing allocations. This then results in the following lock order: rq->lock zone->lock.rlock batched_entropy_u64.lock Which in turn causes deadlocks when we do wakeups while holding that batched_entropy lock -- as the random code does. Solve this by moving __sched_fork() out from under rq->lock. This is safe because nothing there relies on rq->lock, as also evident from the other __sched_fork() callsite. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Qian Cai Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: cl@linux.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: penberg@kernel.org Cc: rientjes@google.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Cc: tytso@mit.edu Cc: will@kernel.org Fixes: b7d5dc21072c ("random: add a spinlock_t to struct batched_entropy") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191001091837.GK4536@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin