user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v4.14.19

kernel/exit.c: export abort() to modules

2018-02-13T09:19:49Z

commit dc8635b78cd8669c37e230058d18c33af7451ab1 upstream. gcc -fisolate-erroneous-paths-dereference can generate calls to abort() from modular code too. [arnd@arndb.de: drop duplicate exports of abort()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180102103311.706364-1-arnd@arndb.de Reported-by: Vineet Gupta Cc: Sudip Mukherjee Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Alexey Brodkin Cc: Russell King Cc: Jose Abreu Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Evgeniy Didin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

arch: define weak abort()

2018-02-13T09:19:49Z

commit 7c2c11b208be09c156573fc0076b7b3646e05219 upstream. gcc toggle -fisolate-erroneous-paths-dereference (default at -O2 onwards) isolates faulty code paths such as null pointer access, divide by zero etc. If gcc port doesnt implement __builtin_trap, an abort() is generated which causes kernel link error. In this case, gcc is generating abort due to 'divide by zero' in lib/mpi/mpih-div.c. Currently 'frv' and 'arc' are failing. Previously other arch was also broken like m32r was fixed by commit d22e3d69ee1a ("m32r: fix build failure"). Let's define this weak function which is common for all arch and fix the problem permanently. We can even remove the arch specific 'abort' after this is done. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513118956-8718-1-git-send-email-sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Cc: Alexey Brodkin Cc: Vineet Gupta Cc: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Evgeniy Didin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module

2018-02-07T19:12:18Z

commit caf7501a1b4ec964190f31f9c3f163de252273b8 There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the right compiler or the right option. To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source or prebuilt object files are not checked. If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: jeyu@kernel.org Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf/core: Fix memory leak triggered by perf --namespace

2018-02-03T16:39:15Z

[ Upstream commit 0e18dd12064e07519f7cbff4149ca7fff620cbed ] perf with --namespace key leaks various memory objects including namespaces 4.14.0+ pid_namespace 1 12 2568 12 8 user_namespace 1 39 824 39 8 net_namespace 1 5 6272 5 8 This happen because perf_fill_ns_link_info() struct patch ns_path: during initialization ns_path incremented counters on related mnt and dentry, but without lost path_put nobody decremented them back. Leaked dentry is name of related namespace, and its leak does not allow to free unused namespace. Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Hari Bathini Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Thomas Gleixner Fixes: commit e422267322cd ("perf: Add PERF_RECORD_NAMESPACES to include namespaces related info") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c510711b-3904-e5e1-d296-61273d21118d@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Fix OWNER_DEAD fixup

2018-02-03T16:38:47Z

commit a97cb0e7b3f4c6297fd857055ae8e895f402f501 upstream. Both Geert and DaveJ reported that the recent futex commit: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex") introduced a problem with setting OWNER_DEAD. We set the bit on an uninitialized variable and then entirely optimize it away as a dead-store. Move the setting of the bit to where it is more useful. Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Reported-by: Dave Jones Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Paul E. McKenney Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180122103947.GD2228@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Ozkan Sezer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd

2018-01-31T13:03:50Z

[ upstream commit f37a8cb84cce18762e8f86a70bd6a49a66ab964c ] Alexei found that verifier does not reject stores into context via BPF_ST instead of BPF_STX. And while looking at it, we also should not allow XADD variant of BPF_STX. The context rewriter is only assuming either BPF_LDX_MEM- or BPF_STX_MEM-type operations, thus reject anything other than that so that assumptions in the rewriter properly hold. Add test cases as well for BPF selftests. Fixes: d691f9e8d440 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix 32-bit divide by zero

2018-01-31T13:03:50Z

[ upstream commit 68fda450a7df51cff9e5a4d4a4d9d0d5f2589153 ] due to some JITs doing if (src_reg == 0) check in 64-bit mode for div/mod operations mask upper 32-bits of src register before doing the check Fixes: 622582786c9e ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT") Fixes: 7a12b5031c6b ("sparc64: Add eBPF JIT.") Reported-by: syzbot+48340bb518e88849e2e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix divides by zero

2018-01-31T13:03:50Z

[ upstream commit c366287ebd698ef5e3de300d90cd62ee9ee7373e ] Divides by zero are not nice, lets avoid them if possible. Also do_div() seems not needed when dealing with 32bit operands, but this seems a minor detail. Fixes: bd4cf0ed331a ("net: filter: rework/optimize internal BPF interpreter's instruction set") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config

2018-01-31T13:03:49Z

[ upstream commit 290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb ] The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

hrtimer: Reset hrtimer cpu base proper on CPU hotplug

2018-01-31T13:03:49Z

commit d5421ea43d30701e03cadc56a38854c36a8b4433 upstream. The hrtimer interrupt code contains a hang detection and mitigation mechanism, which prevents that a long delayed hrtimer interrupt causes a continous retriggering of interrupts which prevent the system from making progress. If a hang is detected then the timer hardware is programmed with a certain delay into the future and a flag is set in the hrtimer cpu base which prevents newly enqueued timers from reprogramming the timer hardware prior to the chosen delay. The subsequent hrtimer interrupt after the delay clears the flag and resumes normal operation. If such a hang happens in the last hrtimer interrupt before a CPU is unplugged then the hang_detected flag is set and stays that way when the CPU is plugged in again. At that point the timer hardware is not armed and it cannot be armed because the hang_detected flag is still active, so nothing clears that flag. As a consequence the CPU does not receive hrtimer interrupts and no timers expire on that CPU which results in RCU stalls and other malfunctions. Clear the flag along with some other less critical members of the hrtimer cpu base to ensure starting from a clean state when a CPU is plugged in. Thanks to Paul, Sebastian and Anna-Maria for their help to get down to the root cause of that hard to reproduce heisenbug. Once understood it's trivial and certainly justifies a brown paperbag. Fixes: 41d2e4949377 ("hrtimer: Tune hrtimer_interrupt hang logic") Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Sebastian Sewior Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801261447590.2067@nanos Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman