user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v4.14.240

tracing: Do not reference char * as a string in histograms

2021-07-20T14:17:48Z

commit 704adfb5a9978462cd861f170201ae2b5e3d3a80 upstream. The histogram logic was allowing events with char * pointers to be used as normal strings. But it was easy to crash the kernel with: # echo 'hist:keys=filename' > events/syscalls/sys_enter_openat/trigger And open some files, and boom! BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2ced0c3280 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1173fa067 P4D 1173fa067 PUD 1171b6067 PMD 1171dd067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 6 PID: 1810 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-test+ #61 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20 Code: f6 82 80 2a 0b a9 20 74 11 0f b6 50 01 48 83 c0 01 f6 82 80 2a 0b a9 20 75 ef c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 <80> 3f 00 74 10 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3 RSP: 0018:ffffbdbf81567b50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffff93815cdb3800 RCX: ffff9382401a22d0 RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f2ced0c3280 RBP: 0000000000000100 R08: ffff9382409ff074 R09: ffffbdbf81567c98 R10: ffff9382409ff074 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9382409ff074 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff93815a744f00 R15: 00007f2ced0c3280 FS: 00007f2ced0f8580(0000) GS:ffff93825a800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2ced0c3280 CR3: 0000000107069005 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: event_hist_trigger+0x463/0x5f0 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0xd0 ? lock_release+0x155/0x440 ? kernel_init_free_pages+0x6d/0x90 ? preempt_count_sub+0x9b/0xd0 ? kernel_init_free_pages+0x6d/0x90 ? get_page_from_freelist+0x12c4/0x1680 ? __rb_reserve_next+0xe5/0x460 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x12a/0x3f0 event_triggers_call+0x52/0xe0 ftrace_syscall_enter+0x264/0x2c0 syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x1ee/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x1c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Where it triggered a fault on strlen(key) where key was the filename. The reason is that filename is a char * to user space, and the histogram code just blindly dereferenced it, with obvious bad results. I originally tried to use strncpy_from_user/kernel_nofault() but found that there's other places that its dereferenced and not worth the effort. Just do not allow "char *" to act like strings. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210715000206.025df9d2@rorschach.local.home Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Namhyung Kim Acked-by: Tom Zanussi Fixes: 79e577cbce4c4 ("tracing: Support string type key properly") Fixes: 5967bd5c4239 ("tracing: Let filter_assign_type() detect FILTER_PTR_STRING") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Simplify & fix saved_tgids logic

2021-07-20T14:17:47Z

commit b81b3e959adb107cd5b36c7dc5ba1364bbd31eb2 upstream. The tgid_map array records a mapping from pid to tgid, where the index of an entry within the array is the pid & the value stored at that index is the tgid. The saved_tgids_next() function iterates over pointers into the tgid_map array & dereferences the pointers which results in the tgid, but then it passes that dereferenced value to trace_find_tgid() which treats it as a pid & does a further lookup within the tgid_map array. It seems likely that the intent here was to skip over entries in tgid_map for which the recorded tgid is zero, but instead we end up skipping over entries for which the thread group leader hasn't yet had its own tgid recorded in tgid_map. A minimal fix would be to remove the call to trace_find_tgid, turning: if (trace_find_tgid(*ptr)) into: if (*ptr) ..but it seems like this logic can be much simpler if we simply let seq_read() iterate over the whole tgid_map array & filter out empty entries by returning SEQ_SKIP from saved_tgids_show(). Here we take that approach, removing the incorrect logic here entirely. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210630003406.4013668-1-paulburton@google.com Fixes: d914ba37d714 ("tracing: Add support for recording tgid of tasks") Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Joel Fernandes Cc: Signed-off-by: Paul Burton Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cpu/hotplug: Cure the cpusets trainwreck

2021-07-20T14:17:46Z

commit b22afcdf04c96ca58327784e280e10288cfd3303 upstream. Alexey and Joshua tried to solve a cpusets related hotplug problem which is user space visible and results in unexpected behaviour for some time after a CPU has been plugged in and the corresponding uevent was delivered. cpusets delegate the hotplug work (rebuilding cpumasks etc.) to a workqueue. This is done because the cpusets code has already a lock nesting of cgroups_mutex -> cpu_hotplug_lock. A synchronous callback or waiting for the work to finish with cpu_hotplug_lock held can and will deadlock because that results in the reverse lock order. As a consequence the uevent can be delivered before cpusets have consistent state which means that a user space invocation of sched_setaffinity() to move a task to the plugged CPU fails up to the point where the scheduled work has been processed. The same is true for CPU unplug, but that does not create user observable failure (yet). It's still inconsistent to claim that an operation is finished before it actually is and that's the real issue at hand. uevents just make it reliably observable. Obviously the problem should be fixed in cpusets/cgroups, but untangling that is pretty much impossible because according to the changelog of the commit which introduced this 8 years ago: 3a5a6d0c2b03("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside get_online_cpus()") the lock order cgroups_mutex -> cpu_hotplug_lock is a design decision and the whole code is built around that. So bite the bullet and invoke the relevant cpuset function, which waits for the work to finish, in _cpu_up/down() after dropping cpu_hotplug_lock and only when tasks are not frozen by suspend/hibernate because that would obviously wait forever. Waiting there with cpu_add_remove_lock, which is protecting the present and possible CPU maps, held is not a problem at all because neither work queues nor cpusets/cgroups have any lockchains related to that lock. Waiting in the hotplug machinery is not problematic either because there are already state callbacks which wait for hardware queues to drain. It makes the operations slightly slower, but hotplug is slow anyway. This ensures that state is consistent before returning from a hotplug up/down operation. It's still inconsistent during the operation, but that's a different story. Add a large comment which explains why this is done and why this is not a dump ground for the hack of the day to work around half thought out locking schemes. Document also the implications vs. hotplug operations and serialization or the lack of it. Thanks to Alexy and Joshua for analyzing why this temporary sched_setaffinity() failure happened. Fixes: 3a5a6d0c2b03("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside get_online_cpus()") Reported-by: Alexey Klimov Reported-by: Joshua Baker Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Alexey Klimov Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87tuowcnv3.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kthread: prevent deadlock when kthread_mod_delayed_work() races with kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync()

2021-07-11T10:48:13Z

commit 5fa54346caf67b4b1b10b1f390316ae466da4d53 upstream. The system might hang with the following backtrace: schedule+0x80/0x100 schedule_timeout+0x48/0x138 wait_for_common+0xa4/0x134 wait_for_completion+0x1c/0x2c kthread_flush_work+0x114/0x1cc kthread_cancel_work_sync.llvm.16514401384283632983+0xe8/0x144 kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x18/0x2c xxxx_pm_notify+0xb0/0xd8 blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x80/0x194 pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x28/0x4c suspend_prepare+0x40/0x260 enter_state+0x80/0x3f4 pm_suspend+0x60/0xdc state_store+0x108/0x144 kobj_attr_store+0x38/0x88 sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0xc0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x108/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x2f4/0x368 ksys_write+0x7c/0xec It is caused by the following race between kthread_mod_delayed_work() and kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync(): CPU0 CPU1 Context: Thread A Context: Thread B kthread_mod_delayed_work() spin_lock() __kthread_cancel_work() spin_unlock() del_timer_sync() kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync() spin_lock() __kthread_cancel_work() spin_unlock() del_timer_sync() spin_lock() work->canceling++ spin_unlock spin_lock() queue_delayed_work() // dwork is put into the worker->delayed_work_list spin_unlock() kthread_flush_work() // flush_work is put at the tail of the dwork wait_for_completion() Context: IRQ kthread_delayed_work_timer_fn() spin_lock() list_del_init(&work->node); spin_unlock() BANG: flush_work is not longer linked and will never get proceed. The problem is that kthread_mod_delayed_work() checks work->canceling flag before canceling the timer. A simple solution is to (re)check work->canceling after __kthread_cancel_work(). But then it is not clear what should be returned when __kthread_cancel_work() removed the work from the queue (list) and it can't queue it again with the new @delay. The return value might be used for reference counting. The caller has to know whether a new work has been queued or an existing one was replaced. The proper solution is that kthread_mod_delayed_work() will remove the work from the queue (list) _only_ when work->canceling is not set. The flag must be checked after the timer is stopped and the remaining operations can be done under worker->lock. Note that kthread_mod_delayed_work() could remove the timer and then bail out. It is fine. The other canceling caller needs to cancel the timer as well. The important thing is that the queue (list) manipulation is done atomically under worker->lock. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210610133051.15337-3-pmladek@suse.com Fixes: 9a6b06c8d9a220860468a ("kthread: allow to modify delayed kthread work") Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek Reported-by: Martin Liu Cc: Cc: Minchan Kim Cc: Nathan Chancellor Cc: Nick Desaulniers Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kthread_worker: split code for canceling the delayed work timer

2021-07-11T10:48:12Z

commit 34b3d5344719d14fd2185b2d9459b3abcb8cf9d8 upstream. Patch series "kthread_worker: Fix race between kthread_mod_delayed_work() and kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync()". This patchset fixes the race between kthread_mod_delayed_work() and kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync() including proper return value handling. This patch (of 2): Simple code refactoring as a preparation step for fixing a race between kthread_mod_delayed_work() and kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync(). It does not modify the existing behavior. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210610133051.15337-2-pmladek@suse.com Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek Cc: Cc: Martin Liu Cc: Minchan Kim Cc: Nathan Chancellor Cc: Nick Desaulniers Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm, futex: fix shared futex pgoff on shmem huge page

2021-07-11T10:48:12Z

[ Upstream commit fe19bd3dae3d15d2fbfdb3de8839a6ea0fe94264 ] If more than one futex is placed on a shmem huge page, it can happen that waking the second wakes the first instead, and leaves the second waiting: the key's shared.pgoff is wrong. When 3.11 commit 13d60f4b6ab5 ("futex: Take hugepages into account when generating futex_key"), the only shared huge pages came from hugetlbfs, and the code added to deal with its exceptional page->index was put into hugetlb source. Then that was missed when 4.8 added shmem huge pages. page_to_pgoff() is what others use for this nowadays: except that, as currently written, it gives the right answer on hugetlbfs head, but nonsense on hugetlbfs tails. Fix that by calling hugetlbfs-specific hugetlb_basepage_index() on PageHuge tails as well as on head. Yes, it's unconventional to declare hugetlb_basepage_index() there in pagemap.h, rather than in hugetlb.h; but I do not expect anything but page_to_pgoff() ever to need it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: give hugetlb_basepage_index() prototype the correct scope] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b17d946b-d09-326e-b42a-52884c36df32@google.com Fixes: 800d8c63b2e9 ("shmem: add huge pages support") Reported-by: Neel Natu Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Zhang Yi Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Darren Hart Cc: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Note on stable backport: leave redundant #include in kernel/futex.c, to avoid conflict over the header files included. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tracing: Do no increment trace_clock_global() by one

2021-06-30T12:48:53Z

commit 89529d8b8f8daf92d9979382b8d2eb39966846ea upstream. The trace_clock_global() tries to make sure the events between CPUs is somewhat in order. A global value is used and updated by the latest read of a clock. If one CPU is ahead by a little, and is read by another CPU, a lock is taken, and if the timestamp of the other CPU is behind, it will simply use the other CPUs timestamp. The lock is also only taken with a "trylock" due to tracing, and strange recursions can happen. The lock is not taken at all in NMI context. In the case where the lock is not able to be taken, the non synced timestamp is returned. But it will not be less than the saved global timestamp. The problem arises because when the time goes "backwards" the time returned is the saved timestamp plus 1. If the lock is not taken, and the plus one to the timestamp is returned, there's a small race that can cause the time to go backwards! CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- trace_clock_global() { ts = clock() [ 1000 ] trylock(clock_lock) [ success ] global_ts = ts; [ 1000 ] trace_clock_global() { ts = clock() [ 999 ] if (ts < global_ts) ts = global_ts + 1 [ 1001 ] trylock(clock_lock) [ fail ] return ts [ 1001] } unlock(clock_lock); return ts; [ 1000 ] } trace_clock_global() { ts = clock() [ 1000 ] if (ts < global_ts) [ false 1000 == 1000 ] trylock(clock_lock) [ success ] global_ts = ts; [ 1000 ] unlock(clock_lock) return ts; [ 1000 ] } The above case shows to reads of trace_clock_global() on the same CPU, but the second read returns one less than the first read. That is, time when backwards, and this is not what is allowed by trace_clock_global(). This was triggered by heavy tracing and the ring buffer checker that tests for the clock going backwards: Ring buffer clock went backwards: 20613921464 -> 20613921463 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3412 check_buffer+0x1b9/0x1c0 Modules linked in: [..] [CPU: 2]TIME DOES NOT MATCH expected:20620711698 actual:20620711697 delta:6790234 before:20613921463 after:20613921463 [20613915818] PAGE TIME STAMP [20613915818] delta:0 [20613915819] delta:1 [20613916035] delta:216 [20613916465] delta:430 [20613916575] delta:110 [20613916749] delta:174 [20613917248] delta:499 [20613917333] delta:85 [20613917775] delta:442 [20613917921] delta:146 [20613918321] delta:400 [20613918568] delta:247 [20613918768] delta:200 [20613919306] delta:538 [20613919353] delta:47 [20613919980] delta:627 [20613920296] delta:316 [20613920571] delta:275 [20613920862] delta:291 [20613921152] delta:290 [20613921464] delta:312 [20613921464] delta:0 TIME EXTEND [20613921464] delta:0 This happened more than once, and always for an off by one result. It also started happening after commit aafe104aa9096 was added. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: aafe104aa9096 ("tracing: Restructure trace_clock_global() to never block") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Do not stop recording comms if the trace file is being read

2021-06-30T12:48:53Z

commit 4fdd595e4f9a1ff6d93ec702eaecae451cfc6591 upstream. A while ago, when the "trace" file was opened, tracing was stopped, and code was added to stop recording the comms to saved_cmdlines, for mapping of the pids to the task name. Code has been added that only records the comm if a trace event occurred, and there's no reason to not trace it if the trace file is opened. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7ffbd48d5cab2 ("tracing: Cache comms only after an event occurred") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Do not stop recording cmdlines when tracing is off

2021-06-30T12:48:53Z

commit 85550c83da421fb12dc1816c45012e1e638d2b38 upstream. The saved_cmdlines is used to map pids to the task name, such that the output of the tracing does not just show pids, but also gives a human readable name for the task. If the name is not mapped, the output looks like this: <...>-1316 [005] ...2 132.044039: ... Instead of this: gnome-shell-1316 [005] ...2 132.044039: ... The names are updated when tracing is running, but are skipped if tracing is stopped. Unfortunately, this stops the recording of the names if the top level tracer is stopped, and not if there's other tracers active. The recording of a name only happens when a new event is written into a ring buffer, so there is no need to test if tracing is on or not. If tracing is off, then no event is written and no need to test if tracing is off or not. Remove the check, as it hides the names of tasks for events in the instance buffers. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7ffbd48d5cab2 ("tracing: Cache comms only after an event occurred") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Correct the length check which causes memory corruption

2021-06-16T09:53:05Z

commit 3e08a9f9760f4a70d633c328a76408e62d6f80a3 upstream. We've suffered from severe kernel crashes due to memory corruption on our production environment, like, Call Trace: [1640542.554277] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [1640542.554856] CPU: 17 PID: 26996 Comm: python Kdump: loaded Tainted:G [1640542.556629] RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0x90/0x190 [1640542.559074] RSP: 0018:ffffb16faa597df8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [1640542.559587] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000400200 RCX: 0000000006e931bf [1640542.560323] RDX: 0000000006e931be RSI: 0000000000400200 RDI: ffff9a45ff004300 [1640542.560996] RBP: 0000000000400200 R08: 0000000000023420 R09: 0000000000000000 [1640542.561670] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff9a20608d [1640542.562366] R13: ffff9a45ff004300 R14: ffff9a45ff004300 R15: 696c662f65636976 [1640542.563128] FS: 00007f45d7c6f740(0000) GS:ffff9a45ff840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1640542.563937] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [1640542.564557] CR2: 00007f45d71311a0 CR3: 000000189d63e004 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [1640542.565279] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [1640542.566069] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [1640542.566742] Call Trace: [1640542.567009] anon_vma_clone+0x5d/0x170 [1640542.567417] __split_vma+0x91/0x1a0 [1640542.567777] do_munmap+0x2c6/0x320 [1640542.568128] vm_munmap+0x54/0x70 [1640542.569990] __x64_sys_munmap+0x22/0x30 [1640542.572005] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0 [1640542.573724] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [1640542.575642] RIP: 0033:0x7f45d6e61e27 James Wang has reproduced it stably on the latest 4.19 LTS. After some debugging, we finally proved that it's due to ftrace buffer out-of-bound access using a debug tool as follows: [ 86.775200] BUG: Out-of-bounds write at addr 0xffff88aefe8b7000 [ 86.780806] no_context+0xdf/0x3c0 [ 86.784327] __do_page_fault+0x252/0x470 [ 86.788367] do_page_fault+0x32/0x140 [ 86.792145] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 86.795576] strncpy_from_unsafe+0x66/0xb0 [ 86.799789] fetch_memory_string+0x25/0x40 [ 86.804002] fetch_deref_string+0x51/0x60 [ 86.808134] kprobe_trace_func+0x32d/0x3a0 [ 86.812347] kprobe_dispatcher+0x45/0x50 [ 86.816385] kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x90/0xf0 [ 86.820779] ftrace_ops_assist_func+0xa1/0x140 [ 86.825340] 0xffffffffc00750bf [ 86.828603] do_sys_open+0x5/0x1f0 [ 86.832124] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0 [ 86.835900] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 commit b220c049d519 ("tracing: Check length before giving out the filter buffer") adds length check to protect trace data overflow introduced in 0fc1b09ff1ff, seems that this fix can't prevent overflow entirely, the length check should also take the sizeof entry->array[0] into account, since this array[0] is filled the length of trace data and occupy addtional space and risk overflow. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210607125734.1770447-1-liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Xunlei Pang Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Fixes: b220c049d519 ("tracing: Check length before giving out the filter buffer") Reviewed-by: Xunlei Pang Reviewed-by: yinbinbin Reviewed-by: Wetp Zhang Tested-by: James Wang Signed-off-by: Liangyan Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman