<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v4.19.133</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.133</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.133'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:17:27Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Check correct cred for CAP_SYSLOG in bpf_dump_raw_ok()</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:17:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-02T22:45:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b80e052c3ae6900f6dbcd502846650fd3a9828b7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b80e052c3ae6900f6dbcd502846650fd3a9828b7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 63960260457a02af2a6cb35d75e6bdb17299c882 upstream.

When evaluating access control over kallsyms visibility, credentials at
open() time need to be used, not the "current" creds (though in BPF's
case, this has likely always been the same). Plumb access to associated
file-&gt;f_cred down through bpf_dump_raw_ok() and its callers now that
kallsysm_show_value() has been refactored to take struct cred.

Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7105e828c087 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kprobes: Do not expose probe addresses to non-CAP_SYSLOG</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:17:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-02T22:20:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bff4fad828795d3285697742181b05448ec0b08d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bff4fad828795d3285697742181b05448ec0b08d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 60f7bb66b88b649433bf700acfc60c3f24953871 upstream.

The kprobe show() functions were using "current"'s creds instead
of the file opener's creds for kallsyms visibility. Fix to use
seq_file-&gt;file-&gt;f_cred.

Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 81365a947de4 ("kprobes: Show address of kprobes if kallsyms does")
Fixes: ffb9bd68ebdb ("kprobes: Show blacklist addresses as same as kallsyms does")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>module: Do not expose section addresses to non-CAP_SYSLOG</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:17:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-02T21:43:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c744568a5cc1624febbbad94b14a4ebd7bc6498a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c744568a5cc1624febbbad94b14a4ebd7bc6498a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b25a7c5af9051850d4f3d93ca500056ab6ec724b upstream.

The printing of section addresses in /sys/module/*/sections/* was not
using the correct credentials to evaluate visibility.

Before:

 # cat /sys/module/*/sections/.*text
 0xffffffffc0458000
 ...
 # capsh --drop=CAP_SYSLOG -- -c "cat /sys/module/*/sections/.*text"
 0xffffffffc0458000
 ...

After:

 # cat /sys/module/*/sections/*.text
 0xffffffffc0458000
 ...
 # capsh --drop=CAP_SYSLOG -- -c "cat /sys/module/*/sections/.*text"
 0x0000000000000000
 ...

Additionally replaces the existing (safe) /proc/modules check with
file-&gt;f_cred for consistency.

Reported-by: Dominik Czarnota &lt;dominik.czarnota@trailofbits.com&gt;
Fixes: be71eda5383f ("module: Fix display of wrong module .text address")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>module: Refactor section attr into bin attribute</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:17:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-02T20:47:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bbd10824d8157e1a4e443689f1ef1fde0028c0ff'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bbd10824d8157e1a4e443689f1ef1fde0028c0ff</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ed66f991bb19d94cae5d38f77de81f96aac7813f upstream.

In order to gain access to the open file's f_cred for kallsym visibility
permission checks, refactor the module section attributes to use the
bin_attribute instead of attribute interface. Additionally removes the
redundant "name" struct member.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel: module: Use struct_size() helper</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:17:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-06T18:18:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2bcda8386aef48863555ea8aecc3967dc2818182'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2bcda8386aef48863555ea8aecc3967dc2818182</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8d1b73dd25ff92c3fa9807a20c22fa2b44c07336 upstream.

One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:

struct module_sect_attrs {
	...
        struct module_sect_attr attrs[0];
};

Make use of the struct_size() helper instead of an open-coded version
in order to avoid any potential type mistakes.

So, replace the following form:

sizeof(*sect_attrs) + nloaded * sizeof(sect_attrs-&gt;attrs[0]

with:

struct_size(sect_attrs, attrs, nloaded)

This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kallsyms: Refactor kallsyms_show_value() to take cred</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:17:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-02T18:49:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ebce5c1fb51b185b60927a6c5bf1fad12e1812fc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ebce5c1fb51b185b60927a6c5bf1fad12e1812fc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 160251842cd35a75edfb0a1d76afa3eb674ff40a upstream.

In order to perform future tests against the cred saved during open(),
switch kallsyms_show_value() to operate on a cred, and have all current
callers pass current_cred(). This makes it very obvious where callers
are checking the wrong credential in their "read" contexts. These will
be fixed in the coming patches.

Additionally switch return value to bool, since it is always used as a
direct permission check, not a 0-on-success, negative-on-error style
function return.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kgdb: Avoid suspicious RCU usage warning</title>
<updated>2020-07-09T07:37:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Douglas Anderson</name>
<email>dianders@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-02T22:47:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a464152c184dde346628114659bd6729c5f75c8f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a464152c184dde346628114659bd6729c5f75c8f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 440ab9e10e2e6e5fd677473ee6f9e3af0f6904d6 ]

At times when I'm using kgdb I see a splat on my console about
suspicious RCU usage.  I managed to come up with a case that could
reproduce this that looked like this:

  WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
  5.7.0-rc4+ #609 Not tainted
  -----------------------------
  kernel/pid.c:395 find_task_by_pid_ns() needs rcu_read_lock() protection!

  other info that might help us debug this:

    rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
  3 locks held by swapper/0/1:
   #0: ffffff81b6b8e988 (&amp;dev-&gt;mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach+0x40/0x13c
   #1: ffffffd01109e9e8 (dbg_master_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kgdb_cpu_enter+0x20c/0x7ac
   #2: ffffffd01109ea90 (dbg_slave_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kgdb_cpu_enter+0x3ec/0x7ac

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4+ #609
  Hardware name: Google Cheza (rev3+) (DT)
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b8
   show_stack+0x1c/0x24
   dump_stack+0xd4/0x134
   lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xf0/0x100
   find_task_by_pid_ns+0x5c/0x80
   getthread+0x8c/0xb0
   gdb_serial_stub+0x9d4/0xd04
   kgdb_cpu_enter+0x284/0x7ac
   kgdb_handle_exception+0x174/0x20c
   kgdb_brk_fn+0x24/0x30
   call_break_hook+0x6c/0x7c
   brk_handler+0x20/0x5c
   do_debug_exception+0x1c8/0x22c
   el1_sync_handler+0x3c/0xe4
   el1_sync+0x7c/0x100
   rpmh_rsc_probe+0x38/0x420
   platform_drv_probe+0x94/0xb4
   really_probe+0x134/0x300
   driver_probe_device+0x68/0x100
   __device_attach_driver+0x90/0xa8
   bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xcc
   __device_attach+0xb4/0x13c
   device_initial_probe+0x18/0x20
   bus_probe_device+0x38/0x98
   device_add+0x38c/0x420

If I understand properly we should just be able to blanket kgdb under
one big RCU read lock and the problem should go away.  We'll add it to
the beast-of-a-function known as kgdb_cpu_enter().

With this I no longer get any splats and things seem to work fine.

Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson &lt;dianders@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200602154729.v2.1.I70e0d4fd46d5ed2aaf0c98a355e8e1b7a5bb7e4e@changeid
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson &lt;daniel.thompson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ring-buffer: Zero out time extend if it is nested and not absolute</title>
<updated>2020-07-01T03:17:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-22T19:18:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a1de4067516d1fbf20a08c0b68e8e8e70f39c3c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a1de4067516d1fbf20a08c0b68e8e8e70f39c3c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 097350d1c6e1f5808cae142006f18a0bbc57018d upstream.

Currently the ring buffer makes events that happen in interrupts that preempt
another event have a delta of zero. (Hopefully we can change this soon). But
this is to deal with the races of updating a global counter with lockless
and nesting functions updating deltas.

With the addition of absolute time stamps, the time extend didn't follow
this rule. A time extend can happen if two events happen longer than 2^27
nanoseconds appart, as the delta time field in each event is only 27 bits.
If that happens, then a time extend is injected with 2^59 bits of
nanoseconds to use (18 years). But if the 2^27 nanoseconds happen between
two events, and as it is writing the event, an interrupt triggers, it will
see the 2^27 difference as well and inject a time extend of its own. But a
recent change made the time extend logic not take into account the nesting,
and this can cause two time extend deltas to happen moving the time stamp
much further ahead than the current time. This gets all reset when the ring
buffer moves to the next page, but that can cause time to appear to go
backwards.

This was observed in a trace-cmd recording, and since the data is saved in a
file, with trace-cmd report --debug, it was possible to see that this indeed
did happen!

  bash-52501   110d... 81778.908247: sched_switch:         bash:52501 [120] S ==&gt; swapper/110:0 [120] [12770284:0x2e8:64]
  &lt;idle&gt;-0     110d... 81778.908757: sched_switch:         swapper/110:0 [120] R ==&gt; bash:52501 [120] [509947:0x32c:64]
 TIME EXTEND: delta:306454770 length:0
  bash-52501   110.... 81779.215212: sched_swap_numa:      src_pid=52501 src_tgid=52388 src_ngid=52501 src_cpu=110 src_nid=2 dst_pid=52509 dst_tgid=52388 dst_ngid=52501 dst_cpu=49 dst_nid=1 [0:0x378:48]
 TIME EXTEND: delta:306458165 length:0
  bash-52501   110dNh. 81779.521670: sched_wakeup:         migration/110:565 [0] success=1 CPU:110 [0:0x3b4:40]

and at the next page, caused the time to go backwards:

  bash-52504   110d... 81779.685411: sched_switch:         bash:52504 [120] S ==&gt; swapper/110:0 [120] [8347057:0xfb4:64]
CPU:110 [SUBBUFFER START] [81779379165886:0x1320000]
  &lt;idle&gt;-0     110dN.. 81779.379166: sched_wakeup:         bash:52504 [120] success=1 CPU:110 [0:0x10:40]
  &lt;idle&gt;-0     110d... 81779.379167: sched_switch:         swapper/110:0 [120] R ==&gt; bash:52504 [120] [1168:0x3c:64]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622151815.345d1bf5@oasis.local.home

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;zanussi@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc4e2801d400b ("ring-buffer: Redefine the unimplemented RINGBUF_TYPE_TIME_STAMP")
Reported-by: Julia Lawall &lt;julia.lawall@inria.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix event trigger to accept redundant spaces</title>
<updated>2020-07-01T03:17:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-20T03:46:03Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e8f436c0f1c3bd7362d89e94dec8564cf2746ab3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e8f436c0f1c3bd7362d89e94dec8564cf2746ab3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6784beada631800f2c5afd567e5628c843362cee upstream.

Fix the event trigger to accept redundant spaces in
the trigger input.

For example, these return -EINVAL

echo " traceon" &gt; events/ftrace/print/trigger
echo "traceon  if common_pid == 0" &gt; events/ftrace/print/trigger
echo "disable_event:kmem:kmalloc " &gt; events/ftrace/print/trigger

But these are hard to find what is wrong.

To fix this issue, use skip_spaces() to remove spaces
in front of actual tokens, and set NULL if there is no
token.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/159262476352.185015.5261566783045364186.stgit@devnote2

Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;zanussi@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 85f2b08268c0 ("tracing: Add basic event trigger framework")
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi &lt;zanussi@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>blktrace: break out of blktrace setup on concurrent calls</title>
<updated>2020-07-01T03:17:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Luis Chamberlain</name>
<email>mcgrof@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-05T14:58:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c7b333600aac096d700b857eebed8269f08a1b4b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c7b333600aac096d700b857eebed8269f08a1b4b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1b0b283648163dae2a214ca28ed5a99f62a77319 ]

We use one blktrace per request_queue, that means one per the entire
disk.  So we cannot run one blktrace on say /dev/vda and then /dev/vda1,
or just two calls on /dev/vda.

We check for concurrent setup only at the very end of the blktrace setup though.

If we try to run two concurrent blktraces on the same block device the
second one will fail, and the first one seems to go on. However when
one tries to kill the first one one will see things like this:

The kernel will show these:

```
debugfs: File 'dropped' in directory 'nvme1n1' already present!
debugfs: File 'msg' in directory 'nvme1n1' already present!
debugfs: File 'trace0' in directory 'nvme1n1' already present!
``

And userspace just sees this error message for the second call:

```
blktrace /dev/nvme1n1
BLKTRACESETUP(2) /dev/nvme1n1 failed: 5/Input/output error
```

The first userspace process #1 will also claim that the files
were taken underneath their nose as well. The files are taken
away form the first process given that when the second blktrace
fails, it will follow up with a BLKTRACESTOP and BLKTRACETEARDOWN.
This means that even if go-happy process #1 is waiting for blktrace
data, we *have* been asked to take teardown the blktrace.

This can easily be reproduced with break-blktrace [0] run_0005.sh test.

Just break out early if we know we're already going to fail, this will
prevent trying to create the files all over again, which we know still
exist.

[0] https://github.com/mcgrof/break-blktrace

Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bvanassche@acm.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
