<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v4.19.53</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.53</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.53'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-06-19T06:18:06Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>timekeeping: Repair ktime_get_coarse*() granularity</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T06:18:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-13T19:40:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ca4c34037bb9b96263f3cf6043079e15e46a25b1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca4c34037bb9b96263f3cf6043079e15e46a25b1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e3ff9c3678b4d80e22d2557b68726174578eaf52 upstream.

Jason reported that the coarse ktime based time getters advance only once
per second and not once per tick as advertised.

The code reads only the monotonic base time, which advances once per
second. The nanoseconds are accumulated on every tick in xtime_nsec up to
a second and the regular time getters take this nanoseconds offset into
account, but the ktime_get_coarse*() implementation fails to do so.

Add the accumulated xtime_nsec value to the monotonic base time to get the
proper per tick advancing coarse tinme.

Fixes: b9ff604cff11 ("timekeeping: Add ktime_get_coarse_with_offset")
Reported-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Clemens Ladisch &lt;clemens@ladisch.de&gt;
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf &lt;sultan@kerneltoast.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1906132136280.1791@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Prevent hist_field_var_ref() from accessing NULL tracing_map_elts</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T06:18:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Zanussi</name>
<email>tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-18T15:18:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=86895090621c80ba00ffac078443f91945c356ac'/>
<id>urn:sha1:86895090621c80ba00ffac078443f91945c356ac</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 55267c88c003a3648567beae7c90512d3e2ab15e ]

hist_field_var_ref() is an implementation of hist_field_fn_t(), which
can be called with a null tracing_map_elt elt param when assembling a
key in event_hist_trigger().

In the case of hist_field_var_ref() this doesn't make sense, because a
variable can only be resolved by looking it up using an already
assembled key i.e. a variable can't be used to assemble a key since
the key is required in order to access the variable.

Upper layers should prevent the user from constructing a key using a
variable in the first place, but in case one slips through, it
shouldn't cause a NULL pointer dereference.  Also if one does slip
through, we want to know about it, so emit a one-time warning in that
case.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/64ec8dc15c14d305295b64cdfcc6b2b9dd14753f.1555597045.git.tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com

Reported-by: Vincent Bernat &lt;vincent@bernat.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi &lt;tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/uaccess, kcov: Disable stack protector</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T06:18:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-07T18:54:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=82055ad3d3edf372e85d67e4e0db098c254b180f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:82055ad3d3edf372e85d67e4e0db098c254b180f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 40ea97290b08be2e038b31cbb33097d1145e8169 ]

New tooling noticed this mishap:

  kernel/kcov.o: warning: objtool: write_comp_data()+0x138: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled
  kernel/kcov.o: warning: objtool: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()+0xd9: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled

All the other instrumentation (KASAN,UBSAN) also have stack protector
disabled.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access()</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T06:18:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-29T11:31:57Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=31e216cf9dc2346a20e8361b55807ef7135459c6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:31e216cf9dc2346a20e8361b55807ef7135459c6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f6581f5b55141a95657ef5742cf6a6bfa20a109f upstream.

Restore the read memory barrier in __ptrace_may_access() that was deleted
a couple years ago. Also add comments on this barrier and the one it pairs
with to explain why they're there (as far as I understand).

Fixes: bfedb589252c ("mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signal/ptrace: Don't leak unitialized kernel memory with PTRACE_PEEK_SIGINFO</title>
<updated>2019-06-19T06:18:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-28T23:46:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=662b831dde6160096091a1a9560281dfd450c68f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:662b831dde6160096091a1a9560281dfd450c68f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f6e2aa91a46d2bc79fce9b93a988dbe7655c90c0 ]

Recently syzbot in conjunction with KMSAN reported that
ptrace_peek_siginfo can copy an uninitialized siginfo to userspace.
Inspecting ptrace_peek_siginfo confirms this.

The problem is that off when initialized from args.off can be
initialized to a negaive value.  At which point the "if (off &gt;= 0)"
test to see if off became negative fails because off started off
negative.

Prevent the core problem by adding a variable found that is only true
if a siginfo is found and copied to a temporary in preparation for
being copied to userspace.

Prevent args.off from being truncated when being assigned to off by
testing that off is &lt;= the maximum possible value of off.  Convert off
to an unsigned long so that we should not have to truncate args.off,
we have well defined overflow behavior so if we add another check we
won't risk fighting undefined compiler behavior, and so that we have a
type whose maximum value is easy to test for.

Cc: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+0d602a1b0d8c95bdf299@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 84c751bd4aeb ("ptrace: add ability to retrieve signals without removing from a queue (v4)")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ntp: Allow TAI-UTC offset to be set to zero</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:54:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miroslav Lichvar</name>
<email>mlichvar@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-17T08:48:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0b50d08c5d854f9052e4a50769d897c6d97dc0ad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0b50d08c5d854f9052e4a50769d897c6d97dc0ad</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fdc6bae940ee9eb869e493990540098b8c0fd6ab ]

The ADJ_TAI adjtimex mode sets the TAI-UTC offset of the system clock.
It is typically set by NTP/PTP implementations and it is automatically
updated by the kernel on leap seconds. The initial value is zero (which
applications may interpret as unknown), but this value cannot be set by
adjtimex. This limitation seems to go back to the original "nanokernel"
implementation by David Mills.

Change the ADJ_TAI check to accept zero as a valid TAI-UTC offset in
order to allow setting it back to the initial value.

Fixes: 153b5d054ac2 ("ntp: support for TAI")
Suggested-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Lichvar &lt;mlichvar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Richard Cochran &lt;richardcochran@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417084833.7401-1-mlichvar@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix undefined behavior in narrow load handling</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:54:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Krzesimir Nowak</name>
<email>krzesimir@kinvolk.io</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-08T16:08:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f9ee13ce21dbaf99d2a6876ee8bd77a179ae788e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f9ee13ce21dbaf99d2a6876ee8bd77a179ae788e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e2f7fc0ac6957cabff4cecf6c721979b571af208 ]

Commit 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program
context fields") made the verifier add AND instructions to clear the
unwanted bits with a mask when doing a narrow load. The mask is
computed with

  (1 &lt;&lt; size * 8) - 1

where "size" is the size of the narrow load. When doing a 4 byte load
of a an 8 byte field the verifier shifts the literal 1 by 32 places to
the left. This results in an overflow of a signed integer, which is an
undefined behavior. Typically, the computed mask was zero, so the
result of the narrow load ended up being zero too.

Cast the literal to long long to avoid overflows. Note that narrow
load of the 4 byte fields does not have the undefined behavior,
because the load size can only be either 1 or 2 bytes, so shifting 1
by 8 or 16 places will not overflow it. And reading 4 bytes would not
be a narrow load of a 4 bytes field.

Fixes: 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields")
Reviewed-by: Alban Crequy &lt;alban@kinvolk.io&gt;
Reviewed-by: Iago López Galeiras &lt;iago@kinvolk.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzesimir Nowak &lt;krzesimir@kinvolk.io&gt;
Cc: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/sys.c: prctl: fix false positive in validate_prctl_map()</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:54:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T00:15:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c50c4fb0cb62cbacfe45694f99f2de09b86d62df'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c50c4fb0cb62cbacfe45694f99f2de09b86d62df</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a9e73998f9d705c94a8dca9687633adc0f24a19a ]

While validating new map we require the @start_data to be strictly less
than @end_data, which is fine for regular applications (this is why this
nit didn't trigger for that long).  These members are set from executable
loaders such as elf handers, still it is pretty valid to have a loadable
data section with zero size in file, in such case the start_data is equal
to end_data once kernel loader finishes.

As a result when we're trying to restore such programs the procedure fails
and the kernel returns -EINVAL.  From the image dump of a program:

 | "mm_start_code": "0x400000",
 | "mm_end_code": "0x8f5fb4",
 | "mm_start_data": "0xf1bfb0",
 | "mm_end_data": "0xf1bfb0",

Thus we need to change validate_prctl_map from strictly less to less or
equal operator use.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190408143554.GY1421@uranus.lan
Fixes: f606b77f1a9e3 ("prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysctl: return -EINVAL if val violates minmax</title>
<updated>2019-06-15T09:53:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian@brauner.io</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T22:44:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=91ae202e2c88a026eb2065fbee10b8e80591a27d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:91ae202e2c88a026eb2065fbee10b8e80591a27d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e260ad01f0aa9e96b5386d5cd7184afd949dc457 ]

Currently when userspace gives us a values that overflow e.g.  file-max
and other callers of __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() we simply ignore the
new value and leave the current value untouched.

This can be problematic as it gives the illusion that the limit has
indeed be bumped when in fact it failed.  This commit makes sure to
return EINVAL when an overflow is detected.  Please note that this is a
userspace facing change.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190210203943.8227-4-christian@brauner.io
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian@brauner.io&gt;
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/power: Fix 'nosmt' vs hibernation triple fault during resume</title>
<updated>2019-06-11T10:20:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Kosina</name>
<email>jkosina@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-29T22:09:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4d166206cf418122ab01c4206b979d328e55e923'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4d166206cf418122ab01c4206b979d328e55e923</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ec527c318036a65a083ef68d8ba95789d2212246 upstream.

As explained in

	0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")

we always, no matter what, have to bring up x86 HT siblings during boot at
least once in order to avoid first MCE bringing the system to its knees.

That means that whenever 'nosmt' is supplied on the kernel command-line,
all the HT siblings are as a result sitting in mwait or cpudile after
going through the online-offline cycle at least once.

This causes a serious issue though when a kernel, which saw 'nosmt' on its
commandline, is going to perform resume from hibernation: if the resume
from the hibernated image is successful, cr3 is flipped in order to point
to the address space of the kernel that is being resumed, which in turn
means that all the HT siblings are all of a sudden mwaiting on address
which is no longer valid.

That results in triple fault shortly after cr3 is switched, and machine
reboots.

Fix this by always waking up all the SMT siblings before initiating the
'restore from hibernation' process; this guarantees that all the HT
siblings will be properly carried over to the resumed kernel waiting in
resume_play_dead(), and acted upon accordingly afterwards, based on the
target kernel configuration.

Symmetricaly, the resumed kernel has to push the SMT siblings to mwait
again in case it has SMT disabled; this means it has to online all
the siblings when resuming (so that they come out of hlt) and offline
them again to let them reach mwait.

Cc: 4.19+ &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.19+
Debugged-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 0cc3cd21657b ("cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
