<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v4.9.180</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.180</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.180'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:48:30Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>rcuperf: Fix cleanup path for invalid perf_type strings</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:48:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul E. McKenney</name>
<email>paulmck@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-21T17:26:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=090eb578b9e6c99041e067d64b81d7a212604156'/>
<id>urn:sha1:090eb578b9e6c99041e067d64b81d7a212604156</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ad092c027713a68a34168942a5ef422e42e039f4 ]

If the specified rcuperf.perf_type is not in the rcu_perf_init()
function's perf_ops[] array, rcuperf prints some console messages and
then invokes rcu_perf_cleanup() to set state so that a future torture
test can run.  However, rcu_perf_cleanup() also attempts to end the
test that didn't actually start, and in doing so relies on the value
of cur_ops, a value that is not particularly relevant in this case.
This can result in confusing output or even follow-on failures due to
attempts to use facilities that have not been properly initialized.

This commit therefore sets the value of cur_ops to NULL in this case and
inserts a check near the beginning of rcu_perf_cleanup(), thus avoiding
relying on an irrelevant cur_ops value.

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rcutorture: Fix cleanup path for invalid torture_type strings</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:48:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul E. McKenney</name>
<email>paulmck@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-21T16:27:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0b447e75c2c35a8509aba93e1adc0bfedafb53b6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0b447e75c2c35a8509aba93e1adc0bfedafb53b6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b813afae7ab6a5e91b4e16cc567331d9c2ae1f04 ]

If the specified rcutorture.torture_type is not in the rcu_torture_init()
function's torture_ops[] array, rcutorture prints some console messages
and then invokes rcu_torture_cleanup() to set state so that a future
torture test can run.  However, rcu_torture_cleanup() also attempts to
end the test that didn't actually start, and in doing so relies on the
value of cur_ops, a value that is not particularly relevant in this case.
This can result in confusing output or even follow-on failures due to
attempts to use facilities that have not been properly initialized.

This commit therefore sets the value of cur_ops to NULL in this case
and inserts a check near the beginning of rcu_torture_cleanup(),
thus avoiding relying on an irrelevant cur_ops value.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;rong.a.chen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/core: Handle overflow in cpu_shares_write_u64</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:48:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-27T08:10:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c58f0e847bdca07ec4f0fe33ea1d61394d522f42'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c58f0e847bdca07ec4f0fe33ea1d61394d522f42</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5b61d50ab4ef590f5e1d4df15cd2cea5f5715308 ]

Bit shift in scale_load() could overflow shares. This patch saturates
it to MAX_SHARES like following sched_group_set_shares().

Example:

 # echo 9223372036854776832 &gt; cpu.shares
 # cat cpu.shares

Before patch: 1024
After pattch: 262144

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125501891.293431.3345233332801109696.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/core: Check quota and period overflow at usec to nsec conversion</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:48:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-27T08:10:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5e4ea98f521605fe55141cf711f769eaddd6511b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5e4ea98f521605fe55141cf711f769eaddd6511b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1a8b4540db732ca16c9e43ac7c08b1b8f0b252d8 ]

Large values could overflow u64 and pass following sanity checks.

 # echo 18446744073750000 &gt; cpu.cfs_period_us
 # cat cpu.cfs_period_us
 40448

 # echo 18446744073750000 &gt; cpu.cfs_quota_us
 # cat cpu.cfs_quota_us
 40448

After this patch they will fail with -EINVAL.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125502079.293431.3947497929372138600.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: fix a memory leak bug</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:48:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wenwen Wang</name>
<email>wang6495@umn.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-20T01:49:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=51e088baae2bb197238231009c016a02093079ea'/>
<id>urn:sha1:51e088baae2bb197238231009c016a02093079ea</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 70c4cf17e445264453bc5323db3e50aa0ac9e81f ]

In audit_rule_change(), audit_data_to_entry() is firstly invoked to
translate the payload data to the kernel's rule representation. In
audit_data_to_entry(), depending on the audit field type, an audit tree may
be created in audit_make_tree(), which eventually invokes kmalloc() to
allocate the tree.  Since this tree is a temporary tree, it will be then
freed in the following execution, e.g., audit_add_rule() if the message
type is AUDIT_ADD_RULE or audit_del_rule() if the message type is
AUDIT_DEL_RULE. However, if the message type is neither AUDIT_ADD_RULE nor
AUDIT_DEL_RULE, i.e., the default case of the switch statement, this
temporary tree is not freed.

To fix this issue, only allocate the tree when the type is AUDIT_ADD_RULE
or AUDIT_DEL_RULE.

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wang6495@umn.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix partial reading of trace event's id file</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:26:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Elazar Leibovich</name>
<email>elazar@lightbitslabs.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-31T11:58:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=17fe9003ffccd0f7b26f9935cc1d60d0bf2bdc12'/>
<id>urn:sha1:17fe9003ffccd0f7b26f9935cc1d60d0bf2bdc12</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cbe08bcbbe787315c425dde284dcb715cfbf3f39 upstream.

When reading only part of the id file, the ppos isn't tracked correctly.
This is taken care by simple_read_from_buffer.

Reading a single byte, and then the next byte would result EOF.

While this seems like not a big deal, this breaks abstractions that
reads information from files unbuffered. See for example
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/29399

This code was mentioned as problematic in
commit cd458ba9d5a5
("tracing: Do not (ab)use trace_seq in event_id_read()")

An example C code that show this bug is:

  #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
  #include &lt;stdint.h&gt;

  #include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/stat.h&gt;
  #include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
  #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;

  int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    if (argc &lt; 2)
      return 1;
    int fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
    char c;
    read(fd, &amp;c, 1);
    printf("First  %c\n", c);
    read(fd, &amp;c, 1);
    printf("Second %c\n", c);
  }

Then run with, e.g.

  sudo ./a.out /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/tcp/tcp_set_state/id

You'll notice you're getting the first character twice, instead of the
first two characters in the id file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181231115837.4932-1-elazar@lightbitslabs.com

Cc: Orit Wasserman &lt;orit.was@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 23725aeeab10b ("ftrace: provide an id file for each event")
Signed-off-by: Elazar Leibovich &lt;elazar@lightbitslabs.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>locking/rwsem: Prevent decrement of reader count before increment</title>
<updated>2019-05-21T16:48:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-28T21:25:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e85fab7c4b4a3a3bb54d1294b437326f4288156e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e85fab7c4b4a3a3bb54d1294b437326f4288156e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a9e9bcb45b1525ba7aea26ed9441e8632aeeda58 ]

During my rwsem testing, it was found that after a down_read(), the
reader count may occasionally become 0 or even negative. Consequently,
a writer may steal the lock at that time and execute with the reader
in parallel thus breaking the mutual exclusion guarantee of the write
lock. In other words, both readers and writer can become rwsem owners
simultaneously.

The current reader wakeup code does it in one pass to clear waiter-&gt;task
and put them into wake_q before fully incrementing the reader count.
Once waiter-&gt;task is cleared, the corresponding reader may see it,
finish the critical section and do unlock to decrement the count before
the count is incremented. This is not a problem if there is only one
reader to wake up as the count has been pre-incremented by 1.  It is
a problem if there are more than one readers to be woken up and writer
can steal the lock.

The wakeup was actually done in 2 passes before the following v4.9 commit:

  70800c3c0cc5 ("locking/rwsem: Scan the wait_list for readers only once")

To fix this problem, the wakeup is now done in two passes
again. In the first pass, we collect the readers and count them.
The reader count is then fully incremented. In the second pass, the
waiter-&gt;task is then cleared and they are put into wake_q to be woken
up later.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tim Chen &lt;tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: huang ying &lt;huang.ying.caritas@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 70800c3c0cc5 ("locking/rwsem: Scan the wait_list for readers only once")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190428212557.13482-2-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: convert htab map to hlist_nulls</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:43:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-10T02:33:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=82303dd64addd098f1ec7029bc2c97990ae2bf2a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:82303dd64addd098f1ec7029bc2c97990ae2bf2a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4fe8435909fddc97b81472026aa954e06dd192a5 upstream.

when all map elements are pre-allocated one cpu can delete and reuse htab_elem
while another cpu is still walking the hlist. In such case the lookup may
miss the element. Convert hlist to hlist_nulls to avoid such scenario.
When bucket lock is taken there is no need to take such precautions,
so only convert map_lookup and map_get_next to nulls.
The race window is extremely small and only reproducible with explicit
udelay() inside lookup_nulls_elem_raw()

Similar to hlist add hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_safe() and
hlist_nulls_entry_safe() helpers.

Fixes: 6c9059817432 ("bpf: pre-allocate hash map elements")
Reported-by: Jonathan Perry &lt;jonperry@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng &lt;fengc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix struct htab_elem layout</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:43:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-10T02:33:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=aad9db666c2546b38c8c10f424a90c2f38b65493'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aad9db666c2546b38c8c10f424a90c2f38b65493</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9f691549f76d488a0c74397b3e51e943865ea01f upstream.

when htab_elem is removed from the bucket list the htab_elem.hash_node.next
field should not be overridden too early otherwise we have a tiny race window
between lookup and delete.
The bug was discovered by manual code analysis and reproducible
only with explicit udelay() in lookup_elem_raw().

Fixes: 6c9059817432 ("bpf: pre-allocate hash map elements")
Reported-by: Jonathan Perry &lt;jonperry@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng &lt;fengc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option</title>
<updated>2019-05-14T17:19:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-12T20:39:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=edda9c38930f5088a740952d5181bc1aa443e63c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:edda9c38930f5088a740952d5181bc1aa443e63c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream.

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
   it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
   vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
  leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
  SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt; (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jon Masters &lt;jcm@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Phil Auld &lt;pauld@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
