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<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v4.9.284</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-09-26T11:36:18Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>profiling: fix shift-out-of-bounds bugs</title>
<updated>2021-09-26T11:36:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Skripkin</name>
<email>paskripkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T02:58:21Z</published>
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commit 2d186afd04d669fe9c48b994c41a7405a3c9f16d upstream.

Syzbot reported shift-out-of-bounds bug in profile_init().
The problem was in incorrect prof_shift. Since prof_shift value comes from
userspace we need to clamp this value into [0, BITS_PER_LONG -1]
boundaries.

Second possible shiht-out-of-bounds was found by Tetsuo:
sample_step local variable in read_profile() had "unsigned int" type,
but prof_shift allows to make a BITS_PER_LONG shift. So, to prevent
possible shiht-out-of-bounds sample_step type was changed to
"unsigned long".

Also, "unsigned short int" will be sufficient for storing
[0, BITS_PER_LONG] value, that's why there is no need for
"unsigned long" prof_shift.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210813140022.5011-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e68c89a9510c159d9684@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables</title>
<updated>2021-09-26T11:36:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T03:00:41Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit e1fbbd073137a9d63279f6bf363151a938347640 upstream.

Keno Fischer reported that when a binray loaded via ld-linux-x the
prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP) doesn't allow to setup brk value because it lays
before mm:end_data.

For example a test program shows

 | # ~/t
 |
 | start_code      401000
 | end_code        401a15
 | start_stack     7ffce4577dd0
 | start_data	   403e10
 | end_data        40408c
 | start_brk	   b5b000
 | sbrk(0)         b5b000

and when executed via ld-linux

 | # /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 ~/t
 |
 | start_code      7fc25b0a4000
 | end_code        7fc25b0c4524
 | start_stack     7fffcc6b2400
 | start_data	   7fc25b0ce4c0
 | end_data        7fc25b0cff98
 | start_brk	   55555710c000
 | sbrk(0)         55555710c000

This of course prevent criu from restoring such programs.  Looking into
how kernel operates with brk/start_brk inside brk() syscall I don't see
any problem if we allow to setup brk/start_brk without checking for
end_data.  Even if someone pass some weird address here on a purpose then
the worst possible result will be an unexpected unmapping of existing vma
(own vma, since prctl works with the callers memory) but test for
RLIMIT_DATA is still valid and a user won't be able to gain more memory in
case of expanding VMAs via new values shipped with prctl call.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121221207.GB2174@grain
Fixes: bbdc6076d2e5 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Keno Fischer &lt;keno@juliacomputing.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov &lt;ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn &lt;alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>events: Reuse value read using READ_ONCE instead of re-reading it</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T09:43:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Baptiste Lepers</name>
<email>baptiste.lepers@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-06T01:53:10Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:af7eb4784346f505c9b8e25ed8aa2edcb66e4c21</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b89a05b21f46150ac10a962aa50109250b56b03b upstream.

In perf_event_addr_filters_apply, the task associated with
the event (event-&gt;ctx-&gt;task) is read using READ_ONCE at the beginning
of the function, checked, and then re-read from event-&gt;ctx-&gt;task,
voiding all guarantees of the checks. Reuse the value that was read by
READ_ONCE to ensure the consistency of the task struct throughout the
function.

Fixes: 375637bc52495 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers &lt;baptiste.lepers@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210906015310.12802-1-baptiste.lepers@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>memcg: enable accounting for pids in nested pid namespaces</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T09:43:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Averin</name>
<email>vvs@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-02T21:54:57Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit fab827dbee8c2e06ca4ba000fa6c48bcf9054aba upstream.

Commit 5d097056c9a0 ("kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcg")
enabled memcg accounting for pids allocated from init_pid_ns.pid_cachep,
but forgot to adjust the setting for nested pid namespaces.  As a result,
pid memory is not accounted exactly where it is really needed, inside
memcg-limited containers with their own pid namespaces.

Pid was one the first kernel objects enabled for memcg accounting.
init_pid_ns.pid_cachep marked by SLAB_ACCOUNT and we can expect that any
new pids in the system are memcg-accounted.

Though recently I've noticed that it is wrong.  nested pid namespaces
creates own slab caches for pid objects, nested pids have increased size
because contain id both for all parent and for own pid namespaces.  The
problem is that these slab caches are _NOT_ marked by SLAB_ACCOUNT, as a
result any pids allocated in nested pid namespaces are not
memcg-accounted.

Pid struct in nested pid namespace consumes up to 500 bytes memory, 100000
such objects gives us up to ~50Mb unaccounted memory, this allow container
to exceed assigned memcg limits.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b6de616-fd1a-02c6-cbdb-976ecdcfa604@virtuozzo.com
Fixes: 5d097056c9a0 ("kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcg")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný &lt;mkoutny@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;guro@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/hugetlb: initialize hugetlb_usage in mm_init</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T09:43:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Liu Zixian</name>
<email>liuzixian4@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-09T01:10:05Z</published>
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commit 13db8c50477d83ad3e3b9b0ae247e5cd833a7ae4 upstream.

After fork, the child process will get incorrect (2x) hugetlb_usage.  If
a process uses 5 2MB hugetlb pages in an anonymous mapping,

	HugetlbPages:	   10240 kB

and then forks, the child will show,

	HugetlbPages:	   20480 kB

The reason for double the amount is because hugetlb_usage will be copied
from the parent and then increased when we copy page tables from parent
to child.  Child will have 2x actual usage.

Fix this by adding hugetlb_count_init in mm_init.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210826071742.877-1-liuzixian4@huawei.com
Fixes: 5d317b2b6536 ("mm: hugetlb: proc: add HugetlbPages field to /proc/PID/status")
Signed-off-by: Liu Zixian &lt;liuzixian4@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;naoya.horiguchi@nec.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>workqueue: fix UAF in pwq_unbound_release_workfn()</title>
<updated>2021-08-04T09:58:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Yang Yingliang</name>
<email>yangyingliang@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-14T09:19:33Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit b42b0bddcbc87b4c66f6497f66fc72d52b712aa7 upstream.

I got a UAF report when doing fuzz test:

[  152.880091][ T8030] ==================================================================
[  152.881240][ T8030] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.882442][ T8030] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810d31bd00 by task kworker/3:2/8030
[  152.883578][ T8030]
[  152.883932][ T8030] CPU: 3 PID: 8030 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.13.0+ #249
[  152.885014][ T8030] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  152.886442][ T8030] Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn
[  152.887358][ T8030] Call Trace:
[  152.887837][ T8030]  dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0x9b
[  152.888525][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.889371][ T8030]  print_address_description.constprop.10+0x48/0x70
[  152.890326][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.891163][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.891999][ T8030]  kasan_report.cold.15+0x82/0xdb
[  152.892740][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.893594][ T8030]  __asan_load4+0x69/0x90
[  152.894243][ T8030]  pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.895057][ T8030]  process_one_work+0x47b/0x890
[  152.895778][ T8030]  worker_thread+0x5c/0x790
[  152.896439][ T8030]  ? process_one_work+0x890/0x890
[  152.897163][ T8030]  kthread+0x223/0x250
[  152.897747][ T8030]  ? set_kthread_struct+0xb0/0xb0
[  152.898471][ T8030]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[  152.899114][ T8030]
[  152.899446][ T8030] Allocated by task 8884:
[  152.900084][ T8030]  kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[  152.900769][ T8030]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[  152.901416][ T8030]  __kmalloc+0x29c/0x460
[  152.902014][ T8030]  alloc_workqueue+0x111/0x8e0
[  152.902690][ T8030]  __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[  152.903459][ T8030]  btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[  152.904198][ T8030]  scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[  152.904929][ T8030]  btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[  152.905599][ T8030]  btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[  152.906247][ T8030]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[  152.906916][ T8030]  do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[  152.907535][ T8030]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  152.908365][ T8030]
[  152.908688][ T8030] Freed by task 8884:
[  152.909243][ T8030]  kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[  152.909893][ T8030]  kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30
[  152.910541][ T8030]  kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
[  152.911265][ T8030]  __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140
[  152.911964][ T8030]  kfree+0x9e/0x3d0
[  152.912501][ T8030]  alloc_workqueue+0x7d7/0x8e0
[  152.913182][ T8030]  __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[  152.913949][ T8030]  btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[  152.914703][ T8030]  scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[  152.915402][ T8030]  btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[  152.916077][ T8030]  btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[  152.916729][ T8030]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[  152.917414][ T8030]  do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[  152.918034][ T8030]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  152.918872][ T8030]
[  152.919203][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d31bc00
[  152.919203][ T8030]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[  152.921155][ T8030] The buggy address is located 256 bytes inside of
[  152.921155][ T8030]  512-byte region [ffff88810d31bc00, ffff88810d31be00)
[  152.922993][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  152.923800][ T8030] page:ffffea000434c600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d318
[  152.925249][ T8030] head:ffffea000434c600 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[  152.926399][ T8030] flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[  152.927515][ T8030] raw: 057ff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888009c42c80
[  152.928716][ T8030] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  152.929890][ T8030] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  152.930759][ T8030]
[  152.931076][ T8030] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  152.931851][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.932967][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.934068][ T8030] &gt;ffff88810d31bd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.935189][ T8030]                    ^
[  152.935763][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.936847][ T8030]  ffff88810d31be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  152.937940][ T8030] ==================================================================

If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails in alloc_workqueue(), it will call put_pwq()
which invoke a work queue to call pwq_unbound_release_workfn() and use the 'wq'.
The 'wq' allocated in alloc_workqueue() will be freed in error path when
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails. So it will lead a UAF.

CPU0                                          CPU1
alloc_workqueue()
alloc_and_link_pwqs()
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails
apply_wqattrs_cleanup()
schedule_work(&amp;pwq-&gt;unbound_release_work)
kfree(wq)
                                              worker_thread()
                                              pwq_unbound_release_workfn() &lt;- trigger uaf here

If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails, the new pwq are not linked, it doesn't
hold any reference to the 'wq', 'wq' is invalid to access in the worker,
so add check pwq if linked to fix this.

Fixes: 2d5f0764b526 ("workqueue: split apply_workqueue_attrs() into 3 stages")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;jiangshanlai@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang &lt;yangyingliang@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;jiangshanlai@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix bug in rb_per_cpu_empty() that might cause deadloop.</title>
<updated>2021-07-28T07:14:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Haoran Luo</name>
<email>www@aegistudio.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-21T14:12:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7db12bae1a239d872d17e128fd5271da789bf99c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 67f0d6d9883c13174669f88adac4f0ee656cc16a upstream.

The "rb_per_cpu_empty()" misinterpret the condition (as not-empty) when
"head_page" and "commit_page" of "struct ring_buffer_per_cpu" points to
the same buffer page, whose "buffer_data_page" is empty and "read" field
is non-zero.

An error scenario could be constructed as followed (kernel perspective):

1. All pages in the buffer has been accessed by reader(s) so that all of
them will have non-zero "read" field.

2. Read and clear all buffer pages so that "rb_num_of_entries()" will
return 0 rendering there's no more data to read. It is also required
that the "read_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same
page, while "head_page" is the next page of them.

3. Invoke "ring_buffer_lock_reserve()" with large enough "length"
so that it shot pass the end of current tail buffer page. Now the
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same page.

4. Discard current event with "ring_buffer_discard_commit()", so that
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to a page whose buffer
data page is now empty.

When the error scenario has been constructed, "tracing_read_pipe" will
be trapped inside a deadloop: "trace_empty()" returns 0 since
"rb_per_cpu_empty()" returns 0 when it hits the CPU containing such
constructed ring buffer. Then "trace_find_next_entry_inc()" always
return NULL since "rb_num_of_entries()" reports there's no more entry
to read. Finally "trace_seq_to_user()" returns "-EBUSY" spanking
"tracing_read_pipe" back to the start of the "waitagain" loop.

I've also written a proof-of-concept script to construct the scenario
and trigger the bug automatically, you can use it to trace and validate
my reasoning above:

  https://github.com/aegistudio/RingBufferDetonator.git

Tests has been carried out on linux kernel 5.14-rc2
(2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c), my fixed version
of kernel (for testing whether my update fixes the bug) and
some older kernels (for range of affected kernels). Test result is
also attached to the proof-of-concept repository.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPaNxsIlb2yjSi5Y@aegistudio/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPgrN85WL9VyrZ55@aegistudio

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf41a158cacba ("ring-buffer: make reentrant")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Haoran Luo &lt;www@aegistudio.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/fair: Fix CFS bandwidth hrtimer expiry type</title>
<updated>2021-07-28T07:14:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Odin Ugedal</name>
<email>odin@uged.al</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-29T12:14:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8adfb5fe9c26373f45b772dbde09a84ec59365db'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8adfb5fe9c26373f45b772dbde09a84ec59365db</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 72d0ad7cb5bad265adb2014dbe46c4ccb11afaba ]

The time remaining until expiry of the refresh_timer can be negative.
Casting the type to an unsigned 64-bit value will cause integer
underflow, making the runtime_refresh_within return false instead of
true. These situations are rare, but they do happen.

This does not cause user-facing issues or errors; other than
possibly unthrottling cfs_rq's using runtime from the previous period(s),
making the CFS bandwidth enforcement less strict in those (special)
situations.

Signed-off-by: Odin Ugedal &lt;odin@uged.al&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210629121452.18429-1-odin@uged.al
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Do not reference char * as a string in histograms</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:21:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-15T04:02:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=657df1f079638c95cecd1229a0cf4e3678682fe6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:657df1f079638c95cecd1229a0cf4e3678682fe6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 704adfb5a9978462cd861f170201ae2b5e3d3a80 upstream.

The histogram logic was allowing events with char * pointers to be used as
normal strings. But it was easy to crash the kernel with:

 # echo 'hist:keys=filename' &gt; events/syscalls/sys_enter_openat/trigger

And open some files, and boom!

 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2ced0c3280
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 1173fa067 P4D 1173fa067 PUD 1171b6067 PMD 1171dd067 PTE 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 CPU: 6 PID: 1810 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-test+ #61
 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01
v03.03 07/14/2016
 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20
 Code: f6 82 80 2a 0b a9 20 74 11 0f b6 50 01 48 83 c0 01 f6 82 80 2a 0b
a9 20 75 ef c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 &lt;80&gt; 3f 00 74
10 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3

 RSP: 0018:ffffbdbf81567b50 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffff93815cdb3800 RCX: ffff9382401a22d0
 RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f2ced0c3280
 RBP: 0000000000000100 R08: ffff9382409ff074 R09: ffffbdbf81567c98
 R10: ffff9382409ff074 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9382409ff074
 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff93815a744f00 R15: 00007f2ced0c3280
 FS:  00007f2ced0f8580(0000) GS:ffff93825a800000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f2ced0c3280 CR3: 0000000107069005 CR4: 00000000001706e0
 Call Trace:
  event_hist_trigger+0x463/0x5f0
  ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0xd0
  ? lock_release+0x155/0x440
  ? kernel_init_free_pages+0x6d/0x90
  ? preempt_count_sub+0x9b/0xd0
  ? kernel_init_free_pages+0x6d/0x90
  ? get_page_from_freelist+0x12c4/0x1680
  ? __rb_reserve_next+0xe5/0x460
  ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x12a/0x3f0
  event_triggers_call+0x52/0xe0
  ftrace_syscall_enter+0x264/0x2c0
  syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x1ee/0x210
  do_syscall_64+0x1c/0x80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Where it triggered a fault on strlen(key) where key was the filename.

The reason is that filename is a char * to user space, and the histogram
code just blindly dereferenced it, with obvious bad results.

I originally tried to use strncpy_from_user/kernel_nofault() but found
that there's other places that its dereferenced and not worth the effort.

Just do not allow "char *" to act like strings.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210715000206.025df9d2@rorschach.local.home

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov &lt;tz.stoyanov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Tom Zanussi &lt;zanussi@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 79e577cbce4c4 ("tracing: Support string type key properly")
Fixes: 5967bd5c4239 ("tracing: Let filter_assign_type() detect FILTER_PTR_STRING")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kthread: prevent deadlock when kthread_mod_delayed_work() races with kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync()</title>
<updated>2021-07-11T10:46:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Mladek</name>
<email>pmladek@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-25T01:39:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5d27e1503b17db8571a4e71b6146644ab29c18a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5d27e1503b17db8571a4e71b6146644ab29c18a7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5fa54346caf67b4b1b10b1f390316ae466da4d53 upstream.

The system might hang with the following backtrace:

	schedule+0x80/0x100
	schedule_timeout+0x48/0x138
	wait_for_common+0xa4/0x134
	wait_for_completion+0x1c/0x2c
	kthread_flush_work+0x114/0x1cc
	kthread_cancel_work_sync.llvm.16514401384283632983+0xe8/0x144
	kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x18/0x2c
	xxxx_pm_notify+0xb0/0xd8
	blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x80/0x194
	pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x28/0x4c
	suspend_prepare+0x40/0x260
	enter_state+0x80/0x3f4
	pm_suspend+0x60/0xdc
	state_store+0x108/0x144
	kobj_attr_store+0x38/0x88
	sysfs_kf_write+0x64/0xc0
	kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x108/0x1d0
	vfs_write+0x2f4/0x368
	ksys_write+0x7c/0xec

It is caused by the following race between kthread_mod_delayed_work()
and kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync():

CPU0				CPU1

Context: Thread A		Context: Thread B

kthread_mod_delayed_work()
  spin_lock()
  __kthread_cancel_work()
     spin_unlock()
     del_timer_sync()
				kthread_cancel_delayed_work_sync()
				  spin_lock()
				  __kthread_cancel_work()
				    spin_unlock()
				    del_timer_sync()
				    spin_lock()

				  work-&gt;canceling++
				  spin_unlock
     spin_lock()
   queue_delayed_work()
     // dwork is put into the worker-&gt;delayed_work_list

   spin_unlock()

				  kthread_flush_work()
     // flush_work is put at the tail of the dwork

				    wait_for_completion()

Context: IRQ

  kthread_delayed_work_timer_fn()
    spin_lock()
    list_del_init(&amp;work-&gt;node);
    spin_unlock()

BANG: flush_work is not longer linked and will never get proceed.

The problem is that kthread_mod_delayed_work() checks work-&gt;canceling
flag before canceling the timer.

A simple solution is to (re)check work-&gt;canceling after
__kthread_cancel_work().  But then it is not clear what should be
returned when __kthread_cancel_work() removed the work from the queue
(list) and it can't queue it again with the new @delay.

The return value might be used for reference counting.  The caller has
to know whether a new work has been queued or an existing one was
replaced.

The proper solution is that kthread_mod_delayed_work() will remove the
work from the queue (list) _only_ when work-&gt;canceling is not set.  The
flag must be checked after the timer is stopped and the remaining
operations can be done under worker-&gt;lock.

Note that kthread_mod_delayed_work() could remove the timer and then
bail out.  It is fine.  The other canceling caller needs to cancel the
timer as well.  The important thing is that the queue (list)
manipulation is done atomically under worker-&gt;lock.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210610133051.15337-3-pmladek@suse.com
Fixes: 9a6b06c8d9a220860468a ("kthread: allow to modify delayed kthread work")
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Reported-by: Martin Liu &lt;liumartin@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;jenhaochen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Minchan Kim &lt;minchan@google.com&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
