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<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v4.9.287</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-10-17T08:05:39Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix integer overflow in prealloc_elems_and_freelist()</title>
<updated>2021-10-17T08:05:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu</name>
<email>th.yasumatsu@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-30T13:55:45Z</published>
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[ Upstream commit 30e29a9a2bc6a4888335a6ede968b75cd329657a ]

In prealloc_elems_and_freelist(), the multiplication to calculate the
size passed to bpf_map_area_alloc() could lead to an integer overflow.
As a result, out-of-bounds write could occur in pcpu_freelist_populate()
as reported by KASAN:

[...]
[   16.968613] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.969408] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888104fc6ea0 by task crash/78
[   16.970038]
[   16.970195] CPU: 0 PID: 78 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #1
[   16.970878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[   16.972026] Call Trace:
[   16.972306]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[   16.972687]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[   16.973297]  ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.973777]  ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.974257]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[   16.974681]  ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.975190]  pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.975669]  stack_map_alloc+0x209/0x2a0
[   16.976106]  __sys_bpf+0xd83/0x2ce0
[...]

The possibility of this overflow was originally discussed in [0], but
was overlooked.

Fix the integer overflow by changing elem_size to u64 from u32.

  [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/728b238e-a481-eb50-98e9-b0f430ab01e7@gmail.com/

Fixes: 557c0c6e7df8 ("bpf: convert stackmap to pre-allocation")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu &lt;th.yasumatsu@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210930135545.173698-1-th.yasumatsu@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpufreq: schedutil: Use kobject release() method to free sugov_tunables</title>
<updated>2021-10-06T08:23:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kevin Hao</name>
<email>haokexin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-05T07:29:17Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e5c6b312ce3cc97e90ea159446e6bfa06645364d ]

The struct sugov_tunables is protected by the kobject, so we can't free
it directly. Otherwise we would get a call trace like this:
  ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x30
  WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 720 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: a.sh Tainted: G        W         5.14.0-rc1-next-20210715-yocto-standard+ #507
  Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT)
  pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
  pc : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
  lr : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
  sp : ffff80001ecaf910
  x29: ffff80001ecaf910 x28: ffff00011b10b8d0 x27: ffff800011043d80
  x26: ffff00011a8f0000 x25: ffff800013cb3ff0 x24: 0000000000000000
  x23: ffff80001142aa68 x22: ffff800011043d80 x21: ffff00010de46f20
  x20: ffff800013c0c520 x19: ffff800011d8f5b0 x18: 0000000000000010
  x17: 6e6968207473696c x16: 5f72656d6974203a x15: 6570797420746365
  x14: 6a626f2029302065 x13: 303378302f307830 x12: 2b6e665f72656d69
  x11: ffff8000124b1560 x10: ffff800012331520 x9 : ffff8000100ca6b0
  x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 0000000000000001
  x5 : ffff800011d8c000 x4 : ffff800011d8c740 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : ffff0001108301c0 x1 : ab3c90eedf9c0f00 x0 : 0000000000000000
  Call trace:
   debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
   __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1c0/0x230
   debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x20/0x88
   slab_free_freelist_hook+0x154/0x1c8
   kfree+0x114/0x5d0
   sugov_exit+0xbc/0xc0
   cpufreq_exit_governor+0x44/0x90
   cpufreq_set_policy+0x268/0x4a8
   store_scaling_governor+0xe0/0x128
   store+0xc0/0xf0
   sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x80
   kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1c0
   new_sync_write+0xf0/0x190
   vfs_write+0x2d4/0x478
   ksys_write+0x74/0x100
   __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
   invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe0
   do_el0_svc+0x64/0x158
   el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
   el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
  irq event stamp: 5518
  hardirqs last  enabled at (5517): [&lt;ffff8000100cbd7c&gt;] console_unlock+0x554/0x6c8
  hardirqs last disabled at (5518): [&lt;ffff800010fc0638&gt;] el1_dbg+0x28/0xa0
  softirqs last  enabled at (5504): [&lt;ffff8000100106e0&gt;] __do_softirq+0x4d0/0x6c0
  softirqs last disabled at (5483): [&lt;ffff800010049548&gt;] irq_exit+0x1b0/0x1b8

So split the original sugov_tunables_free() into two functions,
sugov_clear_global_tunables() is just used to clear the global_tunables
and the new sugov_tunables_free() is used as kobj_type::release to
release the sugov_tunables safely.

Fixes: 9bdcb44e391d ("cpufreq: schedutil: New governor based on scheduler utilization data")
Cc: 4.7+ &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao &lt;haokexin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar &lt;viresh.kumar@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>blktrace: Fix uaf in blk_trace access after removing by sysfs</title>
<updated>2021-10-06T08:23:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhihao Cheng</name>
<email>chengzhihao1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-23T13:49:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dacfd5e4d1142bfb3809aab3634a375f6f373269</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5afedf670caf30a2b5a52da96eb7eac7dee6a9c9 ]

There is an use-after-free problem triggered by following process:

      P1(sda)				P2(sdb)
			echo 0 &gt; /sys/block/sdb/trace/enable
			  blk_trace_remove_queue
			    synchronize_rcu
			    blk_trace_free
			      relay_close
rcu_read_lock
__blk_add_trace
  trace_note_tsk
  (Iterate running_trace_list)
			        relay_close_buf
				  relay_destroy_buf
				    kfree(buf)
    trace_note(sdb's bt)
      relay_reserve
        buf-&gt;offset &lt;- nullptr deference (use-after-free) !!!
rcu_read_unlock

[  502.714379] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
0000000000000010
[  502.715260] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  502.715903] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  502.716546] PGD 103984067 P4D 103984067 PUD 17592b067 PMD 0
[  502.717252] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  502.720308] RIP: 0010:trace_note.isra.0+0x86/0x360
[  502.732872] Call Trace:
[  502.733193]  __blk_add_trace.cold+0x137/0x1a3
[  502.733734]  blk_add_trace_rq+0x7b/0xd0
[  502.734207]  blk_add_trace_rq_issue+0x54/0xa0
[  502.734755]  blk_mq_start_request+0xde/0x1b0
[  502.735287]  scsi_queue_rq+0x528/0x1140
...
[  502.742704]  sg_new_write.isra.0+0x16e/0x3e0
[  502.747501]  sg_ioctl+0x466/0x1100

Reproduce method:
  ioctl(/dev/sda, BLKTRACESETUP, blk_user_trace_setup[buf_size=127])
  ioctl(/dev/sda, BLKTRACESTART)
  ioctl(/dev/sdb, BLKTRACESETUP, blk_user_trace_setup[buf_size=127])
  ioctl(/dev/sdb, BLKTRACESTART)

  echo 0 &gt; /sys/block/sdb/trace/enable &amp;
  // Add delay(mdelay/msleep) before kernel enters blk_trace_free()

  ioctl$SG_IO(/dev/sda, SG_IO, ...)
  // Enters trace_note_tsk() after blk_trace_free() returned
  // Use mdelay in rcu region rather than msleep(which may schedule out)

Remove blk_trace from running_list before calling blk_trace_free() by
sysfs if blk_trace is at Blktrace_running state.

Fixes: c71a896154119f ("blktrace: add ftrace plugin")
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng &lt;chengzhihao1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923134921.109194-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>profiling: fix shift-out-of-bounds bugs</title>
<updated>2021-09-26T11:36:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Skripkin</name>
<email>paskripkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T02:58:21Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit 2d186afd04d669fe9c48b994c41a7405a3c9f16d upstream.

Syzbot reported shift-out-of-bounds bug in profile_init().
The problem was in incorrect prof_shift. Since prof_shift value comes from
userspace we need to clamp this value into [0, BITS_PER_LONG -1]
boundaries.

Second possible shiht-out-of-bounds was found by Tetsuo:
sample_step local variable in read_profile() had "unsigned int" type,
but prof_shift allows to make a BITS_PER_LONG shift. So, to prevent
possible shiht-out-of-bounds sample_step type was changed to
"unsigned long".

Also, "unsigned short int" will be sufficient for storing
[0, BITS_PER_LONG] value, that's why there is no need for
"unsigned long" prof_shift.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210813140022.5011-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e68c89a9510c159d9684@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables</title>
<updated>2021-09-26T11:36:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T03:00:41Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit e1fbbd073137a9d63279f6bf363151a938347640 upstream.

Keno Fischer reported that when a binray loaded via ld-linux-x the
prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP) doesn't allow to setup brk value because it lays
before mm:end_data.

For example a test program shows

 | # ~/t
 |
 | start_code      401000
 | end_code        401a15
 | start_stack     7ffce4577dd0
 | start_data	   403e10
 | end_data        40408c
 | start_brk	   b5b000
 | sbrk(0)         b5b000

and when executed via ld-linux

 | # /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 ~/t
 |
 | start_code      7fc25b0a4000
 | end_code        7fc25b0c4524
 | start_stack     7fffcc6b2400
 | start_data	   7fc25b0ce4c0
 | end_data        7fc25b0cff98
 | start_brk	   55555710c000
 | sbrk(0)         55555710c000

This of course prevent criu from restoring such programs.  Looking into
how kernel operates with brk/start_brk inside brk() syscall I don't see
any problem if we allow to setup brk/start_brk without checking for
end_data.  Even if someone pass some weird address here on a purpose then
the worst possible result will be an unexpected unmapping of existing vma
(own vma, since prctl works with the callers memory) but test for
RLIMIT_DATA is still valid and a user won't be able to gain more memory in
case of expanding VMAs via new values shipped with prctl call.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121221207.GB2174@grain
Fixes: bbdc6076d2e5 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Keno Fischer &lt;keno@juliacomputing.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov &lt;ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn &lt;alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>events: Reuse value read using READ_ONCE instead of re-reading it</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T09:43:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Baptiste Lepers</name>
<email>baptiste.lepers@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-06T01:53:10Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit b89a05b21f46150ac10a962aa50109250b56b03b upstream.

In perf_event_addr_filters_apply, the task associated with
the event (event-&gt;ctx-&gt;task) is read using READ_ONCE at the beginning
of the function, checked, and then re-read from event-&gt;ctx-&gt;task,
voiding all guarantees of the checks. Reuse the value that was read by
READ_ONCE to ensure the consistency of the task struct throughout the
function.

Fixes: 375637bc52495 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers &lt;baptiste.lepers@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210906015310.12802-1-baptiste.lepers@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>memcg: enable accounting for pids in nested pid namespaces</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T09:43:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Averin</name>
<email>vvs@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-02T21:54:57Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:91acb9615115f256a68564a6ec0ac01f9deea298</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fab827dbee8c2e06ca4ba000fa6c48bcf9054aba upstream.

Commit 5d097056c9a0 ("kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcg")
enabled memcg accounting for pids allocated from init_pid_ns.pid_cachep,
but forgot to adjust the setting for nested pid namespaces.  As a result,
pid memory is not accounted exactly where it is really needed, inside
memcg-limited containers with their own pid namespaces.

Pid was one the first kernel objects enabled for memcg accounting.
init_pid_ns.pid_cachep marked by SLAB_ACCOUNT and we can expect that any
new pids in the system are memcg-accounted.

Though recently I've noticed that it is wrong.  nested pid namespaces
creates own slab caches for pid objects, nested pids have increased size
because contain id both for all parent and for own pid namespaces.  The
problem is that these slab caches are _NOT_ marked by SLAB_ACCOUNT, as a
result any pids allocated in nested pid namespaces are not
memcg-accounted.

Pid struct in nested pid namespace consumes up to 500 bytes memory, 100000
such objects gives us up to ~50Mb unaccounted memory, this allow container
to exceed assigned memcg limits.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b6de616-fd1a-02c6-cbdb-976ecdcfa604@virtuozzo.com
Fixes: 5d097056c9a0 ("kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcg")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný &lt;mkoutny@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;guro@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/hugetlb: initialize hugetlb_usage in mm_init</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T09:43:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Liu Zixian</name>
<email>liuzixian4@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-09T01:10:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=958bb88f6fae67e9401047dafabd2d3e9507707d'/>
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<content type='text'>
commit 13db8c50477d83ad3e3b9b0ae247e5cd833a7ae4 upstream.

After fork, the child process will get incorrect (2x) hugetlb_usage.  If
a process uses 5 2MB hugetlb pages in an anonymous mapping,

	HugetlbPages:	   10240 kB

and then forks, the child will show,

	HugetlbPages:	   20480 kB

The reason for double the amount is because hugetlb_usage will be copied
from the parent and then increased when we copy page tables from parent
to child.  Child will have 2x actual usage.

Fix this by adding hugetlb_count_init in mm_init.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210826071742.877-1-liuzixian4@huawei.com
Fixes: 5d317b2b6536 ("mm: hugetlb: proc: add HugetlbPages field to /proc/PID/status")
Signed-off-by: Liu Zixian &lt;liuzixian4@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;naoya.horiguchi@nec.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>workqueue: fix UAF in pwq_unbound_release_workfn()</title>
<updated>2021-08-04T09:58:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Yang Yingliang</name>
<email>yangyingliang@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-14T09:19:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1f63eec1c8489c6edd9ca96dd36c8638f595e234'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1f63eec1c8489c6edd9ca96dd36c8638f595e234</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b42b0bddcbc87b4c66f6497f66fc72d52b712aa7 upstream.

I got a UAF report when doing fuzz test:

[  152.880091][ T8030] ==================================================================
[  152.881240][ T8030] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.882442][ T8030] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810d31bd00 by task kworker/3:2/8030
[  152.883578][ T8030]
[  152.883932][ T8030] CPU: 3 PID: 8030 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.13.0+ #249
[  152.885014][ T8030] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  152.886442][ T8030] Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn
[  152.887358][ T8030] Call Trace:
[  152.887837][ T8030]  dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0x9b
[  152.888525][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.889371][ T8030]  print_address_description.constprop.10+0x48/0x70
[  152.890326][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.891163][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.891999][ T8030]  kasan_report.cold.15+0x82/0xdb
[  152.892740][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.893594][ T8030]  __asan_load4+0x69/0x90
[  152.894243][ T8030]  pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.895057][ T8030]  process_one_work+0x47b/0x890
[  152.895778][ T8030]  worker_thread+0x5c/0x790
[  152.896439][ T8030]  ? process_one_work+0x890/0x890
[  152.897163][ T8030]  kthread+0x223/0x250
[  152.897747][ T8030]  ? set_kthread_struct+0xb0/0xb0
[  152.898471][ T8030]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[  152.899114][ T8030]
[  152.899446][ T8030] Allocated by task 8884:
[  152.900084][ T8030]  kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[  152.900769][ T8030]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[  152.901416][ T8030]  __kmalloc+0x29c/0x460
[  152.902014][ T8030]  alloc_workqueue+0x111/0x8e0
[  152.902690][ T8030]  __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[  152.903459][ T8030]  btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[  152.904198][ T8030]  scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[  152.904929][ T8030]  btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[  152.905599][ T8030]  btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[  152.906247][ T8030]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[  152.906916][ T8030]  do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[  152.907535][ T8030]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  152.908365][ T8030]
[  152.908688][ T8030] Freed by task 8884:
[  152.909243][ T8030]  kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[  152.909893][ T8030]  kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30
[  152.910541][ T8030]  kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
[  152.911265][ T8030]  __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140
[  152.911964][ T8030]  kfree+0x9e/0x3d0
[  152.912501][ T8030]  alloc_workqueue+0x7d7/0x8e0
[  152.913182][ T8030]  __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[  152.913949][ T8030]  btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[  152.914703][ T8030]  scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[  152.915402][ T8030]  btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[  152.916077][ T8030]  btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[  152.916729][ T8030]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[  152.917414][ T8030]  do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[  152.918034][ T8030]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  152.918872][ T8030]
[  152.919203][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d31bc00
[  152.919203][ T8030]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[  152.921155][ T8030] The buggy address is located 256 bytes inside of
[  152.921155][ T8030]  512-byte region [ffff88810d31bc00, ffff88810d31be00)
[  152.922993][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  152.923800][ T8030] page:ffffea000434c600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d318
[  152.925249][ T8030] head:ffffea000434c600 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[  152.926399][ T8030] flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[  152.927515][ T8030] raw: 057ff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888009c42c80
[  152.928716][ T8030] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  152.929890][ T8030] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  152.930759][ T8030]
[  152.931076][ T8030] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  152.931851][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.932967][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.934068][ T8030] &gt;ffff88810d31bd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.935189][ T8030]                    ^
[  152.935763][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.936847][ T8030]  ffff88810d31be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  152.937940][ T8030] ==================================================================

If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails in alloc_workqueue(), it will call put_pwq()
which invoke a work queue to call pwq_unbound_release_workfn() and use the 'wq'.
The 'wq' allocated in alloc_workqueue() will be freed in error path when
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails. So it will lead a UAF.

CPU0                                          CPU1
alloc_workqueue()
alloc_and_link_pwqs()
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails
apply_wqattrs_cleanup()
schedule_work(&amp;pwq-&gt;unbound_release_work)
kfree(wq)
                                              worker_thread()
                                              pwq_unbound_release_workfn() &lt;- trigger uaf here

If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails, the new pwq are not linked, it doesn't
hold any reference to the 'wq', 'wq' is invalid to access in the worker,
so add check pwq if linked to fix this.

Fixes: 2d5f0764b526 ("workqueue: split apply_workqueue_attrs() into 3 stages")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;jiangshanlai@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang &lt;yangyingliang@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;jiangshanlai@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix bug in rb_per_cpu_empty() that might cause deadloop.</title>
<updated>2021-07-28T07:14:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Haoran Luo</name>
<email>www@aegistudio.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-21T14:12:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7db12bae1a239d872d17e128fd5271da789bf99c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7db12bae1a239d872d17e128fd5271da789bf99c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 67f0d6d9883c13174669f88adac4f0ee656cc16a upstream.

The "rb_per_cpu_empty()" misinterpret the condition (as not-empty) when
"head_page" and "commit_page" of "struct ring_buffer_per_cpu" points to
the same buffer page, whose "buffer_data_page" is empty and "read" field
is non-zero.

An error scenario could be constructed as followed (kernel perspective):

1. All pages in the buffer has been accessed by reader(s) so that all of
them will have non-zero "read" field.

2. Read and clear all buffer pages so that "rb_num_of_entries()" will
return 0 rendering there's no more data to read. It is also required
that the "read_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same
page, while "head_page" is the next page of them.

3. Invoke "ring_buffer_lock_reserve()" with large enough "length"
so that it shot pass the end of current tail buffer page. Now the
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same page.

4. Discard current event with "ring_buffer_discard_commit()", so that
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to a page whose buffer
data page is now empty.

When the error scenario has been constructed, "tracing_read_pipe" will
be trapped inside a deadloop: "trace_empty()" returns 0 since
"rb_per_cpu_empty()" returns 0 when it hits the CPU containing such
constructed ring buffer. Then "trace_find_next_entry_inc()" always
return NULL since "rb_num_of_entries()" reports there's no more entry
to read. Finally "trace_seq_to_user()" returns "-EBUSY" spanking
"tracing_read_pipe" back to the start of the "waitagain" loop.

I've also written a proof-of-concept script to construct the scenario
and trigger the bug automatically, you can use it to trace and validate
my reasoning above:

  https://github.com/aegistudio/RingBufferDetonator.git

Tests has been carried out on linux kernel 5.14-rc2
(2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c), my fixed version
of kernel (for testing whether my update fixes the bug) and
some older kernels (for range of affected kernels). Test result is
also attached to the proof-of-concept repository.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPaNxsIlb2yjSi5Y@aegistudio/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPgrN85WL9VyrZ55@aegistudio

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf41a158cacba ("ring-buffer: make reentrant")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Haoran Luo &lt;www@aegistudio.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
