<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v5.10.243</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2025-09-09T16:45:22Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>cpufreq/sched: Explicitly synchronize limits_changed flag handling</title>
<updated>2025-09-09T16:45:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Rafael J. Wysocki</name>
<email>rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-06T19:49:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2075ccfcba2745ea43d859e20975e6019e38f5f7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 79443a7e9da3c9f68290a8653837e23aba0fa89f ]

The handling of the limits_changed flag in struct sugov_policy needs to
be explicitly synchronized to ensure that cpufreq policy limits updates
will not be missed in some cases.

Without that synchronization it is theoretically possible that
the limits_changed update in sugov_should_update_freq() will be
reordered with respect to the reads of the policy limits in
cpufreq_driver_resolve_freq() and in that case, if the limits_changed
update in sugov_limits() clobbers the one in sugov_should_update_freq(),
the new policy limits may not take effect for a long time.

Likewise, the limits_changed update in sugov_limits() may theoretically
get reordered with respect to the updates of the policy limits in
cpufreq_set_policy() and if sugov_should_update_freq() runs between
them, the policy limits change may be missed.

To ensure that the above situations will not take place, add memory
barriers preventing the reordering in question from taking place and
add READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations around all of the
limits_changed flag updates to prevent the compiler from messing up
with that code.

Fixes: 600f5badb78c ("cpufreq: schedutil: Don't skip freq update when limits change")
Cc: 5.3+ &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 5.3+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Loehle &lt;christian.loehle@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3376719.44csPzL39Z@rjwysocki.net
[ Adjust context ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dma/pool: Ensure DMA_DIRECT_REMAP allocations are decrypted</title>
<updated>2025-09-04T12:41:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Shanker Donthineni</name>
<email>sdonthineni@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-11T18:17:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:be100617e89600c7fae0baa9b8cf39e8e9b3bbc0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 89a2d212bdb4bc29bed8e7077abe054b801137ea upstream.

When CONFIG_DMA_DIRECT_REMAP is enabled, atomic pool pages are
remapped via dma_common_contiguous_remap() using the supplied
pgprot. Currently, the mapping uses
pgprot_dmacoherent(PAGE_KERNEL), which leaves the memory encrypted
on systems with memory encryption enabled (e.g., ARM CCA Realms).

This can cause the DMA layer to fail or crash when accessing the
memory, as the underlying physical pages are not configured as
expected.

Fix this by requesting a decrypted mapping in the vmap() call:
pgprot_decrypted(pgprot_dmacoherent(PAGE_KERNEL))

This ensures that atomic pool memory is consistently mapped
unencrypted.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni &lt;sdonthineni@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski &lt;m.szyprowski@samsung.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250811181759.998805-1-sdonthineni@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace: Fix potential warning in trace_printk_seq during ftrace_dump</title>
<updated>2025-09-04T12:41:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tengda Wu</name>
<email>wutengda@huaweicloud.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-22T03:33:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5ab0ec206deb99eb3baf8f1d7602aeaa91dbcc85'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5ab0ec206deb99eb3baf8f1d7602aeaa91dbcc85</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4013aef2ced9b756a410f50d12df9ebe6a883e4a ]

When calling ftrace_dump_one() concurrently with reading trace_pipe,
a WARN_ON_ONCE() in trace_printk_seq() can be triggered due to a race
condition.

The issue occurs because:

CPU0 (ftrace_dump)                              CPU1 (reader)
echo z &gt; /proc/sysrq-trigger

!trace_empty(&amp;iter)
trace_iterator_reset(&amp;iter) &lt;- len = size = 0
                                                cat /sys/kernel/tracing/trace_pipe
trace_find_next_entry_inc(&amp;iter)
  __find_next_entry
    ring_buffer_empty_cpu &lt;- all empty
  return NULL

trace_printk_seq(&amp;iter.seq)
  WARN_ON_ONCE(s-&gt;seq.len &gt;= s-&gt;seq.size)

In the context between trace_empty() and trace_find_next_entry_inc()
during ftrace_dump, the ring buffer data was consumed by other readers.
This caused trace_find_next_entry_inc to return NULL, failing to populate
`iter.seq`. At this point, due to the prior trace_iterator_reset, both
`iter.seq.len` and `iter.seq.size` were set to 0. Since they are equal,
the WARN_ON_ONCE condition is triggered.

Move the trace_printk_seq() into the if block that checks to make sure the
return value of trace_find_next_entry_inc() is non-NULL in
ftrace_dump_one(), ensuring the 'iter.seq' is properly populated before
subsequent operations.

Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250822033343.3000289-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
Fixes: d769041f8653 ("ring_buffer: implement new locking")
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu &lt;wutengda@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cgroup/cpuset: Use static_branch_enable_cpuslocked() on cpusets_insane_config_key</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-06T17:24:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9488173166e7e04b33c1cb69d7dbcd5beaa2e99c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 65f97cc81b0adc5f49cf6cff5d874be0058e3f41 ]

The following lockdep splat was observed.

[  812.359086] ============================================
[  812.359089] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  812.359097] --------------------------------------------
[  812.359100] runtest.sh/30042 is trying to acquire lock:
[  812.359105] ffffffffa7f27420 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_enable+0xe/0x20
[  812.359131]
[  812.359131] but task is already holding lock:
[  812.359134] ffffffffa7f27420 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuset_write_resmask+0x98/0xa70
     :
[  812.359267] Call Trace:
[  812.359272]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  812.359367]  cpus_read_lock+0x3c/0xe0
[  812.359382]  static_key_enable+0xe/0x20
[  812.359389]  check_insane_mems_config.part.0+0x11/0x30
[  812.359398]  cpuset_write_resmask+0x9f2/0xa70
[  812.359411]  cgroup_file_write+0x1c7/0x660
[  812.359467]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x358/0x530
[  812.359479]  vfs_write+0xabe/0x1250
[  812.359529]  ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0
[  812.359558]  do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xe0

Since commit d74b27d63a8b ("cgroup/cpuset: Change cpuset_rwsem
and hotplug lock order"), the ordering of cpu hotplug lock
and cpuset_mutex had been reversed. That patch correctly
used the cpuslocked version of the static branch API to enable
cpusets_pre_enable_key and cpusets_enabled_key, but it didn't do the
same for cpusets_insane_config_key.

The cpusets_insane_config_key can be enabled in the
check_insane_mems_config() which is called from update_nodemask()
or cpuset_hotplug_update_tasks() with both cpu hotplug lock and
cpuset_mutex held. Deadlock can happen with a pending hotplug event that
tries to acquire the cpu hotplug write lock which will block further
cpus_read_lock() attempt from check_insane_mems_config(). Fix that by
switching to use static_branch_enable_cpuslocked().

Fixes: d74b27d63a8b ("cgroup/cpuset: Change cpuset_rwsem and hotplug lock order")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/page_alloc: detect allocation forbidden by cpuset and bail out early</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Feng Tang</name>
<email>feng.tang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-05T20:40:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c65b1bd0af076fa5a1da26b9cf780097b14b1543</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8ca1b5a49885f0c0c486544da46a9e0ac790831d ]

There was a report that starting an Ubuntu in docker while using cpuset
to bind it to movable nodes (a node only has movable zone, like a node
for hotplug or a Persistent Memory node in normal usage) will fail due
to memory allocation failure, and then OOM is involved and many other
innocent processes got killed.

It can be reproduced with command:

    $ docker run -it --rm --cpuset-mems 4 ubuntu:latest bash -c "grep Mems_allowed /proc/self/status"

(where node 4 is a movable node)

  runc:[2:INIT] invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x500cc2(GFP_HIGHUSER|__GFP_ACCOUNT), order=0, oom_score_adj=0
  CPU: 8 PID: 8291 Comm: runc:[2:INIT] Tainted: G        W I E     5.8.2-0.g71b519a-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased)
  Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/0PHYDR, BIOS 2.6.4 04/09/2020
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x6b/0x88
   dump_header+0x4a/0x1e2
   oom_kill_process.cold+0xb/0x10
   out_of_memory.part.0+0xaf/0x230
   out_of_memory+0x3d/0x80
   __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x954/0xa20
   __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2d3/0x300
   pipe_write+0x322/0x590
   new_sync_write+0x196/0x1b0
   vfs_write+0x1c3/0x1f0
   ksys_write+0xa7/0xe0
   do_syscall_64+0x52/0xd0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  Mem-Info:
  active_anon:392832 inactive_anon:182 isolated_anon:0
   active_file:68130 inactive_file:151527 isolated_file:0
   unevictable:2701 dirty:0 writeback:7
   slab_reclaimable:51418 slab_unreclaimable:116300
   mapped:45825 shmem:735 pagetables:2540 bounce:0
   free:159849484 free_pcp:73 free_cma:0
  Node 4 active_anon:1448kB inactive_anon:0kB active_file:0kB inactive_file:0kB unevictable:0kB isolated(anon):0kB isolated(file):0kB mapped:0kB dirty:0kB writeback:0kB shmem:0kB shmem_thp: 0kB shmem_pmdmapped: 0kB anon_thp: 0kB writeback_tmp:0kB all_unreclaimable? no
  Node 4 Movable free:130021408kB min:9140kB low:139160kB high:269180kB reserved_highatomic:0KB active_anon:1448kB inactive_anon:0kB active_file:0kB inactive_file:0kB unevictable:0kB writepending:0kB present:130023424kB managed:130023424kB mlocked:0kB kernel_stack:0kB pagetables:0kB bounce:0kB free_pcp:292kB local_pcp:84kB free_cma:0kB
  lowmem_reserve[]: 0 0 0 0 0
  Node 4 Movable: 1*4kB (M) 0*8kB 0*16kB 1*32kB (M) 0*64kB 0*128kB 1*256kB (M) 1*512kB (M) 1*1024kB (M) 0*2048kB 31743*4096kB (M) = 130021156kB

  oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_CPUSET,nodemask=(null),cpuset=docker-9976a269caec812c134fa317f27487ee36e1129beba7278a463dd53e5fb9997b.scope,mems_allowed=4,global_oom,task_memcg=/system.slice/containerd.service,task=containerd,pid=4100,uid=0
  Out of memory: Killed process 4100 (containerd) total-vm:4077036kB, anon-rss:51184kB, file-rss:26016kB, shmem-rss:0kB, UID:0 pgtables:676kB oom_score_adj:0
  oom_reaper: reaped process 8248 (docker), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB
  oom_reaper: reaped process 2054 (node_exporter), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB
  oom_reaper: reaped process 1452 (systemd-journal), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:8564kB, shmem-rss:4kB
  oom_reaper: reaped process 2146 (munin-node), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB
  oom_reaper: reaped process 8291 (runc:[2:INIT]), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB

The reason is that in this case, the target cpuset nodes only have
movable zone, while the creation of an OS in docker sometimes needs to
allocate memory in non-movable zones (dma/dma32/normal) like
GFP_HIGHUSER, and the cpuset limit forbids the allocation, then
out-of-memory killing is involved even when normal nodes and movable
nodes both have many free memory.

The OOM killer cannot help to resolve the situation as there is no
usable memory for the request in the cpuset scope.  The only reasonable
measure to take is to fail the allocation right away and have the caller
to deal with it.

So add a check for cases like this in the slowpath of allocation, and
bail out early returning NULL for the allocation.

As page allocation is one of the hottest path in kernel, this check will
hurt all users with sane cpuset configuration, add a static branch check
and detect the abnormal config in cpuset memory binding setup so that
the extra check cost in page allocation is not paid by everyone.

[thanks to Micho Hocko and David Rientjes for suggesting not handling
 it inside OOM code, adding cpuset check, refining comments]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1632481657-68112-1-git-send-email-feng.tang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang &lt;feng.tang@intel.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan.x@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 65f97cc81b0a ("cgroup/cpuset: Use static_branch_enable_cpuslocked() on cpusets_insane_config_key")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Limit access to parser-&gt;buffer when trace_get_user failed</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pu Lehui</name>
<email>pulehui@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-24T14:08:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b842ef39c2ad6156c13afdec25ecc6792a9b67b9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6a909ea83f226803ea0e718f6e88613df9234d58 ]

When the length of the string written to set_ftrace_filter exceeds
FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, the following KASAN alarm will be triggered:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff0000d00bd5ba by task ash/165

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 165 Comm: ash Not tainted 6.16.0-g6bcdbd62bd56-dirty
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 show_stack+0x34/0x50 (C)
 dump_stack_lvl+0xa0/0x158
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x398
 print_report+0xb0/0x280
 kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x30
 strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
 ftrace_process_regex.isra.0+0x100/0x2d8
 ftrace_regex_release+0x484/0x618
 __fput+0x364/0xa58
 ____fput+0x28/0x40
 task_work_run+0x154/0x278
 do_notify_resume+0x1f0/0x220
 el0_svc+0xec/0xf0
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8
 el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0

The reason is that trace_get_user will fail when processing a string
longer than FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, but not set the end of parser-&gt;buffer to 0.
Then an OOB access will be triggered in ftrace_regex_release-&gt;
ftrace_process_regex-&gt;strsep-&gt;strpbrk. We can solve this problem by
limiting access to parser-&gt;buffer when trace_get_user failed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250813040232.1344527-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com
Fixes: 8c9af478c06b ("ftrace: Handle commands when closing set_ftrace_filter file")
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui &lt;pulehui@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Remove unneeded goto out logic</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-24T14:08:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=78c8e107fe7ecf1c3d8839e785c7c3bd71945482'/>
<id>urn:sha1:78c8e107fe7ecf1c3d8839e785c7c3bd71945482</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c89504a703fb779052213add0e8ed642f4a4f1c8 ]

Several places in the trace.c file there's a goto out where the out is
simply a return. There's no reason to jump to the out label if it's not
doing any more logic but simply returning from the function.

Replace the goto outs with a return and remove the out labels.

Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250801203857.538726745@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: drop the assumption that VM_SHARED always implies writable</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenzo Stoakes</name>
<email>lstoakes@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-30T01:53:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=609a43e107b2ee7c736d97e602a6c4fcca61229f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:609a43e107b2ee7c736d97e602a6c4fcca61229f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e8e17ee90eaf650c855adb0a3e5e965fd6692ff1 ]

Patch series "permit write-sealed memfd read-only shared mappings", v4.

The man page for fcntl() describing memfd file seals states the following
about F_SEAL_WRITE:-

    Furthermore, trying to create new shared, writable memory-mappings via
    mmap(2) will also fail with EPERM.

With emphasis on 'writable'.  In turns out in fact that currently the
kernel simply disallows all new shared memory mappings for a memfd with
F_SEAL_WRITE applied, rendering this documentation inaccurate.

This matters because users are therefore unable to obtain a shared mapping
to a memfd after write sealing altogether, which limits their usefulness.
This was reported in the discussion thread [1] originating from a bug
report [2].

This is a product of both using the struct address_space-&gt;i_mmap_writable
atomic counter to determine whether writing may be permitted, and the
kernel adjusting this counter when any VM_SHARED mapping is performed and
more generally implicitly assuming VM_SHARED implies writable.

It seems sensible that we should only update this mapping if VM_MAYWRITE
is specified, i.e.  whether it is possible that this mapping could at any
point be written to.

If we do so then all we need to do to permit write seals to function as
documented is to clear VM_MAYWRITE when mapping read-only.  It turns out
this functionality already exists for F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE - we can
therefore simply adapt this logic to do the same for F_SEAL_WRITE.

We then hit a chicken and egg situation in mmap_region() where the check
for VM_MAYWRITE occurs before we are able to clear this flag.  To work
around this, perform this check after we invoke call_mmap(), with careful
consideration of error paths.

Thanks to Andy Lutomirski for the suggestion!

[1]:https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230324133646.16101dfa666f253c4715d965@linux-foundation.org/
[2]:https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217238

This patch (of 3):

There is a general assumption that VMAs with the VM_SHARED flag set are
writable.  If the VM_MAYWRITE flag is not set, then this is simply not the
case.

Update those checks which affect the struct address_space-&gt;i_mmap_writable
field to explicitly test for this by introducing
[vma_]is_shared_maywrite() helper functions.

This remains entirely conservative, as the lack of VM_MAYWRITE guarantees
that the VMA cannot be written to.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1697116581.git.lstoakes@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d978aefefa83ec42d18dfa964ad180dbcde34795.1697116581.git.lstoakes@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lstoakes@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Muchun Song &lt;muchun.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[isaacmanjarres: resolved merge conflicts due to
due to refactoring that happened in upstream commit
5de195060b2e ("mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour")]
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres &lt;isaacmanjarres@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Add down_write(trace_event_sem) when adding trace event</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-22T14:06:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=db45632479ceecb669612ed8dbce927e3c6279fc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:db45632479ceecb669612ed8dbce927e3c6279fc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b5e8acc14dcb314a9b61ff19dcd9fdd0d88f70df ]

When a module is loaded, it adds trace events defined by the module. It
may also need to modify the modules trace printk formats to replace enum
names with their values.

If two modules are loaded at the same time, the adding of the event to the
ftrace_events list can corrupt the walking of the list in the code that is
modifying the printk format strings and crash the kernel.

The addition of the event should take the trace_event_sem for write while
it adds the new event.

Also add a lockdep_assert_held() on that semaphore in
__trace_add_event_dirs() as it iterates the list.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250718223158.799bfc0c@batman.local.home
Reported-by: Fusheng Huang(黄富生)  &lt;Fusheng.Huang@luxshare-ict.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250717105007.46ccd18f@batman.local.home/
Fixes: 110bf2b764eb6 ("tracing: add protection around module events unload")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:22:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-22T22:36:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c4cd93811e038d19f961985735ef7bb128078dfb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c4cd93811e038d19f961985735ef7bb128078dfb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bfb336cf97df7b37b2b2edec0f69773e06d11955 upstream.

Currently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds
the pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer
that allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the
filter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across
function calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer
hashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs.

Allocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done
for the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a
bit simpler as it doesn't have to differentiate when to free the
iterator's hash between writers and readers.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250822183606.12962cc3@batman.local.home
Fixes: c20489dad156 ("ftrace: Assign iter-&gt;hash to filter or notrace hashes on seq read")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250813023044.2121943-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250822192437.GA458494@ax162/
Reported-by: Tengda Wu &lt;wutengda@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tengda Wu &lt;wutengda@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
