<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v5.18.12</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.18.12</id>
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<updated>2022-07-12T14:42:18Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>srcu: Tighten cleanup_srcu_struct() GP checks</title>
<updated>2022-07-12T14:42:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul E. McKenney</name>
<email>paulmck@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-12T17:52:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e997dda6502eefbc1032d6b0da7b353c53344b07'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e997dda6502eefbc1032d6b0da7b353c53344b07</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8ed00760203d8018bee042fbfe8e076579be2c2b ]

Currently, cleanup_srcu_struct() checks for a grace period in progress,
but it does not check for a grace period that has not yet started but
which might start at any time.  Such a situation could result in a
use-after-free bug, so this commit adds a check for a grace period that
is needed but not yet started to cleanup_srcu_struct().

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals</title>
<updated>2022-07-12T14:42:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-01T12:47:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b2a28bb36664c94375926cbbb91976242847699d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b2a28bb36664c94375926cbbb91976242847699d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3844d153a41adea718202c10ae91dc96b37453b5 upstream.

Kuee reported a corner case where the tnum becomes constant after the call
to __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not, that is, its
min bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds.

This in turn allows to leak pointers through turning a pointer register as
is into an unknown scalar via adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().

Before:

  func#0 @0
  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  0: (b7) r0 = 1                        ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
  1: (b7) r3 = 0                        ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  2: (87) r3 = -r3                      ; R3_w=scalar()
  3: (87) r3 = -r3                      ; R3_w=scalar()
  4: (47) r3 |= 32767                   ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
  5: (75) if r3 s&gt;= 0x0 goto pc+1       ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
  6: (95) exit

  from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  7: (d5) if r3 s&lt;= 0x8000 goto pc+1    ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
  8: (95) exit

  from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  9: (07) r3 += -32767                  ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))  &lt;--- [*]
  10: (95) exit

What can be seen here is that R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff;
0x8000)) after the operation R3 += -32767 results in a 'malformed' constant, that
is, R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)). Intersecting with var_off has
not been done at that point via __update_reg_bounds(), which would have improved
the umax to be equal to umin.

Refactor the tnum &lt;&gt; min/max bounds information flow into a reg_bounds_sync()
helper and use it consistently everywhere. After the fix, bounds have been
corrected to R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) and thus the register
is regarded as a 'proper' constant scalar of 0.

After:

  func#0 @0
  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  0: (b7) r0 = 1                        ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
  1: (b7) r3 = 0                        ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  2: (87) r3 = -r3                      ; R3_w=scalar()
  3: (87) r3 = -r3                      ; R3_w=scalar()
  4: (47) r3 |= 32767                   ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
  5: (75) if r3 s&gt;= 0x0 goto pc+1       ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
  6: (95) exit

  from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  7: (d5) if r3 s&lt;= 0x8000 goto pc+1    ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
  8: (95) exit

  from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  9: (07) r3 += -32767                  ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))  &lt;--- [*]
  10: (95) exit

Fixes: b03c9f9fdc37 ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a &lt;liulin063@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220701124727.11153-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix incorrect verifier simulation around jmp32's jeq/jne</title>
<updated>2022-07-12T14:42:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-01T12:47:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d0cc1e3e0542c1a84c93bc957b4277283847f41e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d0cc1e3e0542c1a84c93bc957b4277283847f41e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a12ca6277eca6aeeccf66e840c23a2b520e24c8f upstream.

Kuee reported a quirk in the jmp32's jeq/jne simulation, namely that the
register value does not match expectations for the fall-through path. For
example:

Before fix:

  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (b7) r2 = 0                        ; R2_w=P0
  1: (b7) r6 = 563                      ; R6_w=P563
  2: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=Pscalar()
  3: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=Pscalar()
  4: (4c) w2 |= w6                      ; R2_w=Pscalar(umin=563,umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x233; 0xfffffdcc),s32_min=-2147483085) R6_w=P563
  5: (56) if w2 != 0x8 goto pc+1        ; R2_w=P571  &lt;--- [*]
  6: (95) exit
  R0 !read_ok

After fix:

  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (b7) r2 = 0                        ; R2_w=P0
  1: (b7) r6 = 563                      ; R6_w=P563
  2: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=Pscalar()
  3: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=Pscalar()
  4: (4c) w2 |= w6                      ; R2_w=Pscalar(umin=563,umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x233; 0xfffffdcc),s32_min=-2147483085) R6_w=P563
  5: (56) if w2 != 0x8 goto pc+1        ; R2_w=P8  &lt;--- [*]
  6: (95) exit
  R0 !read_ok

As can be seen on line 5 for the branch fall-through path in R2 [*] is that
given condition w2 != 0x8 is false, verifier should conclude that r2 = 8 as
upper 32 bit are known to be zero. However, verifier incorrectly concludes
that r2 = 571 which is far off.

The problem is it only marks false{true}_reg as known in the switch for JE/NE
case, but at the end of the function, it uses {false,true}_{64,32}off to
update {false,true}_reg-&gt;var_off and they still hold the prior value of
{false,true}_reg-&gt;var_off before it got marked as known. The subsequent
__reg_combine_32_into_64() then propagates this old var_off and derives new
bounds. The information between min/max bounds on {false,true}_reg from
setting the register to known const combined with the {false,true}_reg-&gt;var_off
based on the old information then derives wrong register data.

Fix it by detangling the BPF_JEQ/BPF_JNE cases and updating relevant
{false,true}_{64,32}off tnums along with the register marking to known
constant.

Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a &lt;liulin063@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220701124727.11153-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tick/nohz: unexport __init-annotated tick_nohz_full_setup()</title>
<updated>2022-07-02T14:44:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-27T03:22:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ea32b27e2f8c58c92bff5ecba7fcf64b97707089'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ea32b27e2f8c58c92bff5ecba7fcf64b97707089</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2390095113e98fc52fffe35c5206d30d9efe3f78 upstream.

EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.

modpost used to detect it, but it had been broken for a decade.

Commit 28438794aba4 ("modpost: fix section mismatch check for exported
init/exit sections") fixed it so modpost started to warn it again, then
this showed up:

    MODPOST vmlinux.symvers
  WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o(___ksymtab_gpl+tick_nohz_full_setup+0x0): Section mismatch in reference from the variable __ksymtab_tick_nohz_full_setup to the function .init.text:tick_nohz_full_setup()
  The symbol tick_nohz_full_setup is exported and annotated __init
  Fix this by removing the __init annotation of tick_nohz_full_setup or drop the export.

Drop the export because tick_nohz_full_setup() is only called from the
built-in code in kernel/sched/isolation.c.

Fixes: ae9e557b5be2 ("time: Export tick start/stop functions for rcutorture")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Backlund &lt;tmb@tmb.nu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dma-direct: use the correct size for dma_set_encrypted()</title>
<updated>2022-06-29T07:04:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dexuan Cui</name>
<email>decui@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-22T19:14:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=eb9c7a8c9ec9e47e8e7f0c73bcf196ad711ac09c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eb9c7a8c9ec9e47e8e7f0c73bcf196ad711ac09c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3be4562584bba603f33863a00c1c32eecf772ee6 upstream.

The third parameter of dma_set_encrypted() is a size in bytes rather than
the number of pages.

Fixes: 4d0564785bb0 ("dma-direct: factor out dma_set_{de,en}crypted helpers")
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy &lt;robin.murphy@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rethook: Reject getting a rethook if RCU is not watching</title>
<updated>2022-06-29T07:04:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu (Google)</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-07T16:11:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0a077f273b5ac2a79e250a36f00f461527f516c4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0a077f273b5ac2a79e250a36f00f461527f516c4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c0f3bb4054ef036e5f67e27f2e3cad9e6512cf00 ]

Since the rethook_recycle() will involve the call_rcu() for reclaiming
the rethook_instance, the rethook must be set up at the RCU available
context (non idle). This rethook_recycle() in the rethook trampoline
handler is inevitable, thus the RCU available check must be done before
setting the rethook trampoline.

This adds a rcu_is_watching() check in the rethook_try_get() so that
it will return NULL if it is called when !rcu_is_watching().

Fixes: 54ecbe6f1ed5 ("rethook: Add a generic return hook")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/165461827269.280167.7379263615545598958.stgit@devnote2
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing/kprobes: Check whether get_kretprobe() returns NULL in kretprobe_dispatcher()</title>
<updated>2022-06-29T07:04:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu (Google)</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-27T15:55:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8a79182e7a039f3f3fcf7ff33d81ebf3c2518edf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a79182e7a039f3f3fcf7ff33d81ebf3c2518edf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cc72b72073ac982a954d3b43519ca1c28f03c27c upstream.

There is a small chance that get_kretprobe(ri) returns NULL in
kretprobe_dispatcher() when another CPU unregisters the kretprobe
right after __kretprobe_trampoline_handler().

To avoid this issue, kretprobe_dispatcher() checks the get_kretprobe()
return value again. And if it is NULL, it returns soon because that
kretprobe is under unregistering process.

This issue has been introduced when the kretprobe is decoupled
from the struct kretprobe_instance by commit d741bf41d7c7
("kprobes: Remove kretprobe hash"). Before that commit, the
struct kretprob_instance::rp directly points the kretprobe
and it is never be NULL.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/165366693881.797669.16926184644089588731.stgit@devnote2

Reported-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Fixes: d741bf41d7c7 ("kprobes: Remove kretprobe hash")
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: bpf &lt;bpf@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kernel Team &lt;kernel-team@fb.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix calling global functions from BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT programs</title>
<updated>2022-06-25T13:29:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Toke Høiland-Jørgensen</name>
<email>toke@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-06T07:52:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4a178ec1924bf9e22e3a3e2af4773c44b115f115'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4a178ec1924bf9e22e3a3e2af4773c44b115f115</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f858c2b2ca04fc7ead291821a793638ae120c11d upstream.

The verifier allows programs to call global functions as long as their
argument types match, using BTF to check the function arguments. One of the
allowed argument types to such global functions is PTR_TO_CTX; however the
check for this fails on BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT functions because the verifier
uses the wrong type to fetch the vmlinux BTF ID for the program context
type. This failure is seen when an XDP program is loaded using
libxdp (which loads it as BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT and attaches it to a global XDP
type program).

Fix the issue by passing in the target program type instead of the
BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT type to bpf_prog_get_ctx() when checking function
argument compatibility.

The first Fixes tag refers to the latest commit that touched the code in
question, while the second one points to the code that first introduced
the global function call verification.

v2:
- Use resolve_prog_type()

Fixes: 3363bd0cfbb8 ("bpf: Extend kfunc with PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_MEM argument support")
Fixes: 51c39bb1d5d1 ("bpf: Introduce function-by-function verification")
Reported-by: Simon Sundberg &lt;simon.sundberg@kau.se&gt;
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606075253.28422-1-toke@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
[ backport: resolve conflict due to kptr series missing ]
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Use safer kvmalloc_array() where possible</title>
<updated>2022-06-22T12:28:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-26T10:24:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=16fa23f1abee08b80f08fafea0c74caa602ec512'/>
<id>urn:sha1:16fa23f1abee08b80f08fafea0c74caa602ec512</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fd58f7df2415ef747782e01f94880fefad1247cf upstream.

The kvmalloc_array() function is safer because it has a check for
integer overflows.  These sizes come from the user and I was not
able to see any bounds checking so an integer overflow seems like a
realistic concern.

Fixes: 0dcac2725406 ("bpf: Add multi kprobe link")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/Yo9VRVMeHbALyjUH@kili
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cfi: Fix __cfi_slowpath_diag RCU usage with cpuidle</title>
<updated>2022-06-22T12:28:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sami Tolvanen</name>
<email>samitolvanen@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-31T17:59:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ca3897f2ac02ceae5e6fa794f83c36f9885b93da'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca3897f2ac02ceae5e6fa794f83c36f9885b93da</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 57cd6d157eb479f0a8e820fd36b7240845c8a937 upstream.

RCU_NONIDLE usage during __cfi_slowpath_diag can result in an invalid
RCU state in the cpuidle code path:

  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/rcu/tree.c:613 rcu_eqs_enter+0xe4/0x138
  ...
  Call trace:
    rcu_eqs_enter+0xe4/0x138
    rcu_idle_enter+0xa8/0x100
    cpuidle_enter_state+0x154/0x3a8
    cpuidle_enter+0x3c/0x58
    do_idle.llvm.6590768638138871020+0x1f4/0x2ec
    cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x2c
    secondary_start_kernel+0x1b8/0x220
    __secondary_switched+0x94/0x98

Instead, call rcu_irq_enter/exit to wake up RCU only when needed and
disable interrupts for the entire CFI shadow/module check when we do.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen &lt;samitolvanen@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220531175910.890307-1-samitolvanen@google.com
Fixes: cf68fffb66d6 ("add support for Clang CFI")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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