user/sven/linux.git/kernel, branch v6.1.151

cpufreq/sched: Explicitly synchronize limits_changed flag handling

2025-09-09T16:54:18Z

[ Upstream commit 79443a7e9da3c9f68290a8653837e23aba0fa89f ] The handling of the limits_changed flag in struct sugov_policy needs to be explicitly synchronized to ensure that cpufreq policy limits updates will not be missed in some cases. Without that synchronization it is theoretically possible that the limits_changed update in sugov_should_update_freq() will be reordered with respect to the reads of the policy limits in cpufreq_driver_resolve_freq() and in that case, if the limits_changed update in sugov_limits() clobbers the one in sugov_should_update_freq(), the new policy limits may not take effect for a long time. Likewise, the limits_changed update in sugov_limits() may theoretically get reordered with respect to the updates of the policy limits in cpufreq_set_policy() and if sugov_should_update_freq() runs between them, the policy limits change may be missed. To ensure that the above situations will not take place, add memory barriers preventing the reordering in question from taking place and add READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations around all of the limits_changed flag updates to prevent the compiler from messing up with that code. Fixes: 600f5badb78c ("cpufreq: schedutil: Don't skip freq update when limits change") Cc: 5.3+ # 5.3+ Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Reviewed-by: Christian Loehle Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3376719.44csPzL39Z@rjwysocki.net [ bw_min => bw_dl ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage

2025-09-09T16:54:11Z

[ Upstream commit abad3d0bad72a52137e0c350c59542d75ae4f513 ] Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the runtime context: ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx); storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype]; if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED) ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0]; else ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf); For the second program which was called from the originally attached one, this means bpf_get_local_storage() will pick up the former program's map, not its own. With mismatching sizes, this can result in an unintended out-of-bounds access. To fix this issue, we need to extend bpf_map_owner with an array of storage_cookie[] to match on i) the exact maps from the original program if the second program was using bpf_get_local_storage(), or ii) allow the tail call combination if the second program was not using any of the cgroup local storage maps. Fixes: 7d9c3427894f ("bpf: Make cgroup storages shared between programs on the same cgroup") Reported-by: Lonial Con Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-4-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Move bpf map owner out of common struct

2025-09-09T16:54:11Z

[ Upstream commit fd1c98f0ef5cbcec842209776505d9e70d8fcd53 ] Given this is only relevant for BPF tail call maps, it is adding up space and penalizing other map types. We also need to extend this with further objects to track / compare to. Therefore, lets move this out into a separate structure and dynamically allocate it only for BPF tail call maps. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Add cookie object to bpf maps

2025-09-09T16:54:11Z

[ Upstream commit 12df58ad294253ac1d8df0c9bb9cf726397a671d ] Add a cookie to BPF maps to uniquely identify BPF maps for the timespan when the node is up. This is different to comparing a pointer or BPF map id which could get rolled over and reused. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

dma/pool: Ensure DMA_DIRECT_REMAP allocations are decrypted

2025-09-04T13:26:30Z

commit 89a2d212bdb4bc29bed8e7077abe054b801137ea upstream. When CONFIG_DMA_DIRECT_REMAP is enabled, atomic pool pages are remapped via dma_common_contiguous_remap() using the supplied pgprot. Currently, the mapping uses pgprot_dmacoherent(PAGE_KERNEL), which leaves the memory encrypted on systems with memory encryption enabled (e.g., ARM CCA Realms). This can cause the DMA layer to fail or crash when accessing the memory, as the underlying physical pages are not configured as expected. Fix this by requesting a decrypted mapping in the vmap() call: pgprot_decrypted(pgprot_dmacoherent(PAGE_KERNEL)) This ensures that atomic pool memory is consistently mapped unencrypted. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250811181759.998805-1-sdonthineni@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ftrace: Fix potential warning in trace_printk_seq during ftrace_dump

2025-09-04T13:26:24Z

[ Upstream commit 4013aef2ced9b756a410f50d12df9ebe6a883e4a ] When calling ftrace_dump_one() concurrently with reading trace_pipe, a WARN_ON_ONCE() in trace_printk_seq() can be triggered due to a race condition. The issue occurs because: CPU0 (ftrace_dump) CPU1 (reader) echo z > /proc/sysrq-trigger !trace_empty(&iter) trace_iterator_reset(&iter) <- len = size = 0 cat /sys/kernel/tracing/trace_pipe trace_find_next_entry_inc(&iter) __find_next_entry ring_buffer_empty_cpu <- all empty return NULL trace_printk_seq(&iter.seq) WARN_ON_ONCE(s->seq.len >= s->seq.size) In the context between trace_empty() and trace_find_next_entry_inc() during ftrace_dump, the ring buffer data was consumed by other readers. This caused trace_find_next_entry_inc to return NULL, failing to populate `iter.seq`. At this point, due to the prior trace_iterator_reset, both `iter.seq.len` and `iter.seq.size` were set to 0. Since they are equal, the WARN_ON_ONCE condition is triggered. Move the trace_printk_seq() into the if block that checks to make sure the return value of trace_find_next_entry_inc() is non-NULL in ftrace_dump_one(), ensuring the 'iter.seq' is properly populated before subsequent operations. Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250822033343.3000289-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com Fixes: d769041f8653 ("ring_buffer: implement new locking") Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

cgroup/cpuset: Use static_branch_enable_cpuslocked() on cpusets_insane_config_key

2025-08-28T14:26:17Z

[ Upstream commit 65f97cc81b0adc5f49cf6cff5d874be0058e3f41 ] The following lockdep splat was observed. [ 812.359086] ============================================ [ 812.359089] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 812.359097] -------------------------------------------- [ 812.359100] runtest.sh/30042 is trying to acquire lock: [ 812.359105] ffffffffa7f27420 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_enable+0xe/0x20 [ 812.359131] [ 812.359131] but task is already holding lock: [ 812.359134] ffffffffa7f27420 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuset_write_resmask+0x98/0xa70 : [ 812.359267] Call Trace: [ 812.359272] [ 812.359367] cpus_read_lock+0x3c/0xe0 [ 812.359382] static_key_enable+0xe/0x20 [ 812.359389] check_insane_mems_config.part.0+0x11/0x30 [ 812.359398] cpuset_write_resmask+0x9f2/0xa70 [ 812.359411] cgroup_file_write+0x1c7/0x660 [ 812.359467] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x358/0x530 [ 812.359479] vfs_write+0xabe/0x1250 [ 812.359529] ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0 [ 812.359558] do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xe0 Since commit d74b27d63a8b ("cgroup/cpuset: Change cpuset_rwsem and hotplug lock order"), the ordering of cpu hotplug lock and cpuset_mutex had been reversed. That patch correctly used the cpuslocked version of the static branch API to enable cpusets_pre_enable_key and cpusets_enabled_key, but it didn't do the same for cpusets_insane_config_key. The cpusets_insane_config_key can be enabled in the check_insane_mems_config() which is called from update_nodemask() or cpuset_hotplug_update_tasks() with both cpu hotplug lock and cpuset_mutex held. Deadlock can happen with a pending hotplug event that tries to acquire the cpu hotplug write lock which will block further cpus_read_lock() attempt from check_insane_mems_config(). Fix that by switching to use static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(). Fixes: d74b27d63a8b ("cgroup/cpuset: Change cpuset_rwsem and hotplug lock order") Signed-off-by: Waiman Long Reviewed-by: Juri Lelli Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tracing: Limit access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed

2025-08-28T14:26:16Z

[ Upstream commit 6a909ea83f226803ea0e718f6e88613df9234d58 ] When the length of the string written to set_ftrace_filter exceeds FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, the following KASAN alarm will be triggered: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strsep+0x18c/0x1b0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff0000d00bd5ba by task ash/165 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 165 Comm: ash Not tainted 6.16.0-g6bcdbd62bd56-dirty Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x34/0x50 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0xa0/0x158 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x398 print_report+0xb0/0x280 kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x30 strsep+0x18c/0x1b0 ftrace_process_regex.isra.0+0x100/0x2d8 ftrace_regex_release+0x484/0x618 __fput+0x364/0xa58 ____fput+0x28/0x40 task_work_run+0x154/0x278 do_notify_resume+0x1f0/0x220 el0_svc+0xec/0xf0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8 el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0 The reason is that trace_get_user will fail when processing a string longer than FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, but not set the end of parser->buffer to 0. Then an OOB access will be triggered in ftrace_regex_release-> ftrace_process_regex->strsep->strpbrk. We can solve this problem by limiting access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250813040232.1344527-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com Fixes: 8c9af478c06b ("ftrace: Handle commands when closing set_ftrace_filter file") Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Remove unneeded goto out logic

2025-08-28T14:26:16Z

[ Upstream commit c89504a703fb779052213add0e8ed642f4a4f1c8 ] Several places in the trace.c file there's a goto out where the out is simply a return. There's no reason to jump to the out label if it's not doing any more logic but simply returning from the function. Replace the goto outs with a return and remove the out labels. Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Andrew Morton Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250801203857.538726745@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files

2025-08-28T14:26:14Z

commit bfb336cf97df7b37b2b2edec0f69773e06d11955 upstream. Currently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds the pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer that allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the filter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across function calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer hashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs. Allocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done for the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a bit simpler as it doesn't have to differentiate when to free the iterator's hash between writers and readers. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Nathan Chancellor Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250822183606.12962cc3@batman.local.home Fixes: c20489dad156 ("ftrace: Assign iter->hash to filter or notrace hashes on seq read") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250813023044.2121943-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250822192437.GA458494@ax162/ Reported-by: Tengda Wu Tested-by: Tengda Wu Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman