<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/lib/Makefile, branch v4.9.262</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.262</id>
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<updated>2020-05-27T14:42:00Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ubsan: build ubsan.c more conservatively</title>
<updated>2020-05-27T14:42:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-03T04:48:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=eff8c0335c31624795ce687845e5a66be9c3a73f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eff8c0335c31624795ce687845e5a66be9c3a73f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit af700eaed0564d5d3963a7a51cb0843629d7fe3d upstream.

objtool points out several conditions that it does not like, depending
on the combination with other configuration options and compiler
variants:

stack protector:
  lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch()+0xbf: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled
  lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1()+0xbe: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled

stackleak plugin:
  lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch()+0x4a: call to stackleak_track_stack() with UACCESS enabled
  lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1()+0x4a: call to stackleak_track_stack() with UACCESS enabled

kasan:
  lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch()+0x25: call to memcpy() with UACCESS enabled
  lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1()+0x25: call to memcpy() with UACCESS enabled

The stackleak and kasan options just need to be disabled for this file
as we do for other files already.  For the stack protector, we already
attempt to disable it, but this fails on clang because the check is
mixed with the gcc specific -fno-conserve-stack option.  According to
Andrey Ryabinin, that option is not even needed, dropping it here fixes
the stackprotector issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190722125139.1335385-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190617123109.667090-1-arnd@arndb.de/t/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190722091050.2188664-1-arnd@arndb.de/t/
Fixes: d08965a27e84 ("x86/uaccess, ubsan: Fix UBSAN vs. SMAP")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/uaccess, ubsan: Fix UBSAN vs. SMAP</title>
<updated>2020-05-27T14:42:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-03T07:40:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bd44630a88e86d1f7cea808d1264a82ce6d1d522'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd44630a88e86d1f7cea808d1264a82ce6d1d522</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d08965a27e84ca090b504844d50c24fc98587b11 upstream.

UBSAN can insert extra code in random locations; including AC=1
sections. Typically this code is not safe and needs wrapping.

So far, only __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch* have been observed in AC=1
sections and therefore only those are annotated.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[stable backport: only take the lib/Makefile change to resolve gcc-10
 build issues]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF</title>
<updated>2019-08-25T08:51:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-16T23:01:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=53e054b3cd1bd3dde2212c3e279ab4a3eefac6bb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:53e054b3cd1bd3dde2212c3e279ab4a3eefac6bb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2c956a60778cbb6a27e0c7a8a52a91378c90e1d1 upstream.

SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a
general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG
chaining.

For the first usage:

There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently
hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of
rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant
as a replacement for jhash in these cases.

There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.

While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
poses a real security risk.

For the second usage:

A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure
sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers.
SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5
in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is
obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch
series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy.

Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels.
SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of
problems, and it's time we catch-up.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson &lt;jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 4.9 as dependency of commits df453700e8d8 "inet: switch
 IP ID generator to siphash" and 3c79107631db "netfilter: ctnetlink: don't
 use conntrack/expect object addresses as id"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: prevent compiler from optimizing away memset in tests</title>
<updated>2019-05-08T05:19:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Konovalov</name>
<email>andreyknvl@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-10T23:30:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5d01a64da40355b3274f0f7f746019809184b72c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5d01a64da40355b3274f0f7f746019809184b72c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 69ca372c100fba99c78ef826a1795aa86e4f01a8 upstream.

A compiler can optimize away memset calls by replacing them with mov
instructions.  There are KASAN tests that specifically test that KASAN
correctly handles memset calls so we don't want this optimization to
happen.

The solution is to add -fno-builtin flag to test_kasan.ko

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/105ec9a308b2abedb1a0d1fdced0c22d765e4732.1519924383.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Nick Terrell &lt;terrelln@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Mason &lt;clm@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Yury Norov &lt;ynorov@caviumnetworks.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@dabbelt.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kcov: do not instrument lib/stackdepot.c</title>
<updated>2016-10-11T22:06:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-11T20:54:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=65deb8af76defeae4b114a75242ed15b0bcba173'/>
<id>urn:sha1:65deb8af76defeae4b114a75242ed15b0bcba173</id>
<content type='text'>
There's no point in collecting coverage from lib/stackdepot.c, as it is
not a function of syscall inputs.  Disabling kcov instrumentation for that
file will reduce the coverage noise level.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474640972-104131-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-4.9/block' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block</title>
<updated>2016-10-07T21:42:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-07T21:42:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=513a4befae06c4469abfb836e8f71977de58c636'/>
<id>urn:sha1:513a4befae06c4469abfb836e8f71977de58c636</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull block layer updates from Jens Axboe:
 "This is the main pull request for block layer changes in 4.9.

  As mentioned at the last merge window, I've changed things up and now
  do just one branch for core block layer changes, and driver changes.
  This avoids dependencies between the two branches. Outside of this
  main pull request, there are two topical branches coming as well.

  This pull request contains:

   - A set of fixes, and a conversion to blk-mq, of nbd. From Josef.

   - Set of fixes and updates for lightnvm from Matias, Simon, and Arnd.
     Followup dependency fix from Geert.

   - General fixes from Bart, Baoyou, Guoqing, and Linus W.

   - CFQ async write starvation fix from Glauber.

   - Add supprot for delayed kick of the requeue list, from Mike.

   - Pull out the scalable bitmap code from blk-mq-tag.c and make it
     generally available under the name of sbitmap. Only blk-mq-tag uses
     it for now, but the blk-mq scheduling bits will use it as well.
     From Omar.

   - bdev thaw error progagation from Pierre.

   - Improve the blk polling statistics, and allow the user to clear
     them. From Stephen.

   - Set of minor cleanups from Christoph in block/blk-mq.

   - Set of cleanups and optimizations from me for block/blk-mq.

   - Various nvme/nvmet/nvmeof fixes from the various folks"

* 'for-4.9/block' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (54 commits)
  fs/block_dev.c: return the right error in thaw_bdev()
  nvme: Pass pointers, not dma addresses, to nvme_get/set_features()
  nvme/scsi: Remove power management support
  nvmet: Make dsm number of ranges zero based
  nvmet: Use direct IO for writes
  admin-cmd: Added smart-log command support.
  nvme-fabrics: Add host_traddr options field to host infrastructure
  nvme-fabrics: revise host transport option descriptions
  nvme-fabrics: rework nvmf_get_address() for variable options
  nbd: use BLK_MQ_F_BLOCKING
  blkcg: Annotate blkg_hint correctly
  cfq: fix starvation of asynchronous writes
  blk-mq: add flag for drivers wanting blocking -&gt;queue_rq()
  blk-mq: remove non-blocking pass in blk_mq_map_request
  blk-mq: get rid of manual run of queue with __blk_mq_run_hw_queue()
  block: export bio_free_pages to other modules
  lightnvm: propagate device_add() error code
  lightnvm: expose device geometry through sysfs
  lightnvm: control life of nvm_dev in driver
  blk-mq: register device instead of disk
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/win_minmax: windowed min or max estimator</title>
<updated>2016-09-21T04:22:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Neal Cardwell</name>
<email>ncardwell@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-20T03:39:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a4f1f9ac8153e22869b6408832b5a9bb9c762bf6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4f1f9ac8153e22869b6408832b5a9bb9c762bf6</id>
<content type='text'>
This commit introduces a generic library to estimate either the min or
max value of a time-varying variable over a recent time window. This
is code originally from Kathleen Nichols. The current form of the code
is from Van Jacobson.

A single struct minmax_sample will track the estimated windowed-max
value of the series if you call minmax_running_max() or the estimated
windowed-min value of the series if you call minmax_running_min().

Nearly equivalent code is already in place for minimum RTT estimation
in the TCP stack. This commit extracts that code and generalizes it to
handle both min and max. Moving the code here reduces the footprint
and complexity of the TCP code base and makes the filter generally
available for other parts of the codebase, including an upcoming TCP
congestion control module.

This library works well for time series where the measurements are
smoothly increasing or decreasing.

Signed-off-by: Van Jacobson &lt;vanj@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nandita Dukkipati &lt;nanditad@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>blk-mq: abstract tag allocation out into sbitmap library</title>
<updated>2016-09-17T14:38:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Omar Sandoval</name>
<email>osandov@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-17T14:38:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=88459642cba452630326b9cab1c651e09577d4e4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:88459642cba452630326b9cab1c651e09577d4e4</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a generally useful data structure, so make it available to
anyone else who might want to use it. It's also a nice cleanup
separating the allocation logic from the rest of the tag handling logic.

The code is behind a new Kconfig option, CONFIG_SBITMAP, which is only
selected by CONFIG_BLOCK for now.

This should be a complete noop functionality-wise.

Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval &lt;osandov@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@fb.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/usercopy: get rid of CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS</title>
<updated>2016-08-30T17:10:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-30T13:04:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0d025d271e55f3de21f0aaaf54b42d20404d2b23'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0d025d271e55f3de21f0aaaf54b42d20404d2b23</id>
<content type='text'>
There are three usercopy warnings which are currently being silenced for
gcc 4.6 and newer:

1) "copy_from_user() buffer size is too small" compile warning/error

   This is a static warning which happens when object size and copy size
   are both const, and copy size &gt; object size.  I didn't see any false
   positives for this one.  So the function warning attribute seems to
   be working fine here.

   Note this scenario is always a bug and so I think it should be
   changed to *always* be an error, regardless of
   CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS.

2) "copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct" compile warning

   This is another static warning which happens when I enable
   __compiletime_object_size() for new compilers (and
   CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS).  It happens when object size
   is const, but copy size is *not*.  In this case there's no way to
   compare the two at build time, so it gives the warning.  (Note the
   warning is a byproduct of the fact that gcc has no way of knowing
   whether the overflow function will be called, so the call isn't dead
   code and the warning attribute is activated.)

   So this warning seems to only indicate "this is an unusual pattern,
   maybe you should check it out" rather than "this is a bug".

   I get 102(!) of these warnings with allyesconfig and the
   __compiletime_object_size() gcc check removed.  I don't know if there
   are any real bugs hiding in there, but from looking at a small
   sample, I didn't see any.  According to Kees, it does sometimes find
   real bugs.  But the false positive rate seems high.

3) "Buffer overflow detected" runtime warning

   This is a runtime warning where object size is const, and copy size &gt;
   object size.

All three warnings (both static and runtime) were completely disabled
for gcc 4.6 with the following commit:

  2fb0815c9ee6 ("gcc4: disable __compiletime_object_size for GCC 4.6+")

That commit mistakenly assumed that the false positives were caused by a
gcc bug in __compiletime_object_size().  But in fact,
__compiletime_object_size() seems to be working fine.  The false
positives were instead triggered by #2 above.  (Though I don't have an
explanation for why the warnings supposedly only started showing up in
gcc 4.6.)

So remove warning #2 to get rid of all the false positives, and re-enable
warnings #1 and #3 by reverting the above commit.

Furthermore, since #1 is a real bug which is detected at compile time,
upgrade it to always be an error.

Having done all that, CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS is no longer
needed.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Byungchul Park &lt;byungchul.park@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Nilay Vaish &lt;nilayvaish@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random</title>
<updated>2016-07-27T22:11:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-27T22:11:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=818e607b57c94ade9824dad63a96c2ea6b21baf3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:818e607b57c94ade9824dad63a96c2ea6b21baf3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull random driver updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "A number of improvements for the /dev/random driver; the most
  important is the use of a ChaCha20-based CRNG for /dev/urandom, which
  is faster, more efficient, and easier to make scalable for
  silly/abusive userspace programs that want to read from /dev/urandom
  in a tight loop on NUMA systems.

  This set of patches also improves entropy gathering on VM's running on
  Microsoft Azure, and will take advantage of a hw random number
  generator (if present) to initialize the /dev/urandom pool"

(It turns out that the random tree hadn't been in linux-next this time
around, because it had been dropped earlier as being too quiet.  Oh
well).

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  random: strengthen input validation for RNDADDTOENTCNT
  random: add backtracking protection to the CRNG
  random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly userspace programs
  random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG
  random: properly align get_random_int_hash
  random: add interrupt callback to VMBus IRQ handler
  random: print a warning for the first ten uninitialized random users
  random: initialize the non-blocking pool via add_hwgenerator_randomness()
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
