user/sven/linux.git/lib, branch v3.0.99

klist: del waiter from klist_remove_waiters before wakeup waitting process

2013-06-07T19:46:36Z

commit ac5a2962b02f57dea76d314ef2521a2170b28ab6 upstream. There is a race between klist_remove and klist_release. klist_remove uses a local var waiter saved on stack. When klist_release calls wake_up_process(waiter->process) to wake up the waiter, waiter might run immediately and reuse the stack. Then, klist_release calls list_del(&waiter->list) to change previous wait data and cause prior waiter thread corrupt. The patch fixes it against kernel 3.9. Signed-off-by: wang, biao Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

idr: fix a subtle bug in idr_get_next()

2013-03-03T22:09:04Z

commit 6cdae7416a1c45c2ce105a78187d9b7e8feb9e24 upstream. The iteration logic of idr_get_next() is borrowed mostly verbatim from idr_for_each(). It walks down the tree looking for the slot matching the current ID. If the matching slot is not found, the ID is incremented by the distance of single slot at the given level and repeats. The implementation assumes that during the whole iteration id is aligned to the layer boundaries of the level closest to the leaf, which is true for all iterations starting from zero or an existing element and thus is fine for idr_for_each(). However, idr_get_next() may be given any point and if the starting id hits in the middle of a non-existent layer, increment to the next layer will end up skipping the same offset into it. For example, an IDR with IDs filled between [64, 127] would look like the following. [ 0 64 ... ] /----/ | | | NULL [ 64 ... 127 ] If idr_get_next() is called with 63 as the starting point, it will try to follow down the pointer from 0. As it is NULL, it will then try to proceed to the next slot in the same level by adding the slot distance at that level which is 64 - making the next try 127. It goes around the loop and finds and returns 127 skipping [64, 126]. Note that this bug also triggers in idr_for_each_entry() loop which deletes during iteration as deletions can make layers go away leaving the iteration with unaligned ID into missing layers. Fix it by ensuring proceeding to the next slot doesn't carry over the unaligned offset - ie. use round_up(id + 1, slot_distance) instead of id += slot_distance. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Reported-by: David Teigland Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

genalloc: stop crashing the system when destroying a pool

2012-10-31T16:51:34Z

commit eedce141cd2dad8d0cefc5468ef41898949a7031 upstream. The genalloc code uses the bitmap API from include/linux/bitmap.h and lib/bitmap.c, which is based on long values. Both bitmap_set from lib/bitmap.c and bitmap_set_ll, which is the lockless version from genalloc.c, use BITMAP_LAST_WORD_MASK to set the first bits in a long in the bitmap. That one uses (1 << bits) - 1, 0b111, if you are setting the first three bits. This means that the API counts from the least significant bits (LSB from now on) to the MSB. The LSB in the first long is bit 0, then. The same works for the lookup functions. The genalloc code uses longs for the bitmap, as it should. In include/linux/genalloc.h, struct gen_pool_chunk has unsigned long bits[0] as its last member. When allocating the struct, genalloc should reserve enough space for the bitmap. This should be a proper number of longs that can fit the amount of bits in the bitmap. However, genalloc allocates an integer number of bytes that fit the amount of bits, but may not be an integer amount of longs. 9 bytes, for example, could be allocated for 70 bits. This is a problem in itself if the Least Significat Bit in a long is in the byte with the largest address, which happens in Big Endian machines. This means genalloc is not allocating the byte in which it will try to set or check for a bit. This may end up in memory corruption, where genalloc will try to set the bits it has not allocated. In fact, genalloc may not set these bits because it may find them already set, because they were not zeroed since they were not allocated. And that's what causes a BUG when gen_pool_destroy is called and check for any set bits. What really happens is that genalloc uses kmalloc_node with __GFP_ZERO on gen_pool_add_virt. With SLAB and SLUB, this means the whole slab will be cleared, not only the requested bytes. Since struct gen_pool_chunk has a size that is a multiple of 8, and slab sizes are multiples of 8, we get lucky and allocate and clear the right amount of bytes. Hower, this is not the case with SLOB or with older code that did memset after allocating instead of using __GFP_ZERO. So, a simple module as this (running 3.6.0), will cause a crash when rmmod'ed. [root@phantom-lp2 foo]# cat foo.c #include #include #include #include MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_VERSION("0.1"); static struct gen_pool *foo_pool; static __init int foo_init(void) { int ret; foo_pool = gen_pool_create(10, -1); if (!foo_pool) return -ENOMEM; ret = gen_pool_add(foo_pool, 0xa0000000, 32 << 10, -1); if (ret) { gen_pool_destroy(foo_pool); return ret; } return 0; } static __exit void foo_exit(void) { gen_pool_destroy(foo_pool); } module_init(foo_init); module_exit(foo_exit); [root@phantom-lp2 foo]# zcat /proc/config.gz | grep SLOB CONFIG_SLOB=y [root@phantom-lp2 foo]# insmod ./foo.ko [root@phantom-lp2 foo]# rmmod foo ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/genalloc.c:243! cpu 0x4: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c0000000bb0e7960] pc: c0000000003cb50c: .gen_pool_destroy+0xac/0x110 lr: c0000000003cb4fc: .gen_pool_destroy+0x9c/0x110 sp: c0000000bb0e7be0 msr: 8000000000029032 current = 0xc0000000bb0e0000 paca = 0xc000000006d30e00 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 13044, comm = rmmod kernel BUG at lib/genalloc.c:243! [c0000000bb0e7ca0] d000000004b00020 .foo_exit+0x20/0x38 [foo] [c0000000bb0e7d20] c0000000000dff98 .SyS_delete_module+0x1a8/0x290 [c0000000bb0e7e30] c0000000000097d4 syscall_exit+0x0/0x94 --- Exception: c00 (System Call) at 000000800753d1a0 SP (fffd0b0e640) is in userspace Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Cc: Paul Gortmaker Cc: Benjamin Gaignard Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lib/gcd.c: prevent possible div by 0

2012-10-12T20:28:03Z

commit e96875677fb2b7cb739c5d7769824dff7260d31d upstream. Account for all properties when a and/or b are 0: gcd(0, 0) = 0 gcd(a, 0) = a gcd(0, b) = b Fixes no known problems in current kernels. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

btree: fix tree corruption in btree_get_prev()

2012-06-17T18:23:10Z

commit cbf8ae32f66a9ceb8907ad9e16663c2a29e48990 upstream. The memory the parameter __key points to is used as an iterator in btree_get_prev(), so if we save off a bkey() pointer in retry_key and then assign that to __key, we'll end up corrupting the btree internals when we do eg longcpy(__key, bkey(geo, node, i), geo->keylen); to return the key value. What we should do instead is use longcpy() to copy the key value that retry_key points to __key. This can cause a btree to get corrupted by seemingly read-only operations such as btree_for_each_safe. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: avoid the double longcpy()] Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier Acked-by: Joern Engel Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

uevent: send events in correct order according to seqnum (v3)

2012-04-02T16:27:09Z

commit 7b60a18da393ed70db043a777fd9e6d5363077c4 upstream. The queue handling in the udev daemon assumes that the events are ordered. Before this patch uevent_seqnum is incremented under sequence_lock, than an event is send uner uevent_sock_mutex. I want to say that code contained a window between incrementing seqnum and sending an event. This patch locks uevent_sock_mutex before incrementing uevent_seqnum. v2: delete sequence_lock, uevent_seqnum is protected by uevent_sock_mutex v3: unlock the mutex before the goto exit Thanks for Kay for the comments. Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin Tested-By: Kay Sievers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlink: validate NLA_MSECS length

2011-11-11T17:37:12Z

commit c30bc94758ae2a38a5eb31767c1985c0aae0950b upstream. L2TP for example uses NLA_MSECS like this: policy: [L2TP_ATTR_RECV_TIMEOUT] = { .type = NLA_MSECS, }, code: if (info->attrs[L2TP_ATTR_RECV_TIMEOUT]) cfg.reorder_timeout = nla_get_msecs(info->attrs[L2TP_ATTR_RECV_TIMEOUT]); As nla_get_msecs() is essentially nla_get_u64() plus the conversion to a HZ-based value, this will not properly reject attributes from userspace that aren't long enough and might overrun the message. Add NLA_MSECS to the attribute minlen array to check the size properly. Cc: Thomas Graf Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kobj_uevent: Ignore if some listeners cannot handle message

2011-11-11T17:35:46Z

commit ebf4127cd677e9781b450e44dfaaa1cc595efcaa upstream. kobject_uevent() uses a multicast socket and should ignore if one of listeners cannot handle messages or nobody is listening at all. Easily reproducible when a process in system is cloned with CLONE_NEWNET flag. (See also http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt/5256) Signed-off-by: Milan Broz Acked-by: Kay Sievers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

XZ: Fix incorrect XZ_BUF_ERROR

2011-10-03T18:40:37Z

commit 9c1f8594df4814ebfd6822ca3c9444fb3445888d upstream. xz_dec_run() could incorrectly return XZ_BUF_ERROR if all of the following was true: - The caller knows how many bytes of output to expect and only provides that much output space. - When the last output bytes are decoded, the caller-provided input buffer ends right before the LZMA2 end of payload marker. So LZMA2 won't provide more output anymore, but it won't know it yet and thus won't return XZ_STREAM_END yet. - A BCJ filter is in use and it hasn't left any unfiltered bytes in the temp buffer. This can happen with any BCJ filter, but in practice it's more likely with filters other than the x86 BCJ. This fixes where Squashfs thinks that a valid file system is corrupt. This also fixes a similar bug in single-call mode where the uncompressed size of a block using BCJ + LZMA2 was 0 bytes and caller provided no output space. Many empty .xz files don't contain any blocks and thus don't trigger this bug. This also tweaks a closely related detail: xz_dec_bcj_run() could call xz_dec_lzma2_run() to decode into temp buffer when it was known to be useless. This was harmless although it wasted a minuscule number of CPU cycles. Signed-off-by: Lasse Collin Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: Move md5_transform to lib/md5.c

2011-08-16T01:31:35Z

We are going to use this for TCP/IP sequence number and fragment ID generation. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman