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<title>user/sven/linux.git/lib, branch v3.10.59</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2014-10-30T16:35:11Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>lzo: check for length overrun in variable length encoding.</title>
<updated>2014-10-30T16:35:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-27T10:31:37Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:96894152592785638ba49e3a55c5bc218aafc49e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 72cf90124e87d975d0b2114d930808c58b4c05e4 upstream.

This fix ensures that we never meet an integer overflow while adding
255 while parsing a variable length encoding. It works differently from
commit 206a81c ("lzo: properly check for overruns") because instead of
ensuring that we don't overrun the input, which is tricky to guarantee
due to many assumptions in the code, it simply checks that the cumulated
number of 255 read cannot overflow by bounding this number.

The MAX_255_COUNT is the maximum number of times we can add 255 to a base
count without overflowing an integer. The multiply will overflow when
multiplying 255 by more than MAXINT/255. The sum will overflow earlier
depending on the base count. Since the base count is taken from a u8
and a few bits, it is safe to assume that it will always be lower than
or equal to 2*255, thus we can always prevent any overflow by accepting
two less 255 steps.

This patch also reduces the CPU overhead and actually increases performance
by 1.1% compared to the initial code, while the previous fix costs 3.1%
(measured on x86_64).

The fix needs to be backported to all currently supported stable kernels.

Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers &lt;willem@lekkertech.net&gt;
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "lzo: properly check for overruns"</title>
<updated>2014-10-30T16:35:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-27T10:31:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f7939e1eb8de872933fc2e3fa9934aa55567a541</id>
<content type='text'>
commit af958a38a60c7ca3d8a39c918c1baa2ff7b6b233 upstream.

This reverts commit 206a81c ("lzo: properly check for overruns").

As analysed by Willem Pinckaers, this fix is still incomplete on
certain rare corner cases, and it is easier to restart from the
original code.

Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers &lt;willem@lekkertech.net&gt;
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/btree.c: fix leak of whole btree nodes</title>
<updated>2014-08-07T21:30:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Minfei Huang</name>
<email>huangminfei@ucloud.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-04T23:11:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:81513d14716eb555b443e7e2e2b862f094f8b731</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c75b53af2f0043aff500af0a6f878497bef41bca upstream.

I use btree from 3.14-rc2 in my own module.  When the btree module is
removed, a warning arises:

 kmem_cache_destroy btree_node: Slab cache still has objects
 CPU: 13 PID: 9150 Comm: rmmod Tainted: GF          O 3.14.0-rc2 #1
 Hardware name: Inspur NF5270M3/NF5270M3, BIOS CHEETAH_2.1.3 09/10/2013
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x49/0x5d
   kmem_cache_destroy+0xcf/0xe0
   btree_module_exit+0x10/0x12 [btree]
   SyS_delete_module+0x198/0x1f0
   system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

The cause is that it doesn't release the last btree node, when height = 1
and fill = 1.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded test of NULL]
Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang &lt;huangminfei@ucloud.cn&gt;
Cc: Joern Engel &lt;joern@logfs.org&gt;
Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>idr: fix overflow bug during maximum ID calculation at maximum height</title>
<updated>2014-07-01T03:09:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lai Jiangshan</name>
<email>laijs@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-06T21:37:10Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2ada32b01b05759c21e8ef86f97772e868075e9b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3afb69cb5572b3c8c898c00880803cf1a49852c4 upstream.

idr_replace() open-codes the logic to calculate the maximum valid ID
given the height of the idr tree; unfortunately, the open-coded logic
doesn't account for the fact that the top layer may have unused slots
and over-shifts the limit to zero when the tree is at its maximum
height.

The following test code shows it fails to replace the value for
id=((1&lt;&lt;27)+42):

  static void test5(void)
  {
        int id;
        DEFINE_IDR(test_idr);
  #define TEST5_START ((1&lt;&lt;27)+42) /* use the highest layer */

        printk(KERN_INFO "Start test5\n");
        id = idr_alloc(&amp;test_idr, (void *)1, TEST5_START, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
        BUG_ON(id != TEST5_START);
        TEST_BUG_ON(idr_replace(&amp;test_idr, (void *)2, TEST5_START) != (void *)1);
        idr_destroy(&amp;test_idr);
        printk(KERN_INFO "End of test5\n");
  }

Fix the bug by using idr_max() which correctly takes into account the
maximum allowed shift.

sub_alloc() shares the same problem and may incorrectly fail with
-EAGAIN; however, this bug doesn't affect correct operation because
idr_get_empty_slot(), which already uses idr_max(), retries with the
increased @id in such cases.

[tj@kernel.org: Updated patch description.]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lzo: properly check for overruns</title>
<updated>2014-06-26T19:12:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-21T05:00:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:feaad01723471c67e10f5c5bc537299e686f78b8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 206a81c18401c0cde6e579164f752c4b147324ce upstream.

The lzo decompressor can, if given some really crazy data, possibly
overrun some variable types.  Modify the checking logic to properly
detect overruns before they happen.

Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Tested-by: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: rate-limit leftover bytes warning and print process name</title>
<updated>2014-06-26T19:12:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Schmidt</name>
<email>mschmidt@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-02T16:25:02Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:83880480db7b0a59c6304f9b86ae2b7024741045</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bfc5184b69cf9eeb286137640351c650c27f118a ]

Any process is able to send netlink messages with leftover bytes.
Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam.

The warning is supposed to help find userspace bugs, so print the
triggering command name to implicate the buggy program.

[v2: Use pr_warn_ratelimited instead of printk_ratelimited.]

Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt &lt;mschmidt@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: don't compare the nul-termination in nla_strcmp</title>
<updated>2014-04-14T13:42:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-01T17:38:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=dbd3f730cf94e5ff51c196f6765a87e9e113ee64'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dbd3f730cf94e5ff51c196f6765a87e9e113ee64</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8b7b932434f5eee495b91a2804f5b64ebb2bc835 ]

nla_strcmp compares the string length plus one, so it's implicitly
including the nul-termination in the comparison.

 int nla_strcmp(const struct nlattr *nla, const char *str)
 {
        int len = strlen(str) + 1;
        ...
                d = memcmp(nla_data(nla), str, len);

However, if NLA_STRING is used, userspace can send us a string without
the nul-termination. This is a problem since the string
comparison will not match as the last byte may be not the
nul-termination.

Fix this by skipping the comparison of the nul-termination if the
attribute data is nul-terminated. Suggested by Thomas Graf.

Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, hweight: Fix BUG when booting with CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL=y</title>
<updated>2014-02-20T19:06:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Oberparleiter</name>
<email>oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-06T14:58:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f878b94f967e1c6ee0d3c220063db3ff52fe0448'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f878b94f967e1c6ee0d3c220063db3ff52fe0448</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6583327c4dd55acbbf2a6f25e775b28b3abf9a42 upstream.

Commit d61931d89b, "x86: Add optimized popcnt variants" introduced
compile flag -fcall-saved-rdi for lib/hweight.c. When combined with
options -fprofile-arcs and -O2, this flag causes gcc to generate
broken constructor code. As a result, a 64 bit x86 kernel compiled
with CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL=y prints message "gcov: could not create
file" and runs into sproadic BUGs during boot.

The gcc people indicate that these kinds of problems are endemic when
using ad hoc calling conventions.  It is therefore best to treat any
file compiled with ad hoc calling conventions as an isolated
environment and avoid things like profiling or coverage analysis,
since those subsystems assume a "normal" calling conventions.

This patch avoids the bug by excluding lib/hweight.o from coverage
profiling.

Reported-by: Meelis Roos &lt;mroos@linux.ee&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Oberparleiter &lt;oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52F3A30C.7050205@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/decompressors: fix "no limit" output buffer length</title>
<updated>2014-02-06T19:08:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexandre Courbot</name>
<email>acourbot@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-11T21:23:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c18e49ad50903819b947aea33c1cdcef724f7c35</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1431574a1c4c669a0c198e4763627837416e4443 upstream.

When decompressing into memory, the output buffer length is set to some
arbitrarily high value (0x7fffffff) to indicate the output is, virtually,
unlimited in size.

The problem with this is that some platforms have their physical memory at
high physical addresses (0x80000000 or more), and that the output buffer
address and its "unlimited" length cannot be added without overflowing.
An example of this can be found in inflate_fast():

/* next_out is the output buffer address */
out = strm-&gt;next_out - OFF;
/* avail_out is the output buffer size. end will overflow if the output
 * address is &gt;= 0x80000104 */
end = out + (strm-&gt;avail_out - 257);

This has huge consequences on the performance of kernel decompression,
since the following exit condition of inflate_fast() will be always true:

} while (in &lt; last &amp;&amp; out &lt; end);

Indeed, "end" has overflowed and is now always lower than "out".  As a
result, inflate_fast() will return after processing one single byte of
input data, and will thus need to be called an unreasonably high number of
times.  This probably went unnoticed because kernel decompression is fast
enough even with this issue.

Nonetheless, adjusting the output buffer length in such a way that the
above pointer arithmetic never overflows results in a kernel decompression
that is about 3 times faster on affected machines.

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Courbot &lt;acourbot@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jon Medhurst &lt;tixy@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Warren &lt;swarren@wwwdotorg.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/genalloc.c: fix overflow of ending address of memory chunk</title>
<updated>2013-12-12T06:36:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joonyoung Shim</name>
<email>jy0922.shim@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-11T21:21:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2e8cb3339b9e52c4d8dcaca913412ebab5dae271</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 674470d97958a0ec72f72caf7f6451da40159cc7 upstream.

In struct gen_pool_chunk, end_addr means the end address of memory chunk
(inclusive), but in the implementation it is treated as address + size of
memory chunk (exclusive), so it points to the address plus one instead of
correct ending address.

The ending address of memory chunk plus one will cause overflow on the
memory chunk including the last address of memory map, e.g.  when starting
address is 0xFFF00000 and size is 0x100000 on 32bit machine, ending
address will be 0x100000000.

Use correct ending address like starting address + size - 1.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment to struct gen_pool_chunk:end_addr]
Signed-off-by: Joonyoung Shim &lt;jy0922.shim@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi &lt;jhbird.choi@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
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