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<title>user/sven/linux.git/lib, branch v4.4.130</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2018-04-24T07:32:04Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>x86/hweight: Get rid of the special calling convention</title>
<updated>2018-04-24T07:32:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov</name>
<email>bp@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-30T10:56:27Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit f5967101e9de12addcda4510dfbac66d7c5779c3 upstream.

People complained about ARCH_HWEIGHT_CFLAGS and how it throws a wrench
into kcov, lto, etc, experimentations.

Add asm versions for __sw_hweight{32,64}() and do explicit saving and
restoring of clobbered registers. This gets rid of the special calling
convention. We get to call those functions on !X86_FEATURE_POPCNT CPUs.

We still need to hardcode POPCNT and register operands as some old gas
versions which we support, do not know about POPCNT.

Btw, remove redundant REX prefix from 32-bit POPCNT because alternatives
can do padding now.

Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464605787-20603-1-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page table</title>
<updated>2018-03-28T16:40:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Toshi Kani</name>
<email>toshi.kani@hpe.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-22T23:17:20Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit b6bdb7517c3d3f41f20e5c2948d6bc3f8897394e upstream.

On architectures with CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP set, ioremap() may
create pud/pmd mappings.  A kernel panic was observed on arm64 systems
with Cortex-A75 in the following steps as described by Hanjun Guo.

 1. ioremap a 4K size, valid page table will build,
 2. iounmap it, pte0 will set to 0;
 3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, pgd/pmd is unchanged,
    then set the a new value for pmd;
 4. pte0 is leaked;
 5. CPU may meet exception because the old pmd is still in TLB,
    which will lead to kernel panic.

This panic is not reproducible on x86.  INVLPG, called from iounmap,
purges all levels of entries associated with purged address on x86.  x86
still has memory leak.

The patch changes the ioremap path to free unmapped page table(s) since
doing so in the unmap path has the following issues:

 - The iounmap() path is shared with vunmap(). Since vmap() only
   supports pte mappings, making vunmap() to free a pte page is an
   overhead for regular vmap users as they do not need a pte page freed
   up.

 - Checking if all entries in a pte page are cleared in the unmap path
   is racy, and serializing this check is expensive.

 - The unmap path calls free_vmap_area_noflush() to do lazy TLB purges.
   Clearing a pud/pmd entry before the lazy TLB purges needs extra TLB
   purge.

Add two interfaces, pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page(), which
clear a given pud/pmd entry and free up a page for the lower level
entries.

This patch implements their stub functions on x86 and arm64, which work
as workaround.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo in pmd_free_pte_page() stub]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180314180155.19492-2-toshi.kani@hpe.com
Fixes: e61ce6ade404e ("mm: change ioremap to set up huge I/O mappings")
Reported-by: Lei Li &lt;lious.lilei@hisilicon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Wang Xuefeng &lt;wxf.wang@hisilicon.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Hanjun Guo &lt;guohanjun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Chintan Pandya &lt;cpandya@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ tweak arm64 portion to rely on CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_HUGE_VMAP - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/mpi: Fix umul_ppmm() for MIPS64r6</title>
<updated>2018-03-03T09:19:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Hogan</name>
<email>jhogan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-05T23:31:35Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0db6b1db4f27f1a9f42c37579aee125334ce702e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bbc25bee37d2b32cf3a1fab9195b6da3a185614a ]

Current MIPS64r6 toolchains aren't able to generate efficient
DMULU/DMUHU based code for the C implementation of umul_ppmm(), which
performs an unsigned 64 x 64 bit multiply and returns the upper and
lower 64-bit halves of the 128-bit result. Instead it widens the 64-bit
inputs to 128-bits and emits a __multi3 intrinsic call to perform a 128
x 128 multiply. This is both inefficient, and it results in a link error
since we don't include __multi3 in MIPS linux.

For example commit 90a53e4432b1 ("cfg80211: implement regdb signature
checking") merged in v4.15-rc1 recently broke the 64r6_defconfig and
64r6el_defconfig builds by indirectly selecting MPILIB. The same build
errors can be reproduced on older kernels by enabling e.g. CRYPTO_RSA:

lib/mpi/generic_mpih-mul1.o: In function `mpihelp_mul_1':
lib/mpi/generic_mpih-mul1.c:50: undefined reference to `__multi3'
lib/mpi/generic_mpih-mul2.o: In function `mpihelp_addmul_1':
lib/mpi/generic_mpih-mul2.c:49: undefined reference to `__multi3'
lib/mpi/generic_mpih-mul3.o: In function `mpihelp_submul_1':
lib/mpi/generic_mpih-mul3.c:49: undefined reference to `__multi3'
lib/mpi/mpih-div.o In function `mpihelp_divrem':
lib/mpi/mpih-div.c:205: undefined reference to `__multi3'
lib/mpi/mpih-div.c:142: undefined reference to `__multi3'

Therefore add an efficient MIPS64r6 implementation of umul_ppmm() using
inline assembly and the DMULU/DMUHU instructions, to prevent __multi3
calls being emitted.

Fixes: 7fd08ca58ae6 ("MIPS: Add build support for the MIPS R6 ISA")
Signed-off-by: James Hogan &lt;jhogan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: rework Kconfig settings</title>
<updated>2018-02-25T10:03:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-20T11:55:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0ffa39fb594e22e974da2101d92d8967a7777253</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e7c52b84fb18f08ce49b6067ae6285aca79084a8 upstream.

We get a lot of very large stack frames using gcc-7.0.1 with the default
-fsanitize-address-use-after-scope --param asan-stack=1 options, which can
easily cause an overflow of the kernel stack, e.g.

  drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2434:1: warning: the frame size of 46176 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
  drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2800lib.c:5650:1: warning: the frame size of 23632 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
  lib/atomic64_test.c:250:1: warning: the frame size of 11200 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
  drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2621:1: warning: the frame size of 9208 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
  drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv090x.c:3431:1: warning: the frame size of 6816 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
  fs/fscache/stats.c:287:1: warning: the frame size of 6536 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes

To reduce this risk, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope is now split out
into a separate CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA Kconfig option, leading to stack
frames that are smaller than 2 kilobytes most of the time on x86_64.  An
earlier version of this patch also prevented combining KASAN_EXTRA with
KASAN_INLINE, but that is no longer necessary with gcc-7.0.1.

All patches to get the frame size below 2048 bytes with CONFIG_KASAN=y
and CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA=n have been merged by maintainers now, so we can
bring back that default now.  KASAN_EXTRA=y still causes lots of
warnings but now defaults to !COMPILE_TEST to disable it in
allmodconfig, and it remains disabled in all other defconfigs since it
is a new option.  I arbitrarily raise the warning limit for KASAN_EXTRA
to 3072 to reduce the noise, but an allmodconfig kernel still has around
50 warnings on gcc-7.

I experimented a bit more with smaller stack frames and have another
follow-up series that reduces the warning limit for 64-bit architectures
to 1280 bytes (without CONFIG_KASAN).

With earlier versions of this patch series, I also had patches to address
the warnings we get with KASAN and/or KASAN_EXTRA, using a
"noinline_if_stackbloat" annotation.

That annotation now got replaced with a gcc-8 bugfix (see
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715) and a workaround for
older compilers, which means that KASAN_EXTRA is now just as bad as
before and will lead to an instant stack overflow in a few extreme
cases.

This reverts parts of commit 3f181b4d8652 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable
-Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y").  Two patches in linux-next
should be merged first to avoid introducing warnings in an allmodconfig
build:
  3cd890dbe2a4 ("media: dvb-frontends: fix i2c access helpers for KASAN")
  16c3ada89cff ("media: r820t: fix r820t_write_reg for KASAN")

Do we really need to backport this?

I think we do: without this patch, enabling KASAN will lead to
unavoidable kernel stack overflow in certain device drivers when built
with gcc-7 or higher on linux-4.10+ or any version that contains a
backport of commit c5caf21ab0cf8.  Most people are probably still on
older compilers, but it will get worse over time as they upgrade their
distros.

The warnings we get on kernels older than this should all be for code
that uses dangerously large stack frames, though most of them do not
cause an actual stack overflow by themselves.The asan-stack option was
added in linux-4.0, and commit 3f181b4d8652 ("lib/Kconfig.debug:
disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y") effectively turned
off the warning for allmodconfig kernels, so I would like to see this
fix backported to any kernels later than 4.0.

I have done dozens of fixes for individual functions with stack frames
larger than 2048 bytes with asan-stack, and I plan to make sure that
all those fixes make it into the stable kernels as well (most are
already there).

Part of the complication here is that asan-stack (from 4.0) was
originally assumed to always require much larger stacks, but that
turned out to be a combination of multiple gcc bugs that we have now
worked around and fixed, but sanitize-address-use-after-scope (from
v4.10) has a much higher inherent stack usage and also suffers from at
least three other problems that we have analyzed but not yet fixed
upstream, each of them makes the stack usage more severe than it should
be.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171221134744.2295529-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[arnd: rebase to v4.4; only re-enable warning]
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>509: fix printing uninitialized stack memory when OID is empty</title>
<updated>2018-02-25T10:03:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers3@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-08T15:13:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a7fbdc8875a676b9ddef27b0149b4a686725fca8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8dfd2f22d3bf3ab7714f7495ad5d897b8845e8c1 ]

Callers of sprint_oid() do not check its return value before printing
the result.  In the case where the OID is zero-length, -EBADMSG was
being returned without anything being written to the buffer, resulting
in uninitialized stack memory being printed.  Fix this by writing
"(bad)" to the buffer in the cases where -EBADMSG is returned.

Fixes: 4f73175d0375 ("X.509: Add utility functions to render OIDs as strings")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:04:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-30T02:37:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:28c486744e6de4d882a1d853aa63d99fcba4b7a6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ upstream commit 290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb ]

The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.

A quote from goolge project zero blog:
"At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in
the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading
from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result
appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an
attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together
and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying.
So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into
the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside
a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient
to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."

To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode.
So far eBPF JIT is supported by:
x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64

The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only.
In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden

v2-&gt;v3:
- move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)

v1-&gt;v2:
- fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback)
- fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback)
- add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog-&gt;bpf_func
- retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk.
  It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next

Considered doing:
  int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT;
but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove
bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place
and remove this jit_init() function.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dynamic-debug-howto: fix optional/omitted ending line number to be LARGE instead of 0</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:33:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-17T23:27:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=640192431a29a336a6a7226653dbeb949f56bc6b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:640192431a29a336a6a7226653dbeb949f56bc6b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1f3c790bd5989fcfec9e53ad8fa09f5b740c958f ]

line-range is supposed to treat "1-" as "1-endoffile", so
handle the special case by setting last_lineno to UINT_MAX.

Fixes this error:

  dynamic_debug:ddebug_parse_query: last-line:0 &lt; 1st-line:1
  dynamic_debug:ddebug_exec_query: query parse failed

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/10a6a101-e2be-209f-1f41-54637824788e@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/genalloc.c: make the avail variable an atomic_long_t</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:33:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Bates</name>
<email>sbates@raithlin.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-17T23:28:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=24c98ec494c2df1e449c6aa6c3904d7c32c20c44'/>
<id>urn:sha1:24c98ec494c2df1e449c6aa6c3904d7c32c20c44</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 36a3d1dd4e16bcd0d2ddfb4a2ec7092f0ae0d931 ]

If the amount of resources allocated to a gen_pool exceeds 2^32 then the
avail atomic overflows and this causes problems when clients try and
borrow resources from the pool.  This is only expected to be an issue on
64 bit systems.

Add the &lt;linux/atomic.h&gt; header to pull in atomic_long* operations.  So
that 32 bit systems continue to use atomic32_t but 64 bit systems can
use atomic64_t.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509033843-25667-1-git-send-email-sbates@raithlin.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Bates &lt;sbates@raithlin.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe &lt;logang@deltatee.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Mentz &lt;danielmentz@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ASN.1: check for error from ASN1_OP_END__ACT actions</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:33:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-08T15:13:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=1471d125892123b1a204f425952b86a8f86264b8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1471d125892123b1a204f425952b86a8f86264b8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 81a7be2cd69b412ab6aeacfe5ebf1bb6e5bce955 upstream.

asn1_ber_decoder() was ignoring errors from actions associated with the
opcodes ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_ACT, ASN1_OP_END_SET_ACT,
ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF_ACT, and ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF_ACT.  In practice, this
meant the pkcs7_note_signed_info() action (since that was the only user
of those opcodes).  Fix it by checking for the error, just like the
decoder does for actions associated with the other opcodes.

This bug allowed users to leak slab memory by repeatedly trying to add a
specially crafted "pkcs7_test" key (requires CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY).

In theory, this bug could also be used to bypass module signature
verification, by providing a PKCS#7 message that is misparsed such that
a signature's -&gt;authattrs do not contain its -&gt;msgdigest.  But it
doesn't seem practical in normal cases, due to restrictions on the
format of the -&gt;authattrs.

Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ASN.1: fix out-of-bounds read when parsing indefinite length item</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:33:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-08T15:13:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=621dac1d699106265f3245fe9f6dd2ca2adbe518'/>
<id>urn:sha1:621dac1d699106265f3245fe9f6dd2ca2adbe518</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e0058f3a874ebb48b25be7ff79bc3b4e59929f90 upstream.

In asn1_ber_decoder(), indefinitely-sized ASN.1 items were being passed
to the action functions before their lengths had been computed, using
the bogus length of 0x80 (ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH).  This resulted in
reading data past the end of the input buffer, when given a specially
crafted message.

Fix it by rearranging the code so that the indefinite length is resolved
before the action is called.

This bug was originally found by fuzzing the X.509 parser in userspace
using libFuzzer from the LLVM project.

KASAN report (cleaned up slightly):

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366
    Read of size 128 at addr ffff880035dd9eaf by task keyctl/195

    CPU: 1 PID: 195 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
     dump_stack+0xd1/0x175 lib/dump_stack.c:53
     print_address_description+0x78/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252
     kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
     kasan_report+0x23f/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
     memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302
     memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
     x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366
     asn1_ber_decoder+0xb4a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:447
     x509_cert_parse+0x1c7/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89
     x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
     asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
     key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

    Allocated by task 195:
     __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3675 [inline]
     __kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 mm/slab.c:3682
     kvmalloc ./include/linux/mm.h:540 [inline]
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:104 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0x19e/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
