<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/mm, branch v5.17.3</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.17.3</id>
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<updated>2022-04-13T17:27:36Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>mm/mempolicy: fix mpol_new leak in shared_policy_replace</title>
<updated>2022-04-13T17:27:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miaohe Lin</name>
<email>linmiaohe@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-08T20:09:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fe39ac59dbbf893b73b24e3184161d0bd06d6651'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fe39ac59dbbf893b73b24e3184161d0bd06d6651</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4ad099559b00ac01c3726e5c95dc3108ef47d03e upstream.

If mpol_new is allocated but not used in restart loop, mpol_new will be
freed via mpol_put before returning to the caller.  But refcnt is not
initialized yet, so mpol_put could not do the right things and might
leak the unused mpol_new.  This would happen if mempolicy was updated on
the shared shmem file while the sp-&gt;lock has been dropped during the
memory allocation.

This issue could be triggered easily with the below code snippet if
there are many processes doing the below work at the same time:

  shmid = shmget((key_t)5566, 1024 * PAGE_SIZE, 0666|IPC_CREAT);
  shm = shmat(shmid, 0, 0);
  loop many times {
    mbind(shm, 1024 * PAGE_SIZE, MPOL_LOCAL, mask, maxnode, 0);
    mbind(shm + 128 * PAGE_SIZE, 128 * PAGE_SIZE, MPOL_DEFAULT, mask,
          maxnode, 0);
  }

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220329111416.27954-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: 42288fe366c4 ("mm: mempolicy: Convert shared_policy mutex to spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin &lt;linmiaohe@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[3.8]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mmmremap.c: avoid pointless invalidate_range_start/end on mremap(old_size=0)</title>
<updated>2022-04-13T17:27:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-08T20:09:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:04bc13dae4a27b8d030843c85ae452bb2f1d9c1f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 01e67e04c28170c47700c2c226d732bbfedb1ad0 upstream.

If an mremap() syscall with old_size=0 ends up in move_page_tables(), it
will call invalidate_range_start()/invalidate_range_end() unnecessarily,
i.e.  with an empty range.

This causes a WARN in KVM's mmu_notifier.  In the past, empty ranges
have been diagnosed to be off-by-one bugs, hence the WARNing.  Given the
low (so far) number of unique reports, the benefits of detecting more
buggy callers seem to outweigh the cost of having to fix cases such as
this one, where userspace is doing something silly.  In this particular
case, an early return from move_page_tables() is enough to fix the
issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220329173155.172439-1-pbonzini@redhat.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6bde52d89cfdf9f61425@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>highmem: fix checks in __kmap_local_sched_{in,out}</title>
<updated>2022-04-13T17:27:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Max Filippov</name>
<email>jcmvbkbc@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-08T20:08:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7dd5b3b97716a611fcf67d92fd2370fcb8d50372</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 66f133ceab7456c789f70a242991ed1b27ba1c3d upstream.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL is enabled __kmap_local_sched_{in,out} check
that even slots in the tsk-&gt;kmap_ctrl.pteval are unmapped.  The slots are
initialized with 0 value, but the check is done with pte_none.  0 pte
however does not necessarily mean that pte_none will return true.  e.g.
on xtensa it returns false, resulting in the following runtime warnings:

 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:627 __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
 CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc/0x40
   __warn+0x8f/0x174
   warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
   __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
   __schedule+0x71a/0x9c4
   preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
   common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
   do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
   handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
   do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
   common_exception+0x7f/0x7f

 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:664 __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
 CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Tainted: G        W         5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc/0x40
   __warn+0x8f/0x174
   warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
   __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
   finish_task_switch$isra$0+0x1ce/0x2f8
   __schedule+0x86e/0x9c4
   preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
   common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
   do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
   handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
   do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
   common_exception+0x7f/0x7f

Fix it by replacing !pte_none(pteval) with pte_val(pteval) != 0.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220403235159.3498065-1-jcmvbkbc@gmail.com
Fixes: 5fbda3ecd14a ("sched: highmem: Store local kmaps in task struct")
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov &lt;jcmvbkbc@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: fix race between MADV_FREE reclaim and blkdev direct IO read</title>
<updated>2022-04-13T17:27:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mauricio Faria de Oliveira</name>
<email>mfo@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-07T19:14:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b56e43436e27432b3d46dc927ea8715cfddce95c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b56e43436e27432b3d46dc927ea8715cfddce95c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6c8e2a256915a223f6289f651d6b926cd7135c9e upstream.

Problem:
=======

Userspace might read the zero-page instead of actual data from a direct IO
read on a block device if the buffers have been called madvise(MADV_FREE)
on earlier (this is discussed below) due to a race between page reclaim on
MADV_FREE and blkdev direct IO read.

- Race condition:
  ==============

During page reclaim, the MADV_FREE page check in try_to_unmap_one() checks
if the page is not dirty, then discards its rmap PTE(s) (vs.  remap back
if the page is dirty).

However, after try_to_unmap_one() returns to shrink_page_list(), it might
keep the page _anyway_ if page_ref_freeze() fails (it expects exactly
_one_ page reference, from the isolation for page reclaim).

Well, blkdev_direct_IO() gets references for all pages, and on READ
operations it only sets them dirty _later_.

So, if MADV_FREE'd pages (i.e., not dirty) are used as buffers for direct
IO read from block devices, and page reclaim happens during
__blkdev_direct_IO[_simple]() exactly AFTER bio_iov_iter_get_pages()
returns, but BEFORE the pages are set dirty, the situation happens.

The direct IO read eventually completes.  Now, when userspace reads the
buffers, the PTE is no longer there and the page fault handler
do_anonymous_page() services that with the zero-page, NOT the data!

A synthetic reproducer is provided.

- Page faults:
  ===========

If page reclaim happens BEFORE bio_iov_iter_get_pages() the issue doesn't
happen, because that faults-in all pages as writeable, so
do_anonymous_page() sets up a new page/rmap/PTE, and that is used by
direct IO.  The userspace reads don't fault as the PTE is there (thus
zero-page is not used/setup).

But if page reclaim happens AFTER it / BEFORE setting pages dirty, the PTE
is no longer there; the subsequent page faults can't help:

The data-read from the block device probably won't generate faults due to
DMA (no MMU) but even in the case it wouldn't use DMA, that happens on
different virtual addresses (not user-mapped addresses) because `struct
bio_vec` stores `struct page` to figure addresses out (which are different
from user-mapped addresses) for the read.

Thus userspace reads (to user-mapped addresses) still fault, then
do_anonymous_page() gets another `struct page` that would address/ map to
other memory than the `struct page` used by `struct bio_vec` for the read.
(The original `struct page` is not available, since it wasn't freed, as
page_ref_freeze() failed due to more page refs.  And even if it were
available, its data cannot be trusted anymore.)

Solution:
========

One solution is to check for the expected page reference count in
try_to_unmap_one().

There should be one reference from the isolation (that is also checked in
shrink_page_list() with page_ref_freeze()) plus one or more references
from page mapping(s) (put in discard: label).  Further references mean
that rmap/PTE cannot be unmapped/nuked.

(Note: there might be more than one reference from mapping due to
fork()/clone() without CLONE_VM, which use the same `struct page` for
references, until the copy-on-write page gets copied.)

So, additional page references (e.g., from direct IO read) now prevent the
rmap/PTE from being unmapped/dropped; similarly to the page is not freed
per shrink_page_list()/page_ref_freeze()).

- Races and Barriers:
  ==================

The new check in try_to_unmap_one() should be safe in races with
bio_iov_iter_get_pages() in get_user_pages() fast and slow paths, as it's
done under the PTE lock.

The fast path doesn't take the lock, but it checks if the PTE has changed
and if so, it drops the reference and leaves the page for the slow path
(which does take that lock).

The fast path requires synchronization w/ full memory barrier: it writes
the page reference count first then it reads the PTE later, while
try_to_unmap() writes PTE first then it reads page refcount.

And a second barrier is needed, as the page dirty flag should not be read
before the page reference count (as in __remove_mapping()).  (This can be
a load memory barrier only; no writes are involved.)

Call stack/comments:

- try_to_unmap_one()
  - page_vma_mapped_walk()
    - map_pte()			# see pte_offset_map_lock():
        pte_offset_map()
        spin_lock()

  - ptep_get_and_clear()	# write PTE
  - smp_mb()			# (new barrier) GUP fast path
  - page_ref_count()		# (new check) read refcount

  - page_vma_mapped_walk_done()	# see pte_unmap_unlock():
      pte_unmap()
      spin_unlock()

- bio_iov_iter_get_pages()
  - __bio_iov_iter_get_pages()
    - iov_iter_get_pages()
      - get_user_pages_fast()
        - internal_get_user_pages_fast()

          # fast path
          - lockless_pages_from_mm()
            - gup_{pgd,p4d,pud,pmd,pte}_range()
                ptep = pte_offset_map()		# not _lock()
                pte = ptep_get_lockless(ptep)

                page = pte_page(pte)
                try_grab_compound_head(page)	# inc refcount
                                            	# (RMW/barrier
                                             	#  on success)

                if (pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep)) # read PTE
                        put_compound_head(page) # dec refcount
                        			# go slow path

          # slow path
          - __gup_longterm_unlocked()
            - get_user_pages_unlocked()
              - __get_user_pages_locked()
                - __get_user_pages()
                  - follow_{page,p4d,pud,pmd}_mask()
                    - follow_page_pte()
                        ptep = pte_offset_map_lock()
                        pte = *ptep
                        page = vm_normal_page(pte)
                        try_grab_page(page)	# inc refcount
                        pte_unmap_unlock()

- Huge Pages:
  ==========

Regarding transparent hugepages, that logic shouldn't change, as MADV_FREE
(aka lazyfree) pages are PageAnon() &amp;&amp; !PageSwapBacked()
(madvise_free_pte_range() -&gt; mark_page_lazyfree() -&gt; lru_lazyfree_fn())
thus should reach shrink_page_list() -&gt; split_huge_page_to_list() before
try_to_unmap[_one](), so it deals with normal pages only.

(And in case unlikely/TTU_SPLIT_HUGE_PMD/split_huge_pmd_address() happens,
which should not or be rare, the page refcount should be greater than
mapcount: the head page is referenced by tail pages.  That also prevents
checking the head `page` then incorrectly call page_remove_rmap(subpage)
for a tail page, that isn't even in the shrink_page_list()'s page_list (an
effect of split huge pmd/pmvw), as it might happen today in this unlikely
scenario.)

MADV_FREE'd buffers:
===================

So, back to the "if MADV_FREE pages are used as buffers" note.  The case
is arguable, and subject to multiple interpretations.

The madvise(2) manual page on the MADV_FREE advice value says:

1) 'After a successful MADV_FREE ... data will be lost when
   the kernel frees the pages.'
2) 'the free operation will be canceled if the caller writes
   into the page' / 'subsequent writes ... will succeed and
   then [the] kernel cannot free those dirtied pages'
3) 'If there is no subsequent write, the kernel can free the
   pages at any time.'

Thoughts, questions, considerations... respectively:

1) Since the kernel didn't actually free the page (page_ref_freeze()
   failed), should the data not have been lost? (on userspace read.)
2) Should writes performed by the direct IO read be able to cancel
   the free operation?
   - Should the direct IO read be considered as 'the caller' too,
     as it's been requested by 'the caller'?
   - Should the bio technique to dirty pages on return to userspace
     (bio_check_pages_dirty() is called/used by __blkdev_direct_IO())
     be considered in another/special way here?
3) Should an upcoming write from a previously requested direct IO
   read be considered as a subsequent write, so the kernel should
   not free the pages? (as it's known at the time of page reclaim.)

And lastly:

Technically, the last point would seem a reasonable consideration and
balance, as the madvise(2) manual page apparently (and fairly) seem to
assume that 'writes' are memory access from the userspace process (not
explicitly considering writes from the kernel or its corner cases; again,
fairly)..  plus the kernel fix implementation for the corner case of the
largely 'non-atomic write' encompassed by a direct IO read operation, is
relatively simple; and it helps.

Reproducer:
==========

@ test.c (simplified, but works)

	#define _GNU_SOURCE
	#include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
	#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
	#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/mman.h&gt;

	int main() {
		int fd, i;
		char *buf;

		fd = open(DEV, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);

		buf = mmap(NULL, BUF_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                	   MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

		for (i = 0; i &lt; BUF_SIZE; i += PAGE_SIZE)
			buf[i] = 1; // init to non-zero

		madvise(buf, BUF_SIZE, MADV_FREE);

		read(fd, buf, BUF_SIZE);

		for (i = 0; i &lt; BUF_SIZE; i += PAGE_SIZE)
			printf("%p: 0x%x\n", &amp;buf[i], buf[i]);

		return 0;
	}

@ block/fops.c (formerly fs/block_dev.c)

	+#include &lt;linux/swap.h&gt;
	...
	... __blkdev_direct_IO[_simple](...)
	{
	...
	+	if (!strcmp(current-&gt;comm, "good"))
	+		shrink_all_memory(ULONG_MAX);
	+
         	ret = bio_iov_iter_get_pages(...);
	+
	+	if (!strcmp(current-&gt;comm, "bad"))
	+		shrink_all_memory(ULONG_MAX);
	...
	}

@ shell

        # NUM_PAGES=4
        # PAGE_SIZE=$(getconf PAGE_SIZE)

        # yes | dd of=test.img bs=${PAGE_SIZE} count=${NUM_PAGES}
        # DEV=$(losetup -f --show test.img)

        # gcc -DDEV=\"$DEV\" \
              -DBUF_SIZE=$((PAGE_SIZE * NUM_PAGES)) \
              -DPAGE_SIZE=${PAGE_SIZE} \
               test.c -o test

        # od -tx1 $DEV
        0000000 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a
        *
        0040000

        # mv test good
        # ./good
        0x7f7c10418000: 0x79
        0x7f7c10419000: 0x79
        0x7f7c1041a000: 0x79
        0x7f7c1041b000: 0x79

        # mv good bad
        # ./bad
        0x7fa1b8050000: 0x0
        0x7fa1b8051000: 0x0
        0x7fa1b8052000: 0x0
        0x7fa1b8053000: 0x0

Note: the issue is consistent on v5.17-rc3, but it's intermittent with the
support of MADV_FREE on v4.5 (60%-70% error; needs swap).  [wrap
do_direct_IO() in do_blockdev_direct_IO() @ fs/direct-io.c].

- v5.17-rc3:

        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./good; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           4000  0x79

        # mv good bad
        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./bad; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           4000  0x0

        # free | grep Swap
        Swap:             0           0           0

- v4.5:

        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./good; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           4000  0x79

        # mv good bad
        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./bad; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           2702  0x0
           1298  0x79

        # swapoff -av
        swapoff /swap

        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./bad; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           4000  0x79

Ceph/TCMalloc:
=============

For documentation purposes, the use case driving the analysis/fix is Ceph
on Ubuntu 18.04, as the TCMalloc library there still uses MADV_FREE to
release unused memory to the system from the mmap'ed page heap (might be
committed back/used again; it's not munmap'ed.) - PageHeap::DecommitSpan()
-&gt; TCMalloc_SystemRelease() -&gt; madvise() - PageHeap::CommitSpan() -&gt;
TCMalloc_SystemCommit() -&gt; do nothing.

Note: TCMalloc switched back to MADV_DONTNEED a few commits after the
release in Ubuntu 18.04 (google-perftools/gperftools 2.5), so the issue
just 'disappeared' on Ceph on later Ubuntu releases but is still present
in the kernel, and can be hit by other use cases.

The observed issue seems to be the old Ceph bug #22464 [1], where checksum
mismatches are observed (and instrumentation with buffer dumps shows
zero-pages read from mmap'ed/MADV_FREE'd page ranges).

The issue in Ceph was reasonably deemed a kernel bug (comment #50) and
mostly worked around with a retry mechanism, but other parts of Ceph could
still hit that (rocksdb).  Anyway, it's less likely to be hit again as
TCMalloc switched out of MADV_FREE by default.

(Some kernel versions/reports from the Ceph bug, and relation with
the MADV_FREE introduction/changes; TCMalloc versions not checked.)
- 4.4 good
- 4.5 (madv_free: introduction)
- 4.9 bad
- 4.10 good? maybe a swapless system
- 4.12 (madv_free: no longer free instantly on swapless systems)
- 4.13 bad

[1] https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/22464

Thanks:
======

Several people contributed to analysis/discussions/tests/reproducers in
the first stages when drilling down on ceph/tcmalloc/linux kernel:

- Dan Hill
- Dan Streetman
- Dongdong Tao
- Gavin Guo
- Gerald Yang
- Heitor Alves de Siqueira
- Ioanna Alifieraki
- Jay Vosburgh
- Matthew Ruffell
- Ponnuvel Palaniyappan

Reviews, suggestions, corrections, comments:

- Minchan Kim
- Yu Zhao
- Huang, Ying
- John Hubbard
- Christoph Hellwig

[mfo@canonical.com: v4]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220209202659.183418-1-mfo@canonical.comLink: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220131230255.789059-1-mfo@canonical.com

Fixes: 802a3a92ad7a ("mm: reclaim MADV_FREE pages")
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira &lt;mfo@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Minchan Kim &lt;minchan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Yu Zhao &lt;yuzhao@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yang Shi &lt;shy828301@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Miaohe Lin &lt;linmiaohe@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Hill &lt;daniel.hill@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Streetman &lt;dan.streetman@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Dongdong Tao &lt;dongdong.tao@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Gavin Guo &lt;gavin.guo@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Gerald Yang &lt;gerald.yang@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Heitor Alves de Siqueira &lt;halves@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Ioanna Alifieraki &lt;ioanna-maria.alifieraki@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Jay Vosburgh &lt;jay.vosburgh@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Ruffell &lt;matthew.ruffell@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Ponnuvel Palaniyappan &lt;ponnuvel.palaniyappan@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[mfo: backport: replace folio/test_flag with page/flag equivalents;
 real Fixes: 854e9ed09ded ("mm: support madvise(MADV_FREE)") in v4.]
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira &lt;mfo@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: kfence: fix objcgs vector allocation</title>
<updated>2022-04-13T17:27:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Muchun Song</name>
<email>songmuchun@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-01T18:28:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=99144b9a46f0b6934aac36f1d0598f9b7bd2b82a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:99144b9a46f0b6934aac36f1d0598f9b7bd2b82a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8f0b36497303487d5a32c75789c77859cc2ee895 ]

If the kfence object is allocated to be used for objects vector, then
this slot of the pool eventually being occupied permanently since the
vector is never freed.  The solutions could be (1) freeing vector when
the kfence object is freed or (2) allocating all vectors statically.

Since the memory consumption of object vectors is low, it is better to
chose (2) to fix the issue and it is also can reduce overhead of vectors
allocating in the future.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220328132843.16624-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: d3fb45f370d9 ("mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song &lt;songmuchun@bytedance.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;roman.gushchin@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Xiongchun Duan &lt;duanxiongchun@bytedance.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/usercopy: return 1 from hardened_usercopy __setup() handler</title>
<updated>2022-04-08T11:59:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-22T21:47:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9d4c859d84a14a57a78f6c262d26a7f604a9d7c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9d4c859d84a14a57a78f6c262d26a7f604a9d7c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 05fe3c103f7e6b8b4fca8a7001dfc9ed4628085b upstream.

__setup() handlers should return 1 if the command line option is handled
and 0 if not (or maybe never return 0; it just pollutes init's
environment).  This prevents:

  Unknown kernel command line parameters \
  "BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 hardened_usercopy=off", will be \
  passed to user space.

  Run /sbin/init as init process
   with arguments:
     /sbin/init
   with environment:
     HOME=/
     TERM=linux
     BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5
     hardened_usercopy=off
or
     hardened_usercopy=on
but when "hardened_usercopy=foo" is used, there is no Unknown kernel
command line parameter.

Return 1 to indicate that the boot option has been handled.
Print a warning if strtobool() returns an error on the option string,
but do not mark this as in unknown command line option and do not cause
init's environment to be polluted with this string.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220222034249.14795-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Fixes: b5cb15d9372ab ("usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov &lt;i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Chris von Recklinghausen &lt;crecklin@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/memcontrol: return 1 from cgroup.memory __setup() handler</title>
<updated>2022-04-08T11:59:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-22T21:40:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=070e4b2cdddaa394cc38672fc7b311f23f638d8a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:070e4b2cdddaa394cc38672fc7b311f23f638d8a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 460a79e18842caca6fa0c415de4a3ac1e671ac50 upstream.

__setup() handlers should return 1 if the command line option is handled
and 0 if not (or maybe never return 0; it just pollutes init's
environment).

The only reason that this particular __setup handler does not pollute
init's environment is that the setup string contains a '.', as in
"cgroup.memory".  This causes init/main.c::unknown_boottoption() to
consider it to be an "Unused module parameter" and ignore it.  (This is
for parsing of loadable module parameters any time after kernel init.)
Otherwise the string "cgroup.memory=whatever" would be added to init's
environment strings.

Instead of relying on this '.' quirk, just return 1 to indicate that the
boot option has been handled.

Note that there is no warning message if someone enters:
	cgroup.memory=anything_invalid

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220222005811.10672-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Fixes: f7e1cb6ec51b0 ("mm: memcontrol: account socket memory in unified hierarchy memory controller")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov &lt;i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru&gt;
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný &lt;mkoutny@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov.dev@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Roman Gushchin &lt;roman.gushchin@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/mmap: return 1 from stack_guard_gap __setup() handler</title>
<updated>2022-04-08T11:59:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-22T21:42:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=aaa0d690d4ba981a6aac18ab5cf788aa809b033c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aaa0d690d4ba981a6aac18ab5cf788aa809b033c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e6d094936988910ce6e8197570f2753898830081 upstream.

__setup() handlers should return 1 if the command line option is handled
and 0 if not (or maybe never return 0; it just pollutes init's
environment).  This prevents:

  Unknown kernel command line parameters \
  "BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 stack_guard_gap=100", will be \
  passed to user space.

  Run /sbin/init as init process
   with arguments:
     /sbin/init
   with environment:
     HOME=/
     TERM=linux
     BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5
     stack_guard_gap=100

Return 1 to indicate that the boot option has been handled.

Note that there is no warning message if someone enters:
	stack_guard_gap=anything_invalid
and 'val' and stack_guard_gap are both set to 0 due to the use of
simple_strtoul(). This could be improved by using kstrtoxxx() and
checking for an error.

It appears that having stack_guard_gap == 0 is valid (if unexpected) since
using "stack_guard_gap=0" on the kernel command line does that.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220222005817.11087-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Fixes: 1be7107fbe18e ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov &lt;i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/kmemleak: reset tag when compare object pointer</title>
<updated>2022-04-08T11:57:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuan-Ying Lee</name>
<email>Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-01T18:28:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=cf67c97a3064f8da06f499efc661b9303cef7720'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cf67c97a3064f8da06f499efc661b9303cef7720</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bfc8089f00fa526dea983844c880fa8106c33ac4 upstream.

When we use HW-tag based kasan and enable vmalloc support, we hit the
following bug.  It is due to comparison between tagged object and
non-tagged pointer.

We need to reset the kasan tag when we need to compare tagged object and
non-tagged pointer.

  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&amp;]Scan area larger than object 0xffffffe77076f440
  CPU: 4 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G S      W         5.15.25-android13-0-g5cacf919c2bc #1
  Hardware name: MT6983(ENG) (DT)
  Call trace:
   add_scan_area+0xc4/0x244
   kmemleak_scan_area+0x40/0x9c
   layout_and_allocate+0x1e8/0x288
   load_module+0x2c8/0xf00
   __se_sys_finit_module+0x190/0x1d0
   __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x20/0x30
   invoke_syscall+0x60/0x170
   el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x114
   do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0
   el0_svc+0x60/0xf8
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
   el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&amp;]Object 0xf5ffffe77076b000 (size 32768):
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&amp;]  comm "init", pid 1, jiffies 4294894197
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&amp;]  min_count = 0
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&amp;]  count = 0
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&amp;]  flags = 0x1
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&amp;]  checksum = 0
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&amp;]  backtrace:
       module_alloc+0x9c/0x120
       move_module+0x34/0x19c
       layout_and_allocate+0x1c4/0x288
       load_module+0x2c8/0xf00
       __se_sys_finit_module+0x190/0x1d0
       __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x20/0x30
       invoke_syscall+0x60/0x170
       el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x114
       do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0
       el0_svc+0x60/0xf8
       el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
       el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220318034051.30687-1-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee &lt;Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthias Brugger &lt;matthias.bgg@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Chinwen Chang &lt;chinwen.chang@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Tang &lt;nicholas.tang@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: Yee Lee &lt;yee.lee@mediatek.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: only re-generate demotion targets when a numa node changes its N_CPU state</title>
<updated>2022-04-08T11:57:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oscar Salvador</name>
<email>osalvador@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-22T21:47:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d3e5ccff718630464601329971cb1de274ee6c3e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d3e5ccff718630464601329971cb1de274ee6c3e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 734c15700cdf9062ae98d8b131c6fe873dfad26d upstream.

Abhishek reported that after patch [1], hotplug operations are taking
roughly double the expected time.  [2]

The reason behind is that the CPU callbacks that
migrate_on_reclaim_init() sets always call set_migration_target_nodes()
whenever a CPU is brought up/down.

But we only care about numa nodes going from having cpus to become
cpuless, and vice versa, as that influences the demotion_target order.

We do already have two CPU callbacks (vmstat_cpu_online() and
vmstat_cpu_dead()) that check exactly that, so get rid of the CPU
callbacks in migrate_on_reclaim_init() and only call
set_migration_target_nodes() from vmstat_cpu_{dead,online}() whenever a
numa node change its N_CPU state.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210721063926.3024591-2-ying.huang@intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/eb438ddd-2919-73d4-bd9f-b7eecdd9577a@linux.vnet.ibm.com/

[osalvador@suse.de: add feedback from Huang Ying]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220314150945.12694-1-osalvador@suse.de

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220310120749.23077-1-osalvador@suse.de
Fixes: 884a6e5d1f93b ("mm/migrate: update node demotion order on hotplug events")
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador &lt;osalvador@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Tested-by: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Reported-by: Abhishek Goel &lt;huntbag@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: "Huang, Ying" &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Abhishek Goel &lt;huntbag@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
