user/sven/linux.git/net/ceph, branch v3.10.78

libceph: fix double __remove_osd() problem

2015-03-06T22:40:54Z

commit 7eb71e0351fbb1b242ae70abb7bb17107fe2f792 upstream. It turns out it's possible to get __remove_osd() called twice on the same OSD. That doesn't sit well with rb_erase() - depending on the shape of the tree we can get a NULL dereference, a soft lockup or a random crash at some point in the future as we end up touching freed memory. One scenario that I was able to reproduce is as follows: con_fault_finish() osd_reset() ceph_osdc_handle_map() kick_requests() reset_changed_osds() __reset_osd() __remove_osd() __kick_osd_requests() __reset_osd() __remove_osd() <-- !!! A case can be made that osd refcounting is imperfect and reworking it would be a proper resolution, but for now Sage and I decided to fix this by adding a safe guard around __remove_osd(). Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8087 Cc: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Reviewed-by: Alex Elder Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: change from BUG to WARN for __remove_osd() asserts

2015-03-06T22:40:54Z

commit cc9f1f518cec079289d11d732efa490306b1ddad upstream. No reason to use BUG_ON for osd request list assertions. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Alex Elder Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: assert both regular and lingering lists in __remove_osd()

2015-03-06T22:40:54Z

commit 7c6e6fc53e7335570ed82f77656cedce1502744e upstream. It is important that both regular and lingering requests lists are empty when the OSD is removed. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Alex Elder Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: do not crash on large auth tickets

2014-11-21T17:22:53Z

commit aaef31703a0cf6a733e651885bfb49edc3ac6774 upstream. Large (greater than 32k, the value of PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER) auth tickets will have their buffers vmalloc'ed, which leads to the following crash in crypto: [ 28.685082] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffeb04000032c0 [ 28.686032] IP: [] scatterwalk_pagedone+0x22/0x80 [ 28.686032] PGD 0 [ 28.688088] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 28.688088] Modules linked in: [ 28.688088] CPU: 0 PID: 878 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.17.0-vm+ #305 [ 28.688088] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007 [ 28.688088] Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work [ 28.688088] task: ffff88011a7f9030 ti: ffff8800d903c000 task.ti: ffff8800d903c000 [ 28.688088] RIP: 0010:[] [] scatterwalk_pagedone+0x22/0x80 [ 28.688088] RSP: 0018:ffff8800d903f688 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 28.688088] RAX: ffffeb04000032c0 RBX: ffff8800d903f718 RCX: ffffeb04000032c0 [ 28.688088] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800d903f750 [ 28.688088] RBP: ffff8800d903f688 R08: 00000000000007de R09: ffff8800d903f880 [ 28.688088] R10: 18df467c72d6257b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010 [ 28.688088] R13: ffff8800d903f750 R14: ffff8800d903f8a0 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 28.688088] FS: 00007f50a41c7700(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 28.688088] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 28.688088] CR2: ffffeb04000032c0 CR3: 00000000da3f3000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 [ 28.688088] Stack: [ 28.688088] ffff8800d903f698 ffffffff81392ca8 ffff8800d903f6e8 ffffffff81395d32 [ 28.688088] ffff8800dac96000 ffff880000000000 ffff8800d903f980 ffff880119b7e020 [ 28.688088] ffff880119b7e010 0000000000000000 0000000000000010 0000000000000010 [ 28.688088] Call Trace: [ 28.688088] [] scatterwalk_done+0x38/0x40 [ 28.688088] [] scatterwalk_done+0x38/0x40 [ 28.688088] [] blkcipher_walk_done+0x182/0x220 [ 28.688088] [] crypto_cbc_encrypt+0x15f/0x180 [ 28.688088] [] ? crypto_aes_set_key+0x30/0x30 [ 28.688088] [] ceph_aes_encrypt2+0x29c/0x2e0 [ 28.688088] [] ceph_encrypt2+0x93/0xb0 [ 28.688088] [] ceph_x_encrypt+0x4a/0x60 [ 28.688088] [] ? ceph_buffer_new+0x5d/0xf0 [ 28.688088] [] ceph_x_build_authorizer.isra.6+0x297/0x360 [ 28.688088] [] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11b/0x1c0 [ 28.688088] [] ? ceph_auth_create_authorizer+0x36/0x80 [ 28.688088] [] ceph_x_create_authorizer+0x63/0xd0 [ 28.688088] [] ceph_auth_create_authorizer+0x54/0x80 [ 28.688088] [] get_authorizer+0x80/0xd0 [ 28.688088] [] prepare_write_connect+0x18b/0x2b0 [ 28.688088] [] try_read+0x1e59/0x1f10 This is because we set up crypto scatterlists as if all buffers were kmalloc'ed. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: ceph-msgr workqueue needs a resque worker

2014-11-14T16:48:01Z

commit f9865f06f7f18c6661c88d0511f05c48612319cc upstream. Commit f363e45fd118 ("net/ceph: make ceph_msgr_wq non-reentrant") effectively removed WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag from ceph_msgr_wq. This is wrong - libceph is very much a memory reclaim path, so restore it. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Tested-by: Micha Krause Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: gracefully handle large reply messages from the mon

2014-09-17T16:04:02Z

commit 73c3d4812b4c755efeca0140f606f83772a39ce4 upstream. We preallocate a few of the message types we get back from the mon. If we get a larger message than we are expecting, fall back to trying to allocate a new one instead of blindly using the one we have. Signed-off-by: Sage Weil Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: rename ceph_msg::front_max to front_alloc_len

2014-09-17T16:04:02Z

commit 3cea4c3071d4e55e9d7356efe9d0ebf92f0c2204 upstream. Rename front_max field of struct ceph_msg to front_alloc_len to make its purpose more clear. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len

2014-09-17T16:04:01Z

commit c27a3e4d667fdcad3db7b104f75659478e0c68d8 upstream. We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at the point where we know how much is going to be needed. Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: add process_one_ticket() helper

2014-09-17T16:04:01Z

commit 597cda357716a3cf8d994cb11927af917c8d71fa upstream. Add a helper for processing individual cephx auth tickets. Needed for the next commit, which deals with allocating ticket buffers. (Most of the diff here is whitespace - view with git diff -b). Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: set last_piece in ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor_init() correctly

2014-09-17T16:04:01Z

commit 5f740d7e1531099b888410e6bab13f68da9b1a4d upstream. Determining ->last_piece based on the value of ->page_offset + length is incorrect because length here is the length of the entire message. ->last_piece set to false even if page array data item length is <= PAGE_SIZE, which results in invalid length passed to ceph_tcp_{send,recv}page() and causes various asserts to fire. # cat pages-cursor-init.sh #!/bin/bash rbd create --size 10 --image-format 2 foo FOO_DEV=$(rbd map foo) dd if=/dev/urandom of=$FOO_DEV bs=1M &>/dev/null rbd snap create foo@snap rbd snap protect foo@snap rbd clone foo@snap bar # rbd_resize calls librbd rbd_resize(), size is in bytes ./rbd_resize bar $(((4 << 20) + 512)) rbd resize --size 10 bar BAR_DEV=$(rbd map bar) # trigger a 512-byte copyup -- 512-byte page array data item dd if=/dev/urandom of=$BAR_DEV bs=1M count=1 seek=5 The problem exists only in ceph_msg_data_pages_cursor_init(), ceph_msg_data_pages_advance() does the right thing. The size_t cast is unnecessary. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Reviewed-by: Alex Elder Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman