<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/net/core, branch v4.4.119</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.119</id>
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<updated>2018-02-25T10:03:55Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>net: dst_cache_per_cpu_dst_set() can be static</title>
<updated>2018-02-25T10:03:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Wu Fengguang</name>
<email>fengguang.wu@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-18T15:27:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:554d660e4472a246ef7c98c247e43152badfa3f5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b73f96fcb49ec90c2f837719893e7b25fcdf08d8 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload on IS_ERR</title>
<updated>2018-02-25T10:03:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-12T16:39:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c1eb38748c284e318699ae2d35b53ef7308fcd9d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8d74e9f88d65af8bb2e095aff506aa6eac755ada upstream.

skb_warn_bad_offload warns when packets enter the GSO stack that
require skb_checksum_help or vice versa. Do not warn on arbitrary
bad packets. Packet sockets can craft many. Syzkaller was able to
demonstrate another one with eth_type games.

In particular, suppress the warning when segmentation returns an
error, which is for reasons other than checksum offload.

See also commit 36c92474498a ("net: WARN if skb_checksum_help() is
called on skb requiring segmentation") for context on this warning.

Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add dst_cache support</title>
<updated>2018-02-25T10:03:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Abeni</name>
<email>pabeni@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-12T14:43:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d365b297433cf2969fa94f243d7afddc073c7bf1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 911362c70df5b766c243dc297fadeaced786ffd8 upstream.

This patch add a generic, lockless dst cache implementation.
The need for lock is avoided updating the dst cache fields
only in per cpu scope, and requiring that the cache manipulation
functions are invoked with the local bh disabled.

The refresh_ts and reset_ts fields are used to ensure the cache
consistency in case of cuncurrent cache update (dst_cache_set*) and
reset operation (dst_cache_reset).

Consider the following scenario:

CPU1:                                   	CPU2:
  &lt;cache lookup with emtpy cache: it fails&gt;
  &lt;get dst via uncached route lookup&gt;
						&lt;related configuration changes&gt;
                                        	dst_cache_reset()
  dst_cache_set()

The dst entry set passed to dst_cache_set() should not be used
for later dst cache lookup, because it's obtained using old
configuration values.

Since the refresh_ts is updated only on dst_cache lookup, the
cached value in the above scenario will be discarded on the next
lookup.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-and-acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Manoj Boopathi Raj &lt;manojboopathi@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix 32-bit divide by zero</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:04:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-30T02:37:45Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:02662601a231f8721930168ce71d84bcfb8d9a96</id>
<content type='text'>
[ upstream commit 68fda450a7df51cff9e5a4d4a4d9d0d5f2589153 ]

due to some JITs doing if (src_reg == 0) check in 64-bit mode
for div/mod operations mask upper 32-bits of src register
before doing the check

Fixes: 622582786c9e ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT")
Fixes: 7a12b5031c6b ("sparc64: Add eBPF JIT.")
Reported-by: syzbot+48340bb518e88849e2e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:04:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-30T02:37:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:28c486744e6de4d882a1d853aa63d99fcba4b7a6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ upstream commit 290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb ]

The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.

A quote from goolge project zero blog:
"At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in
the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading
from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result
appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an
attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together
and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying.
So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into
the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside
a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient
to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."

To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode.
So far eBPF JIT is supported by:
x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64

The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only.
In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden

v2-&gt;v3:
- move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)

v1-&gt;v2:
- fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback)
- fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback)
- add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog-&gt;bpf_func
- retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk.
  It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next

Considered doing:
  int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT;
but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove
bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place
and remove this jit_init() function.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>flow_dissector: properly cap thoff field</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T11:06:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-17T22:21:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d35cd5e279881ec36ff8cd82a2d9caebc0cce3fc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d0c081b49137cd3200f2023c0875723be66e7ce5 ]

syzbot reported yet another crash [1] that is caused by
insufficient validation of DODGY packets.

Two bugs are happening here to trigger the crash.

1) Flow dissection leaves with incorrect thoff field.

2) skb_probe_transport_header() sets transport header to this invalid
thoff, even if pointing after skb valid data.

3) qdisc_pkt_len_init() reads out-of-bound data because it
trusts tcp_hdrlen(skb)

Possible fixes :

- Full flow dissector validation before injecting bad DODGY packets in
the stack.
 This approach was attempted here : https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/
861874/

- Have more robust functions in the core.
  This might be needed anyway for stable versions.

This patch fixes the flow dissection issue.

[1]
CPU: 1 PID: 3144 Comm: syzkaller271204 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc4-mm1+ #49
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:355 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x23b/0x360 mm/kasan/report.c:413
 __asan_report_load2_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:432
 __tcp_hdrlen include/linux/tcp.h:35 [inline]
 tcp_hdrlen include/linux/tcp.h:40 [inline]
 qdisc_pkt_len_init net/core/dev.c:3160 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x20d3/0x2200 net/core/dev.c:3465
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3554
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2943 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x3ad5/0x60a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:2968
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:628 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:638
 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:907
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1776 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline]
 __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482
 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544
 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline]
 SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

Fixes: 34fad54c2537 ("net: __skb_flow_dissect() must cap its return value")
Fixes: a6e544b0a88b ("flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Allow neigh contructor functions ability to modify the primary_key</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T11:06:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jim Westfall</name>
<email>jwestfall@surrealistic.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-14T12:18:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:29837a4a8764c1b73674eb78c99717cbc73aa9f3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 096b9854c04df86f03b38a97d40b6506e5730919 ]

Use n-&gt;primary_key instead of pkey to account for the possibility that a neigh
constructor function may have modified the primary_key value.

Signed-off-by: Jim Westfall &lt;jwestfall@surrealistic.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: qdisc_pkt_len_init() should be more robust</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T11:06:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-19T03:59:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f50fc5f4f3e5f0d2b55cd09c01f3a09d0ddeb9dc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7c68d1a6b4db9012790af7ac0f0fdc0d2083422a ]

Without proper validation of DODGY packets, we might very well
feed qdisc_pkt_len_init() with invalid GSO packets.

tcp_hdrlen() might access out-of-bound data, so let's use
skb_header_pointer() and proper checks.

Whole story is described in commit d0c081b49137 ("flow_dissector:
properly cap thoff field")

We have the goal of validating DODGY packets earlier in the stack,
so we might very well revert this fix in the future.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+9da69ebac7dddd804552@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: core: fix module type in sock_diag_bind</title>
<updated>2018-01-17T08:35:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Vladyka</name>
<email>tulup@mail.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-04T11:09:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d19b5ed46cce475fa8cae56aba8eadf794a1f090</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b8fd0823e0770c2d5fdbd865bccf0d5e058e5287 ]

Use AF_INET6 instead of AF_INET in IPv6-related code path

Signed-off-by: Andrii Vladyka &lt;tulup@mail.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sock: free skb in skb_complete_tx_timestamp on error</title>
<updated>2018-01-02T19:33:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-13T19:41:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3f54a6d41d443117cb4e077b2a064b430f9fc7c8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 35b99dffc3f710cafceee6c8c6ac6a98eb2cb4bf ]

skb_complete_tx_timestamp must ingest the skb it is passed. Call
kfree_skb if the skb cannot be enqueued.

Fixes: b245be1f4db1 ("net-timestamp: no-payload only sysctl")
Fixes: 9ac25fc06375 ("net: fix socket refcounting in skb_complete_tx_timestamp()")
Reported-by: Richard Cochran &lt;richardcochran@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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