<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/net/ipv6, branch v5.15.19</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.15.19</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.15.19'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2022-02-01T16:27:14Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Revert "ipv6: Honor all IPv6 PIO Valid Lifetime values"</title>
<updated>2022-02-01T16:27:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Guillaume Nault</name>
<email>gnault@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-26T15:38:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e406345f8a26af5963936bc3aca32534adc30f16'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e406345f8a26af5963936bc3aca32534adc30f16</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 36268983e90316b37000a005642af42234dabb36 ]

This reverts commit b75326c201242de9495ff98e5d5cff41d7fc0d9d.

This commit breaks Linux compatibility with USGv6 tests. The RFC this
commit was based on is actually an expired draft: no published RFC
currently allows the new behaviour it introduced.

Without full IETF endorsement, the flash renumbering scenario this
patch was supposed to enable is never going to work, as other IPv6
equipements on the same LAN will keep the 2 hours limit.

Fixes: b75326c20124 ("ipv6: Honor all IPv6 PIO Valid Lifetime values")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;gnault@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: annotate accesses to fn-&gt;fn_sernum</title>
<updated>2022-02-01T16:27:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-20T17:41:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fe36a67e82c846eeaceeae2b6c281ccab2e8239a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fe36a67e82c846eeaceeae2b6c281ccab2e8239a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aafc2e3285c2d7a79b7ee15221c19fbeca7b1509 upstream.

struct fib6_node's fn_sernum field can be
read while other threads change it.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Do not change existing smp barriers in fib6_get_cookie_safe()
and __fib6_update_sernum_upto_root()

syzbot reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in fib6_clean_node / inet6_csk_route_socket

write to 0xffff88813df62e2c of 4 bytes by task 1920 on cpu 1:
 fib6_clean_node+0xc2/0x260 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2178
 fib6_walk_continue+0x38e/0x430 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2112
 fib6_walk net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2160 [inline]
 fib6_clean_tree net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2240 [inline]
 __fib6_clean_all+0x1a9/0x2e0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2256
 fib6_flush_trees+0x6c/0x80 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2281
 rt_genid_bump_ipv6 include/net/net_namespace.h:488 [inline]
 addrconf_dad_completed+0x57f/0x870 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4230
 addrconf_dad_work+0x908/0x1170
 process_one_work+0x3f6/0x960 kernel/workqueue.c:2307
 worker_thread+0x616/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2454
 kthread+0x1bf/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:359
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

read to 0xffff88813df62e2c of 4 bytes by task 15701 on cpu 0:
 fib6_get_cookie_safe include/net/ip6_fib.h:285 [inline]
 rt6_get_cookie include/net/ip6_fib.h:306 [inline]
 ip6_dst_store include/net/ip6_route.h:234 [inline]
 inet6_csk_route_socket+0x352/0x3c0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:109
 inet6_csk_xmit+0x91/0x1e0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:121
 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1323/0x1840 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1402
 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1420 [inline]
 tcp_write_xmit+0x1450/0x4460 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2680
 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x68/0x1c0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2864
 tcp_push+0x2d9/0x2f0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:725
 mptcp_push_release net/mptcp/protocol.c:1491 [inline]
 __mptcp_push_pending+0x46c/0x490 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1578
 mptcp_sendmsg+0x9ec/0xa50 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1764
 inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:643
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline]
 kernel_sendmsg+0x97/0xd0 net/socket.c:745
 sock_no_sendpage+0x84/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:3086
 inet_sendpage+0x9d/0xc0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:834
 kernel_sendpage+0x187/0x200 net/socket.c:3492
 sock_sendpage+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1007
 pipe_to_sendpage+0x128/0x160 fs/splice.c:364
 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:418 [inline]
 __splice_from_pipe+0x207/0x500 fs/splice.c:562
 splice_from_pipe fs/splice.c:597 [inline]
 generic_splice_sendpage+0x94/0xd0 fs/splice.c:746
 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:767 [inline]
 direct_splice_actor+0x80/0xa0 fs/splice.c:936
 splice_direct_to_actor+0x345/0x650 fs/splice.c:891
 do_splice_direct+0x106/0x190 fs/splice.c:979
 do_sendfile+0x675/0xc40 fs/read_write.c:1245
 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1310 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1296 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x102/0x140 fs/read_write.c:1296
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000026f -&gt; 0x00000271

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 15701 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

The Fixes tag I chose is probably arbitrary, I do not think
we need to backport this patch to older kernels.

Fixes: c5cff8561d2d ("ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220120174112.1126644-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6_tunnel: Rate limit warning messages</title>
<updated>2022-02-01T16:27:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-20T08:05:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=88e32f7b37a0fce0aa6ee97f5fe546c3f2c0e21c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:88e32f7b37a0fce0aa6ee97f5fe546c3f2c0e21c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6cee105e7f2ced596373951d9ea08dacc3883c68 upstream.

The warning messages can be invoked from the data path for every packet
transmitted through an ip6gre netdev, leading to high CPU utilization.

Fix that by rate limiting the messages.

Fixes: 09c6bbf090ec ("[IPV6]: Do mandatory IPv6 tunnel endpoint checks in realtime")
Reported-by: Maksym Yaremchuk &lt;maksymy@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Maksym Yaremchuk &lt;maksymy@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amit Cohen &lt;amcohen@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: fix policy lookup for ipv6 gre packets</title>
<updated>2022-01-27T10:05:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ghalem Boudour</name>
<email>ghalem.boudour@6wind.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-19T17:20:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=491c3ae9fbb6eecdc880aef608d35f28fc7481d3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:491c3ae9fbb6eecdc880aef608d35f28fc7481d3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bcf141b2eb551b3477b24997ebc09c65f117a803 upstream.

On egress side, xfrm lookup is called from __gre6_xmit() with the
fl6_gre_key field not initialized leading to policies selectors check
failure. Consequently, gre packets are sent without encryption.

On ingress side, INET6_PROTO_NOPOLICY was set, thus packets were not
checked against xfrm policies. Like for egress side, fl6_gre_key should be
correctly set, this is now done in decode_session6().

Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ghalem Boudour &lt;ghalem.boudour@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp6: Use Segment Routing Header for dest address if present</title>
<updated>2022-01-27T10:05:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Lunn</name>
<email>andrew@lunn.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-03T17:11:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=591a1e2ef0f11cb37fb8ebb6479885229425e784'/>
<id>urn:sha1:591a1e2ef0f11cb37fb8ebb6479885229425e784</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 222a011efc839ca1f51bf89fe7a2b3705fa55ccd ]

When finding the socket to report an error on, if the invoking packet
is using Segment Routing, the IPv6 destination address is that of an
intermediate router, not the end destination. Extract the ultimate
destination address from the segment address.

This change allows traceroute to function in the presence of Segment
Routing.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn &lt;andrew@lunn.ch&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>icmp: ICMPV6: Examine invoking packet for Segment Route Headers.</title>
<updated>2022-01-27T10:05:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Lunn</name>
<email>andrew@lunn.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-03T17:11:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=af58dbc08ea3e736a47394da75d9c849a18e606c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:af58dbc08ea3e736a47394da75d9c849a18e606c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e41294408c56c68ea0f269d757527bf33b39118a ]

RFC8754 says:

ICMP error packets generated within the SR domain are sent to source
nodes within the SR domain.  The invoking packet in the ICMP error
message may contain an SRH.  Since the destination address of a packet
with an SRH changes as each segment is processed, it may not be the
destination used by the socket or application that generated the
invoking packet.

For the source of an invoking packet to process the ICMP error
message, the ultimate destination address of the IPv6 header may be
required.  The following logic is used to determine the destination
address for use by protocol-error handlers.

*  Walk all extension headers of the invoking IPv6 packet to the
   routing extension header preceding the upper-layer header.

   -  If routing header is type 4 Segment Routing Header (SRH)

      o  The SID at Segment List[0] may be used as the destination
         address of the invoking packet.

Mangle the skb so the network header points to the invoking packet
inside the ICMP packet. The seg6 helpers can then be used on the skb
to find any segment routing headers. If found, mark this fact in the
IPv6 control block of the skb, and store the offset into the packet of
the SRH. Then restore the skb back to its old state.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn &lt;andrew@lunn.ch&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seg6: export get_srh() for ICMP handling</title>
<updated>2022-01-27T10:05:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Lunn</name>
<email>andrew@lunn.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-03T17:11:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=85b3b307471ef1f9fa093ada115a67373952b6ac'/>
<id>urn:sha1:85b3b307471ef1f9fa093ada115a67373952b6ac</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fa55a7d745de2d10489295b0674a403e2a5d490d ]

An ICMP error message can contain in its message body part of an IPv6
packet which invoked the error. Such a packet might contain a segment
router header. Export get_srh() so the ICMP code can make use of it.

Since his changes the scope of the function from local to global, add
the seg6_ prefix to keep the namespace clean. And move it into seg6.c
so it is always available, not just when IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn &lt;andrew@lunn.ch&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: raw: check passed optlen before reading</title>
<updated>2022-01-11T14:35:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tamir Duberstein</name>
<email>tamird@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-29T20:09:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ec33da9ae07227fe322f56b2b747652a910c6e8f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ec33da9ae07227fe322f56b2b747652a910c6e8f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fb7bc9204095090731430c8921f9e629740c110a ]

Add a check that the user-provided option is at least as long as the
number of bytes we intend to read. Before this patch we would blindly
read sizeof(int) bytes even in cases where the user passed
optlen&lt;sizeof(int), which would potentially read garbage or fault.

Discovered by new tests in https://github.com/google/gvisor/pull/6957 .

The original get_user call predates history in the git repo.

Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein &lt;tamird@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211229200947.2862255-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip6_vti: initialize __ip6_tnl_parm struct in vti6_siocdevprivate</title>
<updated>2022-01-11T14:35:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>William Zhao</name>
<email>wizhao@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-23T17:33:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=294f3fc9dc2721481a0cbea56a69fbd399d0f162'/>
<id>urn:sha1:294f3fc9dc2721481a0cbea56a69fbd399d0f162</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c1833c3964d5bd8c163bd4e01736a38bc473cb8a ]

The "__ip6_tnl_parm" struct was left uninitialized causing an invalid
load of random data when the "__ip6_tnl_parm" struct was used elsewhere.
As an example, in the function "ip6_tnl_xmit_ctl()", it tries to access
the "collect_md" member. With "__ip6_tnl_parm" being uninitialized and
containing random data, the UBSAN detected that "collect_md" held a
non-boolean value.

The UBSAN issue is as follows:
===============================================================
UBSAN: invalid-load in net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1025:14
load of value 30 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
CPU: 1 PID: 228 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4+ #8
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
Call Trace:
&lt;TASK&gt;
dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x57
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
__ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x66/0x70
? __cpuhp_setup_state+0x1d3/0x210
ip6_tnl_xmit_ctl.cold.52+0x2c/0x6f [ip6_tunnel]
vti6_tnl_xmit+0x79c/0x1e96 [ip6_vti]
? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130
? vti6_rcv+0x100/0x100 [ip6_vti]
? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130
? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xc0/0xc0
? lock_acquired+0x262/0xb10
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1e6/0x820
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2079/0x3340
? mark_lock.part.52+0xf7/0x1050
? netdev_core_pick_tx+0x290/0x290
? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
? sched_clock_cpu+0x15/0x200
? find_held_lock+0x3a/0x1c0
? lock_release+0x42f/0xc90
? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
? mark_held_locks+0xb7/0x120
? neigh_connected_output+0x31f/0x470
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100
? neigh_connected_output+0x31f/0x470
? ip6_finish_output2+0x9b0/0x1d90
? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x62/0xc0
? ip6_finish_output2+0x9b0/0x1d90
ip6_finish_output2+0x9b0/0x1d90
? ip6_append_data+0x330/0x330
? ip6_mtu+0x166/0x370
? __ip6_finish_output+0x1ad/0xfb0
? nf_hook_slow+0xa6/0x170
ip6_output+0x1fb/0x710
? nf_hook.constprop.32+0x317/0x430
? ip6_finish_output+0x180/0x180
? __ip6_finish_output+0xfb0/0xfb0
? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130
ndisc_send_skb+0xb33/0x1590
? __sk_mem_raise_allocated+0x11cf/0x1560
? dst_output+0x4a0/0x4a0
? ndisc_send_rs+0x432/0x610
addrconf_dad_completed+0x30c/0xbb0
? addrconf_rs_timer+0x650/0x650
? addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0
addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0
? addrconf_dad_completed+0xbb0/0xbb0
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xaf/0xe0
? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xc0/0xc0
process_one_work+0x97b/0x1740
? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x270/0x270
worker_thread+0x87/0xbf0
? process_one_work+0x1740/0x1740
kthread+0x3ac/0x490
? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
&lt;/TASK&gt;
===============================================================

The solution is to initialize "__ip6_tnl_parm" struct to zeros in the
"vti6_siocdevprivate()" function.

Signed-off-by: William Zhao &lt;wizhao@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Do cleanup if attribute validation fails in multipath route</title>
<updated>2022-01-11T14:35:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Ahern</name>
<email>dsahern@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-03T17:05:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8a7520c49994ab1d43221e6445252e9fad0b3391'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a7520c49994ab1d43221e6445252e9fad0b3391</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 95bdba23b5b4aa75fe3e6c84335e638641c707bb ]

As Nicolas noted, if gateway validation fails walking the multipath
attribute the code should jump to the cleanup to free previously
allocated memory.

Fixes: 1ff15a710a86 ("ipv6: Check attribute length for RTA_GATEWAY when deleting multipath route")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220103170555.94638-1-dsahern@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
