<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/net/netlink, branch v5.10.212</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.212</id>
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<updated>2024-03-06T14:37:48Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>netlink: Fix kernel-infoleak-after-free in __skb_datagram_iter</title>
<updated>2024-03-06T14:37:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryosuke Yasuoka</name>
<email>ryasuoka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-21T07:40:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f19d1f98e60e68b11fc60839105dd02a30ec0d77'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f19d1f98e60e68b11fc60839105dd02a30ec0d77</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 661779e1fcafe1b74b3f3fe8e980c1e207fea1fd ]

syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1]:

netlink_to_full_skb() creates a new `skb` and puts the `skb-&gt;data`
passed as a 1st arg of netlink_to_full_skb() onto new `skb`. The data
size is specified as `len` and passed to skb_put_data(). This `len`
is based on `skb-&gt;end` that is not data offset but buffer offset. The
`skb-&gt;end` contains data and tailroom. Since the tailroom is not
initialized when the new `skb` created, KMSAN detects uninitialized
memory area when copying the data.

This patch resolved this issue by correct the len from `skb-&gt;end` to
`skb-&gt;len`, which is the actual data offset.

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in _copy_to_iter+0x364/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:186
 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
 copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]
 iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]
 iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]
 iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]
 _copy_to_iter+0x364/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:186
 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:197 [inline]
 simple_copy_to_iter+0x68/0xa0 net/core/datagram.c:532
 __skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0xdc0 net/core/datagram.c:420
 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:546
 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3960 [inline]
 packet_recvmsg+0xd9c/0x2000 net/packet/af_packet.c:3482
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1066 [inline]
 sock_read_iter+0x467/0x580 net/socket.c:1136
 call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2014 [inline]
 new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:389 [inline]
 vfs_read+0x8f6/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:470
 ksys_read+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:613
 __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:623 [inline]
 __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:621 [inline]
 __x64_sys_read+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:621
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 skb_put_data include/linux/skbuff.h:2622 [inline]
 netlink_to_full_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:181 [inline]
 __netlink_deliver_tap_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:298 [inline]
 __netlink_deliver_tap+0x5be/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:325
 netlink_deliver_tap net/netlink/af_netlink.c:338 [inline]
 netlink_deliver_tap_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:347 [inline]
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x10f1/0x1250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1368
 netlink_sendmsg+0x1238/0x13d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1910
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Uninit was created at:
 free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1087 [inline]
 free_unref_page_prepare+0xb0/0xa40 mm/page_alloc.c:2347
 free_unref_page_list+0xeb/0x1100 mm/page_alloc.c:2533
 release_pages+0x23d3/0x2410 mm/swap.c:1042
 free_pages_and_swap_cache+0xd9/0xf0 mm/swap_state.c:316
 tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:98 [inline]
 tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:293 [inline]
 tlb_flush_mmu+0x6f5/0x980 mm/mmu_gather.c:300
 tlb_finish_mmu+0x101/0x260 mm/mmu_gather.c:392
 exit_mmap+0x49e/0xd30 mm/mmap.c:3321
 __mmput+0x13f/0x530 kernel/fork.c:1349
 mmput+0x8a/0xa0 kernel/fork.c:1371
 exit_mm+0x1b8/0x360 kernel/exit.c:567
 do_exit+0xd57/0x4080 kernel/exit.c:858
 do_group_exit+0x2fd/0x390 kernel/exit.c:1021
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3c/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1030
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Bytes 3852-3903 of 3904 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 3904 starts at ffff88812ea1e000
Data copied to user address 0000000020003280

CPU: 1 PID: 5043 Comm: syz-executor297 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5-syzkaller-00047-g5bd7ef53ffe5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023

Fixes: 1853c9496460 ("netlink, mmap: transform mmap skb into full skb on taps")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+34ad5fab48f7bf510349@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=34ad5fab48f7bf510349 [1]
Signed-off-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka &lt;ryasuoka@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240221074053.1794118-1-ryasuoka@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: fix potential sleeping issue in mqueue_flush_file</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:41:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhengchao Shao</name>
<email>shaozhengchao@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-22T01:18:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=be8d1f619ea3576d6eeca4d4eadbac1e7f8a17ad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:be8d1f619ea3576d6eeca4d4eadbac1e7f8a17ad</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 234ec0b6034b16869d45128b8cd2dc6ffe596f04 ]

I analyze the potential sleeping issue of the following processes:
Thread A                                Thread B
...                                     netlink_create  //ref = 1
do_mq_notify                            ...
  sock = netlink_getsockbyfilp          ...     //ref = 2
  info-&gt;notify_sock = sock;             ...
...                                     netlink_sendmsg
...                                       skb = netlink_alloc_large_skb  //skb-&gt;head is vmalloced
...                                       netlink_unicast
...                                         sk = netlink_getsockbyportid //ref = 3
...                                         netlink_sendskb
...                                           __netlink_sendskb
...                                             skb_queue_tail //put skb to sk_receive_queue
...                                         sock_put //ref = 2
...                                     ...
...                                     netlink_release
...                                       deferred_put_nlk_sk //ref = 1
mqueue_flush_file
  spin_lock
  remove_notification
    netlink_sendskb
      sock_put  //ref = 0
        sk_free
          ...
          __sk_destruct
            netlink_sock_destruct
              skb_queue_purge  //get skb from sk_receive_queue
                ...
                __skb_queue_purge_reason
                  kfree_skb_reason
                    __kfree_skb
                    ...
                    skb_release_all
                      skb_release_head_state
                        netlink_skb_destructor
                          vfree(skb-&gt;head)  //sleeping while holding spinlock

In netlink_sendmsg, if the memory pointed to by skb-&gt;head is allocated by
vmalloc, and is put to sk_receive_queue queue, also the skb is not freed.
When the mqueue executes flush, the sleeping bug will occur. Use
vfree_atomic instead of vfree in netlink_skb_destructor to solve the issue.

Fixes: c05cdb1b864f ("netlink: allow large data transfers from user-space")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao &lt;shaozhengchao@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240122011807.2110357-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drop_monitor: Require 'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' when joining "events" group</title>
<updated>2023-12-13T17:27:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-11T12:37:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e844a9309f517c2b4c2a8a4a5ebfc31f0d6648c6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e844a9309f517c2b4c2a8a4a5ebfc31f0d6648c6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e03781879a0d524ce3126678d50a80484a513c4b upstream.

The "NET_DM" generic netlink family notifies drop locations over the
"events" multicast group. This is problematic since by default generic
netlink allows non-root users to listen to these notifications.

Fix by adding a new field to the generic netlink multicast group
structure that when set prevents non-root users or root without the
'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' capability (in the user namespace owning the network
namespace) from joining the group. Set this field for the "events"
group. Use 'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' rather than 'CAP_NET_ADMIN' because of the
nature of the information that is shared over this group.

Note that the capability check in this case will always be performed
against the initial user namespace since the family is not netns aware
and only operates in the initial network namespace.

A new field is added to the structure rather than using the "flags"
field because the existing field uses uAPI flags and it is inappropriate
to add a new uAPI flag for an internal kernel check. In net-next we can
rework the "flags" field to use internal flags and fold the new field
into it. But for now, in order to reduce the amount of changes, add a
new field.

Since the information can only be consumed by root, mark the control
plane operations that start and stop the tracing as root-only using the
'GENL_ADMIN_PERM' flag.

Tested using [1].

Before:

 # capsh -- -c ./dm_repo
 # capsh --drop=cap_sys_admin -- -c ./dm_repo

After:

 # capsh -- -c ./dm_repo
 # capsh --drop=cap_sys_admin -- -c ./dm_repo
 Failed to join "events" multicast group

[1]
 $ cat dm.c
 #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
 #include &lt;netlink/genl/ctrl.h&gt;
 #include &lt;netlink/genl/genl.h&gt;
 #include &lt;netlink/socket.h&gt;

 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct nl_sock *sk;
 	int grp, err;

 	sk = nl_socket_alloc();
 	if (!sk) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate socket\n");
 		return -1;
 	}

 	err = genl_connect(sk);
 	if (err) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect socket\n");
 		return err;
 	}

 	grp = genl_ctrl_resolve_grp(sk, "NET_DM", "events");
 	if (grp &lt; 0) {
 		fprintf(stderr,
 			"Failed to resolve \"events\" multicast group\n");
 		return grp;
 	}

 	err = nl_socket_add_memberships(sk, grp, NFNLGRP_NONE);
 	if (err) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to join \"events\" multicast group\n");
 		return err;
 	}

 	return 0;
 }
 $ gcc -I/usr/include/libnl3 -lnl-3 -lnl-genl-3 -o dm_repo dm.c

Fixes: 9a8afc8d3962 ("Network Drop Monitor: Adding drop monitor implementation &amp; Netlink protocol")
Reported-by: "The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)" &lt;security@ncsc.gov.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller &lt;jacob.e.keller@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206213102.1824398-3-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>genetlink: add CAP_NET_ADMIN test for multicast bind</title>
<updated>2023-12-13T17:27:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-11T12:37:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=015870c10c45902882d2d4adad17f162df144104'/>
<id>urn:sha1:015870c10c45902882d2d4adad17f162df144104</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a partial backport of upstream commit 4d54cc32112d ("mptcp:
avoid lock_fast usage in accept path"). It is only a partial backport
because the patch in the link below was erroneously squash-merged into
upstream commit 4d54cc32112d ("mptcp: avoid lock_fast usage in accept
path"). Below is the original patch description from Florian Westphal:

"
genetlink sets NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV for its netlink socket so anyone can
subscribe to multicast messages.

rtnetlink doesn't allow this unconditionally,  rtnetlink_bind() restricts
bind requests to CAP_NET_ADMIN for a few groups.

This allows to set GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM flag on genl mcast groups to
mandate CAP_NET_ADMIN.

This will be used by the upcoming mptcp netlink event facility which
exposes the token (mptcp connection identifier) to userspace.
"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/20210213000001.379332-8-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: don't call -&gt;netlink_bind with table lock held</title>
<updated>2023-12-13T17:27:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-11T12:37:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=df6cb4c43098dfa5ebb3cd478d4b6e5155addc4d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:df6cb4c43098dfa5ebb3cd478d4b6e5155addc4d</id>
<content type='text'>
From: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;

commit f2764bd4f6a8dffaec3e220728385d9756b3c2cb upstream.

When I added support to allow generic netlink multicast groups to be
restricted to subscribers with CAP_NET_ADMIN I was unaware that a
genl_bind implementation already existed in the past.

It was reverted due to ABBA deadlock:

1. -&gt;netlink_bind gets called with the table lock held.
2. genetlink bind callback is invoked, it grabs the genl lock.

But when a new genl subsystem is (un)registered, these two locks are
taken in reverse order.

One solution would be to revert again and add a comment in genl
referring 1e82a62fec613, "genetlink: remove genl_bind").

This would need a second change in mptcp to not expose the raw token
value anymore, e.g.  by hashing the token with a secret key so userspace
can still associate subflow events with the correct mptcp connection.

However, Paolo Abeni reminded me to double-check why the netlink table is
locked in the first place.

I can't find one.  netlink_bind() is already called without this lock
when userspace joins a group via NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP setsockopt.
Same holds for the netlink_unbind operation.

Digging through the history, commit f773608026ee1
("netlink: access nlk groups safely in netlink bind and getname")
expanded the lock scope.

commit 3a20773beeeeade ("net: netlink: cap max groups which will be considered in netlink_bind()")
... removed the nlk-&gt;ngroups access that the lock scope
extension was all about.

Reduce the lock scope again and always call -&gt;netlink_bind without
the table lock.

The Fixes tag should be vs. the patch mentioned in the link below,
but that one got squash-merged into the patch that came earlier in the
series.

Fixes: 4d54cc32112d8d ("mptcp: avoid lock_fast usage in accept path")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/20210213000001.379332-8-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com/T/#u
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Sean Tranchetti &lt;stranche@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: Add __sock_i_ino() for __netlink_diag_dump().</title>
<updated>2023-07-27T06:43:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-26T16:43:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:472a615e66b9b4c7d631f8d493553f035c9d96de</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 25a9c8a4431c364f97f75558cb346d2ad3f53fbb ]

syzbot reported a warning in __local_bh_enable_ip(). [0]

Commit 8d61f926d420 ("netlink: fix potential deadlock in
netlink_set_err()") converted read_lock(&amp;nl_table_lock) to
read_lock_irqsave() in __netlink_diag_dump() to prevent a deadlock.

However, __netlink_diag_dump() calls sock_i_ino() that uses
read_lock_bh() and read_unlock_bh().  If CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=y,
read_unlock_bh() finally enables IRQ even though it should stay
disabled until the following read_unlock_irqrestore().

Using read_lock() in sock_i_ino() would trigger a lockdep splat
in another place that was fixed in commit f064af1e500a ("net: fix
a lockdep splat"), so let's add __sock_i_ino() that would be safe
to use under BH disabled.

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5012 at kernel/softirq.c:376 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xbe/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:376
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 5012 Comm: syz-executor487 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-syzkaller-00202-g6f68fc395f49 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
RIP: 0010:__local_bh_enable_ip+0xbe/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:376
Code: 45 bf 01 00 00 00 e8 91 5b 0a 00 e8 3c 15 3d 00 fb 65 8b 05 ec e9 b5 7e 85 c0 74 58 5b 5d c3 65 8b 05 b2 b6 b4 7e 85 c0 75 a2 &lt;0f&gt; 0b eb 9e e8 89 15 3d 00 eb 9f 48 89 ef e8 6f 49 18 00 eb a8 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a1f3d0 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000201 RCX: 1ffffffff1cf5996
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: ffffffff8805c6f3
RBP: ffffffff8805c6f3 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880152b03a3
R10: ffffed1002a56074 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 00000000000073e4
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000555556726300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 000000007c646000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 sock_i_ino+0x83/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2559
 __netlink_diag_dump+0x45c/0x790 net/netlink/diag.c:171
 netlink_diag_dump+0xd6/0x230 net/netlink/diag.c:207
 netlink_dump+0x570/0xc50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269
 __netlink_dump_start+0x64b/0x910 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2374
 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:329 [inline]
 netlink_diag_handler_dump+0x1ae/0x250 net/netlink/diag.c:238
 __sock_diag_cmd net/core/sock_diag.c:238 [inline]
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x31e/0x440 net/core/sock_diag.c:269
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2547
 sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x547/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
 netlink_sendmsg+0x925/0xe30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1914
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 net/socket.c:747
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x71c/0x900 net/socket.c:2503
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2557
 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2586
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f5303aaabb9
Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc7506e548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5303aaabb9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f5303a6ed60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f5303a6edf0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Fixes: 8d61f926d420 ("netlink: fix potential deadlock in netlink_set_err()")
Reported-by: syzbot+5da61cf6a9bc1902d422@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5da61cf6a9bc1902d422
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230626164313.52528-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: fix potential deadlock in netlink_set_err()</title>
<updated>2023-07-27T06:43:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-21T15:43:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=cde7b90e0539a3b11da377e463dfd2288a162dbf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cde7b90e0539a3b11da377e463dfd2288a162dbf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8d61f926d42045961e6b65191c09e3678d86a9cf ]

syzbot reported a possible deadlock in netlink_set_err() [1]

A similar issue was fixed in commit 1d482e666b8e ("netlink: disable IRQs
for netlink_lock_table()") in netlink_lock_table()

This patch adds IRQ safety to netlink_set_err() and __netlink_diag_dump()
which were not covered by cited commit.

[1]

WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00240-g4e9f0ec38852 #0 Not tainted

syz-executor.2/23011 just changed the state of lock:
ffffffff8e1a7a58 (nl_table_lock){.+.?}-{2:2}, at: netlink_set_err+0x2e/0x3a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1612
but this lock was taken by another, SOFTIRQ-safe lock in the past:
 (&amp;local-&gt;queue_stop_reason_lock){..-.}-{2:2}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(nl_table_lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(&amp;local-&gt;queue_stop_reason_lock);
                               lock(nl_table_lock);
  &lt;Interrupt&gt;
    lock(&amp;local-&gt;queue_stop_reason_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

Fixes: 1d482e666b8e ("netlink: disable IRQs for netlink_lock_table()")
Reported-by: syzbot+a7d200a347f912723e5c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a7d200a347f912723e5c
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000e38d1605fea5747e@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230621154337.1668594-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/netlink: fix NETLINK_LIST_MEMBERSHIPS length report</title>
<updated>2023-06-09T08:30:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pedro Tammela</name>
<email>pctammela@mojatatu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-29T15:33:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=57e6c54034274ebdcf617bf3eb67fc4a617c09f2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:57e6c54034274ebdcf617bf3eb67fc4a617c09f2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f4e4534850a9d18c250a93f8d7fbb51310828110 ]

The current code for the length calculation wrongly truncates the reported
length of the groups array, causing an under report of the subscribed
groups. To fix this, use 'BITS_TO_BYTES()' which rounds up the
division by 8.

Fixes: b42be38b2778 ("netlink: add API to retrieve all group memberships")
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela &lt;pctammela@mojatatu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@corigine.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230529153335.389815-1-pctammela@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: annotate accesses to nlk-&gt;cb_running</title>
<updated>2023-05-30T11:57:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-09T16:56:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f92557f79a60cb142258f5fa7194f327573fadd8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f92557f79a60cb142258f5fa7194f327573fadd8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a939d14919b799e6fff8a9c80296ca229ba2f8a4 ]

Both netlink_recvmsg() and netlink_native_seq_show() read
nlk-&gt;cb_running locklessly. Use READ_ONCE() there.

Add corresponding WRITE_ONCE() to netlink_dump() and
__netlink_dump_start()

syzbot reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __netlink_dump_start / netlink_recvmsg

write to 0xffff88813ea4db59 of 1 bytes by task 28219 on cpu 0:
__netlink_dump_start+0x3af/0x4d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2399
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:308 [inline]
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x70f/0x8c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6130
netlink_rcv_skb+0x126/0x220 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2577
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6192
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x56f/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
netlink_sendmsg+0x665/0x770 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1942
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x1aa/0x230 net/socket.c:1138
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1851 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x463/0x760 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0xeb/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:637
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x42/0x50 fs/read_write.c:646
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

read to 0xffff88813ea4db59 of 1 bytes by task 28222 on cpu 1:
netlink_recvmsg+0x3b4/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2022
sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x4c/0x80 net/socket.c:1017
____sys_recvmsg+0x2db/0x310 net/socket.c:2718
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x2e5/0x710 net/socket.c:2856
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:2951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

value changed: 0x00 -&gt; 0x01

Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: Use copy_to_user() for optval in netlink_getsockopt().</title>
<updated>2023-05-17T09:47:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-21T18:52:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b978d22fa122182829be681a5dfebaf4cff592a1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b978d22fa122182829be681a5dfebaf4cff592a1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d913d32cc2707e9cd24fe6fa6d7d470e9c728980 ]

Brad Spencer provided a detailed report [0] that when calling getsockopt()
for AF_NETLINK, some SOL_NETLINK options set only 1 byte even though such
options require at least sizeof(int) as length.

The options return a flag value that fits into 1 byte, but such behaviour
confuses users who do not initialise the variable before calling
getsockopt() and do not strictly check the returned value as char.

Currently, netlink_getsockopt() uses put_user() to copy data to optlen and
optval, but put_user() casts the data based on the pointer, char *optval.
As a result, only 1 byte is set to optval.

To avoid this behaviour, we need to use copy_to_user() or cast optval for
put_user().

Note that this changes the behaviour on big-endian systems, but we document
that the size of optval is int in the man page.

  $ man 7 netlink
  ...
  Socket options
       To set or get a netlink socket option, call getsockopt(2) to read
       or setsockopt(2) to write the option with the option level argument
       set to SOL_NETLINK.  Unless otherwise noted, optval is a pointer to
       an int.

Fixes: 9a4595bc7e67 ("[NETLINK]: Add set/getsockopt options to support more than 32 groups")
Fixes: be0c22a46cfb ("netlink: add NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option")
Fixes: 38938bfe3489 ("netlink: add NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS socket flag")
Fixes: 0a6a3a23ea6e ("netlink: add NETLINK_CAP_ACK socket option")
Fixes: 2d4bc93368f5 ("netlink: extended ACK reporting")
Fixes: 89d35528d17d ("netlink: Add new socket option to enable strict checking on dumps")
Reported-by: Brad Spencer &lt;bspencer@blackberry.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ZD7VkNWFfp22kTDt@datsun.rim.net/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230421185255.94606-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
