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<title>user/sven/linux.git/net/openvswitch, branch v4.19.226</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-06-03T06:38:11Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: meter: fix race when getting now_ms.</title>
<updated>2021-06-03T06:38:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tao Liu</name>
<email>thomas.liu@ucloud.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-13T13:08:00Z</published>
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[ Upstream commit e4df1b0c24350a0f00229ff895a91f1072bd850d ]

We have observed meters working unexpected if traffic is 3+Gbit/s
with multiple connections.

now_ms is not pretected by meter-&gt;lock, we may get a negative
long_delta_ms when another cpu updated meter-&gt;used, then:
    delta_ms = (u32)long_delta_ms;
which will be a large value.

    band-&gt;bucket += delta_ms * band-&gt;rate;
then we get a wrong band-&gt;bucket.

OpenVswitch userspace datapath has fixed the same issue[1] some
time ago, and we port the implementation to kernel datapath.

[1] https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/openvswitch/patch/20191025114436.9746-1-i.maximets@ovn.org/

Fixes: 96fbc13d7e77 ("openvswitch: Add meter infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Tao Liu &lt;thomas.liu@ucloud.cn&gt;
Suggested-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets &lt;i.maximets@ovn.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets</title>
<updated>2021-05-22T08:59:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Davide Caratti</name>
<email>dcaratti@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-28T13:23:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:df9e900de24637be41879e2c50afb713ec4e8b2e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c0ea5930c1c211931819d83cfb157bff1539a4c upstream.

running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367

 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418
 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
  print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
  kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
  ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
  ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
  genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
  netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
  sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0

 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
 raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
  ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]

 this frame has 2 objects:
  [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
  [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 &gt;ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                         ^
  ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:

  ip_do_fragment()
    ip_skb_dst_mtu()
      ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
        ip_mtu_locked()

the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.

Fixes: d52e5a7e7ca4 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU &lt; net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron &lt;echaudro@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti &lt;dcaratti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: handle DNAT tuple collision</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T08:31:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dumitru Ceara</name>
<email>dceara@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-07T15:48:03Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
commit 8aa7b526dc0b5dbf40c1b834d76a667ad672a410 upstream.

With multiple DNAT rules it's possible that after destination
translation the resulting tuples collide.

For example, two openvswitch flows:
nw_dst=10.0.0.10,tp_dst=10, actions=ct(commit,table=2,nat(dst=20.0.0.1:20))
nw_dst=10.0.0.20,tp_dst=10, actions=ct(commit,table=2,nat(dst=20.0.0.1:20))

Assuming two TCP clients initiating the following connections:
10.0.0.10:5000-&gt;10.0.0.10:10
10.0.0.10:5000-&gt;10.0.0.20:10

Both tuples would translate to 10.0.0.10:5000-&gt;20.0.0.1:20 causing
nf_conntrack_confirm() to fail because of tuple collision.

Netfilter handles this case by allocating a null binding for SNAT at
egress by default.  Perform the same operation in openvswitch for DNAT
if no explicit SNAT is requested by the user and allocate a null binding
for SNAT for packets in the "original" direction.

Reported-at: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1877128
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Fixes: 05752523e565 ("openvswitch: Interface with NAT.")
Signed-off-by: Dumitru Ceara &lt;dceara@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: openvswitch: use div_u64() for 64-by-32 divisions</title>
<updated>2020-10-01T11:14:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tonghao Zhang</name>
<email>xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-25T03:39:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1e6a4232befee0c3dbd201f8a50b5c333498f259</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 659d4587fe7233bfdff303744b20d6f41ad04362 ]

Compile the kernel for arm 32 platform, the build warning found.
To fix that, should use div_u64() for divisions.
| net/openvswitch/meter.c:396: undefined reference to `__udivdi3'

[add more commit msg, change reported tag, and use div_u64 instead
of do_div by Tonghao]

Fixes: e57358873bb5d6ca ("net: openvswitch: use u64 for meter bucket")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang &lt;xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tonghao Zhang &lt;xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: openvswitch: use u64 for meter bucket</title>
<updated>2020-10-01T11:14:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tonghao Zhang</name>
<email>xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-24T00:08:06Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e57358873bb5d6caa882b9684f59140912b37dde ]

When setting the meter rate to 4+Gbps, there is an
overflow, the meters don't work as expected.

Cc: Pravin B Shelar &lt;pshelar@ovn.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Zhou &lt;azhou@ovn.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang &lt;xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar &lt;pshelar@ovn.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: Prevent kernel-infoleak in ovs_ct_put_key()</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:32:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Peilin Ye</name>
<email>yepeilin.cs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-31T04:48:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7fc4eec2a8dc2f3ea7ab860b6d6a5d0391452ca5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9aba6c5b49254d5bee927d81593ed4429e91d4ae ]

ovs_ct_put_key() is potentially copying uninitialized kernel stack memory
into socket buffers, since the compiler may leave a 3-byte hole at the end
of `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4` and `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6`. Fix
it by initializing `orig` with memset().

Fixes: 9dd7f8907c37 ("openvswitch: Add original direction conntrack tuple to sw_flow_key.")
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye &lt;yepeilin.cs@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: support asymmetric conntrack</title>
<updated>2019-12-21T09:57:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Aaron Conole</name>
<email>aconole@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-03T21:34:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6f99afcc247d8b3752f0cbd156c2358eb9da6cfc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5d50aa83e2c8e91ced2cca77c198b468ca9210f4 ]

The openvswitch module shares a common conntrack and NAT infrastructure
exposed via netfilter.  It's possible that a packet needs both SNAT and
DNAT manipulation, due to e.g. tuple collision.  Netfilter can support
this because it runs through the NAT table twice - once on ingress and
again after egress.  The openvswitch module doesn't have such capability.

Like netfilter hook infrastructure, we should run through NAT twice to
keep the symmetry.

Fixes: 05752523e565 ("openvswitch: Interface with NAT.")
Signed-off-by: Aaron Conole &lt;aconole@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: remove another BUG_ON()</title>
<updated>2019-12-05T08:21:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Abeni</name>
<email>pabeni@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-01T17:41:25Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8a574f86652a4540a2433946ba826ccb87f398cc ]

If we can't build the flow del notification, we can simply delete
the flow, no need to crash the kernel. Still keep a WARN_ON to
preserve debuggability.

Note: the BUG_ON() predates the Fixes tag, but this change
can be applied only after the mentioned commit.

v1 -&gt; v2:
 - do not leak an skb on error

Fixes: aed067783e50 ("openvswitch: Minimize ovs_flow_cmd_del critical section.")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: drop unneeded BUG_ON() in ovs_flow_cmd_build_info()</title>
<updated>2019-12-05T08:21:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Abeni</name>
<email>pabeni@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-01T17:41:24Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8ffeb03fbba3b599690b361467bfd2373e8c450f ]

All the callers of ovs_flow_cmd_build_info() already deal with
error return code correctly, so we can handle the error condition
in a more gracefull way. Still dump a warning to preserve
debuggability.

v1 -&gt; v2:
 - clarify the commit message
 - clean the skb and report the error (DaveM)

Fixes: ccb1352e76cf ("net: Add Open vSwitch kernel components.")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: fix flow command message size</title>
<updated>2019-12-05T08:21:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Abeni</name>
<email>pabeni@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-26T11:55:50Z</published>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4e81c0b3fa93d07653e2415fa71656b080a112fd ]

When user-space sets the OVS_UFID_F_OMIT_* flags, and the relevant
flow has no UFID, we can exceed the computed size, as
ovs_nla_put_identifier() will always dump an OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY
attribute.
Take the above in account when computing the flow command message
size.

Fixes: 74ed7ab9264c ("openvswitch: Add support for unique flow IDs.")
Reported-by: Qi Jun Ding &lt;qding@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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