user/sven/linux.git/net, branch v3.4.40

can: gw: use kmem_cache_free() instead of kfree()

2013-04-12T16:38:47Z

commit 3480a2125923e4b7a56d79efc76743089bf273fc upstream. Memory allocated by kmem_cache_alloc() should be freed using kmem_cache_free(), not kfree(). Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: add a synchronize_net() in netdev_rx_handler_unregister()

2013-04-05T17:04:47Z

[ Upstream commit 00cfec37484761a44a3b6f4675a54caa618210ae ] commit 35d48903e97819 (bonding: fix rx_handler locking) added a race in bonding driver, reported by Steven Rostedt who did a very good diagnosis : I'm currently debugging a crash in an old 3.0-rt kernel that one of our customers is seeing. The bug happens with a stress test that loads and unloads the bonding module in a loop (I don't know all the details as I'm not the one that is directly interacting with the customer). But the bug looks to be something that may still be present and possibly present in mainline too. It will just be much harder to trigger it in mainline. In -rt, interrupts are threads, and can schedule in and out just like any other thread. Note, mainline now supports interrupt threads so this may be easily reproducible in mainline as well. I don't have the ability to tell the customer to try mainline or other kernels, so my hands are somewhat tied to what I can do. But according to a core dump, I tracked down that the eth irq thread crashed in bond_handle_frame() here: slave = bond_slave_get_rcu(skb->dev); bond = slave->bond; <--- BUG the slave returned was NULL and accessing slave->bond caused a NULL pointer dereference. Looking at the code that unregisters the handler: void netdev_rx_handler_unregister(struct net_device *dev) { ASSERT_RTNL(); RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->rx_handler, NULL); RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->rx_handler_data, NULL); } Which is basically: dev->rx_handler = NULL; dev->rx_handler_data = NULL; And looking at __netif_receive_skb() we have: rx_handler = rcu_dereference(skb->dev->rx_handler); if (rx_handler) { if (pt_prev) { ret = deliver_skb(skb, pt_prev, orig_dev); pt_prev = NULL; } switch (rx_handler(&skb)) { My question to all of you is, what stops this interrupt from happening while the bonding module is unloading? What happens if the interrupt triggers and we have this: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rx_handler = skb->dev->rx_handler netdev_rx_handler_unregister() { dev->rx_handler = NULL; dev->rx_handler_data = NULL; rx_handler() bond_handle_frame() { slave = skb->dev->rx_handler; bond = slave->bond; <-- NULL pointer dereference!!! What protection am I missing in the bond release handler that would prevent the above from happening? We can fix bug this in two ways. First is adding a test in bond_handle_frame() and others to check if rx_handler_data is NULL. A second way is adding a synchronize_net() in netdev_rx_handler_unregister() to make sure that a rcu protected reader has the guarantee to see a non NULL rx_handler_data. The second way is better as it avoids an extra test in fast path. Reported-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Jiri Pirko Cc: Paul E. McKenney Acked-by: Steven Rostedt Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: don't accept node local multicast traffic from the wire

2013-04-05T17:04:41Z

[ Upstream commit 1c4a154e5253687c51123956dfcee9e9dfa8542d ] Erik Hugne's errata proposal (Errata ID: 3480) to RFC4291 has been verified: http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?eid=3480 We have to check for pkt_type and loopback flag because either the packets are allowed to travel over the loopback interface (in which case pkt_type is PACKET_HOST and IFF_LOOPBACK flag is set) or they travel over a non-loopback interface back to us (in which case PACKET_TYPE is PACKET_LOOPBACK and IFF_LOOPBACK flag is not set). Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa Cc: Erik Hugne Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: fix bad free of addrconf_init_net

2013-04-05T17:04:41Z

[ Upstream commit a79ca223e029aa4f09abb337accf1812c900a800 ] Signed-off-by: Hong Zhiguo Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: don't accept multicast traffic with scope 0

2013-04-05T17:04:41Z

[ Upstream commit 20314092c1b41894d8c181bf9aa6f022be2416aa ] v2: a) moved before multicast source address check b) changed comment to netdev style Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki Cc: Erik Hugne Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

unix: fix a race condition in unix_release()

2013-04-05T17:04:39Z

[ Upstream commit ded34e0fe8fe8c2d595bfa30626654e4b87621e0 ] As reported by Jan, and others over the past few years, there is a race condition caused by unix_release setting the sock->sk pointer to NULL before properly marking the socket as dead/orphaned. This can cause a problem with the LSM hook security_unix_may_send() if there is another socket attempting to write to this partially released socket in between when sock->sk is set to NULL and it is marked as dead/orphaned. This patch fixes this by only setting sock->sk to NULL after the socket has been marked as dead; I also take the opportunity to make unix_release_sock() a void function as it only ever returned 0/success. Dave, I think this one should go on the -stable pile. Special thanks to Jan for coming up with a reproducer for this problem. Reported-by: Jan Stancek Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

thermal: shorten too long mcast group name

2013-04-05T17:04:38Z

[ Upstream commits 73214f5d9f33b79918b1f7babddd5c8af28dd23d and f1e79e208076ffe7bad97158275f1c572c04f5c7, the latter adds an assertion to genetlink to prevent this from happening again in the future. ] The original name is too long. Signed-off-by: Masatake YAMATO Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

8021q: fix a potential use-after-free

2013-04-05T17:04:38Z

[ Upstream commit 4a7df340ed1bac190c124c1601bfc10cde9fb4fb ] vlan_vid_del() could possibly free ->vlan_info after a RCU grace period, however, we may still refer to the freed memory area by 'grp' pointer. Found by code inspection. This patch moves vlan_vid_del() as behind as possible. Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Cc: Patrick McHardy Cc: "David S. Miller" Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: undo spurious timeout after SACK reneging

2013-04-05T17:04:38Z

[ Upstream commit 7ebe183c6d444ef5587d803b64a1f4734b18c564 ] On SACK reneging the sender immediately retransmits and forces a timeout but disables Eifel (undo). If the (buggy) receiver does not drop any packet this can trigger a false slow-start retransmit storm driven by the ACKs of the original packets. This can be detected with undo and TCP timestamps. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: preserve ACK clocking in TSO

2013-04-05T17:04:38Z

[ Upstream commit f4541d60a449afd40448b06496dcd510f505928e ] A long standing problem with TSO is the fact that tcp_tso_should_defer() rearms the deferred timer, while it should not. Current code leads to following bad bursty behavior : 20:11:24.484333 IP A > B: . 297161:316921(19760) ack 1 win 119 20:11:24.484337 IP B > A: . ack 263721 win 1117 20:11:24.485086 IP B > A: . ack 265241 win 1117 20:11:24.485925 IP B > A: . ack 266761 win 1117 20:11:24.486759 IP B > A: . ack 268281 win 1117 20:11:24.487594 IP B > A: . ack 269801 win 1117 20:11:24.488430 IP B > A: . ack 271321 win 1117 20:11:24.489267 IP B > A: . ack 272841 win 1117 20:11:24.490104 IP B > A: . ack 274361 win 1117 20:11:24.490939 IP B > A: . ack 275881 win 1117 20:11:24.491775 IP B > A: . ack 277401 win 1117 20:11:24.491784 IP A > B: . 316921:332881(15960) ack 1 win 119 20:11:24.492620 IP B > A: . ack 278921 win 1117 20:11:24.493448 IP B > A: . ack 280441 win 1117 20:11:24.494286 IP B > A: . ack 281961 win 1117 20:11:24.495122 IP B > A: . ack 283481 win 1117 20:11:24.495958 IP B > A: . ack 285001 win 1117 20:11:24.496791 IP B > A: . ack 286521 win 1117 20:11:24.497628 IP B > A: . ack 288041 win 1117 20:11:24.498459 IP B > A: . ack 289561 win 1117 20:11:24.499296 IP B > A: . ack 291081 win 1117 20:11:24.500133 IP B > A: . ack 292601 win 1117 20:11:24.500970 IP B > A: . ack 294121 win 1117 20:11:24.501388 IP B > A: . ack 295641 win 1117 20:11:24.501398 IP A > B: . 332881:351881(19000) ack 1 win 119 While the expected behavior is more like : 20:19:49.259620 IP A > B: . 197601:202161(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.260446 IP B > A: . ack 154281 win 1212 20:19:49.261282 IP B > A: . ack 155801 win 1212 20:19:49.262125 IP B > A: . ack 157321 win 1212 20:19:49.262136 IP A > B: . 202161:206721(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.262958 IP B > A: . ack 158841 win 1212 20:19:49.263795 IP B > A: . ack 160361 win 1212 20:19:49.264628 IP B > A: . ack 161881 win 1212 20:19:49.264637 IP A > B: . 206721:211281(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.265465 IP B > A: . ack 163401 win 1212 20:19:49.265886 IP B > A: . ack 164921 win 1212 20:19:49.266722 IP B > A: . ack 166441 win 1212 20:19:49.266732 IP A > B: . 211281:215841(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.267559 IP B > A: . ack 167961 win 1212 20:19:49.268394 IP B > A: . ack 169481 win 1212 20:19:49.269232 IP B > A: . ack 171001 win 1212 20:19:49.269241 IP A > B: . 215841:221161(5320) ack 1 win 119 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Yuchung Cheng Cc: Van Jacobson Cc: Neal Cardwell Cc: Nandita Dukkipati Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman