user/sven/linux.git/net, branch v4.14.149

nl80211: validate beacon head

2019-10-11T16:18:49Z

commit f88eb7c0d002a67ef31aeb7850b42ff69abc46dc upstream. We currently don't validate the beacon head, i.e. the header, fixed part and elements that are to go in front of the TIM element. This means that the variable elements there can be malformed, e.g. have a length exceeding the buffer size, but most downstream code from this assumes that this has already been checked. Add the necessary checks to the netlink policy. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ed1b6cc7f80f ("cfg80211/nl80211: add beacon settings") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1569009255-I7ac7fbe9436e9d8733439eab8acbbd35e55c74ef@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cfg80211: add and use strongly typed element iteration macros

2019-10-11T16:18:48Z

commit 0f3b07f027f87a38ebe5c436490095df762819be upstream. Rather than always iterating elements from frames with pure u8 pointers, add a type "struct element" that encapsulates the id/datalen/data format of them. Then, add the element iteration macros * for_each_element * for_each_element_id * for_each_element_extid which take, as their first 'argument', such a structure and iterate through a given u8 array interpreting it as elements. While at it and since we'll need it, also add * for_each_subelement * for_each_subelement_id * for_each_subelement_extid which instead of taking data/length just take an outer element and use its data/datalen. Also add for_each_element_completed() to determine if any of the loops above completed, i.e. it was able to parse all of the elements successfully and no data remained. Use for_each_element_id() in cfg80211_find_ie_match() as the first user of this. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_tables: allow lookups in dynamic sets

2019-10-11T16:18:39Z

[ Upstream commit acab713177377d9e0889c46bac7ff0cfb9a90c4d ] This un-breaks lookups in sets that have the 'dynamic' flag set. Given this active example configuration: table filter { set set1 { type ipv4_addr size 64 flags dynamic,timeout timeout 1m } chain input { type filter hook input priority 0; policy accept; } } ... this works: nft add rule ip filter input add @set1 { ip saddr } -> whenever rule is triggered, the source ip address is inserted into the set (if it did not exist). This won't work: nft add rule ip filter input ip saddr @set1 counter Error: Could not process rule: Operation not supported In other words, we can add entries to the set, but then can't make matching decision based on that set. That is just wrong -- all set backends support lookups (else they would not be very useful). The failure comes from an explicit rejection in nft_lookup.c. Looking at the history, it seems like NFT_SET_EVAL used to mean 'set contains expressions' (aka. "is a meter"), for instance something like nft add rule ip filter input meter example { ip saddr limit rate 10/second } or nft add rule ip filter input meter example { ip saddr counter } The actual meaning of NFT_SET_EVAL however, is 'set can be updated from the packet path'. 'meters' and packet-path insertions into sets, such as 'add @set { ip saddr }' use exactly the same kernel code (nft_dynset.c) and thus require a set backend that provides the ->update() function. The only set that provides this also is the only one that has the NFT_SET_EVAL feature flag. Removing the wrong check makes the above example work. While at it, also fix the flag check during set instantiation to allow supported combinations only. Fixes: 8aeff920dcc9b3f ("netfilter: nf_tables: add stateful object reference to set elements") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

cfg80211: initialize on-stack chandefs

2019-10-11T16:18:37Z

commit f43e5210c739fe76a4b0ed851559d6902f20ceb1 upstream. In a few places we don't properly initialize on-stack chandefs, resulting in EDMG data to be non-zero, which broke things. Additionally, in a few places we rely on the driver to init the data completely, but perhaps we shouldn't as non-EDMG drivers may not initialize the EDMG data, also initialize it there. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2a38075cd0be ("nl80211: Add support for EDMG channels") Reported-by: Dmitry Osipenko Tested-by: Dmitry Osipenko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1569239475-I2dcce394ecf873376c386a78f31c2ec8b538fa25@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

NFC: fix attrs checks in netlink interface

2019-10-07T16:55:22Z

commit 18917d51472fe3b126a3a8f756c6b18085eb8130 upstream. nfc_genl_deactivate_target() relies on the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attribute being present, but doesn't check whether it is actually provided by the user. Same goes for nfc_genl_fw_download() and NFC_ATTR_FIRMWARE_NAME. This patch adds appropriate checks. Found with syzkaller. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: Handle missing host route in __ipv6_ifa_notify

2019-10-07T16:55:21Z

[ Upstream commit 2d819d250a1393a3e725715425ab70a0e0772a71 ] Rajendra reported a kernel panic when a link was taken down: [ 6870.263084] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a8 [ 6870.271856] IP: [] __ipv6_ifa_notify+0x154/0x290 [ 6870.570501] Call Trace: [ 6870.573238] [] ? ipv6_ifa_notify+0x26/0x40 [ 6870.579665] [] ? addrconf_dad_completed+0x4c/0x2c0 [ 6870.586869] [] ? ipv6_dev_mc_inc+0x196/0x260 [ 6870.593491] [] ? addrconf_dad_work+0x10a/0x430 [ 6870.600305] [] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 [ 6870.606732] [] ? process_one_work+0x18a/0x430 [ 6870.613449] [] ? worker_thread+0x4d/0x490 [ 6870.619778] [] ? process_one_work+0x430/0x430 [ 6870.626495] [] ? kthread+0xd9/0xf0 [ 6870.632145] [] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 [ 6870.638573] [] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [ 6870.644707] [] ? ret_from_fork+0x57/0x70 [ 6870.650936] Code: 31 c0 31 d2 41 b9 20 00 08 02 b9 09 00 00 0 addrconf_dad_work is kicked to be scheduled when a device is brought up. There is a race between addrcond_dad_work getting scheduled and taking the rtnl lock and a process taking the link down (under rtnl). The latter removes the host route from the inet6_addr as part of addrconf_ifdown which is run for NETDEV_DOWN. The former attempts to use the host route in __ipv6_ifa_notify. If the down event removes the host route due to the race to the rtnl, then the BUG listed above occurs. Since the DAD sequence can not be aborted, add a check for the missing host route in __ipv6_ifa_notify. The only way this should happen is due to the previously mentioned race. The host route is created when the address is added to an interface; it is only removed on a down event where the address is kept. Add a warning if the host route is missing AND the device is up; this is a situation that should never happen. Fixes: f1705ec197e7 ("net: ipv6: Make address flushing on ifdown optional") Reported-by: Rajendra Dendukuri Signed-off-by: David Ahern Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sch_cbq: validate TCA_CBQ_WRROPT to avoid crash

2019-10-07T16:55:21Z

[ Upstream commit e9789c7cc182484fc031fd88097eb14cb26c4596 ] syzbot reported a crash in cbq_normalize_quanta() caused by an out of range cl->priority. iproute2 enforces this check, but malicious users do not. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 26447 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:cbq_normalize_quanta.part.0+0x1fd/0x430 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:902 RSP: 0018:ffff8801a5c333b0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000020000003 RBX: 00000000fffffff8 RCX: ffffc9000712f000 RDX: 00000000000043bf RSI: ffffffff83be8962 RDI: 0000000100000018 RBP: ffff8801a5c33420 R08: 000000000000003a R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000002ef R13: ffff88018da95188 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000015 FS: 00007f37d26b1700(0000) GS:ffff8801dad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004c7cec CR3: 00000001bcd0a006 CR4: 00000000001626f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: [] cbq_normalize_quanta include/net/pkt_sched.h:27 [inline] [] cbq_addprio net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1097 [inline] [] cbq_set_wrr+0x2d7/0x450 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1115 [] cbq_change_class+0x987/0x225b net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1537 [] tc_ctl_tclass+0x555/0xcd0 net/sched/sch_api.c:2329 [] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x485/0xc10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5248 [] netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2510 [] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5266 [] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1324 [inline] [] netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1350 [] netlink_sendmsg+0x89a/0xd50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1939 [] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:673 [inline] [] sock_sendmsg+0x12e/0x170 net/socket.c:684 [] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81d/0x960 net/socket.c:2359 [] __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2397 [] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2406 [inline] [] SyS_sendmsg+0x29/0x30 net/socket.c:2404 [] do_syscall_64+0x528/0x770 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tipc: fix unlimited bundling of small messages

2019-10-07T16:55:20Z

[ Upstream commit e95584a889e1902fdf1ded9712e2c3c3083baf96 ] We have identified a problem with the "oversubscription" policy in the link transmission code. When small messages are transmitted, and the sending link has reached the transmit window limit, those messages will be bundled and put into the link backlog queue. However, bundles of data messages are counted at the 'CRITICAL' level, so that the counter for that level, instead of the counter for the real, bundled message's level is the one being increased. Subsequent, to-be-bundled data messages at non-CRITICAL levels continue to be tested against the unchanged counter for their own level, while contributing to an unrestrained increase at the CRITICAL backlog level. This leaves a gap in congestion control algorithm for small messages that can result in starvation for other users or a "real" CRITICAL user. Even that eventually can lead to buffer exhaustion & link reset. We fix this by keeping a 'target_bskb' buffer pointer at each levels, then when bundling, we only bundle messages at the same importance level only. This way, we know exactly how many slots a certain level have occupied in the queue, so can manage level congestion accurately. By bundling messages at the same level, we even have more benefits. Let consider this: - One socket sends 64-byte messages at the 'CRITICAL' level; - Another sends 4096-byte messages at the 'LOW' level; When a 64-byte message comes and is bundled the first time, we put the overhead of message bundle to it (+ 40-byte header, data copy, etc.) for later use, but the next message can be a 4096-byte one that cannot be bundled to the previous one. This means the last bundle carries only one payload message which is totally inefficient, as for the receiver also! Later on, another 64-byte message comes, now we make a new bundle and the same story repeats... With the new bundling algorithm, this will not happen, the 64-byte messages will be bundled together even when the 4096-byte message(s) comes in between. However, if the 4096-byte messages are sent at the same level i.e. 'CRITICAL', the bundling algorithm will again cause the same overhead. Also, the same will happen even with only one socket sending small messages at a rate close to the link transmit's one, so that, when one message is bundled, it's transmitted shortly. Then, another message comes, a new bundle is created and so on... We will solve this issue radically by another patch. Fixes: 365ad353c256 ("tipc: reduce risk of user starvation during link congestion") Reported-by: Hoang Le Acked-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/rds: Fix error handling in rds_ib_add_one()

2019-10-07T16:55:20Z

[ Upstream commit d64bf89a75b65f83f06be9fb8f978e60d53752db ] rds_ibdev:ipaddr_list and rds_ibdev:conn_list are initialized after allocation some resources such as protection domain. If allocation of such resources fail, then these uninitialized variables are accessed in rds_ib_dev_free() in failure path. This can potentially crash the system. The code has been updated to initialize these variables very early in the function. Signed-off-by: Dotan Barak Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Dindukurti Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

vsock: Fix a lockdep warning in __vsock_release()

2019-10-07T16:55:19Z

[ Upstream commit 0d9138ffac24cf8b75366ede3a68c951e6dcc575 ] Lockdep is unhappy if two locks from the same class are held. Fix the below warning for hyperv and virtio sockets (vmci socket code doesn't have the issue) by using lock_sock_nested() when __vsock_release() is called recursively: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.3.0+ #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- server/1795 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880c5158990 (sk_lock-AF_VSOCK){+.+.}, at: hvs_release+0x10/0x120 [hv_sock] but task is already holding lock: ffff8880c5158150 (sk_lock-AF_VSOCK){+.+.}, at: __vsock_release+0x2e/0xf0 [vsock] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_VSOCK); lock(sk_lock-AF_VSOCK); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by server/1795: #0: ffff8880c5d05ff8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}, at: __sock_release+0x2d/0xa0 #1: ffff8880c5158150 (sk_lock-AF_VSOCK){+.+.}, at: __vsock_release+0x2e/0xf0 [vsock] stack backtrace: CPU: 5 PID: 1795 Comm: server Not tainted 5.3.0+ #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x67/0x90 __lock_acquire.cold.67+0xd2/0x20b lock_acquire+0xb5/0x1c0 lock_sock_nested+0x6d/0x90 hvs_release+0x10/0x120 [hv_sock] __vsock_release+0x24/0xf0 [vsock] __vsock_release+0xa0/0xf0 [vsock] vsock_release+0x12/0x30 [vsock] __sock_release+0x37/0xa0 sock_close+0x14/0x20 __fput+0xc1/0x250 task_work_run+0x98/0xc0 do_exit+0x344/0xc60 do_group_exit+0x47/0xb0 get_signal+0x15c/0xc50 do_signal+0x30/0x720 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x50/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x24e/0x270 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7f4184e85f31 Tested-by: Stefano Garzarella Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman