<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/net, branch v4.14.334</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.334</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.334'/>
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<updated>2023-12-20T14:32:34Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>appletalk: Fix Use-After-Free in atalk_ioctl</title>
<updated>2023-12-20T14:32:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hyunwoo Kim</name>
<email>v4bel@theori.io</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-13T04:10:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0686da1ada51c787610185de6289d8a5006ad263'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0686da1ada51c787610185de6289d8a5006ad263</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 189ff16722ee36ced4d2a2469d4ab65a8fee4198 ]

Because atalk_ioctl() accesses sk-&gt;sk_receive_queue
without holding a sk-&gt;sk_receive_queue.lock, it can
cause a race with atalk_recvmsg().
A use-after-free for skb occurs with the following flow.
```
atalk_ioctl() -&gt; skb_peek()
atalk_recvmsg() -&gt; skb_recv_datagram() -&gt; skb_free_datagram()
```
Add sk-&gt;sk_receive_queue.lock to atalk_ioctl() to fix this issue.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;v4bel@theori.io&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231213041056.GA519680@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vsock/virtio: Fix unsigned integer wrap around in virtio_transport_has_space()</title>
<updated>2023-12-20T14:32:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikolay Kuratov</name>
<email>kniv@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-11T16:23:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ad2ecbdc29909424cc34b7383faf8a7c7585cf52'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ad2ecbdc29909424cc34b7383faf8a7c7585cf52</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 60316d7f10b17a7ebb1ead0642fee8710e1560e0 ]

We need to do signed arithmetic if we expect condition
`if (bytes &lt; 0)` to be possible

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE

Fixes: 06a8fc78367d ("VSOCK: Introduce virtio_vsock_common.ko")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Kuratov &lt;kniv@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella &lt;sgarzare@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231211162317.4116625-1-kniv@yandex-team.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Remove acked SYN flag from packet in the transmit queue correctly</title>
<updated>2023-12-20T14:32:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dong Chenchen</name>
<email>dongchenchen2@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-10T02:02:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e71c332bcf3f2b80ecdb1af03535b7ed6895ece1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e71c332bcf3f2b80ecdb1af03535b7ed6895ece1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f99cd56230f56c8b6b33713c5be4da5d6766be1f ]

syzkaller report:

 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:3452!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4-00009-gbee0e7762ad2-dirty #135
 RIP: 0010:skb_copy_and_csum_bits (net/core/skbuff.c:3452)
 Call Trace:
 icmp_glue_bits (net/ipv4/icmp.c:357)
 __ip_append_data.isra.0 (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1165)
 ip_append_data (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1362 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1341)
 icmp_push_reply (net/ipv4/icmp.c:370)
 __icmp_send (./include/net/route.h:252 net/ipv4/icmp.c:772)
 ip_fragment.constprop.0 (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1234 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:592 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:577)
 __ip_finish_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:311 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295)
 ip_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:427)
 __ip_queue_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535)
 __tcp_transmit_skb (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1462)
 __tcp_retransmit_skb (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3387)
 tcp_retransmit_skb (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3404)
 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:604)
 tcp_write_timer (./include/linux/spinlock.h:391 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:716)

The panic issue was trigered by tcp simultaneous initiation.
The initiation process is as follows:

      TCP A                                            TCP B

  1.  CLOSED                                           CLOSED

  2.  SYN-SENT     --&gt; &lt;SEQ=100&gt;&lt;CTL=SYN&gt;              ...

  3.  SYN-RECEIVED &lt;-- &lt;SEQ=300&gt;&lt;CTL=SYN&gt;              &lt;-- SYN-SENT

  4.               ... &lt;SEQ=100&gt;&lt;CTL=SYN&gt;              --&gt; SYN-RECEIVED

  5.  SYN-RECEIVED --&gt; &lt;SEQ=100&gt;&lt;ACK=301&gt;&lt;CTL=SYN,ACK&gt; ...

  // TCP B: not send challenge ack for ack limit or packet loss
  // TCP A: close
	tcp_close
	   tcp_send_fin
              if (!tskb &amp;&amp; tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk))
                  tskb = skb_rb_last(&amp;sk-&gt;tcp_rtx_queue); //pick SYN_ACK packet
           TCP_SKB_CB(tskb)-&gt;tcp_flags |= TCPHDR_FIN;  // set FIN flag

  6.  FIN_WAIT_1  --&gt; &lt;SEQ=100&gt;&lt;ACK=301&gt;&lt;END_SEQ=102&gt;&lt;CTL=SYN,FIN,ACK&gt; ...

  // TCP B: send challenge ack to SYN_FIN_ACK

  7.               ... &lt;SEQ=301&gt;&lt;ACK=101&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt;   &lt;-- SYN-RECEIVED //challenge ack

  // TCP A:  &lt;SND.UNA=101&gt;

  8.  FIN_WAIT_1 --&gt; &lt;SEQ=101&gt;&lt;ACK=301&gt;&lt;END_SEQ=102&gt;&lt;CTL=SYN,FIN,ACK&gt; ... // retransmit panic

	__tcp_retransmit_skb  //skb-&gt;len=0
	    tcp_trim_head
		len = tp-&gt;snd_una - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)-&gt;seq // len=101-100
		    __pskb_trim_head
			skb-&gt;data_len -= len // skb-&gt;len=-1, wrap around
	    ... ...
	    ip_fragment
		icmp_glue_bits //BUG_ON

If we use tcp_trim_head() to remove acked SYN from packet that contains data
or other flags, skb-&gt;len will be incorrectly decremented. We can remove SYN
flag that has been acked from rtx_queue earlier than tcp_trim_head(), which
can fix the problem mentioned above.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Co-developed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen &lt;dongchenchen2@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231210020200.1539875-1-dongchenchen2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/rose: Fix Use-After-Free in rose_ioctl</title>
<updated>2023-12-20T14:32:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hyunwoo Kim</name>
<email>v4bel@theori.io</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-09T10:05:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=02af3c8ab5cda2633b187bd18b5dc2b9f0af0859'/>
<id>urn:sha1:02af3c8ab5cda2633b187bd18b5dc2b9f0af0859</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 810c38a369a0a0ce625b5c12169abce1dd9ccd53 ]

Because rose_ioctl() accesses sk-&gt;sk_receive_queue
without holding a sk-&gt;sk_receive_queue.lock, it can
cause a race with rose_accept().
A use-after-free for skb occurs with the following flow.
```
rose_ioctl() -&gt; skb_peek()
rose_accept() -&gt; skb_dequeue() -&gt; kfree_skb()
```
Add sk-&gt;sk_receive_queue.lock to rose_ioctl() to fix this issue.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;v4bel@theori.io&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231209100538.GA407321@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: Fix Use-After-Free in do_vcc_ioctl</title>
<updated>2023-12-20T14:32:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hyunwoo Kim</name>
<email>v4bel@theori.io</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-09T09:42:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3ddeb55deec5e0e324d0ab8cc2ddd528518ea12d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3ddeb55deec5e0e324d0ab8cc2ddd528518ea12d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 24e90b9e34f9e039f56b5f25f6e6eb92cdd8f4b3 ]

Because do_vcc_ioctl() accesses sk-&gt;sk_receive_queue
without holding a sk-&gt;sk_receive_queue.lock, it can
cause a race with vcc_recvmsg().
A use-after-free for skb occurs with the following flow.
```
do_vcc_ioctl() -&gt; skb_peek()
vcc_recvmsg() -&gt; skb_recv_datagram() -&gt; skb_free_datagram()
```
Add sk-&gt;sk_receive_queue.lock to do_vcc_ioctl() to fix this issue.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim &lt;v4bel@theori.io&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231209094210.GA403126@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drop_monitor: Require 'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' when joining "events" group</title>
<updated>2023-12-13T15:46:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-11T12:43:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d9478fe0a89b0de361e7d503f42b6480eedf1972'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d9478fe0a89b0de361e7d503f42b6480eedf1972</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e03781879a0d524ce3126678d50a80484a513c4b upstream.

The "NET_DM" generic netlink family notifies drop locations over the
"events" multicast group. This is problematic since by default generic
netlink allows non-root users to listen to these notifications.

Fix by adding a new field to the generic netlink multicast group
structure that when set prevents non-root users or root without the
'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' capability (in the user namespace owning the network
namespace) from joining the group. Set this field for the "events"
group. Use 'CAP_SYS_ADMIN' rather than 'CAP_NET_ADMIN' because of the
nature of the information that is shared over this group.

Note that the capability check in this case will always be performed
against the initial user namespace since the family is not netns aware
and only operates in the initial network namespace.

A new field is added to the structure rather than using the "flags"
field because the existing field uses uAPI flags and it is inappropriate
to add a new uAPI flag for an internal kernel check. In net-next we can
rework the "flags" field to use internal flags and fold the new field
into it. But for now, in order to reduce the amount of changes, add a
new field.

Since the information can only be consumed by root, mark the control
plane operations that start and stop the tracing as root-only using the
'GENL_ADMIN_PERM' flag.

Tested using [1].

Before:

 # capsh -- -c ./dm_repo
 # capsh --drop=cap_sys_admin -- -c ./dm_repo

After:

 # capsh -- -c ./dm_repo
 # capsh --drop=cap_sys_admin -- -c ./dm_repo
 Failed to join "events" multicast group

[1]
 $ cat dm.c
 #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
 #include &lt;netlink/genl/ctrl.h&gt;
 #include &lt;netlink/genl/genl.h&gt;
 #include &lt;netlink/socket.h&gt;

 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct nl_sock *sk;
 	int grp, err;

 	sk = nl_socket_alloc();
 	if (!sk) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate socket\n");
 		return -1;
 	}

 	err = genl_connect(sk);
 	if (err) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect socket\n");
 		return err;
 	}

 	grp = genl_ctrl_resolve_grp(sk, "NET_DM", "events");
 	if (grp &lt; 0) {
 		fprintf(stderr,
 			"Failed to resolve \"events\" multicast group\n");
 		return grp;
 	}

 	err = nl_socket_add_memberships(sk, grp, NFNLGRP_NONE);
 	if (err) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to join \"events\" multicast group\n");
 		return err;
 	}

 	return 0;
 }
 $ gcc -I/usr/include/libnl3 -lnl-3 -lnl-genl-3 -o dm_repo dm.c

Fixes: 9a8afc8d3962 ("Network Drop Monitor: Adding drop monitor implementation &amp; Netlink protocol")
Reported-by: "The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)" &lt;security@ncsc.gov.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller &lt;jacob.e.keller@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206213102.1824398-3-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>psample: Require 'CAP_NET_ADMIN' when joining "packets" group</title>
<updated>2023-12-13T15:46:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-11T12:43:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fe3c8a71cbda6af029e43a7b6475f180bde79688'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fe3c8a71cbda6af029e43a7b6475f180bde79688</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 44ec98ea5ea9cfecd31a5c4cc124703cb5442832 upstream.

The "psample" generic netlink family notifies sampled packets over the
"packets" multicast group. This is problematic since by default generic
netlink allows non-root users to listen to these notifications.

Fix by marking the group with the 'GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM' flag. This will
prevent non-root users or root without the 'CAP_NET_ADMIN' capability
(in the user namespace owning the network namespace) from joining the
group.

Tested using [1].

Before:

 # capsh -- -c ./psample_repo
 # capsh --drop=cap_net_admin -- -c ./psample_repo

After:

 # capsh -- -c ./psample_repo
 # capsh --drop=cap_net_admin -- -c ./psample_repo
 Failed to join "packets" multicast group

[1]
 $ cat psample.c
 #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
 #include &lt;netlink/genl/ctrl.h&gt;
 #include &lt;netlink/genl/genl.h&gt;
 #include &lt;netlink/socket.h&gt;

 int join_grp(struct nl_sock *sk, const char *grp_name)
 {
 	int grp, err;

 	grp = genl_ctrl_resolve_grp(sk, "psample", grp_name);
 	if (grp &lt; 0) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to resolve \"%s\" multicast group\n",
 			grp_name);
 		return grp;
 	}

 	err = nl_socket_add_memberships(sk, grp, NFNLGRP_NONE);
 	if (err) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to join \"%s\" multicast group\n",
 			grp_name);
 		return err;
 	}

 	return 0;
 }

 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct nl_sock *sk;
 	int err;

 	sk = nl_socket_alloc();
 	if (!sk) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate socket\n");
 		return -1;
 	}

 	err = genl_connect(sk);
 	if (err) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect socket\n");
 		return err;
 	}

 	err = join_grp(sk, "config");
 	if (err)
 		return err;

 	err = join_grp(sk, "packets");
 	if (err)
 		return err;

 	return 0;
 }
 $ gcc -I/usr/include/libnl3 -lnl-3 -lnl-genl-3 -o psample_repo psample.c

Fixes: 6ae0a6286171 ("net: Introduce psample, a new genetlink channel for packet sampling")
Reported-by: "The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)" &lt;security@ncsc.gov.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller &lt;jacob.e.keller@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206213102.1824398-2-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>genetlink: add CAP_NET_ADMIN test for multicast bind</title>
<updated>2023-12-13T15:46:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-11T12:42:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=eddc6121ec705cfe7fed9cfd04a8cbf01d39943d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eddc6121ec705cfe7fed9cfd04a8cbf01d39943d</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a partial backport of upstream commit 4d54cc32112d ("mptcp:
avoid lock_fast usage in accept path"). It is only a partial backport
because the patch in the link below was erroneously squash-merged into
upstream commit 4d54cc32112d ("mptcp: avoid lock_fast usage in accept
path"). Below is the original patch description from Florian Westphal:

"
genetlink sets NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV for its netlink socket so anyone can
subscribe to multicast messages.

rtnetlink doesn't allow this unconditionally,  rtnetlink_bind() restricts
bind requests to CAP_NET_ADMIN for a few groups.

This allows to set GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM flag on genl mcast groups to
mandate CAP_NET_ADMIN.

This will be used by the upcoming mptcp netlink event facility which
exposes the token (mptcp connection identifier) to userspace.
"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/20210213000001.379332-8-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: don't call -&gt;netlink_bind with table lock held</title>
<updated>2023-12-13T15:46:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-11T12:42:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ab9991aabd7abf5d9fa0d745cd60c3b321e8415e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab9991aabd7abf5d9fa0d745cd60c3b321e8415e</id>
<content type='text'>
From: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;

commit f2764bd4f6a8dffaec3e220728385d9756b3c2cb upstream.

When I added support to allow generic netlink multicast groups to be
restricted to subscribers with CAP_NET_ADMIN I was unaware that a
genl_bind implementation already existed in the past.

It was reverted due to ABBA deadlock:

1. -&gt;netlink_bind gets called with the table lock held.
2. genetlink bind callback is invoked, it grabs the genl lock.

But when a new genl subsystem is (un)registered, these two locks are
taken in reverse order.

One solution would be to revert again and add a comment in genl
referring 1e82a62fec613, "genetlink: remove genl_bind").

This would need a second change in mptcp to not expose the raw token
value anymore, e.g.  by hashing the token with a secret key so userspace
can still associate subflow events with the correct mptcp connection.

However, Paolo Abeni reminded me to double-check why the netlink table is
locked in the first place.

I can't find one.  netlink_bind() is already called without this lock
when userspace joins a group via NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP setsockopt.
Same holds for the netlink_unbind operation.

Digging through the history, commit f773608026ee1
("netlink: access nlk groups safely in netlink bind and getname")
expanded the lock scope.

commit 3a20773beeeeade ("net: netlink: cap max groups which will be considered in netlink_bind()")
... removed the nlk-&gt;ngroups access that the lock scope
extension was all about.

Reduce the lock scope again and always call -&gt;netlink_bind without
the table lock.

The Fixes tag should be vs. the patch mentioned in the link below,
but that one got squash-merged into the patch that came earlier in the
series.

Fixes: 4d54cc32112d8d ("mptcp: avoid lock_fast usage in accept path")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/20210213000001.379332-8-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com/T/#u
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Sean Tranchetti &lt;stranche@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>packet: Move reference count in packet_sock to atomic_long_t</title>
<updated>2023-12-13T15:46:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-01T13:10:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=17674fbd97855734e77bcb6725aaa2ba5bd52718'/>
<id>urn:sha1:17674fbd97855734e77bcb6725aaa2ba5bd52718</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db3fadacaf0c817b222090290d06ca2a338422d0 upstream.

In some potential instances the reference count on struct packet_sock
could be saturated and cause overflows which gets the kernel a bit
confused. To prevent this, move to a 64-bit atomic reference count on
64-bit architectures to prevent the possibility of this type to overflow.

Because we can not handle saturation, using refcount_t is not possible
in this place. Maybe someday in the future if it changes it could be
used. Also, instead of using plain atomic64_t, use atomic_long_t instead.
32-bit machines tend to be memory-limited (i.e. anything that increases
a reference uses so much memory that you can't actually get to 2**32
references). 32-bit architectures also tend to have serious problems
with 64-bit atomics. Hence, atomic_long_t is the more natural solution.

Reported-by: "The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)" &lt;security@ncsc.gov.uk&gt;
Co-developed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201131021.19999-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
