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<title>user/sven/linux.git/net, branch v4.19.170</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.170</id>
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<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:57Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>net: ipv6: Validate GSO SKB before finish IPv6 processing</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Aya Levin</name>
<email>ayal@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-07T13:50:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=394d9608da91e7909d74895af22c26bba6c0be5d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:394d9608da91e7909d74895af22c26bba6c0be5d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b210de4f8c97d57de051e805686248ec4c6cfc52 ]

There are cases where GSO segment's length exceeds the egress MTU:
 - Forwarding of a TCP GRO skb, when DF flag is not set.
 - Forwarding of an skb that arrived on a virtualisation interface
   (virtio-net/vhost/tap) with TSO/GSO size set by other network
   stack.
 - Local GSO skb transmitted on an NETIF_F_TSO tunnel stacked over an
   interface with a smaller MTU.
 - Arriving GRO skb (or GSO skb in a virtualised environment) that is
   bridged to a NETIF_F_TSO tunnel stacked over an interface with an
   insufficient MTU.

If so:
 - Consume the SKB and its segments.
 - Issue an ICMP packet with 'Packet Too Big' message containing the
   MTU, allowing the source host to reduce its Path MTU appropriately.

Note: These cases are handled in the same manner in IPv4 output finish.
This patch aligns the behavior of IPv6 and the one of IPv4.

Fixes: 9e50849054a4 ("netfilter: ipv6: move POSTROUTING invocation before fragmentation")
Signed-off-by: Aya Levin &lt;ayal@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan &lt;tariqt@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1610027418-30438-1-git-send-email-ayal@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tipc: fix NULL deref in tipc_link_xmit()</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hoang Le</name>
<email>hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-08T07:13:37Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4d1d3dddcb3f26000e66cd0a9b8b16f7c2eb41bb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b77413446408fdd256599daf00d5be72b5f3e7c6 ]

The buffer list can have zero skb as following path:
tipc_named_node_up()-&gt;tipc_node_xmit()-&gt;tipc_link_xmit(), so
we need to check the list before casting an &amp;sk_buff.

Fault report:
 [] tipc: Bulk publication failure
 [] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical [#1] PREEMPT [...]
 [] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf]
 [] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #2
 [] Hardware name: Bochs ..., BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 [] RIP: 0010:tipc_link_xmit+0xc1/0x2180
 [] Code: 24 b8 00 00 00 00 4d 39 ec 4c 0f 44 e8 e8 d7 0a 10 f9 48 [...]
 [] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006ea0 EFLAGS: 00010202
 [] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880224da000 RCX: 1ffff11003d3cc0d
 [] RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffffffff886007b9 RDI: 00000000000000c8
 [] RBP: ffffc90000007018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000000ded
 [] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff52000000dec R12: ffffc90000007148
 [] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000007018
 [] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888037400000(0000) knlGS:000[...]
 [] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [] CR2: 00007fffd2db5000 CR3: 000000002b08f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Fixes: af9b028e270fd ("tipc: make media xmit call outside node spinlock context")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy &lt;jmaloy@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le &lt;hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108071337.3598-1-hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix handling of an unsupported token type in rxrpc_read()</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-12T15:23:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d9364c8f03edff0266b5dce8295c55a4750ebaa4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d52e419ac8b50c8bef41b398ed13528e75d7ad48 ]

Clang static analysis reports the following:

net/rxrpc/key.c:657:11: warning: Assigned value is garbage or undefined
                toksize = toksizes[tok++];
                        ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

rxrpc_read() contains two consecutive loops.  The first loop calculates the
token sizes and stores the results in toksizes[] and the second one uses
the array.  When there is an error in identifying the token in the first
loop, the token is skipped, no change is made to the toksizes[] array.
When the same error happens in the second loop, the token is not skipped.
This will cause the toksizes[] array to be out of step and will overrun
past the calculated sizes.

Fix this by making both loops log a message and return an error in this
case.  This should only happen if a new token type is incompletely
implemented, so it should normally be impossible to trigger this.

Fixes: 9a059cd5ca7d ("rxrpc: Downgrade the BUG() for unsupported token type in rxrpc_read()")
Reported-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161046503122.2445787.16714129930607546635.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: avoid 32 x truesize under-estimation for tiny skbs</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-13T16:18:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:669c0b5782fba3c4b0a5f68bca53b3b6055b3b2f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3226b158e67cfaa677fd180152bfb28989cb2fac ]

Both virtio net and napi_get_frags() allocate skbs
with a very small skb-&gt;head

While using page fragments instead of a kmalloc backed skb-&gt;head might give
a small performance improvement in some cases, there is a huge risk of
under estimating memory usage.

For both GOOD_COPY_LEN and GRO_MAX_HEAD, we can fit at least 32 allocations
per page (order-3 page in x86), or even 64 on PowerPC

We have been tracking OOM issues on GKE hosts hitting tcp_mem limits
but consuming far more memory for TCP buffers than instructed in tcp_mem[2]

Even if we force napi_alloc_skb() to only use order-0 pages, the issue
would still be there on arches with PAGE_SIZE &gt;= 32768

This patch makes sure that small skb head are kmalloc backed, so that
other objects in the slab page can be reused instead of being held as long
as skbs are sitting in socket queues.

Note that we might in the future use the sk_buff napi cache,
instead of going through a more expensive __alloc_skb()

Another idea would be to use separate page sizes depending
on the allocated length (to never have more than 4 frags per page)

I would like to thank Greg Thelen for his precious help on this matter,
analysing crash dumps is always a time consuming task.

Fixes: fd11a83dd363 ("net: Pull out core bits of __netdev_alloc_skb and add __napi_alloc_skb")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexanderduyck@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210113161819.1155526-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sit: unregister_netdevice on newlink's error path</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-14T01:29:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=11e36dcef44e6c7ab269f79657ff3d2db9a82c15'/>
<id>urn:sha1:11e36dcef44e6c7ab269f79657ff3d2db9a82c15</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 47e4bb147a96f1c9b4e7691e7e994e53838bfff8 ]

We need to unregister the netdevice if config failed.
.ndo_uninit takes care of most of the heavy lifting.

This was uncovered by recent commit c269a24ce057 ("net: make
free_netdev() more lenient with unregistering devices").
Previously the partially-initialized device would be left
in the system.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2393580080a2da190f04@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e2f1f072db8d ("sit: allow to configure 6rd tunnels via netlink")
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114012947.2515313-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Call state should be read with READ_ONCE() under some circumstances</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Baptiste Lepers</name>
<email>baptiste.lepers@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-12T15:59:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6b676c4bd0e3ef7df8427d73f45c0d680c5c5afe'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6b676c4bd0e3ef7df8427d73f45c0d680c5c5afe</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a95d25dd7b94a5ba18246da09b4218f132fed60e ]

The call state may be changed at any time by the data-ready routine in
response to received packets, so if the call state is to be read and acted
upon several times in a function, READ_ONCE() must be used unless the call
state lock is held.

As it happens, we used READ_ONCE() to read the state a few lines above the
unmarked read in rxrpc_input_data(), so use that value rather than
re-reading it.

Fixes: a158bdd3247b ("rxrpc: Fix call timeouts")
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers &lt;baptiste.lepers@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161046715522.2450566.488819910256264150.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dcb: Accept RTM_GETDCB messages carrying set-like DCB commands</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Machata</name>
<email>petrm@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-11T17:07:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5fd803e108d704b1a093c0d319fcbf07df5f5446</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit df85bc140a4d6cbaa78d8e9c35154e1a2f0622c7 ]

In commit 826f328e2b7e ("net: dcb: Validate netlink message in DCB
handler"), Linux started rejecting RTM_GETDCB netlink messages if they
contained a set-like DCB_CMD_ command.

The reason was that privileges were only verified for RTM_SETDCB messages,
but the value that determined the action to be taken is the command, not
the message type. And validation of message type against the DCB command
was the obvious missing piece.

Unfortunately it turns out that mlnx_qos, a somewhat widely deployed tool
for configuration of DCB, accesses the DCB set-like APIs through
RTM_GETDCB.

Therefore do not bounce the discrepancy between message type and command.
Instead, in addition to validating privileges based on the actual message
type, validate them also based on the expected message type. This closes
the loophole of allowing DCB configuration on non-admin accounts, while
maintaining backward compatibility.

Fixes: 2f90b8657ec9 ("ixgbe: this patch adds support for DCB to the kernel and ixgbe driver")
Fixes: 826f328e2b7e ("net: dcb: Validate netlink message in DCB handler")
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata &lt;petrm@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a3edcfda0825f2aa2591801c5232f2bbf2d8a554.1610384801.git.me@pmachata.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dcb: Validate netlink message in DCB handler</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Machata</name>
<email>me@pmachata.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-22T21:49:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3997f963f12f4510b33a584f7a2bac6387fe68e5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 826f328e2b7e8854dd42ea44e6519cd75018e7b1 ]

DCB uses the same handler function for both RTM_GETDCB and RTM_SETDCB
messages. dcb_doit() bounces RTM_SETDCB mesasges if the user does not have
the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.

However, the operation to be performed is not decided from the DCB message
type, but from the DCB command. Thus DCB_CMD_*_GET commands are used for
reading DCB objects, the corresponding SET and DEL commands are used for
manipulation.

The assumption is that set-like commands will be sent via an RTM_SETDCB
message, and get-like ones via RTM_GETDCB. However, this assumption is not
enforced.

It is therefore possible to manipulate DCB objects without CAP_NET_ADMIN
capability by sending the corresponding command in an RTM_GETDCB message.
That is a bug. Fix it by validating the type of the request message against
the type used for the response.

Fixes: 2f90b8657ec9 ("ixgbe: this patch adds support for DCB to the kernel and ixgbe driver")
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata &lt;me@pmachata.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a2a9b88418f3a58ef211b718f2970128ef9e3793.1608673640.git.me@pmachata.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>esp: avoid unneeded kmap_atomic call</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-09T22:18:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d4ede0a453cb2658a72dfed7572415c5366cdf4d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9bd6b629c39e3fa9e14243a6d8820492be1a5b2e ]

esp(6)_output_head uses skb_page_frag_refill to allocate a buffer for
the esp trailer.

It accesses the page with kmap_atomic to handle highmem. But
skb_page_frag_refill can return compound pages, of which
kmap_atomic only maps the first underlying page.

skb_page_frag_refill does not return highmem, because flag
__GFP_HIGHMEM is not set. ESP uses it in the same manner as TCP.
That also does not call kmap_atomic, but directly uses page_address,
in skb_copy_to_page_nocache. Do the same for ESP.

This issue has become easier to trigger with recent kmap local
debugging feature CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL_FORCE_MAP.

Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: Prevent reuseport_select_sock from reading uninitialized socks</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:49:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Baptiste Lepers</name>
<email>baptiste.lepers@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-07T05:11:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4669452b4c66268a184a51c543b525533013c14e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4669452b4c66268a184a51c543b525533013c14e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fd2ddef043592e7de80af53f47fa46fd3573086e ]

reuse-&gt;socks[] is modified concurrently by reuseport_add_sock. To
prevent reading values that have not been fully initialized, only read
the array up until the last known safe index instead of incorrectly
re-reading the last index of the array.

Fixes: acdcecc61285f ("udp: correct reuseport selection with connected sockets")
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers &lt;baptiste.lepers@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210107051110.12247-1-baptiste.lepers@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
