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<title>user/sven/linux.git/net, branch v4.4.148</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.148</id>
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<updated>2018-08-15T15:42:05Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ipv4+ipv6: Make INET*_ESP select CRYPTO_ECHAINIV</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:42:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Egerer</name>
<email>hakke_007@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-25T11:58:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e424bee248c38266c6057d43f3e350072fc41c5d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32b6170ca59ccf07d0e394561e54b2cd9726038c upstream.

The ESP algorithms using CBC mode require echainiv. Hence INET*_ESP have
to select CRYPTO_ECHAINIV in order to work properly. This solves the
issues caused by a misconfiguration as described in [1].
The original approach, patching crypto/Kconfig was turned down by
Herbert Xu [2].

[1] https://lists.strongswan.org/pipermail/users/2015-December/009074.html
[2] http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&amp;m=145224655809562&amp;w=2

Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer &lt;hakke_007@gmx.de&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Yongqin Liu &lt;yongqin.liu@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: Don't shift on 64 for ngroups</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:19:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Safonov</name>
<email>dima@arista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-05T00:35:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a5928d68418768e3e7ed9c75039060c1e70e047e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 91874ecf32e41b5d86a4cb9d60e0bee50d828058 upstream.

It's legal to have 64 groups for netlink_sock.

As user-supplied nladdr-&gt;nl_groups is __u32, it's possible to subscribe
only to first 32 groups.

The check for correctness of .bind() userspace supplied parameter
is done by applying mask made from ngroups shift. Which broke Android
as they have 64 groups and the shift for mask resulted in an overflow.

Fixes: 61f4b23769f0 ("netlink: Don't shift with UB on nlk-&gt;ngroups")
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: Don't shift with UB on nlk-&gt;ngroups</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:19:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Safonov</name>
<email>dima@arista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-30T17:32:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:bc48f46f117e05af226a4c0dff617218f1c13650</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 61f4b23769f0cc72ae62c9a81cf08f0397d40da8 ]

On i386 nlk-&gt;ngroups might be 32 or 0. Which leads to UB, resulting in
hang during boot.
Check for 0 ngroups and use (unsigned long long) as a type to shift.

Fixes: 7acf9d4237c4 ("netlink: Do not subscribe to non-existent groups").
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;rong.a.chen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: Do not subscribe to non-existent groups</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:19:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Safonov</name>
<email>dima@arista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-27T15:54:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:52296ab92b66e2a8c932b2a4cb318dd08cb8bd29</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7acf9d4237c46894e0fa0492dd96314a41742e84 ]

Make ABI more strict about subscribing to group &gt; ngroups.
Code doesn't check for that and it looks bogus.
(one can subscribe to non-existing group)
Still, it's possible to bind() to all possible groups with (-1)

Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: socket: fix potential spectre v1 gadget in socketcall</title>
<updated>2018-08-06T14:24:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeremy Cline</name>
<email>jcline@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-27T22:43:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d856749a77546f033d9a41cc681ed3a58dba18e9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c8e8cd579bb4265651df8223730105341e61a2d1 upstream.

'call' is a user-controlled value, so sanitize the array index after the
bounds check to avoid speculating past the bounds of the 'nargs' array.

Found with the help of Smatch:

net/socket.c:2508 __do_sys_socketcall() warn: potential spectre issue
'nargs' [r] (local cap)

Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline &lt;jcline@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink: Fix spectre v1 gadget in netlink_create()</title>
<updated>2018-08-06T14:24:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeremy Cline</name>
<email>jcline@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-31T21:13:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8cac0ce0a8853cae7dc01256f88bc9b7e53ad3ce</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bc5b6c0b62b932626a135f516a41838c510c6eba ]

'protocol' is a user-controlled value, so sanitize it after the bounds
check to avoid using it for speculative out-of-bounds access to arrays
indexed by it.

This addresses the following accesses detected with the help of smatch:

* net/netlink/af_netlink.c:654 __netlink_create() warn: potential
  spectre issue 'nlk_cb_mutex_keys' [w]

* net/netlink/af_netlink.c:654 __netlink_create() warn: potential
  spectre issue 'nlk_cb_mutex_key_strings' [w]

* net/netlink/af_netlink.c:685 netlink_create() warn: potential spectre
  issue 'nl_table' [w] (local cap)

Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline &lt;jcline@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dsa: Do not suspend/resume closed slave_dev</title>
<updated>2018-08-06T14:24:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Fainelli</name>
<email>f.fainelli@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-01T00:12:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b5fef54e3212e2ec1449a4445becb25208c9410c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a94c689e6c9e72e722f28339e12dff191ee5a265 ]

If a DSA slave network device was previously disabled, there is no need
to suspend or resume it.

Fixes: 2446254915a7 ("net: dsa: allow switch drivers to implement suspend/resume hooks")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;f.fainelli@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn &lt;andrew@lunn.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: frag: enforce memory limits earlier</title>
<updated>2018-08-06T14:24:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-31T03:09:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:df30bfccc463082cfc2a5b164e5590403f16af94</id>
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[ Upstream commit 56e2c94f055d328f5f6b0a5c1721cca2f2d4e0a1 ]

We currently check current frags memory usage only when
a new frag queue is created. This allows attackers to first
consume the memory budget (default : 4 MB) creating thousands
of frag queues, then sending tiny skbs to exceed high_thresh
limit by 2 to 3 order of magnitude.

Note that before commit 648700f76b03 ("inet: frags: use rhashtables
for reassembly units"), work queue could be starved under DOS,
getting no cpu cycles.
After commit 648700f76b03, only the per frag queue timer can eventually
remove an incomplete frag queue and its skbs.

Fixes: b13d3cbfb8e8 ("inet: frag: move eviction of queues to work queue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Oskolkov &lt;posk@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: add one more quick ack after after ECN events</title>
<updated>2018-08-06T14:24:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-27T15:47:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:27a0762cb570834dc44155363c118cabdd024c3c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 15ecbe94a45ef88491ca459b26efdd02f91edb6d ]

Larry Brakmo proposal ( https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/935233/
tcp: force cwnd at least 2 in tcp_cwnd_reduction) made us rethink
about our recent patch removing ~16 quick acks after ECN events.

tcp_enter_quickack_mode(sk, 1) makes sure one immediate ack is sent,
but in the case the sender cwnd was lowered to 1, we do not want
to have a delayed ack for the next packet we will receive.

Fixes: 522040ea5fdd ("tcp: do not aggressively quick ack after ECN events")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo &lt;brakmo@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: refactor tcp_ecn_check_ce to remove sk type cast</title>
<updated>2018-08-06T14:24:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Yousuk Seung</name>
<email>ysseung@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-04T22:29:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cd760ab9f4e13aedccc80f19a0b7863d5c0b3c8c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f4c9f85f3b2cb7669830cd04d0be61192a4d2436 ]

Refactor tcp_ecn_check_ce and __tcp_ecn_check_ce to accept struct sock*
instead of tcp_sock* to clean up type casts. This is a pure refactor
patch.

Signed-off-by: Yousuk Seung &lt;ysseung@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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