user/sven/linux.git/net, branch v4.4.162

rtnl: limit IFLA_NUM_TX_QUEUES and IFLA_NUM_RX_QUEUES to 4096

2018-10-20T07:52:37Z

[ Upstream commit 0e1d6eca5113858ed2caea61a5adc03c595f6096 ] We have an impressive number of syzkaller bugs that are linked to the fact that syzbot was able to create a networking device with millions of TX (or RX) queues. Let's limit the number of RX/TX queues to 4096, this really should cover all known cases. A separate patch will add various cond_resched() in the loops handling sysfs entries at device creation and dismantle. Tested: lpaa6:~# ip link add gre-4097 numtxqueues 4097 numrxqueues 4097 type ip6gretap RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument lpaa6:~# time ip link add gre-4096 numtxqueues 4096 numrxqueues 4096 type ip6gretap real 0m0.180s user 0m0.000s sys 0m0.107s Fixes: 76ff5cc91935 ("rtnl: allow to specify number of rx and tx queues on device creation") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlabel: check for IPV4MASK in addrinfo_get

2018-10-20T07:52:36Z

[ Upstream commit f88b4c01b97e09535505cf3c327fdbce55c27f00 ] netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() assumes that if it finds the NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR attribute, it must also have the NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK attribute as well. However, this is not necessarily the case as the current checks in netlbl_unlabel_staticadd() and friends are not sufficent to enforce this. If passed a netlink message with NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR, NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR, and NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK attributes, these functions will all call netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() which will then attempt dereference NULL when fetching the non-existent NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK attribute: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0 Process unlab (pid: 31762, stack limit = 0xffffff80502d8000) Call trace: netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get+0x44/0xd8 netlbl_unlabel_staticremovedef+0x98/0xe0 genl_rcv_msg+0x354/0x388 netlink_rcv_skb+0xac/0x118 genl_rcv+0x34/0x48 netlink_unicast+0x158/0x1f0 netlink_sendmsg+0x32c/0x338 sock_sendmsg+0x44/0x60 ___sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x2a8 __sys_sendmsg+0x64/0xb4 SyS_sendmsg+0x34/0x4c el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 Code: 51001149 7100113f 540000a0 f9401508 (79400108) ---[ end trace f6438a488e737143 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/ipv6: Display all addresses in output of /proc/net/if_inet6

2018-10-20T07:52:36Z

[ Upstream commit 86f9bd1ff61c413a2a251fa736463295e4e24733 ] The backend handling for /proc/net/if_inet6 in addrconf.c doesn't properly handle starting/stopping the iteration. The problem is that at some point during the iteration, an overflow is detected and the process is subsequently stopped. The item being shown via seq_printf() when the overflow occurs is not actually shown, though. When start() is subsequently called to resume iterating, it returns the next item, and thus the item that was being processed when the overflow occurred never gets printed. Alter the meaning of the private data member "offset". Currently, when it is not 0 (which only happens at the very beginning), "offset" represents the next hlist item to be printed. After this change, "offset" always represents the current item. This is also consistent with the private data member "bucket", which represents the current bucket, and also the use of "pos" as defined in seq_file.txt: The pos passed to start() will always be either zero, or the most recent pos used in the previous session. Signed-off-by: Jeff Barnhill <0xeffeff@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: ipv4: update fnhe_pmtu when first hop's MTU changes

2018-10-20T07:52:36Z

[ Upstream commit af7d6cce53694a88d6a1bb60c9a239a6a5144459 ] Since commit 5aad1de5ea2c ("ipv4: use separate genid for next hop exceptions"), exceptions get deprecated separately from cached routes. In particular, administrative changes don't clear PMTU anymore. As Stefano described in commit e9fa1495d738 ("ipv6: Reflect MTU changes on PMTU of exceptions for MTU-less routes"), the PMTU discovered before the local MTU change can become stale: - if the local MTU is now lower than the PMTU, that PMTU is now incorrect - if the local MTU was the lowest value in the path, and is increased, we might discover a higher PMTU Similarly to what commit e9fa1495d738 did for IPv6, update PMTU in those cases. If the exception was locked, the discovered PMTU was smaller than the minimal accepted PMTU. In that case, if the new local MTU is smaller than the current PMTU, let PMTU discovery figure out if locking of the exception is still needed. To do this, we need to know the old link MTU in the NETDEV_CHANGEMTU notifier. By the time the notifier is called, dev->mtu has been changed. This patch adds the old MTU as additional information in the notifier structure, and a new call_netdevice_notifiers_u32() function. Fixes: 5aad1de5ea2c ("ipv4: use separate genid for next hop exceptions") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv4: fix use-after-free in ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr()

2018-10-20T07:52:36Z

[ Upstream commit 64199fc0a46ba211362472f7f942f900af9492fd ] Caching ip_hdr(skb) before a call to pskb_may_pull() is buggy, do not do it. Fixes: 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Willem de Bruijn Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ip_tunnel: be careful when accessing the inner header

2018-10-20T07:52:36Z

[ Upstream commit ccfec9e5cb2d48df5a955b7bf47f7782157d3bc2] Cong noted that we need the same checks introduced by commit 76c0ddd8c3a6 ("ip6_tunnel: be careful when accessing the inner header") even for ipv4 tunnels. Fixes: c54419321455 ("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.") Suggested-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ip6_tunnel: be careful when accessing the inner header

2018-10-20T07:52:36Z

[ Upstream commit 76c0ddd8c3a683f6e2c6e60e11dc1a1558caf4bc ] the ip6 tunnel xmit ndo assumes that the processed skb always contains an ip[v6] header, but syzbot has found a way to send frames that fall short of this assumption, leading to the following splat: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6ip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1307 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0x7d2/0x1ef0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1390 CPU: 0 PID: 4504 Comm: syz-executor558 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683 ip6ip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1307 [inline] ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0x7d2/0x1ef0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1390 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4066 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4075 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3026 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5f1/0xc70 net/core/dev.c:3042 __dev_queue_xmit+0x27ee/0x3520 net/core/dev.c:3557 dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:3590 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2944 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x7c70/0x8a30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2969 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmmsg+0x42d/0x800 net/socket.c:2136 SYSC_sendmmsg+0xc4/0x110 net/socket.c:2167 SyS_sendmmsg+0x63/0x90 net/socket.c:2162 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x441819 RSP: 002b:00007ffe58ee8268 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000441819 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006cd018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000402510 R13: 00000000004025a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0x1d4/0xb20 net/core/skbuff.c:5234 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xb56/0x1190 net/core/sock.c:2085 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2803 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2894 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x6454/0x8a30 net/packet/af_packet.c:2969 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmmsg+0x42d/0x800 net/socket.c:2136 SYSC_sendmmsg+0xc4/0x110 net/socket.c:2167 SyS_sendmmsg+0x63/0x90 net/socket.c:2162 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 This change addresses the issue adding the needed check before accessing the inner header. The ipv4 side of the issue is apparently there since the ipv4 over ipv6 initial support, and the ipv6 side predates git history. Fixes: c4d3efafcc93 ("[IPV6] IP6TUNNEL: Add support to IPv4 over IPv6 tunnel.") Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot+3fde91d4d394747d6db4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ebtables: arpreply: Add the standard target sanity check

2018-10-13T07:11:35Z

commit c953d63548207a085abcb12a15fefc8a11ffdf0a upstream. The info->target comes from userspace and it would be used directly. So we need to add the sanity check to make sure it is a valid standard target, although the ebtables tool has already checked it. Kernel needs to validate anything coming from userspace. If the target is set as an evil value, it would break the ebtables and cause a panic. Because the non-standard target is treated as one offset. Now add one helper function ebt_invalid_target, and we would replace the macro INVALID_TARGET later. Signed-off-by: Gao Feng Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Cc: Loic Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: add tcp_ooo_try_coalesce() helper

2018-10-13T07:11:35Z

[ Upstream commit 58152ecbbcc6a0ce7fddd5bf5f6ee535834ece0c ] In case skb in out_or_order_queue is the result of multiple skbs coalescing, we would like to get a proper gso_segs counter tracking, so that future tcp_drop() can report an accurate number. I chose to not implement this tracking for skbs in receive queue, since they are not dropped, unless socket is disconnected. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: call tcp_drop() from tcp_data_queue_ofo()

2018-10-13T07:11:35Z

[ Upstream commit 8541b21e781a22dce52a74fef0b9bed00404a1cd ] In order to be able to give better diagnostics and detect malicious traffic, we need to have better sk->sk_drops tracking. Fixes: 9f5afeae5152 ("tcp: use an RB tree for ooo receive queue") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman