<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/net, branch v4.4.265</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-04-07T10:04:21Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>appletalk: Fix skb allocation size in loopback case</title>
<updated>2021-04-07T10:04:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Doug Brown</name>
<email>doug@schmorgal.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-12T05:27:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5d44e600c4be92b5651be022e4cd30cd5af7a1e1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5d44e600c4be92b5651be022e4cd30cd5af7a1e1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 39935dccb21c60f9bbf1bb72d22ab6fd14ae7705 ]

If a DDP broadcast packet is sent out to a non-gateway target, it is
also looped back. There is a potential for the loopback device to have a
longer hardware header length than the original target route's device,
which can result in the skb not being created with enough room for the
loopback device's hardware header. This patch fixes the issue by
determining that a loopback will be necessary prior to allocating the
skb, and if so, ensuring the skb has enough room.

This was discovered while testing a new driver that creates a LocalTalk
network interface (LTALK_HLEN = 1). It caused an skb_under_panic.

Signed-off-by: Doug Brown &lt;doug@schmorgal.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rpc: fix NULL dereference on kmalloc failure</title>
<updated>2021-04-07T10:04:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>J. Bruce Fields</name>
<email>bfields@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-02T15:48:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9e0b588e2f7630a18d22e10a478efc63b63aa269</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0ddc942394013f08992fc379ca04cffacbbe3dae ]

I think this is unlikely but possible:

svc_authenticate sets rq_authop and calls svcauth_gss_accept.  The
kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL) fails, leaving rq_auth_data NULL,
and returning SVC_DENIED.

This causes svc_process_common to go to err_bad_auth, and eventually
call svc_authorise.  That calls -&gt;release == svcauth_gss_release, which
tries to dereference rq_auth_data.

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/3F1B347F-B809-478F-A1E9-0BE98E22B0F0@oracle.com/T/#t
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: weaken the v4mapped source check</title>
<updated>2021-04-07T10:04:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-17T16:55:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e20bdf90e695f6b10dff23dd5bd4c5e6ddb5b7fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e20bdf90e695f6b10dff23dd5bd4c5e6ddb5b7fa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dcc32f4f183ab8479041b23a1525d48233df1d43 ]

This reverts commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3.

Commit 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped
source address") introduced an input check against v4mapped addresses.
Use of such addresses on the wire is indeed questionable and not
allowed on public Internet. As the commit pointed out

  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02

lists potential issues.

Unfortunately there are applications which use v4mapped addresses,
and breaking them is a clear regression. For example v4mapped
addresses (or any semi-valid addresses, really) may be used
for uni-direction event streams or packet export.

Since the issue which sparked the addition of the check was with
TCP and request_socks in particular push the check down to TCPv6
and DCCP. This restores the ability to receive UDPv6 packets with
v4mapped address as the source.

Keep using the IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS statistic to minimize the
user-visible changes.

Fixes: 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address")
Reported-by: Sunyi Shao &lt;sunyishao@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mat Martineau &lt;mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: vsock: Set SID for socket returned by accept()</title>
<updated>2021-04-07T10:04:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Brazdil</name>
<email>dbrazdil@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-29T18:24:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1b55900f8d6509f850717f5ca663b35fb1b9494c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1f935e8e72ec28dddb2dc0650b3b6626a293d94b ]

For AF_VSOCK, accept() currently returns sockets that are unlabelled.
Other socket families derive the child's SID from the SID of the parent
and the SID of the incoming packet. This is typically done as the
connected socket is placed in the queue that accept() removes from.

Reuse the existing 'security_sk_clone' hook to copy the SID from the
parent (server) socket to the child. There is no packet SID in this
case.

Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Signed-off-by: David Brazdil &lt;dbrazdil@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: fix double free in ibss_leave</title>
<updated>2021-03-30T12:45:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Markus Theil</name>
<email>markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-13T13:36:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=915c5a9ea9e8910d18698d52b19d7ed872e8b2e4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:915c5a9ea9e8910d18698d52b19d7ed872e8b2e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3bd801b14e0c5d29eeddc7336558beb3344efaa3 upstream.

Clear beacon ie pointer and ie length after free
in order to prevent double free.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free \
in ieee80211_ibss_leave+0x83/0xe0 net/mac80211/ibss.c:1876

CPU: 0 PID: 8472 Comm: syz-executor100 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2c6 mm/kasan/report.c:230
 kasan_report_invalid_free+0x51/0x80 mm/kasan/report.c:355
 ____kasan_slab_free+0xcc/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:341
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:192 [inline]
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3424 [inline]
 kfree+0xed/0x270 mm/slab.c:3760
 ieee80211_ibss_leave+0x83/0xe0 net/mac80211/ibss.c:1876
 rdev_leave_ibss net/wireless/rdev-ops.h:545 [inline]
 __cfg80211_leave_ibss+0x19a/0x4c0 net/wireless/ibss.c:212
 __cfg80211_leave+0x327/0x430 net/wireless/core.c:1172
 cfg80211_leave net/wireless/core.c:1221 [inline]
 cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0x9e8/0x12c0 net/wireless/core.c:1335
 notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:2040
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2052 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2066 [inline]
 __dev_close_many+0xee/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:1586
 __dev_close net/core/dev.c:1624 [inline]
 __dev_change_flags+0x2cb/0x730 net/core/dev.c:8476
 dev_change_flags+0x8a/0x160 net/core/dev.c:8549
 dev_ifsioc+0x210/0xa70 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:265
 dev_ioctl+0x1b1/0xc40 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:511
 sock_do_ioctl+0x148/0x2d0 net/socket.c:1060
 sock_ioctl+0x477/0x6a0 net/socket.c:1177
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:739
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Reported-by: syzbot+93976391bf299d425f44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil &lt;markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210213133653.367130-1-markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sched: validate stab values</title>
<updated>2021-03-30T12:45:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-10T16:26:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=47914f6f0ca549c41b19267960074fe61e508840'/>
<id>urn:sha1:47914f6f0ca549c41b19267960074fe61e508840</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e323d865b36134e8c5c82c834df89109a5c60dab upstream.

iproute2 package is well behaved, but malicious user space can
provide illegal shift values and trigger UBSAN reports.

Add stab parameter to red_check_params() to validate user input.

syzbot reported:

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/net/red.h:312:18
shift exponent 111 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 1 PID: 14662 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327
 red_calc_qavg_from_idle_time include/net/red.h:312 [inline]
 red_calc_qavg include/net/red.h:353 [inline]
 choke_enqueue.cold+0x18/0x3dd net/sched/sch_choke.c:221
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3837 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1943/0x2e00 net/core/dev.c:4150
 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:499 [inline]
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0x911/0x1700 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:117
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:182 [inline]
 __ip6_finish_output+0x4c1/0xe10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:161
 ip6_finish_output+0x35/0x200 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:192
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:290 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x1e4/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:448 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:295 [inline]
 ip6_xmit+0x127e/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:320
 inet6_csk_xmit+0x358/0x630 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:135
 dccp_transmit_skb+0x973/0x12c0 net/dccp/output.c:138
 dccp_send_reset+0x21b/0x2b0 net/dccp/output.c:535
 dccp_finish_passive_close net/dccp/proto.c:123 [inline]
 dccp_finish_passive_close+0xed/0x140 net/dccp/proto.c:118
 dccp_terminate_connection net/dccp/proto.c:958 [inline]
 dccp_close+0xb3c/0xe60 net/dccp/proto.c:1028
 inet_release+0x12e/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:431
 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:478
 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:599
 sock_close+0x18/0x20 net/socket.c:1258
 __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280
 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:140
 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]

Fixes: 8afa10cbe281 ("net_sched: red: Avoid illegal values")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: dev: Move device back to init netns on owning netns delete</title>
<updated>2021-03-30T12:45:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin Willi</name>
<email>martin@strongswan.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-02T12:24:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4c4af8157ea92684aa648723f64895325f3cbfbb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4c4af8157ea92684aa648723f64895325f3cbfbb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3a5ca857079ea022e0b1b17fc154f7ad7dbc150f upstream.

When a non-initial netns is destroyed, the usual policy is to delete
all virtual network interfaces contained, but move physical interfaces
back to the initial netns. This keeps the physical interface visible
on the system.

CAN devices are somewhat special, as they define rtnl_link_ops even
if they are physical devices. If a CAN interface is moved into a
non-initial netns, destroying that netns lets the interface vanish
instead of moving it back to the initial netns. default_device_exit()
skips CAN interfaces due to having rtnl_link_ops set. Reproducer:

  ip netns add foo
  ip link set can0 netns foo
  ip netns delete foo

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 84 at net/core/dev.c:11030 ops_exit_list+0x38/0x60
CPU: 1 PID: 84 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.10.19 #1
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
[&lt;c010e700&gt;] (unwind_backtrace) from [&lt;c010a1d8&gt;] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[&lt;c010a1d8&gt;] (show_stack) from [&lt;c086dc10&gt;] (dump_stack+0x94/0xa8)
[&lt;c086dc10&gt;] (dump_stack) from [&lt;c086b938&gt;] (__warn+0xb8/0x114)
[&lt;c086b938&gt;] (__warn) from [&lt;c086ba10&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x7c/0xac)
[&lt;c086ba10&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [&lt;c0629f20&gt;] (ops_exit_list+0x38/0x60)
[&lt;c0629f20&gt;] (ops_exit_list) from [&lt;c062a5c4&gt;] (cleanup_net+0x230/0x380)
[&lt;c062a5c4&gt;] (cleanup_net) from [&lt;c0142c20&gt;] (process_one_work+0x1d8/0x438)
[&lt;c0142c20&gt;] (process_one_work) from [&lt;c0142ee4&gt;] (worker_thread+0x64/0x5a8)
[&lt;c0142ee4&gt;] (worker_thread) from [&lt;c0148a98&gt;] (kthread+0x148/0x14c)
[&lt;c0148a98&gt;] (kthread) from [&lt;c0100148&gt;] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c)

To properly restore physical CAN devices to the initial netns on owning
netns exit, introduce a flag on rtnl_link_ops that can be set by drivers.
For CAN devices setting this flag, default_device_exit() considers them
non-virtual, applying the usual namespace move.

The issue was introduced in the commit mentioned below, as at that time
CAN devices did not have a dellink() operation.

Fixes: e008b5fc8dc7 ("net: Simplfy default_device_exit and improve batching.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302122423.872326-1-martin@strongswan.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi &lt;martin@strongswan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: fix rate mask reset</title>
<updated>2021-03-30T12:45:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-12T10:22:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=214a858922edef7efca72dc00e17ae820167c3e7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:214a858922edef7efca72dc00e17ae820167c3e7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1944015fe9c1d9fa5e9eb7ffbbb5ef8954d6753b ]

Coverity reported the strange "if (~...)" condition that's
always true. It suggested that ! was intended instead of ~,
but upon further analysis I'm convinced that what really was
intended was a comparison to 0xff/0xffff (in HT/VHT cases
respectively), since this indicates that all of the rates
are enabled.

Change the comparison accordingly.

I'm guessing this never really mattered because a reset to
not having a rate mask is basically equivalent to having a
mask that enables all rates.

Reported-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Fixes: 2ffbe6d33366 ("mac80211: fix and optimize MCS mask handling")
Fixes: b119ad6e726c ("mac80211: add rate mask logic for vht rates")
Reviewed-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210212112213.36b38078f569.I8546a20c80bc1669058eb453e213630b846e107b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFSD: Repair misuse of sv_lock in 5.10.16-rt30.</title>
<updated>2021-03-24T09:57:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Korty</name>
<email>joe.korty@concurrent-rt.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-26T14:38:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=60ce70aa3e42f46c649f1349e35c1e899b50d6c4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:60ce70aa3e42f46c649f1349e35c1e899b50d6c4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c7de87ff9dac5f396f62d584f3908f80ddc0e07b upstream.

[ This problem is in mainline, but only rt has the chops to be
able to detect it. ]

Lockdep reports a circular lock dependency between serv-&gt;sv_lock and
softirq_ctl.lock on system shutdown, when using a kernel built with
CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y, and a nfs mount exists.

This is due to the definition of spin_lock_bh on rt:

	local_bh_disable();
	rt_spin_lock(lock);

which forces a softirq_ctl.lock -&gt; serv-&gt;sv_lock dependency.  This is
not a problem as long as _every_ lock of serv-&gt;sv_lock is a:

	spin_lock_bh(&amp;serv-&gt;sv_lock);

but there is one of the form:

	spin_lock(&amp;serv-&gt;sv_lock);

This is what is causing the circular dependency splat.  The spin_lock()
grabs the lock without first grabbing softirq_ctl.lock via local_bh_disable.
If later on in the critical region,  someone does a local_bh_disable, we
get a serv-&gt;sv_lock -&gt; softirq_ctrl.lock dependency established.  Deadlock.

Fix is to make serv-&gt;sv_lock be locked with spin_lock_bh everywhere, no
exceptions.

[  OK  ] Stopped target NFS client services.
         Stopping Logout off all iSCSI sessions on shutdown...
         Stopping NFS server and services...
[  109.442380]
[  109.442385] ======================================================
[  109.442386] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  109.442387] 5.10.16-rt30 #1 Not tainted
[  109.442389] ------------------------------------------------------
[  109.442390] nfsd/1032 is trying to acquire lock:
[  109.442392] ffff994237617f60 ((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0xd9/0x270
[  109.442405]
[  109.442405] but task is already holding lock:
[  109.442406] ffff994245cb00b0 (&amp;serv-&gt;sv_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: svc_close_list+0x1f/0x90
[  109.442415]
[  109.442415] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[  109.442415]
[  109.442416]
[  109.442416] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  109.442417]
[  109.442417] -&gt; #1 (&amp;serv-&gt;sv_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  109.442421]        rt_spin_lock+0x2b/0xc0
[  109.442428]        svc_add_new_perm_xprt+0x42/0xa0
[  109.442430]        svc_addsock+0x135/0x220
[  109.442434]        write_ports+0x4b3/0x620
[  109.442438]        nfsctl_transaction_write+0x45/0x80
[  109.442440]        vfs_write+0xff/0x420
[  109.442444]        ksys_write+0x4f/0xc0
[  109.442446]        do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[  109.442450]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  109.442454]
[  109.442454] -&gt; #0 ((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
[  109.442457]        __lock_acquire+0x1264/0x20b0
[  109.442463]        lock_acquire+0xc2/0x400
[  109.442466]        rt_spin_lock+0x2b/0xc0
[  109.442469]        __local_bh_disable_ip+0xd9/0x270
[  109.442471]        svc_xprt_do_enqueue+0xc0/0x4d0
[  109.442474]        svc_close_list+0x60/0x90
[  109.442476]        svc_close_net+0x49/0x1a0
[  109.442478]        svc_shutdown_net+0x12/0x40
[  109.442480]        nfsd_destroy+0xc5/0x180
[  109.442482]        nfsd+0x1bc/0x270
[  109.442483]        kthread+0x194/0x1b0
[  109.442487]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  109.442492]
[  109.442492] other info that might help us debug this:
[  109.442492]
[  109.442493]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  109.442493]
[  109.442493]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  109.442494]        ----                    ----
[  109.442495]   lock(&amp;serv-&gt;sv_lock);
[  109.442496]                                lock((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock);
[  109.442498]                                lock(&amp;serv-&gt;sv_lock);
[  109.442499]   lock((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock);
[  109.442501]
[  109.442501]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  109.442501]
[  109.442501] 3 locks held by nfsd/1032:
[  109.442503]  #0: ffffffff93b49258 (nfsd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nfsd+0x19a/0x270
[  109.442508]  #1: ffff994245cb00b0 (&amp;serv-&gt;sv_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: svc_close_list+0x1f/0x90
[  109.442512]  #2: ffffffff93a81b20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rt_spin_lock+0x5/0xc0
[  109.442518]
[  109.442518] stack backtrace:
[  109.442519] CPU: 0 PID: 1032 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.16-rt30 #1
[  109.442522] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRL-3F/iF/X9DRL-3F/iF, BIOS 3.2 09/22/2015
[  109.442524] Call Trace:
[  109.442527]  dump_stack+0x77/0x97
[  109.442533]  check_noncircular+0xdc/0xf0
[  109.442546]  __lock_acquire+0x1264/0x20b0
[  109.442553]  lock_acquire+0xc2/0x400
[  109.442564]  rt_spin_lock+0x2b/0xc0
[  109.442570]  __local_bh_disable_ip+0xd9/0x270
[  109.442573]  svc_xprt_do_enqueue+0xc0/0x4d0
[  109.442577]  svc_close_list+0x60/0x90
[  109.442581]  svc_close_net+0x49/0x1a0
[  109.442585]  svc_shutdown_net+0x12/0x40
[  109.442588]  nfsd_destroy+0xc5/0x180
[  109.442590]  nfsd+0x1bc/0x270
[  109.442595]  kthread+0x194/0x1b0
[  109.442600]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  109.518225] nfsd: last server has exited, flushing export cache
[  OK  ] Stopped NFSv4 ID-name mapping service.
[  OK  ] Stopped GSSAPI Proxy Daemon.
[  OK  ] Stopped NFS Mount Daemon.
[  OK  ] Stopped NFS status monitor for NFSv2/3 locking..

Fixes: 719f8bcc883e ("svcrpc: fix xpt_list traversal locking on shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Joe Korty &lt;joe.korty@concurrent-rt.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: x_tables: gpf inside xt_find_revision()</title>
<updated>2021-03-17T15:07:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Averin</name>
<email>vvs@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-27T08:27:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=bdf971bc06a88e58cbe4886e1643da527670c145'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bdf971bc06a88e58cbe4886e1643da527670c145</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8e24edddad152b998b37a7f583175137ed2e04a5 upstream.

nested target/match_revfn() calls work with xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC] lists
without taking xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].mutex. This can race with module unload
and cause host to crash:

general protection fault: 0000 [#1]
Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: xt_cluster]
CPU: 0 PID: 542455 Comm: iptables
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8ffbd518&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff8ffbd518&gt;] strcmp+0x18/0x40
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffff9a5a5d9abe10 RDI: dead000000000111
R13: ffff9a5a5d9abe10 R14: ffff9a5a5d9abd8c R15: dead000000000100
(VvS: %R15 -- &amp;xt_match,  %RDI -- &amp;xt_match.name,
xt_cluster unregister match in xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].match list)
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff902ccf44&gt;] match_revfn+0x54/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff902ccf9f&gt;] match_revfn+0xaf/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff902cd01e&gt;] xt_find_revision+0x6e/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffffc05a5be0&gt;] do_ipt_get_ctl+0x100/0x420 [ip_tables]
 [&lt;ffffffff902cc6bf&gt;] nf_getsockopt+0x4f/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff902dd99e&gt;] ip_getsockopt+0xde/0x100
 [&lt;ffffffff903039b5&gt;] raw_getsockopt+0x25/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff9026c5da&gt;] sock_common_getsockopt+0x1a/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff9026b89d&gt;] SyS_getsockopt+0x7d/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff903cbf92&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x25/0x2a

Fixes: 656caff20e1 ("netfilter 04/09: x_tables: fix match/target revision lookup")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
