user/sven/linux.git/net, branch v4.9.145

mac80211: ignore NullFunc frames in the duplicate detection

2018-12-13T08:20:30Z

commit 990d71846a0b7281bd933c34d734e6afc7408e7e upstream. NullFunc packets should never be duplicate just like QoS-NullFunc packets. We saw a client that enters / exits power save with NullFunc frames (and not with QoS-NullFunc) despite the fact that the association supports HT. This specific client also re-uses a non-zero sequence number for different NullFunc frames. At some point, the client had to send a retransmission of the NullFunc frame and we dropped it, leading to a misalignment in the power save state. Fix this by never consider a NullFunc frame as duplicate, just like we do for QoS NullFunc frames. This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201449 CC: Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: fix reordering of buffered broadcast packets

2018-12-13T08:20:30Z

commit 9ec1190d065998650fd9260dea8cf3e1f56c0e8c upstream. If the buffered broadcast queue contains packets, letting new packets bypass that queue can lead to heavy reordering, since the driver is probably throttling transmission of buffered multicast packets after beacons. Keep buffering packets until the buffer has been cleared (and no client is in powersave mode). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: ignore tx status for PS stations in ieee80211_tx_status_ext

2018-12-13T08:20:30Z

commit a317e65face482371de30246b6494feb093ff7f9 upstream. Make it behave like regular ieee80211_tx_status calls, except for the lack of filtered frame processing. This fixes spurious low-ack triggered disconnections with powersave clients connected to an AP. Fixes: f027c2aca0cf4 ("mac80211: add ieee80211_tx_status_noskb") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: Clear beacon_int in ieee80211_do_stop

2018-12-13T08:20:30Z

commit 5c21e8100dfd57c806e833ae905e26efbb87840f upstream. This fixes stale beacon-int values that would keep a netdev from going up. To reproduce: Create two VAP on one radio. vap1 has beacon-int 100, start it. vap2 has beacon-int 240, start it (and it will fail because beacon-int mismatch). reconfigure vap2 to have beacon-int 100 and start it. It will fail because the stale beacon-int 240 will be used in the ifup path and hostapd never gets a chance to set the new beacon interval. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Greear Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

SUNRPC: Fix leak of krb5p encode pages

2018-12-13T08:20:28Z

commit 8dae5398ab1ac107b1517e8195ed043d5f422bd0 upstream. call_encode can be invoked more than once per RPC call. Ensure that each call to gss_wrap_req_priv does not overwrite pointers to previously allocated memory. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

batman-adv: Expand merged fragment buffer for full packet

2018-12-13T08:20:25Z

[ Upstream commit d7d8bbb40a5b1f682ee6589e212934f4c6b8ad60 ] The complete size ("total_size") of the fragmented packet is stored in the fragment header and in the size of the fragment chain. When the fragments are ready for merge, the skbuff's tail of the first fragment is expanded to have enough room after the data pointer for at least total_size. This means that it gets expanded by total_size - first_skb->len. But this is ignoring the fact that after expanding the buffer, the fragment header is pulled by from this buffer. Assuming that the tailroom of the buffer was already 0, the buffer after the data pointer of the skbuff is now only total_size - len(fragment_header) large. When the merge function is then processing the remaining fragments, the code to copy the data over to the merged skbuff will cause an skb_over_panic when it tries to actually put enough data to fill the total_size bytes of the packet. The size of the skb_pull must therefore also be taken into account when the buffer's tailroom is expanded. Fixes: 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge") Reported-by: Martin Weinelt Co-authored-by: Linus Lüssing Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

libceph: check authorizer reply/challenge length before reading

2018-12-08T12:05:10Z

commit 130f52f2b203aa0aec179341916ffb2e905f3afd upstream. Avoid scribbling over memory if the received reply/challenge is larger than the buffer supplied with the authorizer. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: weaken sizeof check in ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply()

2018-12-08T12:05:10Z

commit f1d10e04637924f2b00a0fecdd2ca4565f5cfc3f upstream. Allow for extending ceph_x_authorize_reply in the future. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: implement CEPHX_V2 calculation mode

2018-12-08T12:05:10Z

commit cc255c76c70f7a87d97939621eae04b600d9f4a1 upstream. Derive the signature from the entire buffer (both AES cipher blocks) instead of using just the first half of the first block, leaving out data_crc entirely. This addresses CVE-2018-1129. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24837 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil [bwh: Backported to 4.9: - Define and test the feature bit in the old way - Don't change any other feature bits in ceph_features.h] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: add authorizer challenge

2018-12-08T12:05:10Z

commit 6daca13d2e72bedaaacfc08f873114c9307d5aea upstream. When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply). This lets the client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse the same authorizer to authenticate themselves. Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge). The client then has to respond with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection instance. The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit. This addresses CVE-2018-1128. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24836 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman