user/sven/linux.git/net, branch v4.9.20

xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder

2017-03-31T08:31:45Z

commit f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df upstream. Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft Acked-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_window

2017-03-31T08:31:45Z

commit 677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a upstream. When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for priviledge escalation. We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained replay_window. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft Acked-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm: policy: init locks early

2017-03-31T08:31:45Z

commit c282222a45cb9503cbfbebfdb60491f06ae84b49 upstream. Dmitry reports following splat: INFO: trying to register non-static key. the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation. turning off the locking correctness validator. CPU: 0 PID: 13059 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170207 #1 [..] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:304 [inline] xfrm_policy_flush+0x32/0x470 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:963 xfrm_policy_fini+0xbf/0x560 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3041 xfrm_net_init+0x79f/0x9e0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3091 ops_init+0x10a/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:115 setup_net+0x2ed/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:291 copy_net_ns+0x26c/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:396 create_new_namespaces+0x409/0x860 kernel/nsproxy.c:106 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205 SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline] Problem is that when we get error during xfrm_net_init we will call xfrm_policy_fini which will acquire xfrm_policy_lock before it was initialized. Just move it around so locks get set up first. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Fixes: 283bc9f35bbbcb0e9 ("xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locks") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

nl80211: fix dumpit error path RTNL deadlocks

2017-03-30T07:41:28Z

commit ea90e0dc8cecba6359b481e24d9c37160f6f524f upstream. Sowmini pointed out Dmitry's RTNL deadlock report to me, and it turns out to be perfectly accurate - there are various error paths that miss unlock of the RTNL. To fix those, change the locking a bit to not be conditional in all those nl80211_prepare_*_dump() functions, but make those require the RTNL to start with, and fix the buggy error paths. This also let me use sparse (by appropriately overriding the rtnl_lock/rtnl_unlock functions) to validate the changes. Reported-by: Sowmini Varadhan Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: don't set weight to IN when OSD is destroyed

2017-03-30T07:41:27Z

commit b581a5854eee4b7851dedb0f8c2ceb54fb902c06 upstream. Since ceph.git commit 4e28f9e63644 ("osd/OSDMap: clear osd_info, osd_xinfo on osd deletion"), weight is set to IN when OSD is deleted. This changes the result of applying an incremental for clients, not just OSDs. Because CRUSH computations are obviously affected, pre-4e28f9e63644 servers disagree with post-4e28f9e63644 clients on object placement, resulting in misdirected requests. Mirrors ceph.git commit a6009d1039a55e2c77f431662b3d6cc5a8e8e63f. Fixes: 930c53286977 ("libceph: apply new_state before new_up_client on incrementals") Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19122 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cgroup, net_cls: iterate the fds of only the tasks which are being migrated

2017-03-30T07:41:27Z

commit a05d4fd9176003e0c1f9c3d083f4dac19fd346ab upstream. The net_cls controller controls the classid field of each socket which is associated with the cgroup. Because the classid is per-socket attribute, when a task migrates to another cgroup or the configured classid of the cgroup changes, the controller needs to walk all sockets and update the classid value, which was implemented by 3b13758f51de ("cgroups: Allow dynamically changing net_classid"). While the approach is not scalable, migrating tasks which have a lot of fds attached to them is rare and the cost is born by the ones initiating the operations. However, for simplicity, both the migration and classid config change paths call update_classid() which scans all fds of all tasks in the target css. This is an overkill for the migration path which only needs to cover a much smaller subset of tasks which are actually getting migrated in. On cgroup v1, this can lead to unexpected scalability issues when one tries to migrate a task or process into a net_cls cgroup which already contains a lot of fds. Even if the migration traget doesn't have many to get scanned, update_classid() ends up scanning all fds in the target cgroup which can be extremely numerous. Unfortunately, on cgroup v2 which doesn't use net_cls, the problem is even worse. Before bfc2cf6f61fc ("cgroup: call subsys->*attach() only for subsystems which are actually affected by migration"), cgroup core would call the ->css_attach callback even for controllers which don't see actual migration to a different css. As net_cls is always disabled but still mounted on cgroup v2, whenever a process is migrated on the cgroup v2 hierarchy, net_cls sees identity migration from root to root and cgroup core used to call ->css_attach callback for those. The net_cls ->css_attach ends up calling update_classid() on the root net_cls css to which all processes on the system belong to as the controller isn't used. This makes any cgroup v2 migration O(total_number_of_fds_on_the_system) which is horrible and easily leads to noticeable stalls triggering RCU stall warnings and so on. The worst symptom is already fixed in upstream by bfc2cf6f61fc ("cgroup: call subsys->*attach() only for subsystems which are actually affected by migration"); however, backporting that commit is too invasive and we want to avoid other cases too. This patch updates net_cls's cgrp_attach() to iterate fds of only the processes which are actually getting migrated. This removes the surprising migration cost which is dependent on the total number of fds in the target cgroup. As this leaves write_classid() the only user of update_classid(), open-code the helper into write_classid(). Reported-by: David Goode Fixes: 3b13758f51de ("cgroups: Allow dynamically changing net_classid") Cc: Nina Schiff Cc: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: initialize icsk_ack.lrcvtime at session start time

2017-03-30T07:41:22Z

[ Upstream commit 15bb7745e94a665caf42bfaabf0ce062845b533b ] icsk_ack.lrcvtime has a 0 value at socket creation time. tcpi_last_data_recv can have bogus value if no payload is ever received. This patch initializes icsk_ack.lrcvtime for active sessions in tcp_finish_connect(), and for passive sessions in tcp_create_openreq_child() Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

socket, bpf: fix sk_filter use after free in sk_clone_lock

2017-03-30T07:41:22Z

[ Upstream commit a97e50cc4cb67e1e7bff56f6b41cda62ca832336 ] In sk_clone_lock(), we create a new socket and inherit most of the parent's members via sock_copy() which memcpy()'s various sections. Now, in case the parent socket had a BPF socket filter attached, then newsk->sk_filter points to the same instance as the original sk->sk_filter. sk_filter_charge() is then called on the newsk->sk_filter to take a reference and should that fail due to hitting max optmem, we bail out and release the newsk instance. The issue is that commit 278571baca2a ("net: filter: simplify socket charging") wrongly combined the dismantle path with the failure path of xfrm_sk_clone_policy(). This means, even when charging failed, we call sk_free_unlock_clone() on the newsk, which then still points to the same sk_filter as the original sk. Thus, sk_free_unlock_clone() calls into __sk_destruct() eventually where it tests for present sk_filter and calls sk_filter_uncharge() on it, which potentially lets sk_omem_alloc wrap around and releases the eBPF prog and sk_filter structure from the (still intact) parent. Fix it by making sure that when sk_filter_charge() failed, we reset newsk->sk_filter back to NULL before passing to sk_free_unlock_clone(), so that we don't mess with the parents sk_filter. Only if xfrm_sk_clone_policy() fails, we did reach the point where either the parent's filter was NULL and as a result newsk's as well or where we previously had a successful sk_filter_charge(), thus for that case, we do need sk_filter_uncharge() to release the prior taken reference on sk_filter. Fixes: 278571baca2a ("net: filter: simplify socket charging") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv4: provide stronger user input validation in nl_fib_input()

2017-03-30T07:41:22Z

[ Upstream commit c64c0b3cac4c5b8cb093727d2c19743ea3965c0b ] Alexander reported a KMSAN splat caused by reads of uninitialized field (tb_id_in) from user provided struct fib_result_nl It turns out nl_fib_input() sanity tests on user input is a bit wrong : User can pretend nlh->nlmsg_len is big enough, but provide at sendmsg() time a too small buffer. Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: make sure to initialize sockc.tsflags before first use

2017-03-30T07:41:22Z

[ Upstream commit d515684d78148884d5fc425ba904c50f03844020 ] In the case udp_sk(sk)->pending is AF_INET6, udpv6_sendmsg() would jump to do_append_data, skipping the initialization of sockc.tsflags. Fix the problem by moving sockc.tsflags initialization earlier. The bug was detected with KMSAN. Fixes: c14ac9451c34 ("sock: enable timestamping using control messages") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman