user/sven/linux.git/security/Kconfig, branch v4.19.269

fortify: Explicitly disable Clang support

2021-11-26T10:36:18Z

commit a52f8a59aef46b59753e583bf4b28fccb069ce64 upstream. Clang has never correctly compiled the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses due to a couple bugs: Eliding inlines with matching __builtin_* names https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50322 Incorrect __builtin_constant_p() of some globals https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459 In the process of making improvements to the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses, the first (silent) bug (coincidentally) becomes worked around, but exposes the latter which breaks the build. As such, Clang must not be used with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE until at least latter bug is fixed (in Clang 13), and the fortify routines have been rearranged. Update the Kconfig to reflect the reality of the current situation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKwvOd=A+ueGV2ihdy5GtgR2fQbcXjjAtVxv3=cPjffpebZB7A@mail.gmail.com Cc: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "x86/mm/legacy: Populate the user page-table with user pgd's"

2018-09-14T15:08:45Z

This reverts commit 1f40a46cf47c12d93a5ad9dccd82bd36ff8f956a. It turned out that this patch is not sufficient to enable PTI on 32 bit systems with legacy 2-level page-tables. In this paging mode the huge-page PTEs are in the top-level page-table directory, where also the mirroring to the user-space page-table happens. So every huge PTE exits twice, in the kernel and in the user page-table. That means that accessed/dirty bits need to be fetched from two PTEs in this mode to be safe, but this is not trivial to implement because it needs changes to generic code just for the sake of enabling PTI with 32-bit legacy paging. As all systems that need PTI should support PAE anyway, remove support for PTI when 32-bit legacy paging is used. Fixes: 7757d607c6b3 ('x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32') Reported-by: Meelis Roos Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536922754-31379-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

Merge tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

2018-08-15T15:45:54Z

Pull hardened usercopy updates from Kees Cook: "This cleans up a minor Kconfig issue and adds a kernel boot option for disabling hardened usercopy for distro users that may have corner-case performance issues (e.g. high bandwidth small-packet UDP traffic). Summary: - drop unneeded Kconfig "select BUG" (Kamal Mostafa) - add "hardened_usercopy=off" rare performance needs (Chris von Recklinghausen)" * tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY

x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32

2018-07-19T23:11:48Z

Allow PTI to be compiled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Pavel Machek Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: David Laight Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Eduardo Valentin Cc: Greg KH Cc: Will Deacon Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Waiman Long Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-38-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY

2018-07-03T00:21:26Z

There is no need to "select BUG" when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled. The kernel thread will always die, regardless of the CONFIG_BUG. Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa [kees: tweak commit log] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

2018-02-04T00:25:42Z

Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook: "Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the next several releases without breaking anyone's system. The series has roughly the following sections: - remove %p and improve reporting with offset - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc - update VFS subsystem with whitelists - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists - update network subsystem with whitelists - update process memory with whitelists - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage" * tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits) lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0 sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache ...

Merge tag 'char-misc-4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc

2018-02-01T18:31:17Z

Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH: "Here is the big pull request for char/misc drivers for 4.16-rc1. There's a lot of stuff in here. Three new driver subsystems were added for various types of hardware busses: - siox - slimbus - soundwire as well as a new vboxguest subsystem for the VirtualBox hypervisor drivers. There's also big updates from the FPGA subsystem, lots of Android binder fixes, the usual handful of hyper-v updates, and lots of other smaller driver updates. All of these have been in linux-next for a long time, with no reported issues" * tag 'char-misc-4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (155 commits) char: lp: use true or false for boolean values android: binder: use VM_ALLOC to get vm area android: binder: Use true and false for boolean values lkdtm: fix handle_irq_event symbol for INT_HW_IRQ_EN EISA: Delete error message for a failed memory allocation in eisa_probe() EISA: Whitespace cleanup misc: remove AVR32 dependencies virt: vbox: Add error mapping for VERR_INVALID_NAME and VERR_NO_MORE_FILES soundwire: Fix a signedness bug uio_hv_generic: fix new type mismatch warnings uio_hv_generic: fix type mismatch warnings auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE uio_hv_generic: add rescind support uio_hv_generic: check that host supports monitor page uio_hv_generic: create send and receive buffers uio: document uio_hv_generic regions doc: fix documentation about uio_hv_generic vmbus: add monitor_id and subchannel_id to sysfs per channel vmbus: fix ABI documentation uio_hv_generic: use ISR callback method ...

usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists

2018-01-15T20:07:48Z

This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive. If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists immediately. Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI

2018-01-14T10:42:10Z

When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final documentation has a different file name. Fix it up to point to the proper file. Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig") Signed-off-by: W. Trevor King Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us

x86/pti: Enable PTI by default

2018-01-03T14:57:58Z

This really want's to be enabled by default. Users who know what they are doing can disable it either in the config or on the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org