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<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/capability.c, branch v3.17-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.17-rc2</id>
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<updated>2014-07-25T18:47:45Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook</title>
<updated>2014-07-25T18:47:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-25T18:28:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05</id>
<content type='text'>
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be
a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel
itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious
firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'keys-20140314' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next</title>
<updated>2014-04-14T01:42:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-14T01:42:49Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b13cebe70775e67323e1c2eff20e1cd174e430a4</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge commit 'v3.14' into next</title>
<updated>2014-04-14T01:23:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-14T01:23:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ecd740c6f2f092b90b95fa35f757973589eaaca2</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h</title>
<updated>2014-03-14T17:44:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-14T17:44:49Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f5895943d91b41b0368830cdb6eaffb8eda0f4c8</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key-&gt;perm.

Whilst we're at it:

 (1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
     with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.

 (2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
     it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
     directly to that.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callers</title>
<updated>2014-03-10T07:30:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikolay Aleksandrov</name>
<email>nikolay@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-07T11:44:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:52a4c6404f91f2d2c5592ee6365a8418c4565f53</id>
<content type='text'>
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -&gt; security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -&gt;
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -&gt;
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)

Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.

CC: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
CC: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
CC: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
CC: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
CC: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
CC: LSM list &lt;linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org&gt;
CC: SELinux list &lt;selinux@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error</title>
<updated>2014-03-07T00:50:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-05T17:47:37Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d4a141c8e77043bd674dd6aa0b40bc3675cb7b1d</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, cap_dentry_init_security returns 0 without actually
initializing the security label. This confuses its only caller
(nfs4_label_init_security) which expects an error in that situation, and
causes it to end up sending out junk onto the wire instead of simply
suppressing the label in the attributes sent.

When CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled, security_dentry_init_security returns
-EOPNOTSUPP. Have cap_dentry_init_security do the same.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into ra-next</title>
<updated>2013-10-22T11:26:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-22T11:26:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6f799c97f37fc0ee2c9c427fa0dada637394886c</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux</title>
<updated>2013-09-18T17:52:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>pmoore@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-18T17:52:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:98f700f317967d45cf60c9843b3c42ce3c286f7c</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	security/selinux/hooks.c

Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in
there that are not yet upstream.  There was some minor fixup needed to
resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts()
between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use()
simplification patch.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: split the xfrm_state_alloc_security() hook implementation</title>
<updated>2013-07-25T17:01:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>pmoore@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-23T21:38:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2e5aa86609ec1cf37bcc204fd7ba6c24c2f49fec'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2e5aa86609ec1cf37bcc204fd7ba6c24c2f49fec</id>
<content type='text'>
The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a
multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the
arguments passed to it by the caller.  This patch splits the LSM hook
implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the
LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel:

 * xfrm_state_alloc
 * xfrm_state_alloc_acquire

Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux
code; no other LSMs are affected.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xattr: Constify -&gt;name member of "struct xattr".</title>
<updated>2013-07-25T09:30:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-24T20:44:02Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9548906b2bb7ff09e12c013a55d669bef2c8e121</id>
<content type='text'>
Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"-&gt;name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"-&gt;name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying -&gt;name member of "struct xattr".

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt; [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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